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1. India and China emerged in the late 1940’s as sovereign states with a clear conception of
international borders. After the independence of India, on 15th August, 1947 New Delhi inherited the
British defined border of India with its neighbours. India’s border with Tibet in the east was defined
during the colonial era according to the ‘Shimla Agreement’ of 1914 which came to be known as
McMahon Line separating North East Frontier Agency with Tibet. In the west or Ladakh, although
the border was historically un-demarcated on the ground it was defined according to traditions,
customs and usages of both Ladakh and Tibet which were reiterated in both the ‘Tingmosgang
Treaty’ of 1684 and Treaty of Chushul’ in 1842.
This border line between India and China in both the sectors was acceptable and prevalent until
Lhasa was annexed and Aksai Chin was disputed by China in 1957 by changing facts on the grounds
in Ladakh. Since then China not only disputed the border alignment in Ladakh but claimed whole of
Aksai Chin. Subsequently, they also disputed McMahon Line in the eastern sector with the objective
to bargain the dispute in McMahon Line for Aksai Chin with India. However, as historically
territorial disputes resulted in wars, India and China met with the same fate in 1962.
Since then the annihilation of buffer Tibet and the un-demarcated border became a serious bone of
contention between the two countries. Besides that, the ‘Cold War’ geopolitical dynamics like the
increasing China-Pakistan nexus and the closer relationship between India and U.S.S.R has also
contributed in making the border settlement process complex one. Moreover, China to the detriment
of India increased its footprint in India’s backyard by entering Pakistan Occupied Ladakh through the
incorporation of Shaksgam Valley into Xinjiang in 1963 and by developing Karakoram Highway
encircling strategic Ladakh. The cultivation of Pakistan by China still haunts India as it exposes India
to two front wars in the east as well as west in Ladakh.
Despite all the strategic concerns due to the border dispute, both countries realizing the complexity of
the border dispute and in the context of changing geopolitics 116

2. of the world with the end of Cold War and disintegration of USSR, showing pragmatism worked on
tranquilizing border by formulating border management frameworks. Both countries expressing
optimism entered into agreement in 1993 and 1996 with the long term objective to settle the border
dispute building confidence between the two countries. However, two nations succeed in only
achieving the short term objective of tranquilizing the border and the border settlement remained a
distant dream even after a decade. In view of slow progress on the border dispute a mechanism of
Special Representatives was established by both India and China in 2003 to explore the windows for
the settlement of the border issue. This Special Representatives talks on the border resulted in the
most closest and the practical agreement of the “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles” in 2005
which took the negotiation to the political level. However, this agreement along with the agreement
signed in 2012 and 2013 failed to yield any decisive solution for the disputed border.
These interstate border agreements were signed along with dozens of other agreements on trade and
investments. However, the agreements on trade and investments achieved their goals way before
their scheduled time but the objectives of the border agreements are still a distant dream for both
nations. India-China bilateral trade in 2000-01 was just slightly over $ 2 billion which crossed $100
billion in 2021, just in span of twenty year. However, with the increasing belligerence of China the
trade imbalances also started bothering India by 2010 reached to $29.3 billion and increased to $63
billion in 2017-18. More recent data shows, trade imbalances at an unprecedented level with India
import of $ 97 billion from China against exports of only $28 billion amounting to total of $125
billion trade.
To add to that the range and magnitude of border dispute is rather increasing with China intruding
into undisputed territories across LAC in Ladakh since 2013. One of the reasons for the increasing
Chinese belligerence along the LAC is due to its increasing economic and military clout which was
immensely contributed by India’s economic cooperation for decades. China’s enormous trade surplus
with India which is still widening emboldened China and became a matter of concern for India. Since
the border dispute has no impact on the economic gains of China, the settlement of the border makes
117

