SlideShare a Scribd company logo
DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage
Can we avoid it ?
Asraf Ali
Head – Security & Network Engineering
asraf.ali@tatacommunications.com
Tata Communications
Agenda
 ○ DDOS attacks –What ? How ?Who ?
 ○The Impact – Direct & indirect victims
 ○The Collateral Damage Problem
 ○ Global Industry Best Practices
 ○ How canTata Communications help ?
 ○ Q & A
 Attempt to consume FINITE resources, exploit WEAKNESS in
design, lack of Infra CAPACITY.
 Affects service AVAILABILITY, thereby Denial of Service to
legitimate user traffic.
 Sourced from BOTNETs but triggered by C&C Servers and
almost always DISTRIBUTED for significant effect.
 Broadly classified as,
 TCP State Exhaustion attacks –TCP SYN Floods
 Volumetric attacks – UDP packet floods on well known ports
 Reflective Amplification attacks – Based on DNS, NTP, SSDP…
 Application layer attacks – HTTP, SIP etc. caused by LOIC, HOIC tool
DDOS Attacks – What ? How ?
DDOS Attacks – Classified
• TCP State exhaustion attacks
− Exploits statefull behavior ofTCP
protocol
− Exhausts resources in servers, reverse
proxies, firewalls.
− System runs out of memory/sockets
− SYN, FIN, RST Floods
• Volumetric attacks
− Exploits stateless behavior of UDP
protocol
− UDP based floods from spoofed IPs
generates heavy bps/pps traffic volume
− Takes out Infra capacity – routers,
switches, servers
Client
Server
SYN
SYN
SYN/ACK
SYN/ACK
Repeated endlessly until
the resources exhaust...
DDOS Attacks – Classified
• Reflective Amplification attacks
− Exploits amplification behavior of
NTP, DNS, SSDP, SNMP protocols
− Reflection and Amplification makes is
easy to execute.
− Impacts more than just the target
− DNS, NTP, SSDP are commonly used
• Application layer attacks
− Low and Slow in nature, targets
application instances and NOT Infra.
− Exploits scale and functionality of
specific applications.
− HTTP GET/POST floods..
− LOIC, HOIC, Slowloris, etc easily
available attack tools
REQ
(spoofed)
RES
(amplified)
Open DNS/NTP
/SNMP/SSDP
services
Botnet
Target
victim
DDOS Attacks -The Impact
• InfoSec systems are built with a goal of
maintaining Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability (CIA).
• Confidentiality and Integrity is mostly
addressed using Encryption in data
security solutions.
• Availability is typically associated with
eliminating points of failure in the
design.
• DDoS attacks are targeted and it
directly affects ‘Availability’.
Service Availability  Business Continuity
Maintaining availability in the face of an attack, proves the success of an Infosec program
An industry survey shows most organizations,
• Do not have DDOS mitigation plans
• Never stress-test their service stack to find
shortcomings
Evolution of DDOS attacks
Source: Arbor Networks WISR
• DDoS attacks have evolved over two decades now
• Peak attacks have grown 400% over the last couple of years
• All of those largest observed attacks were caused by ReflectiveAmplification
Reflective Amplification attacks
A Closer look
• Due to its high magnitude (scaling up to 300+ Gbps), affecting millions of users,
these attacks were reported often in the press.
• Requires ability to spoof the IP address of the target host/network
• MostVolumetric attacks generate high throughput (pps) but for Reflective
amplification attacks bandwidth (bps) is the key to fill the pipes in transit,
saturating network operator infra.
• Two main characteristics,
• Reflection – Spoofed requests (with actual attack target) from a botnet of hosts sent
towards open abusable services in the Internet; an amplified response is reflected
back on the attack target.
• Amplification – A relatively small request that generates a significantly large
response.
Open DNS/NTP/SSDP servers
The Internet
Original Victim
Content or Ecom Provider
Botnet
DDOS Attacks –Victims
DirectVictims:
1. Content owner/provider
REQ with target
spoofed as SRC IP
Amplified response
Targeting the victim
Open DNS/NTP/SSDP servers
DC or Cloud
SP
The Internet
Original Victim
Content or Ecom Provider
Botnet
DDOS Attacks –Victims
Victims:
1. Service Providers
2. DC/Cloud Service provider
3. Content owner/provider
REQ with target
spoofed as SRC IP
Amplified response
Targeting the victim
Collateral Damage Problem
Peer-2
Peer-1
Peer-3
IXP-B
DC
Facility
IXP-A
4G
RAN
DC & Cloud
Services
Mobile Broadband
Services
• Converged Network Infrastructure
• Supporting ISP, DC and Mobile broadband services
Peer-2
Peer-1
Peer-3
IXP-B
DC
Facility
IXP-A
4G
RAN
Collateral Damage Problem
• Attack targeting a service hosted in DC facility
• Impacts bystanders, other business
Reflective Amplification
Protocols used as attack vectors
• Many protocols can be leveraged by attackers
• DNS, NTP, SSDP,CHARGEN, SNMP are commonly-observed.
• Amplification factors makes it lethal,
Protocol Ports Amplification factor
NTP UDP / 123 600x
DNS UDP / 53 160x
SSDP UDP / 1900 30x
CHARGEN UDP / 19 18x
SNMP UDP / 161 800x
What makes it possible ?
• Failure to deploy network ingress filtering at the very edge – BCP 38, for anti-
spoofing usingACLs or uRPF or IP Source verify.
• Abusable services in the open Internet running on servers, home CPE devices,
routers, and other IoT devices.
• Low difficulty of execution of such attacks; readily available attack tools
• Network operators not utilizing the best practices
• Not utilizing flow telemetry for collection and analysis to detect attacks
• Failure to proactively scan and remediate abusable services
• Failure to deploy DDOS attack detection, response and mitigation tools
• Source or Destination based RTBH, flowspec for mitigation
• Subscribe to SP Cloud based DDOS attack detection and mitigation service
Best Practices for Network Operators
Don’t be a part of the problem
• Deploy anti-spoofing at network edges
• uRPF loose and strict modes at peering and customer aggregation
• DHCP Snooping and IP SourceVerify at DC LAN access edge
• Suitable mechanisms for Cable, DOCSIS subscriber edges
• Don’t be a spoofing-friendly network, you will soon be blocked!.
• Proactively scan for and remediate abusable services and block them if
necessary to take them offline.
• Check www.openntpproject.org and its equivalents to see if abusable services
have been identified on your network and take suitable action.
• Do not give in for collateral damage, have a suitable process and system in
place.
Building a DDoS attack defense system
Detection/Classification
• Visibility is key for detection –You can only protect what you can see
• Utilize flow telemetry exported from all network edges for attack detection and
classification
• Deploy a suitable anomaly-based DDoS attack detection solution
• Monitor links across transit, peering, aggregation, service edge and DC
access
