SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Introduction of LTE
Specification, Facts & Advantage of LTE
New types of threats and frauds
Requirement for NGN Frauds Management System
Key Takeaways
Thank You
LTE stands for Long Term Evolution and it was started as a project
in 2004 by telecommunication body known as the Third Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP). SAE (System Architecture Evolution) is
the corresponding evolution of the GPRS/3G packet core network
evolution. The term LTE is typically used to represent both LTE and
SAE.
The main goal of LTE is to provide a high data rate, low latency and
packet optimized radio access technology supporting flexible
bandwidth deployments. Same time its network architecture has
been designed with the goal to support packet-switched traffic with
seamless mobility and great quality of service. The LTE wireless
interface is incompatible with 2G and 3G networks, so that it must
be operated on a separate wireless spectrum.
HSDPA LTE
14 Mbps DL 100 Mbps DL
5,7 Mbps UL 50 Mbps UL
LTE has 10X users per cell than HSDPA
LTE is the successor technology not only of UMTS but also of CDMA
2000.
LTE is important because it will bring up to 50 times performance
improvement and much better spectral efficiency to cellular networks.
LTE introduced to get higher data rates, 300Mbps peak downlink and
75 Mbps peak uplink. In a 20MHz carrier, data rates beyond 300Mbps
can be achieved under very good signal conditions.
LTE is an ideal technology to support high date rates for the services
such as voice over IP (VOIP), streaming multimedia, video
conferencing or even a high-speed cellular modem.
All LTE devices have to support (MIMO) Multiple Input Multiple Output
transmissions, which allow the base station to transmit several data
streams over the same carrier simultaneously.
High throughput: High data rates can be achieved in both
downlink as well as uplink. This causes high throughput.
Low latency: Time required to connect to the network is in range
of a few hundred milliseconds and power saving states can now be
entered and exited very quickly.
Seamless Connection: LTE will also support seamless
connection to existing networks such as GSM, CDMA and WCDMA.
FDD and TDD in the same platform: Frequency Division
Duplex (FDD) and Time Division Duplex (FDD), both schemes can
be used on same platform.
Fraud management is the process of identifying, stopping or
preventing situations where customers, employees or professional
fraudster set out to make use of telecommunications services with
the intention of avoiding full or partial payment.
Fraud is a major concern for all telecom operators /providers as it
directly linked with revenue fall.
Avialable Products:
- Subex Nikira Fraud Management System
- MEGS Optel Fraud Management System
- Neural Fraud Management System
Bill Spreading Fraud
Call Sell Fraud
Roaming Fraud
Prepaid Fraud
Cloning Fraud
SIM Box/Bypass Fraud
PRS Fraud
Wangiri Fraud
Non Authorized Content Broadcast
Distribution of Illegal or Unwanted Content
P2P Content Reselling
Video Share
Mobile/ Smartphone Malware
Consumption of Network Resources with no revenue or ability to bill
Change of billing model making it impossible to bill
ID Spoofing (Access and Services Identity)
• DDoS  The target network is flooded by traffic of multiple sources.
• Ping Flood  A large volume of ping packets causes a
network to crash. In a “ Ping of death ” malformed ping requests
are used.
• Replay Attack  The attacker intercepts legitimate signaling
traffic & retransmits it until the network is over whelmed.
• SQL Injection  The attacker sends malicious commands in
statement to SQL database to make unauthorized changes to the
database or to get a copy of the database.
• DNS Hijacking  The attacker redirects DNS queries to a rogue DNS
server.
A distributed denial of service (DoS) attack, or DDoS, is
much like the ping flood method, only multiple computers are being
used. In this instance, the computers that are being used may or
may not be aware of the fact that they are attacking a website or
network. Trojans and viruses commonly give the hacker control of a
computer, and thus, the ability to use them for attack. In this case
the victim computers are called zombies.
A DDoS attack is very tough to overcome. The first thing to do is
to contact your hosting provider or internet service provider,
depending on what is under attack. They will usually be able to filter
out the bulk of the traffic based on where it’s coming from. For more
large-scale attacks, you’ll have to become more creative.
If you have access to your router, enter the following command into
your router command prompt : No IP verify unicast reverse-path.
This will ensure that attackers can’t spoof their IP address.
The most basic of attacks is the Ping flood attack. It relies on the
ICMP echo command, more popularly known as ping . In legitimate
situations the ping command is used by network administrators to
test connectivity between two computers. In the ping flood attack, it
is used to flood large amounts of data packets to the victim’s
computer in an attempt to overload it. You can see an example of
