Myanmar drew the international spotlight when the world leaders including Prime Minister Modi, President Obama attended the ASEAN and East Asian Summit in Naypidaw last year on11 November. Can we again revalidate the Swarna Bhumi - Bharat Bhumi natural links. India shares 1700-km boundary with Myanmar, yet the absence of it in India’s foreign policy priorities has been a strange but serious omission. It is difficult to imagine how India’s otherwise astute leaders then allowed Burma to slide into seclusion and accepting Chinese hegemony to India’s detriment.

1. Things that Modi should do in Myanmar
Myanmar drew the international spotlight when the world leaders including Prime Minister
Modi, President Obama attended the ASEAN and East Asian Summit in Naypidaw last year
on11 November.
Can we again revalidate the Swarna Bhumi - Bharat Bhumi natural links.
India shares 1700-km boundary with Myanmar, yet the absence of it in India’s foreign policy
priorities has been a strange but serious omission. It is difficult to imagine how India’s otherwise
astute leaders then allowed Burma to slide into seclusion and accepting Chinese hegemony to
India’s detriment. No one seemed to even care for the economic imperative - Burma exported 3
million tons of rice prior to its independence. Rangon was a flourishing city, when Bangkok was
only a village. The reason though may have been less to do with India’s policy neglect, but
Rangon’s own idiosyncratic expression turning into self-inflicted isolation. To be also sure,
Myanmar ignored India in the fear that China might step up arms subversion.
India’s controversial relationship with Myanmar must come to an end. Modi should just do that.
Modi’s visit to Naypidaw should assume importance against the backdrop of firstly, the
possibilities of greater political reforms underway including an amendment in constitution —
which currently bars opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Suu Kyi from
becoming president — ahead of 2015 elections. The regional summit will ensure a more
spotlight on the country's progress toward democracy.
Second, China strong traditional ties with Myanmar are undergoing a change. Beijing for
decades provided the junta with military and diplomatic support to the detriment of democracy in
Myanmar. However, Thein Sein government since 2011 significantly sought to decrease the
country’s over-dependence on China. In fact, China has been stung by massive outcry over
Chinese exploitation of country natural resources and use of Myanmar’s territory for a gas and
oil pipeline and hydroelectricity projects. Mainland China and Hong Kong combined had
invested $20.8 billion in Myanmar but Thein Sein suspended the Chinese-led $3.6 Myitsone dam
project, meant for supplying electricity to China. Beijing is watching the political reforms and
softening of Western approach towards Myanmar nervously. Beijing has been reaching out to
Suu Kyi. There is a possibility of Suu Kyi making a “good-will” visit to China next month. If the
visit takes place, Beijing will succeed in changing the perceptions that its long-lasting support to
the military junta was transitory and it is not oppose to democratic transition.
India’s ties with Myanmar improved substantially after Gen. Maung Aye’s visit to New Delhi in
2000, the landmark visit by President U Thein Sein in October 2011 and the return visit by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh to Naypyitaw in May 2012, the first such visit in 25 years. These
exchanges have fundamentally changed the context. Myanmar’s international image improved
since then and encouraged other countries including President Obama to visit Naypyitaw in
November 2012.

2. However, after the initial support, India failed to sustain the quantum of support for the pro-
democracy movement. Suu Kyi expressed disappointment over India’s courting the junta and
backing away from supporting her when she visited New Delhi in 2012. Suu Kyi said, in a
memorial lecture for Nehru. "I was saddened to feel that we had drawn away from India, or
rather that India had drawn away from us, during our very difficult days, but I always had faith in
the lasting friendship between our two countries."
The Prime Minister must reach out to Myanmar in unconventional ways and remove any
antipathy among the people who once, like other neighbours, had began to perceive India as a
big military threat. China fully exploited those sentiments. The junta even looked once upon a
time to Islamabad for military aid.
Clearly, for India relations with Myanmar cannot be a bilateral affair – rather it a matter of
regional security and India’s long-term interest. While India should acknowledge Myanmar’s
military’s role in stabilizing a country beset by an unprecedented insurgency problem that helped
India as well. However, there are signs that Myanmar will loom large internally, and if India is
not careful, the democratic agenda supported by it could be usurped by others. India’s national
interest also lies in preventing the US fomenting crisis in its strategic neighbourhood. The
changes within Myanmar are likely to spur greater enthusiasm among the Burmese to seek closer
affinity within India.
For India, the lack of conceptualization has been a serious deficit in its policy thinking. So far,
failing to imagine India’s geographic continuum as a whole has rendered space for others to
maneuver the region. China has cleverly boxed India in South Asia. However, foreign policy
under Modi is showing signs of India regaining its lost geopolitical profile. Modi’s visit to
Myanmar, therefore, should prove to be the defining spirit and it should underscore the same
significance as he did to signify India’s ability to show responsibility, realism and regionalism in
Bhutan, Nepal and Japan.
How Modi will bring Myanmar back into the Indian fold will remain a challenge. One very clear
and indigestible truth is that the role of Military in that country cannot be wished away easily.
Any paradigm shift in policy will be too optimistic. Myanmar shares long borders with China
with which it has long historical association. India, therefore, should not aim to compete or
replace Chinese influence but should exploit those areas where it enjoys a distinct edge in
Myanmar.
India should work on strategic convergences and shared concerns of dealing with insurgency
along border areas. Dealing with Rohingya refugees is an important agenda. The bombing of
Buddha Gya temple was linked to crisis in Myanmar.
More importantly, drawing from China’s experience, India and Myanmar should enhance
cooperation in regional development schemes. The ongoing important cross-border connectivity
projects project should be enhanced to promote a regional market across the region. There is
surely much more scope for India to get involved in Myanmar’s oil and gas sector. A new
addition to it could be supported by projects that will promote a web of spiritual activities with
commercial interests. Buddhism is fast becoming a factor of cultural mobilization and economic