• Deploy in-line or SPAN-based monitoring in front of critical services for fine-
grained application aware visibility and detection
• Don’t have CAPex budget, subscribe to Carrier DDOS Protection services.
Building a DDoS attack defense system
Mitigation Infra - Options
• Flowspec – Utilize BGP to inject ACLs or routing policy to filter or divert traffic.
• RemoteTriggered Blackholing - RTBH
• S/RTBH to block known bad sources
• D/RTBH to blackhole the destination under attack as a last resort
• Deploy a commercial mitigation system to protect from any attacks
• Build minimum capacity within and subscribe to Carrier-based cloud mitigation
services
• Planning mitigation capacity - Bandwidth
• Ideal Mitigation capacity =Total Ingress network bandwidth
• Minimum mitigation capacity = max attack size in the region, if the network
transport has room to carry
• You can only Mitigate what you can carry on your network
• Planning mitigation capacity –Throughput
• Volumetric attacks generate high rate of packets; consider hardware architecture
• Ensure 1 Million PPS capacity for every Gbps of mitigation capacity
Building a DDoS attack defense system
Mitigation Infra – Planning and Scale-up
• Build a distributed mitigation systems.
• Stop attack traffic closer to source,
do not allow them to converge.
• Leverage on botnet heat-maps for
planning your mitigation capacity
globally.
• Utilize anycast routing to scrubbing farms
for an effective mitigation
• If you are a regional or a local Network
operator,
• Utilize carrier DDOS protection services
• Build minimal mitigation capacity for
offering services for local enterprise
market
What works well ?
Attack type Impact on Network / DC Service
Provider
Impact on
content owner
Effective Mitigation
technique
TCP State
exhaustion
• Limited or Nil High – Impacts all
statefull devices in
transit
• Arrested by SP Cloud
Mitigation, if detected
• On-premise CPE
solutions are proactive
Volumetric • Tier-1 operator – Nil or limited impact on
rare occasions
• Other DC andTier-2/3 operators – Causes
bandwidth choke-points based on capacity;
leading to collateral damage
High – Impact at
the network edge
to server edge –
weakest link fails
• SP Cloud mitigation
Application layer • Tier-1/2/3 operator - Limited or Nil impact
• DC Service provider services such as IaaS
are impacted; design should adapt
protection against noisy-neighbors
(tenants)
High – weakest
node breaks-
down
• On-premise CPE
solutions are effective
• Basic attacks are
defended by SP Cloud
mitigation techniques
Reflective
Amplification
• Tier-1 operator – Nil or limited impact on
rare occasions
• Other DC andTier-2/3 operators – Causes
bandwidth choke-points based on capacity;
leading to collateral damage
High – Impact at
the network edge
to server edge –
weakest link fails
• SP Cloud mitigation
HOW CANTATA COMMUNICATIONS
HELP?
WE CAN HELP PROTECTYOUR
NETWORKS &YOUR CUSTOMERS
AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS
SECURITY SERVICES ATTATA COMM
21
Multi-Platform Support
Security Operations Centers
Technology & Automation
Build and maintain a
secure network
Protect Sensitive Data
Maintain aVulnerability
Management Program
Implement Strong Access
Control Measures
Regularly Monitor andTest
Networks
Maintain an Information
Security Policy
• DDoS Detection & Mitigation
• Bluecoat Managed Proxy
• Professional Security Services
• Managed & Monitored Firewall-UTM
• Managed & Monitored IDS/IPS
• Log/Security Event Monitoring
• Managed Strong Authentication
• Network Based vUTM
• Zscaler web security/virtual Proxy
• Qualys Vulnerability Management
• Email Secuirty & Postini Anti-Spam
Telephony Magazine
2014 – Leader for Network Services
Strength
Strong range of network security services
Scalable & Multi-tenant
India – Singapore
ISO 27001 Certified
SAS-70 Type I/II audited
Cisco MSCP Firewall - IDS - VPN
“Most Innovative Service Award”
Gartner Magic Quadrant
In +100 countries
INTEGRATED MDDOS D&M SERVICES
POWERED BYTATA COMMUNICATIONS’TIER 1 IP NETWORK
22
- 24% of the world’s
Internet routes are on
our network
- Only Tier 1 Provider to
feature in theTop 5 in 5
continents
- 99.7% of the world’s GDP
can be reached using the
Tata Communications’
Global Network
DDOS SCRUBBING FARM
GLOBAL DEPLOYMENT FOOTPRINT
DDoS scrubbing farm
Americas, EMEA & APAC
DDoS scrubbing farm
(Proposed)
ON-NET SERVICE
Detection
• TATA SSOC collecting/monitoring
flow data 24/7 from withinTATA
network
Mitigation
• SSOC analyst confirms attack,
contacts customer POC
• Customer authorizes mitigation
• TATA activates BGP session
• Multi-Gb attack traffic routes through
TATA mitigation centers and scrubbed
traffic returned to destination over
dedicated TATA IP egress via GRE
tunnel
• Customer confirms application
availability
• Once attack traffic stops, original
route is re-established & ticket closed
CE
Scrubbing
Farm
Customer
Data Center
TATA
Regional Scrubbing
Farms
DDoS Attack
Flow Sensor
Public Internet
Edge
TATA SSOC
Clean Traffic
Injection via GRE
TATA IPTransit Port
OFF-NET SERVICE
Detection
• TATA SSOC collecting/monitoring flow
data 24/7 (Assumes Flow Sensor, router,
IPS, etc…)
Mitigation
• SSOC analyst confirms attack, contacts
customer POC
• Customer authorizes mitigation,
withdraws existing route for /24
• TATA activates BGP session, announces
new route; customer sends /24;
• Multi-Gb attack traffic routes through
TATA mitigation centers with scrubbed
traffic returned to destination over 3rd
party IP egress via GRE tunnel
• Customer confirms application availability
• Once attack traffic stops, original route is
re-established & ticket is closed
3rd Party IP
Scrubbing
Farm
Customer
Data Center
TATA
Regional Scrubbing
Farms
DDoS Attack
Flow Sensor
Public Internet
EdgeTATA SSOC
Clean Traffic
Injection via GRE
CE
DDoS attack Protection Services for Carriers
 Tata Communications’ offers detection of DDoS attacks On-net and Off-net.
 Detects DDoS attack traffic proactively and directs it to the nearest scrubbing farm.
 Scrubbing farms are deployed across the globe with high capacity nodes in regions
with heavy botnet activity; to mitigate attacks closer to source preventing an
avalanche of attack traffic.
 Clean traffic can be delivered on a secure on-net tunnel to carrier network edge *.
Regional
ISP/IXP
Regional
ISP/IXP
Regional
Carrier network
customer
customer
customer
Global
Internet
TCL
Network
DDOS
defense
Dropped attack traffic
in the cloud
Clean traffic
delivered
* - recommended option
Thank You
Have Questions ? Ask Now or Talk to our local
representatives
Marcin Raczkiewicz Marcin.Raczkiewicz@tatacommunications.com
Director, Global Carrier Services, Tata Communications - Poland
Konrad Czubak Konrad.Czubak@tatacommunications.com
Sr. Solutions Architect, Tata Communications - Poland