the ping flood attack below.
Reconfigure your perimeter router or firewall to disallow ICMP echo
requests (pings) on your internal network. This configuration will
prevent flood attacks that originate from outside your network, but it
will not prevent internal flood attacks.
A replay attack is a form of network attack in which a valid data
transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is
carried out either by the originator or by an adversary who intercepts the
data and retransmits it, possibly as part of a masquerade attacks by IP
packet substitution.
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) can protect against replay
attacks by using a mathematically generated sequence number.
When a packet is sent to a recipient, the recipient extracts the
sequence number and records the sequence number in a table.
Now, suppose a hacker captured and replayed a packet. The
recipient would extract the sequence number and compare it
against the table that it has been recording. But the packet's
sequence number will already exist in the table, so the packet is
assumed to be fraudulent and is therefore discarded.
An SQL Injection (also known as "Failure to Preserve SQL Query
Structure") is one of the most common and most dangerous security
issues. SQL injections are dangerous because they are a door wide
open to hackers to enter your system through your Web interface
and to do whatever they please - i.e. delete tables, modify
databases, even get hold of your corporate network. SQL injections
are a programming error and they have nothing to do with your web
site hosting provider.
Prevent an SQL Injection
•Install patches regularly and timely.
•Use automated test tools for SQL injections.
•Remove all functionality you don't use.
DNS hijacking or DNS redirection is the practice of subverting
the resolution of Domain Name System (DNS) queries. This can be
achieved by malware that overrides a computer's TCP/IP
configuration to point at a rogue DNS server under the control of an
attacker, or through modifying the behavior of a trusted DNS server
so that it does not comply with internet standards.
•To change your DNS servers
•To use the HTTPS connection
HTTPS will be harder for ISPs to hijack and redirect your queries.
•Knowledge on NGN network Fraud environment.
•New detection techniques.
Effective fraud detection means identifying fraud accurately, with no
false alarms.
This requires a combination of excellent systems, expert people,
good global intelligence and efficient processes, every hour of the
day and every day of the year.
Flexibility : The FMS must be application independent to detect any type
of fraud for any type of service, regardless of its underlying technology. The
FMS architecture must also be flexible to enable the easy addition, removal
and update of fraud detection algorithms to accommodate changing fraud
scenarios.
Complete network coverage : The FMS needs to analyze all the data
flowing through all the different access points in NGNs. Indeed, due to the
availability of several access mechanisms in NGNs(e.g. wire, wireless,
cable, modem), fraud attacks can be launched from various access points
simultaneously.
Scalability : New fraud scenarios will appear, which implies that more
fraud rules will have to be added to the FMS detection engine. The number
of billing records to inspect will also increase with the new service offered.
The FMS architecture must be able to easily scale up or down to
accommodate the dynamic NGN environment.
•Use network intelligence and visibility of real-time traffic patterns to
improve detection of malicious attacks and accidental traffic floods, And
to understand how they impact the mobile network.
•Adopt scalable, distributed, and flexible security solutions to smoothly
manage the transition to more porous IP - based LTE networks, keep
up with the increase in user and signaling traffic volume, and cope with
advanced policy, QoS and charging tools.
•Strengthen protection of corporate networks, which are increasingly
accessed by mobile devices that are often outside the control of IT
managers.
We know the rules which we are currently applying to detect the
existing frauds. For NGN fraud we can use the new technique of fraud
detection by using an example given below :
International call scenario –
Call frequency: 229 calls made in 4 minutes; frequency is 57/min,
50/min is used as threshold.
Count of dialed numbers: 100 different numbers were dialed from
the same number, 50 is used as threshold.
Rule : If call type = International
And count dialed number from the same reference X > 50
And call frequency from X > 50
And average call duration from X < 20 s
Then alert on likely for analyst.
As an industry we need to review the structure and design of our
fraud teams in order to ensure maximum effectiveness and delivery
for our organizations.
In order to target success in our fight against frauds we must ensure
we have:
Appropriate Structure Develop fraud awareness
Correct focus & strategy Exchange intelligence & best
practice
Appropriate skill sets Assess the fraud exposure of
new services
Appropriate tools Collaborate with other GSMA
working groups and projects
Thank YouThank You