3. growth cross Asia including in China. India is sitting atop millennia-old tourist mines. Buddha-
Industry alone could transform the lives of millions, providing lucrative career options to its
youth. The millions of Shakyamuni’s followers in South-East Asia including China link their
spiritual destinies to India. Promoting a web of economic and cultural interdependency is
essential to ensure that Myanmar does not find it necessary to use the insurgency card against
India.
India’s policy leverage in Myanmar is Buddhism. The Burmese Buddhist tradition is the most
organized and powerful institution in that country. An active interface with the Sangahraja of
Myanmar and other cultural and spiritual bodies is essential for harnessing an enduring
relationship. In fact, monks are the best ambassadors of India in Myanmar. It is only that India
never used these parameters as instruments of its diplomacy. India should consider having a visa-
free scheme for Myanmar monks visiting India.
Myanmar has over 2.5 million Indians and Modi should think about opening Indian Trade and
Cultural Centres (TCCs) across Myanmar. The TCCs would also play a useful role once the
highway project linking India-Myanmar-Thailand-Vietnam are completed. And linked to this is
the imperative of promoting a brand of sustainable cultural tourism. A series of pilgrimage
corridors from China across Myanmar could serve as engines of economic growth for the people
living in the North-East. Once viewed as absurd, the idea of India-China jointly cooperating in
Myanmar could become a reality now. The corridor could benefit India more than China but
delay could risk serious ramifications against China’s increasing quest for strategic minerals and
water resources. It is here that India should visualize Myanmar playing the role of a bridge for
India reaching out to China’s vulnerable Southeast regions and South-East Asian region as a
whole. Here lies India’s strategic and security interests.
India-Myanmar Relations – From past to
present scenario
With the conquest of Assam in 1821, the Burmese came close to British Indian territories. The
Assamese nobilities took refuge in British territories and sought their help to expel the Burmese
from Assam. But the Burmese ambition to capture more English territories led to the first Anglo-
Burmese war in 1824. The Burmese were defeated and the Treaty of Yandaboo was signed in
1826 by which Assam and Manipur were annexed to the British Empire together with Arakan
and Tannesserim of Burma. The second Anglo-Burmese war was fought in 1852 because of
strained Anglo-Burmese relations when the new Burmese king refused to comply with the Treaty
of Yandaboo, which resulted in the annexation of Lower Burma by the British. But the third
Anglo-Burma war in 1885 ended with the annexation of Upper Burma. Burma became a
province of British India.
In 1937, Burma, a pre dominantly Buddhist nation, was separated from British India. India
gained independence in 1947 and Burma in 1948. India and Burma (now known as Myanmar)
share a1643 Km long international border along India’s Northeast. Both countries practiced a
common British parliamentary democracy system. Nehru took over as the Prime Minister of