More Related Content

What's hot

Denial of Service - Service Provider Overview
Denial of Service - Service Provider OverviewDenial of Service - Service Provider Overview
Denial of Service - Service Provider Overview
MarketingArrowECS_CZ
 
Denial of Service
Denial of ServiceDenial of Service
Denial of Service
MarketingArrowECS_CZ
 
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliPLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
Marta Pacyga
 
IRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack Detection
IRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack DetectionIRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack Detection
IRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack Detection
IRJET Journal
 
DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacksDDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
MyNOG
 
What is ddos attack
What is ddos attackWhat is ddos attack
What is ddos attack
Dosarrest007
 
Preparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS Attack
Preparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS AttackPreparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS Attack
Preparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS Attack
Imperva
 
Wp ipam infoblox
Wp ipam infobloxWp ipam infoblox
Wp ipam infoblox
islamet
 
Infoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User Group
Infoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User GroupInfoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User Group
Infoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User Group
NetCraftsmen
 
Juniper Services and Support
Juniper Services and SupportJuniper Services and Support
Juniper Services and Support
MarketingArrowECS_CZ
 
Mitigating worm attacks
Mitigating worm attacksMitigating worm attacks
Mitigating worm attacks
dkaya
 
Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5
Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5
Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5
Bangladesh Network Operators Group
 
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
IJITCA Journal
 
F5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructure
F5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructureF5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructure
F5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructure
DSorensenCPR
 
The Network as a Sensor, Cisco and Lancope
The Network as a Sensor, Cisco and LancopeThe Network as a Sensor, Cisco and Lancope
The Network as a Sensor, Cisco and Lancope
Cisco Enterprise Networks
 
Network Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10G
Network Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10GNetwork Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10G
Network Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10G
Savvius, Inc
 