More Related Content

What's hot

Ip traceback seminar full report
Ip traceback seminar full reportIp traceback seminar full report
Ip traceback seminar full reportdeepakmarndi
 
Internet Traffic Monitoring and Analysis
Internet Traffic Monitoring and AnalysisInternet Traffic Monitoring and Analysis
Internet Traffic Monitoring and AnalysisInformation Technology
 
VPN (virtual private network)
VPN (virtual private network) VPN (virtual private network)
VPN (virtual private network) Netwax Lab
 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test Methodology
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test MethodologyDeep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test Methodology
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test MethodologyIxia
 
Speedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhan
Speedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhanSpeedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhan
Speedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhanSadan Kumar
 
Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...
Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...
Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...Jiunn-Jer Sun
 
Virtual Private Network
Virtual Private NetworkVirtual Private Network
Virtual Private NetworkRicha Singh
 
Ip Guardian customer presentation
Ip Guardian customer presentationIp Guardian customer presentation
Ip Guardian customer presentationacaiani
 
VPN (virtual Private Network)
VPN (virtual Private Network)VPN (virtual Private Network)
VPN (virtual Private Network)Chandan Jha
 
Vineyard Networks Product Overview
Vineyard Networks Product OverviewVineyard Networks Product Overview
Vineyard Networks Product Overviewlaurenjthomson
 
An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...
An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...
An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...IAEME Publication
 
Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011
Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011
Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011Dân Chơi
 

What's hot (20)

Topic22
Topic22Topic22
Topic22
 
Ip traceback seminar full report
Ip traceback seminar full reportIp traceback seminar full report
Ip traceback seminar full report
 
Internet Traffic Monitoring and Analysis
Internet Traffic Monitoring and AnalysisInternet Traffic Monitoring and Analysis
Internet Traffic Monitoring and Analysis
 
call for papers, research paper publishing, where to publish research paper, ...
call for papers, research paper publishing, where to publish research paper, ...call for papers, research paper publishing, where to publish research paper, ...
call for papers, research paper publishing, where to publish research paper, ...
 
VPN (virtual private network)
VPN (virtual private network) VPN (virtual private network)
VPN (virtual private network)
 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test Methodology
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test MethodologyDeep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test Methodology
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Test Methodology
 
WLAN:VPN Security
WLAN:VPN SecurityWLAN:VPN Security
WLAN:VPN Security
 
Speedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhan
Speedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhanSpeedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhan
Speedy ip trace back(sipt) for identifying sadhan
 
Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...
Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...
Defend Your DHCP Infrastructure Against Cyber Attacks - Network Security Feat...
 
VPN
VPNVPN
VPN
 
Virtual Private Network
Virtual Private NetworkVirtual Private Network
Virtual Private Network
 
Ip Guardian customer presentation
Ip Guardian customer presentationIp Guardian customer presentation
Ip Guardian customer presentation
 
VPN (virtual Private Network)
VPN (virtual Private Network)VPN (virtual Private Network)
VPN (virtual Private Network)
 
Firewalls (6)
Firewalls (6)Firewalls (6)
Firewalls (6)
 
Vineyard Networks Product Overview
Vineyard Networks Product OverviewVineyard Networks Product Overview
Vineyard Networks Product Overview
 
Ijnsa050211
Ijnsa050211Ijnsa050211
Ijnsa050211
 
Network security
Network securityNetwork security
Network security
 
An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...
An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...
An enhanced ip traceback mechanism for tracking the attack source using packe...
 