4. India and U Nu became Burma’s first Prime Minister. The personal friendship between Nehru
and U Nu helped to build up cordial Indo-Burma relations.
By 1949, Burma was engulfed in a civil war while putting down communist rebellion and armed
ethnic insurgent groups. Rangoon was about to collapse. India came to Burma’s aid providing
arms to the Burmese army and organising loans from the Commonwealth nations. Rangoon was
saved. In 1951 India and Burma signed the Treaty of Friendship. India became the largest
importer of Burmese rice. In 1962, Indo- Burma relations got strained when Burma came under
Ne Win’s military rule after a coup. Ne Win military regime promulgated stringent
nationalization policy forcing the majority of the Indian community to flee Burma.
After the 1962 Indo-China war, China started aiding India’s North-East insurgents groups on the
one hand and on the other hand started supporting the Burmese communists and the ethnic
insurgents groups which helped in warming up the Indo-Burma relations. In 1967, India and
Burma signed the boundary agreement to solve the border issue between the two countries.
Burma also co-operated with India in its fight against the Northeast insurgents groups. But then,
Deng Xiaoping assumed power after Mao’s death, initiated economic reforms and changed
China’s foreign policy of exporting communist revolution, replacing it by trade and investment.
By 1980s, China stopped supporting Burma’s communists and ethnic insurgents and made
inroads in Burma in the pretext of brokering peace talks. China-Burma relations warmed up and
the Indo-Burma relations suffered. India started aiding the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) with
the assurance to stop training/sheltering the Northeast insurgent groups, which they readily
obliged.
The policy of the military junta under Ne Win’s dictatorship curbed human rights and democracy
and was for its isolation from the international community. Burmese isolation helped to cement
the China-Burma relationships. China started arming the Burmese army and mordernised its
navy. China invested heavily in Burma’s infrastructure development projects building roads,
railways, hydropower projects and laying of gas and oil pipeline. Burma became more dependent
on China.
Meanwhile in India’s Northeast , the insurgency scenario made a paradigm shift towards Burma.
The NSCN was formed in 1980 opposing the 1975 Shillong Accord and established its
headquarters in North western Burma/Sagaing region. The Burmese military Junta had no
control over this region. The NSCN started governing the areas. Slowly, this region became the
training ground for India’s Northeast insurgent groups and access to the KIA to reach the
Chinese border. Apart from guerilla training, weapons were acquired from this region. In 1988
the NSCN got divided. The NSCK (K) faction headed by S.S.Khaplang , a Burmese Naga still
remained in control of the region as the other faction NSCN(IM) headed by Isak Swu and T.
Muviah shifted its headquarters to Dimapur after a ceasefire agreement in 1997 with Govt. of
India. In 2001 the NSCN(K) had also signed similar ceasefire agreement . In 2012 ULFA was
split into ULFA (I) headed by Paresh Baruah with headquarters established in this region. The
NDFB (S) also shifted its headquarters to Burma. The PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KYKL & KCP
had also established their headquarters in this Burmese region. Burma’s Sagaing region became
the bases of the Northeast insurgent groups.

5. In 1988 after a popular nationwide protest, Ne Win resigned. Military officers loyal to Ne Win
staged a coup and Burma was brought under the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC). In 1989 the SLORC changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. Thereafter, Burma
faced a popular pro-democracy movement led by Aung Sung Suu Kyi . Suu Kyi and other
opposition leaders founded the National League for Democracy (NLD) and won the 1990
election. Power was not handed to the NLD and Burma remained under the military regime.
India under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi supported the pro-democracy movement and gave
asylum to the Burmese refugees who fled the military crackdown. India-Burma relations
worsened. Slowly, Burma started building its foreign relations with the West and other Asian
neighbours. The growing Chinese influence in Burma worried New Delhi.
In 1991, the Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao initiated the liberalisation of India’s
economy which resulted in formulating the Look East Policy (LEP) to integrate the Indian
economy with the booming Southeast Asian economy. India’s Look East policy shaped its
foreign policy towards the Southeast Asian countries. India’s Northeast was considered as the
launching pad for the Look East policy because of its geographical proximity to the Southeast
Asia. Burma is India’s land bridge to Southeast Asia and passage for the proposed Trans Asian
highway and railway project. India started building up its relations with Burma and other
Southeast Asian countries. In 1994 India and Burma signed the border trade agreement and
opened border trade outpost at Moreh (Manipur) in 1995 and at Champhai (Mizoram) in
2004.However, both the countries were reluctant to open the Stilwell Road which was
constructed in 1942 by the Allied forces connecting Ledo (Assam) to Myitkyina (Burma) to
Kunming (China).
In 1996, India became a member of the ASEAN(Association of South East Asian Nations)
Regional forum, followed by BIMST-EC(Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand-
economic co-operation) in 1997, the Kunming initiative(India, China, Myanmar and
Bangladesh) in 1999 and the Mekong Ganga Corporation (India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia and Vietnam) in 2000. India’s engagement with Burma partially succeeded in
countering Chinese dominance in Burma. India became the second largest importer of Burmese
products and invested in the infrastructure development and energy sector keeping an eye on
importing Burma’s gas and oil.
Even after more than two decades of formulation, the Look East Policy has failed to deliver the
required economic benefits to the Northeast. The main reason is the lacklustre attitude of the
Indian policy makers in developing adequate infrastructure and connectivity of the Northeastern
region which hampered trading with the Southeast Asian countries. New Delhi is obsessed with
cross border security concerns.
India’s military aid to Burma was mainly directed for counter insurgency operations against the
Northeast insurgent groups based in Burma. Burma is yet to take any major offensive against the
Northeast insurgent groups. Burma’s support is necessary in pressurising the Northeast insurgent
groups for opening a dialogue with New Delhi. A peaceful Northeast has great potential to
develop economically with its rich biodiversity, hydropower and precious mineral resources once
it is properly integrated to the Southeast Asian economy.

6. A prosperous Northeast is the answer, not military operations because the rebellions are basically
due to economic underdevelopment of the region. One of the important challenges to the Look
East Policy is the inflow of narcotics/heroin from Burma into the alcohol prohibited states of
Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram with increasing number of drug addicts and HIV/AIDS
infected persons amongst the drug users who share common needles.
With close India-Burma relations, India can play a crucial role in Burma’s political reforms, and,
Burma, in implementing the Look East Policy and help in solving the decades old Northeast
insurgency.