Sdn&security
Sdn&securitySdn&security
Sdn&security
Cristiano Monteiro
 
IRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree Algorithm
IRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree AlgorithmIRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree Algorithm
IRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree Algorithm
IRJET Journal
 
Tech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentation
Tech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentationTech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentation
Tech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentation
Jisc
 
Paper id 41201622
Paper id 41201622Paper id 41201622
Paper id 41201622
IJRAT
 

What's hot (20)

Denial of Service - Service Provider Overview
Denial of Service - Service Provider OverviewDenial of Service - Service Provider Overview
Denial of Service - Service Provider Overview
 
Denial of Service
Denial of ServiceDenial of Service
Denial of Service
 
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf AliPLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali
 
IRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack Detection
IRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack DetectionIRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack Detection
IRJET- Software Defined Network: DDOS Attack Detection
 
DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacksDDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
DDoS Threats Landscape : Countering Large-scale DDoS attacks
 
What is ddos attack
What is ddos attackWhat is ddos attack
What is ddos attack
 
Preparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS Attack
Preparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS AttackPreparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS Attack
Preparing for the Imminent Terabit DDoS Attack
 
Wp ipam infoblox
Wp ipam infobloxWp ipam infoblox
Wp ipam infoblox
 
Infoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User Group
Infoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User GroupInfoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User Group
Infoblox Cloud Solutions - Cisco Mid-Atlantic User Group
 
Juniper Services and Support
Juniper Services and SupportJuniper Services and Support
Juniper Services and Support
 
Mitigating worm attacks
Mitigating worm attacksMitigating worm attacks
Mitigating worm attacks
 
Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5
Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5
Protection and Visibitlity of Encrypted Traffic by F5
 
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
 
F5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructure
F5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructureF5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructure
F5 and Infoblox deliver complete secured DNS infrastructure
 
The Network as a Sensor, Cisco and Lancope
The Network as a Sensor, Cisco and LancopeThe Network as a Sensor, Cisco and Lancope
The Network as a Sensor, Cisco and Lancope
 
Network Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10G
Network Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10GNetwork Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10G
Network Forensics - Your Only Choice at 10G
 
Sdn&security
Sdn&securitySdn&security
Sdn&security
 
IRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree Algorithm
IRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree AlgorithmIRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree Algorithm
IRJET- DDOS Detection System using C4.5 Decision Tree Algorithm
 
Tech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentation
Tech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentationTech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentation
Tech 2 tech low latency networking on Janet presentation
 
Paper id 41201622
Paper id 41201622Paper id 41201622
Paper id 41201622
 

Viewers also liked

Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.
Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.
Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.
kwantologia2
 
Cząstki wirtualne.
Cząstki wirtualne.Cząstki wirtualne.
Cząstki wirtualne.
kwantologia2
 
P1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internetP1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internet
Paula Redondo Fernández
 
Cancion de dios
Cancion de diosCancion de dios
Cancion de dios
Manicminer2002
 
Reggie NEW
Reggie NEWReggie NEW
Reggie NEW
Reginald Warren
 
Ciemna energia.
Ciemna energia.Ciemna energia.
Ciemna energia.
kwantologia2
 
COŚ.
COŚ.COŚ.
akterianer
akterianerakterianer
akterianer
ganyan
 
Brakująca masa.
Brakująca masa.Brakująca masa.
Brakująca masa.
kwantologia2
 
Λατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσεις
Λατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσειςΛατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσεις
Λατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσεις
gina zaza
 
PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...
PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...
PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...
PROIDEA
 
Abstrakcja, czyli co.
Abstrakcja, czyli co.Abstrakcja, czyli co.
Abstrakcja, czyli co.
kwantologia2
 
P1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internetP1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internet
angela208
 
Czas.
Czas.Czas.

Viewers also liked (14)

Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.
Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.
Czasoprzestrzeń abstrakcyjna.
 
Cząstki wirtualne.
Cząstki wirtualne.Cząstki wirtualne.
Cząstki wirtualne.
 
P1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internetP1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internet
 
Cancion de dios
Cancion de diosCancion de dios
Cancion de dios
 
Reggie NEW
Reggie NEWReggie NEW
Reggie NEW
 
Ciemna energia.
Ciemna energia.Ciemna energia.
Ciemna energia.
 
COŚ.
COŚ.COŚ.
COŚ.
 
akterianer
akterianerakterianer
akterianer
 
Brakująca masa.
Brakująca masa.Brakująca masa.
Brakująca masa.
 
Λατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσεις
Λατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσειςΛατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσεις
Λατινικά : γερουνδιακή έλξη, προσδιορισμός σκοπού - ασκήσεις
 
PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...
PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...
PLNOG15 :Assuring Performance, Scalability and Reliability in NFV Deployments...
 
Abstrakcja, czyli co.
Abstrakcja, czyli co.Abstrakcja, czyli co.
Abstrakcja, czyli co.
 
P1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internetP1 e1 internet
P1 e1 internet
 
Czas.
Czas.Czas.
Czas.
 

Similar to PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali

DETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUS
DETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUSDETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUS
DETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUS
Cristian Garcia G.
 
Rethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security Enforcement
Rethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security EnforcementRethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security Enforcement
Rethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security Enforcement
Corsa Technology
 
PLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr Wojciechowski
PLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr WojciechowskiPLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr Wojciechowski
PLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr Wojciechowski
PROIDEA
 
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
PriyadharshiniHemaku
 
bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...
bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...
bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...
Sergiy Pitel
 
SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...
SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...
SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...
Ziv Ichilov
 
DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.
DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.
DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.
Глеб Хохлов
 
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack PreventionKHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
APNIC
 
Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)
Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)
Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)
Infradata
 
Corsa Giga Filter
Corsa Giga FilterCorsa Giga Filter
Corsa Giga Filter
Corsa Technology
 
Scaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-service
Scaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-serviceScaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-service
Scaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-service
Cloudflare
 
Addios!
Addios!Addios!
Recent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respond
Recent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respondRecent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respond
Recent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respond
Cloudflare
 
ONF & iSDX Webinar
ONF & iSDX WebinarONF & iSDX Webinar
ONF & iSDX Webinar
Katie Hyman
 
ICRTITCS-2012 Conference Publication
ICRTITCS-2012 Conference PublicationICRTITCS-2012 Conference Publication
ICRTITCS-2012 Conference Publication
Tejaswi Agarwal
 
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber ThreatsUsing NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Emulex Corporation
 
DDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT Network
DDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT NetworkDDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT Network
DDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT Network
Haltdos
 
Network Bandwidth management - Mumbai Seminar
Network Bandwidth management - Mumbai SeminarNetwork Bandwidth management - Mumbai Seminar
Network Bandwidth management - Mumbai Seminar
ManageEngine, Zoho Corporation
 
(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks
(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks
(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks
Amazon Web Services
 
PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!
PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!
PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!
PROIDEA
 

Similar to PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali (20)

DETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUS
DETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUSDETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUS
DETENIENDO LOS ATAQUES DDOS CON NSFOCUS
 
Rethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security Enforcement
Rethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security EnforcementRethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security Enforcement
Rethinking Security: Corsa Red Armor Network Security Enforcement
 
PLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr Wojciechowski
PLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr WojciechowskiPLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr Wojciechowski
PLNOG16: DDOS SOLUTIONS – CUSTOMER POINT OF VIEW, Piotr Wojciechowski
 
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
Unleash the Hammer on Denial-of-Service: Conquer DDos Attacks!
 
bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...
bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...
bestpracticesforusingyournetworkandtheciscoasr9kforddos-150603185523-lva1-app...
 
SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...
SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...
SecurityDAM - Hybrid DDoS Protection for MSSPs and Enterprises (Infosecurity ...
 
DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.
DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.
DDoS Mitigator. Personal control panel for each hosting clients.
 
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack PreventionKHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
KHNOG 3: DDoS Attack Prevention
 
Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)
Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)
Cybersecurity breakfast tour 2013 (1)
 
Corsa Giga Filter
Corsa Giga FilterCorsa Giga Filter
Corsa Giga Filter
 
Scaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-service
Scaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-serviceScaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-service
Scaling service provider business with DDoS-mitigation-as-a-service
 
Addios!
Addios!Addios!
Addios!
 
Recent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respond
Recent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respondRecent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respond
Recent DDoS attack trends, and how you should respond
 
ONF & iSDX Webinar
ONF & iSDX WebinarONF & iSDX Webinar
ONF & iSDX Webinar
 
ICRTITCS-2012 Conference Publication
ICRTITCS-2012 Conference PublicationICRTITCS-2012 Conference Publication
ICRTITCS-2012 Conference Publication
 
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber ThreatsUsing NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
Using NetFlow to Streamline Security Analysis and Response to Cyber Threats
 
DDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT Network
DDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT NetworkDDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT Network
DDoS Mitigation Techniques for Your Enterprise IT Network
 
Network Bandwidth management - Mumbai Seminar
Network Bandwidth management - Mumbai SeminarNetwork Bandwidth management - Mumbai Seminar
Network Bandwidth management - Mumbai Seminar
 
(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks
(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks
(SEC306) Defending Against DDoS Attacks
 
PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!
PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!
PLNOG 17 - Artur Kane - DDoS? You shall not pass!
 

Recently uploaded

一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理
eutxy
 
留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理
留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理
留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理
bseovas
 
国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理
国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理
国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理
zoowe
 
一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理
keoku
 
重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理
重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理
重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理
vmemo1
 
Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...
Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...
Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...
CIOWomenMagazine
 
办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理
办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理
办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理
uehowe
 
[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024
[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024
[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024
hackersuli
 
Understanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdf
Understanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdfUnderstanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdf
Understanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdf
SEO Article Boost
 
学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作
学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作
学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作
zyfovom
 
7 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 2024
7 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 20247 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 2024
7 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 2024
Danica Gill
 
办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样
办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样
办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样
xjq03c34
 
Gen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needs
Gen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needsGen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needs
Gen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needs
Laura Szabó
 
Meet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdf
Meet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdfMeet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdf
Meet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdf
Florence Consulting
 
manuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaal
manuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaalmanuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaal
manuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaal
wolfsoftcompanyco
 
Search Result Showing My Post is Now Buried
Search Result Showing My Post is Now BuriedSearch Result Showing My Post is Now Buried
Search Result Showing My Post is Now Buried
Trish Parr
 
Discover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to India
Discover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to IndiaDiscover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to India
Discover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to India
davidjhones387
 