Vp npresentation
Vp npresentationVp npresentation
Vp npresentation
 
Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011
Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011
Ccna 3 chapter 7 v4.0 answers 2011
 

Viewers also liked

User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...
User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...
User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...Siddharth Rao
 
Lte rach configuration and capacity
Lte rach configuration and capacityLte rach configuration and capacity
Lte rach configuration and capacityYoung Hwan Kim
 
Radisys & Airspan - Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar Presentation
Radisys & Airspan -  Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar PresentationRadisys & Airspan -  Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar Presentation
Radisys & Airspan - Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar PresentationRadisys Corporation
 
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...EC-Council
 
LTE Redirection attacks: Zhang Shan
LTE Redirection attacks: Zhang ShanLTE Redirection attacks: Zhang Shan
LTE Redirection attacks: Zhang ShanDarren Pauli
 
presentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivencia
presentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivenciapresentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivencia
presentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivenciaJosselinRomero
 
Five Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development Plan
Five Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development PlanFive Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development Plan
Five Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development PlanHuman Capital Media
 
LTE Architecture and LTE Attach
LTE Architecture and LTE AttachLTE Architecture and LTE Attach
LTE Architecture and LTE Attachaliirfan04
 
4G LTE Presentation Group 9
4G LTE Presentation Group 94G LTE Presentation Group 9
4G LTE Presentation Group 9eel4514team9
 
LTE ADVANCED PPT
LTE ADVANCED PPTLTE ADVANCED PPT
LTE ADVANCED PPTTrinath
 
Analisis dan penafsiran data
Analisis dan penafsiran dataAnalisis dan penafsiran data
Analisis dan penafsiran datahuuriyahbahiirah
 
Lte Presentation.Ppt
Lte Presentation.PptLte Presentation.Ppt
Lte Presentation.Pptvaimalik
 
LTE - Long Term Evolution
LTE - Long Term EvolutionLTE - Long Term Evolution
LTE - Long Term EvolutionArief Gunawan
 
Presentation on fraud prevention, detection & control
Presentation on fraud prevention, detection & controlPresentation on fraud prevention, detection & control
Presentation on fraud prevention, detection & controlDominic Sroda Korkoryi
 

Viewers also liked (19)

Overview and Basics of LTE
Overview and Basics of LTEOverview and Basics of LTE
Overview and Basics of LTE
 
RA self tuning on LTE
RA self tuning on LTERA self tuning on LTE
RA self tuning on LTE
 
User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...
User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...
User location tracking attacks for LTE networks using the Interworking Functi...
 
Lte rach configuration and capacity
Lte rach configuration and capacityLte rach configuration and capacity
Lte rach configuration and capacity
 
Radisys & Airspan - Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar Presentation
Radisys & Airspan -  Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar PresentationRadisys & Airspan -  Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar Presentation
Radisys & Airspan - Small Cells and LTE-A Webinar Presentation
 
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...
Exploring LTE security and protocol exploits with open source software and lo...
 
LTE Redirection attacks: Zhang Shan
LTE Redirection attacks: Zhang ShanLTE Redirection attacks: Zhang Shan
LTE Redirection attacks: Zhang Shan
 
presentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivencia
presentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivenciapresentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivencia
presentacion en power point sobre el manual de convivencia
 
Five Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development Plan
Five Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development PlanFive Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development Plan
Five Steps to Delivering a Competency-Based Development Plan
 
LTE Architecture and LTE Attach
LTE Architecture and LTE AttachLTE Architecture and LTE Attach
LTE Architecture and LTE Attach
 
LTE Basics - II
LTE Basics - IILTE Basics - II
LTE Basics - II
 
Introduction to LTE
Introduction to LTEIntroduction to LTE
Introduction to LTE
 
4G LTE Presentation Group 9
4G LTE Presentation Group 94G LTE Presentation Group 9
4G LTE Presentation Group 9
 
LTE ADVANCED PPT
LTE ADVANCED PPTLTE ADVANCED PPT
LTE ADVANCED PPT
 
Analisis dan penafsiran data
Analisis dan penafsiran dataAnalisis dan penafsiran data
Analisis dan penafsiran data
 
LTE Basics
LTE BasicsLTE Basics
LTE Basics
 
Lte Presentation.Ppt
Lte Presentation.PptLte Presentation.Ppt
Lte Presentation.Ppt
 
LTE - Long Term Evolution
LTE - Long Term EvolutionLTE - Long Term Evolution
LTE - Long Term Evolution
 
Presentation on fraud prevention, detection & control
Presentation on fraud prevention, detection & controlPresentation on fraud prevention, detection & control
Presentation on fraud prevention, detection & control
 

Similar to Lte and future frauds

Network security monitoring elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
Network security monitoring   elastic webinar - 16 june 2021Network security monitoring   elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
Network security monitoring elastic webinar - 16 june 2021Mouaz Alnouri
 
SecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted Connectivity
SecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted ConnectivitySecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted Connectivity
SecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted ConnectivitySecurityGen1
 
Proactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGen
Proactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGenProactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGen
Proactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGenSecurityGen1
 
Understanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdf
Understanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdfUnderstanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdf
Understanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdfSecurityGen1
 
Cryptography and network security.
Cryptography and network security.Cryptography and network security.
Cryptography and network security.RAVI RAJ
 
Background Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docx
Background Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docxBackground Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docx
Background Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docxikirkton
 
WWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docx
WWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docxWWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docx
WWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docxericbrooks84875
 
IPS NAT and VPN.pptx
IPS NAT and VPN.pptxIPS NAT and VPN.pptx
IPS NAT and VPN.pptxkarthikvcyber
 
Entropy based DDos Detection in SDN
Entropy based DDos Detection in SDNEntropy based DDos Detection in SDN
Entropy based DDos Detection in SDNVishal Vasudev
 
8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...
8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...
8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...BGA Cyber Security
 
EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...
EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...
EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...IRJET Journal
 
TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN Optimization
TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN OptimizationTECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN Optimization
TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN OptimizationSymantec
 
Authentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docx
Authentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docxAuthentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docx
Authentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docxrock73
 
IRJET- A Survey on DDOS Attack in Manet
IRJET-  	  A Survey on DDOS Attack in ManetIRJET-  	  A Survey on DDOS Attack in Manet
IRJET- A Survey on DDOS Attack in ManetIRJET Journal
 
Presentation1 shweta
Presentation1 shweta Presentation1 shweta
Presentation1 shweta swet4
 
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliPLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliMarta Pacyga
 
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliPLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliPROIDEA
 
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_Introduction
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_IntroductionFortinet_FortiDDoS_Introduction
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_Introductionswang2010
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLING
AN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLINGAN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLING
AN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLINGSreelekshmi S
 

Similar to Lte and future frauds (20)

Network security monitoring elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
Network security monitoring   elastic webinar - 16 june 2021Network security monitoring   elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
Network security monitoring elastic webinar - 16 june 2021
 
SecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted Connectivity
SecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted ConnectivitySecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted Connectivity
SecurityGen's Signalling Security: A Shield for Uninterrupted Connectivity
 
Proactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGen
Proactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGenProactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGen
Proactive Signalling Network Security with SecurityGen
 
Understanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdf
Understanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdfUnderstanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdf
Understanding SS7 Attacks and Their Implications.pdf
 
5691 computer network career
5691 computer network career5691 computer network career
5691 computer network career
 
Cryptography and network security.
Cryptography and network security.Cryptography and network security.
Cryptography and network security.
 