留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理
留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理
留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理
uehowe
 
APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024
APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024
APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024
APNIC
 
Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!
Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!
Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!
Toptal Tech
 

Recently uploaded (20)

一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(LBS毕业证)伦敦商学院毕业证成绩单专业办理
 
留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理
留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理
留学学历(UoA毕业证)奥克兰大学毕业证成绩单官方原版办理
 
国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理
国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理
国外证书(Lincoln毕业证)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单不能毕业办理
 
一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理
一比一原版(SLU毕业证)圣路易斯大学毕业证成绩单专业办理
 
重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理
重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理
重新申请毕业证书(RMIT毕业证)皇家墨尔本理工大学毕业证成绩单精仿办理
 
Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...
Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...
Internet of Things in Manufacturing: Revolutionizing Efficiency & Quality | C...
 
办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理
办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理
办理毕业证(UPenn毕业证)宾夕法尼亚大学毕业证成绩单快速办理
 
[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024
[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024
[HUN][hackersuli] Red Teaming alapok 2024
 
Understanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdf
Understanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdfUnderstanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdf
Understanding User Behavior with Google Analytics.pdf
 
学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作
学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作
学位认证网(DU毕业证)迪肯大学毕业证成绩单一比一原版制作
 
7 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 2024
7 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 20247 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 2024
7 Best Cloud Hosting Services to Try Out in 2024
 
办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样
办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样
办理新西兰奥克兰大学毕业证学位证书范本原版一模一样
 
Gen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needs
Gen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needsGen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needs
Gen Z and the marketplaces - let's translate their needs
 
Meet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdf
Meet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdfMeet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdf
Meet up Milano 14 _ Axpo Italia_ Migration from Mule3 (On-prem) to.pdf
 
manuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaal
manuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaalmanuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaal
manuaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaal
 
Search Result Showing My Post is Now Buried
Search Result Showing My Post is Now BuriedSearch Result Showing My Post is Now Buried
Search Result Showing My Post is Now Buried
 
Discover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to India
Discover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to IndiaDiscover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to India
Discover the benefits of outsourcing SEO to India
 
留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理
留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理
留学挂科(UofM毕业证)明尼苏达大学毕业证成绩单复刻办理
 
APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024
APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024
APNIC Foundation, presented by Ellisha Heppner at the PNG DNS Forum 2024
 
Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!
Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!
Ready to Unlock the Power of Blockchain!
 

PLNOG15 :DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage. Can we avoid it? Asraf Ali