Background Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docx
Background Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docxBackground Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docx
Background Information for World-Wide Trading CompanyWorld-Wide .docx
 
WWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docx
WWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docxWWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docx
WWTC Office Layout Diagram.htmlBackground Information for Wo.docx
 
IPS NAT and VPN.pptx
IPS NAT and VPN.pptxIPS NAT and VPN.pptx
IPS NAT and VPN.pptx
 
Entropy based DDos Detection in SDN
Entropy based DDos Detection in SDNEntropy based DDos Detection in SDN
Entropy based DDos Detection in SDN
 
8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...
8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...
8 Ocak 2015 SOME Etkinligi - A10 Networks - Accelerating and Securing Applica...
 
EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...
EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...
EFFICIENT IDENTIFICATION AND REDUCTION OF MULTIPLE ATTACKS ADD VICTIMISATION ...
 
TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN Optimization
TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN OptimizationTECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN Optimization
TECHNICAL WHITE PAPER: NetBackup Appliances WAN Optimization
 
Authentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docx
Authentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docxAuthentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docx
Authentic Assessment Project (AAP) Jan 2017Background Informat.docx
 
IRJET- A Survey on DDOS Attack in Manet
IRJET-  	  A Survey on DDOS Attack in ManetIRJET-  	  A Survey on DDOS Attack in Manet
IRJET- A Survey on DDOS Attack in Manet
 
Presentation1 shweta
Presentation1 shweta Presentation1 shweta
Presentation1 shweta
 
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliPLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
 
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliPLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
 
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_Introduction
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_IntroductionFortinet_FortiDDoS_Introduction
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_Introduction
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLING
AN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLINGAN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLING
AN INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK ADDRESS SHUFFLING
 

Recently uploaded

From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...Product School
 
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...Product School
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1DianaGray10
 
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John StaveleyDemystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John StaveleyJohn Staveley
 
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...Product School
 
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara LaskowskaPowerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara LaskowskaCzechDreamin
 
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor TurskyiFwdays
 
SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...
SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...
SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...CzechDreamin
 
AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...
AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...
AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...Product School
 
IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024
IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024
IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024IoTAnalytics
 
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone KomSalesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone KomCzechDreamin
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3DianaGray10
 
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...CzechDreamin
 
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyesAssuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyesThousandEyes
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2DianaGray10
 
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersEssentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersSafe Software
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Jeffrey Haguewood
 
10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka Doktorová
10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka Doktorová10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka Doktorová
10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka DoktorováCzechDreamin
 
IESVE for Early Stage Design and Planning
IESVE for Early Stage Design and PlanningIESVE for Early Stage Design and Planning
IESVE for Early Stage Design and PlanningIES VE
 
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...Product School
 

Recently uploaded (20)

From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
 
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
De-mystifying Zero to One: Design Informed Techniques for Greenfield Innovati...
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 1
 
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John StaveleyDemystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
 
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
Mission to Decommission: Importance of Decommissioning Products to Increase E...
 
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara LaskowskaPowerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
 
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
 
SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...
SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...
SOQL 201 for Admins & Developers: Slice & Dice Your Org’s Data With Aggregate...
 
AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...
AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...
AI for Every Business: Unlocking Your Product's Universal Potential by VP of ...
 
IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024
IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024
IoT Analytics Company Presentation May 2024
 
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone KomSalesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3
 
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
 
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyesAssuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
Assuring Contact Center Experiences for Your Customers With ThousandEyes
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 2
 
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersEssentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
 
10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka Doktorová
10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka Doktorová10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka Doktorová
10 Differences between Sales Cloud and CPQ, Blanka Doktorová
 
IESVE for Early Stage Design and Planning
IESVE for Early Stage Design and PlanningIESVE for Early Stage Design and Planning
IESVE for Early Stage Design and Planning
 
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
 

Lte and future frauds

  • 1.
  • 2. Introduction of LTE Specification, Facts & Advantage of LTE New types of threats and frauds Requirement for NGN Frauds Management System Key Takeaways Thank You
  • 3. LTE stands for Long Term Evolution and it was started as a project in 2004 by telecommunication body known as the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). SAE (System Architecture Evolution) is the corresponding evolution of the GPRS/3G packet core network evolution. The term LTE is typically used to represent both LTE and SAE. The main goal of LTE is to provide a high data rate, low latency and packet optimized radio access technology supporting flexible bandwidth deployments. Same time its network architecture has been designed with the goal to support packet-switched traffic with seamless mobility and great quality of service. The LTE wireless interface is incompatible with 2G and 3G networks, so that it must be operated on a separate wireless spectrum.
  • 4. HSDPA LTE 14 Mbps DL 100 Mbps DL 5,7 Mbps UL 50 Mbps UL LTE has 10X users per cell than HSDPA
  • 5. LTE is the successor technology not only of UMTS but also of CDMA 2000. LTE is important because it will bring up to 50 times performance improvement and much better spectral efficiency to cellular networks. LTE introduced to get higher data rates, 300Mbps peak downlink and 75 Mbps peak uplink. In a 20MHz carrier, data rates beyond 300Mbps can be achieved under very good signal conditions. LTE is an ideal technology to support high date rates for the services such as voice over IP (VOIP), streaming multimedia, video conferencing or even a high-speed cellular modem. All LTE devices have to support (MIMO) Multiple Input Multiple Output transmissions, which allow the base station to transmit several data streams over the same carrier simultaneously.
  • 6. High throughput: High data rates can be achieved in both downlink as well as uplink. This causes high throughput. Low latency: Time required to connect to the network is in range of a few hundred milliseconds and power saving states can now be entered and exited very quickly. Seamless Connection: LTE will also support seamless connection to existing networks such as GSM, CDMA and WCDMA. FDD and TDD in the same platform: Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) and Time Division Duplex (FDD), both schemes can be used on same platform.
  • 7. Fraud management is the process of identifying, stopping or preventing situations where customers, employees or professional fraudster set out to make use of telecommunications services with the intention of avoiding full or partial payment. Fraud is a major concern for all telecom operators /providers as it directly linked with revenue fall. Avialable Products: - Subex Nikira Fraud Management System - MEGS Optel Fraud Management System - Neural Fraud Management System
  • 8. Bill Spreading Fraud Call Sell Fraud Roaming Fraud Prepaid Fraud Cloning Fraud SIM Box/Bypass Fraud PRS Fraud Wangiri Fraud
  • 9. Non Authorized Content Broadcast Distribution of Illegal or Unwanted Content P2P Content Reselling Video Share Mobile/ Smartphone Malware Consumption of Network Resources with no revenue or ability to bill Change of billing model making it impossible to bill ID Spoofing (Access and Services Identity)
  • 10. • DDoS  The target network is flooded by traffic of multiple sources. • Ping Flood  A large volume of ping packets causes a network to crash. In a “ Ping of death ” malformed ping requests are used. • Replay Attack  The attacker intercepts legitimate signaling traffic & retransmits it until the network is over whelmed. • SQL Injection  The attacker sends malicious commands in statement to SQL database to make unauthorized changes to the database or to get a copy of the database. • DNS Hijacking  The attacker redirects DNS queries to a rogue DNS server.
  • 11. A distributed denial of service (DoS) attack, or DDoS, is much like the ping flood method, only multiple computers are being used. In this instance, the computers that are being used may or may not be aware of the fact that they are attacking a website or network. Trojans and viruses commonly give the hacker control of a computer, and thus, the ability to use them for attack. In this case the victim computers are called zombies.
  • 12. A DDoS attack is very tough to overcome. The first thing to do is to contact your hosting provider or internet service provider, depending on what is under attack. They will usually be able to filter out the bulk of the traffic based on where it’s coming from. For more large-scale attacks, you’ll have to become more creative. If you have access to your router, enter the following command into your router command prompt : No IP verify unicast reverse-path. This will ensure that attackers can’t spoof their IP address.
  • 13. The most basic of attacks is the Ping flood attack. It relies on the ICMP echo command, more popularly known as ping . In legitimate situations the ping command is used by network administrators to test connectivity between two computers. In the ping flood attack, it is used to flood large amounts of data packets to the victim’s computer in an attempt to overload it. You can see an example of the ping flood attack below.