  • 1. DDOS Attacks & Collateral Damage Can we avoid it ? Asraf Ali Head – Security & Network Engineering asraf.ali@tatacommunications.com Tata Communications
  • 2. Agenda  ○ DDOS attacks –What ? How ?Who ?  ○The Impact – Direct & indirect victims  ○The Collateral Damage Problem  ○ Global Industry Best Practices  ○ How canTata Communications help ?  ○ Q & A
  • 3.  Attempt to consume FINITE resources, exploit WEAKNESS in design, lack of Infra CAPACITY.  Affects service AVAILABILITY, thereby Denial of Service to legitimate user traffic.  Sourced from BOTNETs but triggered by C&C Servers and almost always DISTRIBUTED for significant effect.  Broadly classified as,  TCP State Exhaustion attacks –TCP SYN Floods  Volumetric attacks – UDP packet floods on well known ports  Reflective Amplification attacks – Based on DNS, NTP, SSDP…  Application layer attacks – HTTP, SIP etc. caused by LOIC, HOIC tool DDOS Attacks – What ? How ?
  • 4. DDOS Attacks – Classified • TCP State exhaustion attacks − Exploits statefull behavior ofTCP protocol − Exhausts resources in servers, reverse proxies, firewalls. − System runs out of memory/sockets − SYN, FIN, RST Floods • Volumetric attacks − Exploits stateless behavior of UDP protocol − UDP based floods from spoofed IPs generates heavy bps/pps traffic volume − Takes out Infra capacity – routers, switches, servers Client Server SYN SYN SYN/ACK SYN/ACK Repeated endlessly until the resources exhaust...
  • 5. DDOS Attacks – Classified • Reflective Amplification attacks − Exploits amplification behavior of NTP, DNS, SSDP, SNMP protocols − Reflection and Amplification makes is easy to execute. − Impacts more than just the target − DNS, NTP, SSDP are commonly used • Application layer attacks − Low and Slow in nature, targets application instances and NOT Infra. − Exploits scale and functionality of specific applications. − HTTP GET/POST floods.. − LOIC, HOIC, Slowloris, etc easily available attack tools REQ (spoofed) RES (amplified) Open DNS/NTP /SNMP/SSDP services Botnet Target victim
  • 6. DDOS Attacks -The Impact • InfoSec systems are built with a goal of maintaining Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). • Confidentiality and Integrity is mostly addressed using Encryption in data security solutions. • Availability is typically associated with eliminating points of failure in the design. • DDoS attacks are targeted and it directly affects ‘Availability’. Service Availability  Business Continuity Maintaining availability in the face of an attack, proves the success of an Infosec program An industry survey shows most organizations, • Do not have DDOS mitigation plans • Never stress-test their service stack to find shortcomings
  • 7. Evolution of DDOS attacks Source: Arbor Networks WISR • DDoS attacks have evolved over two decades now • Peak attacks have grown 400% over the last couple of years • All of those largest observed attacks were caused by ReflectiveAmplification
  • 8. Reflective Amplification attacks A Closer look • Due to its high magnitude (scaling up to 300+ Gbps), affecting millions of users, these attacks were reported often in the press. • Requires ability to spoof the IP address of the target host/network • MostVolumetric attacks generate high throughput (pps) but for Reflective amplification attacks bandwidth (bps) is the key to fill the pipes in transit, saturating network operator infra. • Two main characteristics, • Reflection – Spoofed requests (with actual attack target) from a botnet of hosts sent towards open abusable services in the Internet; an amplified response is reflected back on the attack target. • Amplification – A relatively small request that generates a significantly large response.
  • 9. Open DNS/NTP/SSDP servers The Internet Original Victim Content or Ecom Provider Botnet DDOS Attacks –Victims DirectVictims: 1. Content owner/provider REQ with target spoofed as SRC IP Amplified response Targeting the victim
  • 10. Open DNS/NTP/SSDP servers DC or Cloud SP The Internet Original Victim Content or Ecom Provider Botnet DDOS Attacks –Victims Victims: 1. Service Providers 2. DC/Cloud Service provider 3. Content owner/provider REQ with target spoofed as SRC IP Amplified response Targeting the victim
  • 11. Collateral Damage Problem Peer-2 Peer-1 Peer-3 IXP-B DC Facility IXP-A 4G RAN DC & Cloud Services Mobile Broadband Services • Converged Network Infrastructure • Supporting ISP, DC and Mobile broadband services
  • 12. Peer-2 Peer-1 Peer-3 IXP-B DC Facility IXP-A 4G RAN Collateral Damage Problem • Attack targeting a service hosted in DC facility • Impacts bystanders, other business
  • 13. Reflective Amplification Protocols used as attack vectors • Many protocols can be leveraged by attackers • DNS, NTP, SSDP,CHARGEN, SNMP are commonly-observed. • Amplification factors makes it lethal, Protocol Ports Amplification factor NTP UDP / 123 600x DNS UDP / 53 160x SSDP UDP / 1900 30x CHARGEN UDP / 19 18x SNMP UDP / 161 800x
  • 14. What makes it possible ? • Failure to deploy network ingress filtering at the very edge – BCP 38, for anti- spoofing usingACLs or uRPF or IP Source verify. • Abusable services in the open Internet running on servers, home CPE devices, routers, and other IoT devices. • Low difficulty of execution of such attacks; readily available attack tools • Network operators not utilizing the best practices • Not utilizing flow telemetry for collection and analysis to detect attacks • Failure to proactively scan and remediate abusable services • Failure to deploy DDOS attack detection, response and mitigation tools • Source or Destination based RTBH, flowspec for mitigation • Subscribe to SP Cloud based DDOS attack detection and mitigation service
  • 15. Best Practices for Network Operators Don’t be a part of the problem • Deploy anti-spoofing at network edges • uRPF loose and strict modes at peering and customer aggregation • DHCP Snooping and IP SourceVerify at DC LAN access edge • Suitable mechanisms for Cable, DOCSIS subscriber edges • Don’t be a spoofing-friendly network, you will soon be blocked!. • Proactively scan for and remediate abusable services and block them if necessary to take them offline. • Check www.openntpproject.org and its equivalents to see if abusable services have been identified on your network and take suitable action. • Do not give in for collateral damage, have a suitable process and system in place.
  • 16. Building a DDoS attack defense system Detection/Classification • Visibility is key for detection –You can only protect what you can see • Utilize flow telemetry exported from all network edges for attack detection and classification • Deploy a suitable anomaly-based DDoS attack detection solution • Monitor links across transit, peering, aggregation, service edge and DC access • Deploy in-line or SPAN-based monitoring in front of critical services for fine- grained application aware visibility and detection • Don’t have CAPex budget, subscribe to Carrier DDOS Protection services.