  • 14. Reconfigure your perimeter router or firewall to disallow ICMP echo requests (pings) on your internal network. This configuration will prevent flood attacks that originate from outside your network, but it will not prevent internal flood attacks.
  • 15. A replay attack is a form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. This is carried out either by the originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly as part of a masquerade attacks by IP packet substitution.
  • 16. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) can protect against replay attacks by using a mathematically generated sequence number. When a packet is sent to a recipient, the recipient extracts the sequence number and records the sequence number in a table. Now, suppose a hacker captured and replayed a packet. The recipient would extract the sequence number and compare it against the table that it has been recording. But the packet's sequence number will already exist in the table, so the packet is assumed to be fraudulent and is therefore discarded.
  • 17. An SQL Injection (also known as "Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure") is one of the most common and most dangerous security issues. SQL injections are dangerous because they are a door wide open to hackers to enter your system through your Web interface and to do whatever they please - i.e. delete tables, modify databases, even get hold of your corporate network. SQL injections are a programming error and they have nothing to do with your web site hosting provider. Prevent an SQL Injection •Install patches regularly and timely. •Use automated test tools for SQL injections. •Remove all functionality you don't use.
  • 18. DNS hijacking or DNS redirection is the practice of subverting the resolution of Domain Name System (DNS) queries. This can be achieved by malware that overrides a computer's TCP/IP configuration to point at a rogue DNS server under the control of an attacker, or through modifying the behavior of a trusted DNS server so that it does not comply with internet standards. •To change your DNS servers •To use the HTTPS connection HTTPS will be harder for ISPs to hijack and redirect your queries.
  • 19. •Knowledge on NGN network Fraud environment. •New detection techniques. Effective fraud detection means identifying fraud accurately, with no false alarms. This requires a combination of excellent systems, expert people, good global intelligence and efficient processes, every hour of the day and every day of the year.
  • 20. Flexibility : The FMS must be application independent to detect any type of fraud for any type of service, regardless of its underlying technology. The FMS architecture must also be flexible to enable the easy addition, removal and update of fraud detection algorithms to accommodate changing fraud scenarios. Complete network coverage : The FMS needs to analyze all the data flowing through all the different access points in NGNs. Indeed, due to the availability of several access mechanisms in NGNs(e.g. wire, wireless, cable, modem), fraud attacks can be launched from various access points simultaneously. Scalability : New fraud scenarios will appear, which implies that more fraud rules will have to be added to the FMS detection engine. The number of billing records to inspect will also increase with the new service offered. The FMS architecture must be able to easily scale up or down to accommodate the dynamic NGN environment.
  • 21. •Use network intelligence and visibility of real-time traffic patterns to improve detection of malicious attacks and accidental traffic floods, And to understand how they impact the mobile network. •Adopt scalable, distributed, and flexible security solutions to smoothly manage the transition to more porous IP - based LTE networks, keep up with the increase in user and signaling traffic volume, and cope with advanced policy, QoS and charging tools. •Strengthen protection of corporate networks, which are increasingly accessed by mobile devices that are often outside the control of IT managers.
  • 22. We know the rules which we are currently applying to detect the existing frauds. For NGN fraud we can use the new technique of fraud detection by using an example given below : International call scenario – Call frequency: 229 calls made in 4 minutes; frequency is 57/min, 50/min is used as threshold. Count of dialed numbers: 100 different numbers were dialed from the same number, 50 is used as threshold. Rule : If call type = International And count dialed number from the same reference X > 50 And call frequency from X > 50 And average call duration from X < 20 s Then alert on likely for analyst.
  • 23. As an industry we need to review the structure and design of our fraud teams in order to ensure maximum effectiveness and delivery for our organizations. In order to target success in our fight against frauds we must ensure we have: Appropriate Structure Develop fraud awareness Correct focus & strategy Exchange intelligence & best practice Appropriate skill sets Assess the fraud exposure of new services Appropriate tools Collaborate with other GSMA working groups and projects