  • 17. Building a DDoS attack defense system Mitigation Infra - Options • Flowspec – Utilize BGP to inject ACLs or routing policy to filter or divert traffic. • RemoteTriggered Blackholing - RTBH • S/RTBH to block known bad sources • D/RTBH to blackhole the destination under attack as a last resort • Deploy a commercial mitigation system to protect from any attacks • Build minimum capacity within and subscribe to Carrier-based cloud mitigation services • Planning mitigation capacity - Bandwidth • Ideal Mitigation capacity =Total Ingress network bandwidth • Minimum mitigation capacity = max attack size in the region, if the network transport has room to carry • You can only Mitigate what you can carry on your network • Planning mitigation capacity –Throughput • Volumetric attacks generate high rate of packets; consider hardware architecture • Ensure 1 Million PPS capacity for every Gbps of mitigation capacity
  • 18. Building a DDoS attack defense system Mitigation Infra – Planning and Scale-up • Build a distributed mitigation systems. • Stop attack traffic closer to source, do not allow them to converge. • Leverage on botnet heat-maps for planning your mitigation capacity globally. • Utilize anycast routing to scrubbing farms for an effective mitigation • If you are a regional or a local Network operator, • Utilize carrier DDOS protection services • Build minimal mitigation capacity for offering services for local enterprise market
  • 19. What works well ? Attack type Impact on Network / DC Service Provider Impact on content owner Effective Mitigation technique TCP State exhaustion • Limited or Nil High – Impacts all statefull devices in transit • Arrested by SP Cloud Mitigation, if detected • On-premise CPE solutions are proactive Volumetric • Tier-1 operator – Nil or limited impact on rare occasions • Other DC andTier-2/3 operators – Causes bandwidth choke-points based on capacity; leading to collateral damage High – Impact at the network edge to server edge – weakest link fails • SP Cloud mitigation Application layer • Tier-1/2/3 operator - Limited or Nil impact • DC Service provider services such as IaaS are impacted; design should adapt protection against noisy-neighbors (tenants) High – weakest node breaks- down • On-premise CPE solutions are effective • Basic attacks are defended by SP Cloud mitigation techniques Reflective Amplification • Tier-1 operator – Nil or limited impact on rare occasions • Other DC andTier-2/3 operators – Causes bandwidth choke-points based on capacity; leading to collateral damage High – Impact at the network edge to server edge – weakest link fails • SP Cloud mitigation
  • 20. HOW CANTATA COMMUNICATIONS HELP? WE CAN HELP PROTECTYOUR NETWORKS &YOUR CUSTOMERS AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS
  • 21. SECURITY SERVICES ATTATA COMM 21 Multi-Platform Support Security Operations Centers Technology & Automation Build and maintain a secure network Protect Sensitive Data Maintain aVulnerability Management Program Implement Strong Access Control Measures Regularly Monitor andTest Networks Maintain an Information Security Policy • DDoS Detection & Mitigation • Bluecoat Managed Proxy • Professional Security Services • Managed & Monitored Firewall-UTM • Managed & Monitored IDS/IPS • Log/Security Event Monitoring • Managed Strong Authentication • Network Based vUTM • Zscaler web security/virtual Proxy • Qualys Vulnerability Management • Email Secuirty & Postini Anti-Spam Telephony Magazine 2014 – Leader for Network Services Strength Strong range of network security services Scalable & Multi-tenant India – Singapore ISO 27001 Certified SAS-70 Type I/II audited Cisco MSCP Firewall - IDS - VPN “Most Innovative Service Award” Gartner Magic Quadrant In +100 countries
  • 22. INTEGRATED MDDOS D&M SERVICES POWERED BYTATA COMMUNICATIONS’TIER 1 IP NETWORK 22 - 24% of the world’s Internet routes are on our network - Only Tier 1 Provider to feature in theTop 5 in 5 continents - 99.7% of the world’s GDP can be reached using the Tata Communications’ Global Network
  • 23. DDOS SCRUBBING FARM GLOBAL DEPLOYMENT FOOTPRINT DDoS scrubbing farm Americas, EMEA & APAC DDoS scrubbing farm (Proposed)
  • 24. ON-NET SERVICE Detection • TATA SSOC collecting/monitoring flow data 24/7 from withinTATA network Mitigation • SSOC analyst confirms attack, contacts customer POC • Customer authorizes mitigation • TATA activates BGP session • Multi-Gb attack traffic routes through TATA mitigation centers and scrubbed traffic returned to destination over dedicated TATA IP egress via GRE tunnel • Customer confirms application availability • Once attack traffic stops, original route is re-established & ticket closed CE Scrubbing Farm Customer Data Center TATA Regional Scrubbing Farms DDoS Attack Flow Sensor Public Internet Edge TATA SSOC Clean Traffic Injection via GRE TATA IPTransit Port
  • 25. OFF-NET SERVICE Detection • TATA SSOC collecting/monitoring flow data 24/7 (Assumes Flow Sensor, router, IPS, etc…) Mitigation • SSOC analyst confirms attack, contacts customer POC • Customer authorizes mitigation, withdraws existing route for /24 • TATA activates BGP session, announces new route; customer sends /24; • Multi-Gb attack traffic routes through TATA mitigation centers with scrubbed traffic returned to destination over 3rd party IP egress via GRE tunnel • Customer confirms application availability • Once attack traffic stops, original route is re-established & ticket is closed 3rd Party IP Scrubbing Farm Customer Data Center TATA Regional Scrubbing Farms DDoS Attack Flow Sensor Public Internet EdgeTATA SSOC Clean Traffic Injection via GRE CE
  • 26. DDoS attack Protection Services for Carriers  Tata Communications’ offers detection of DDoS attacks On-net and Off-net.  Detects DDoS attack traffic proactively and directs it to the nearest scrubbing farm.  Scrubbing farms are deployed across the globe with high capacity nodes in regions with heavy botnet activity; to mitigate attacks closer to source preventing an avalanche of attack traffic.  Clean traffic can be delivered on a secure on-net tunnel to carrier network edge *. Regional ISP/IXP Regional ISP/IXP Regional Carrier network customer customer customer Global Internet TCL Network DDOS defense Dropped attack traffic in the cloud Clean traffic delivered * - recommended option
  • 27. Thank You Have Questions ? Ask Now or Talk to our local representatives Marcin Raczkiewicz Marcin.Raczkiewicz@tatacommunications.com Director, Global Carrier Services, Tata Communications - Poland Konrad Czubak Konrad.Czubak@tatacommunications.com Sr. Solutions Architect, Tata Communications - Poland