3. no sense for China. Thus this level of economic advantage complemented by the strategic and
tactical leverage gave China upper hand to transgress in Ladakh in Galwan in 2020 deteriorating the
relationship. This aggressive belligerence by China has brought the two great developing economies
of the world to loggerheads taking the dispute far away from any settlement. Drawing inference from
such developments it is believed that India should brought a change in its trade and investment
policies in order to reduce the trade imbalance which is skewed against India and should focus on
import substitution methods to reduce the dependence on China. If India reduces the dependence on
China and decreases the level of bilateral trade, China will be the net loser and India will end up
losing but with also reducing its trade deficit with China.
Another important factor which contributed to the failure of the border settlement and the
susceptibility of Ladakh against China has always been the passive, reactive and belated response of
India to the Chinese incursion over the LAC. For instance in 2013 when the locals of Ladakh voiced
their concern about the nibbling of their traditional grazing lands by China, the government of India
were very passive; the Foreign Minister of India S. M. Krishna negating the local’s claims expressed
that:
“India-China boundary is the most peaceful border in the world and stated that India has no dispute in
Ladakh with China” (Singh, 2012).
Same reaction was given in June, 2020 when China intruded along the LAC in Galwan Valley and
killed 20 of Indian soldiers. In an all party meeting organised to discuss the security concerns in
Ladakh after the Galwan clash with China, the Prime Minster of India Narendra Modi stated that:
“Neither have they intruded into our border, nor has any post been taken over by them. Twenty of our
Jawans were martyred, but those who dared Bharat Mata, were taught a lesson” (Tripathi, 2020).
But as the India-China border dispute in Ladakh had a direct bearing on the lives of the zero-border
inhabitants who suffers firstly, due to the Chinese encroachment on their ancestral grazing lands and
secondly, by India’s denying of ceding of any territory to China. However, this time again the locals
brought the truth before the public when they complained to the government of India about the
shrinking of area of their 118

4. traditional reserved grazing lands due to the constant and incremental annexation of Indian territory
by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. During my telephonic and personal interview with the
residents of the eastern Ladakh it was realized that Aksai Chin had always been an Indian territory
upto Kunlun Range for long where they often used to migrate in summer season to graze their herds
and to collects salts and soda from Aksai Chin. They expressed their resentment against the Chinese
encroachment in Ladakh as well as have reservations against India’s responses to China which
jointly had repercussions on their livelihood resulting into the shrinking of grazing which drastically
reduced the number of their livestock from almost thousands to hundreds per household in just
couple of decades. Moreover, the Galwan Valley incident and India’s initial lax, increased the
apprehensions of the border residents and many families considered leaving their villages due to the
security concern as well as severe restriction on their movements in the newly created no-patrolling
zones, established during the military talks by India and China post-Galwan, in areas of north and
south Panggong Tso, Kailash Range, Hot Springs, Chumar, Gogra etc. Before anything else, the
residents of zero-border villages of Ladakh are eager to see a peaceful border which they suggested
could be possible through building confidence at the grass-root level between the people of Ladakh
and Tibet by re-opening the trade routes between Ladakh and Tibet. The routine trade and trade fairs
in the past served as a means of understanding and they believe that this sort of policy is the need of
the hour to reduce the difference between India and China. They argue that despite the border dispute
and differences both India and China have mutually accepted points along the border like Chushul
Border Personnel Meeting points where the militaries of both countries meet for flag meeting, which
could used for meeting point of the people of India and China to restore the friendship between India
and China.
On the basis of this study, India-China relationship can be divided into four phases where the border
dispute evolved and influenced the bilateral relationship. The first phase of India-China relationship
began with the establishment of the diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Although, the
annexation of Tibet by China became a prime concern for India, but the relationship remained quite
stable as the borders between Ladakh and Tibet was still the prerogative of Tibet until 1959. The
political understanding between the two enhanced which results into the Panchseel 119

5. agreement which laid down the terms for peaceful coexistence which was also adopted by other
countries as a fundamental principle of international relations. But the same Panchsheel became a
turning point in their history of India-China bilateral relationship when both countries derived
different conclusions from the agreement. New Delhi thought that China will abide by the agreement
and was taken for granted on the other hand China misused it by extending its claims upto Ladakh.
The more Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai engaged in diplomacy the more complex became the
border issue.
The second phase of the relationship was determined by the misunderstanding and misrepresentation
of border by each other which was aggravated by heated arguments between the leaders and incidents
like violation of territorial sovereignty in Aksai Chin and Tibet revolution which was later
manifested in the war of 1962. The war was unleashed by China as they were militarily prepared
with widespread operational lines of communications in Aksai Chin. The military power of China
enabled it to achieve its goal of acquiring strategic depth in Aksai Chin for the protection of their
Highway connecting Tibet with Xinjiang which helped China in suppressing the Tibet revolt from
overpowering Chinese control in 1959. This phase was a period of humiliation for India as its
military was overpowered at the eastern sector and large chunk of lands were occupied in the western
sector by China. However, it also damaged the reputation of China which was claiming the
leadership in Third World. It was during this phase that once friend China, for which India had
compromised at various platforms by rejecting the offers from both the great powers of a permanent
seat and recognizing it as the legitimate government of China, turned arch rival. This phase of the
relationship continued till they realized that their similarities overweigh their differences in the
changing global order.
The third phase of the relationship was accommodative which began with the re-establishment of
their diplomatic relationship in 1976 which was further given impetus by Rajiv-Deng modus vivendi
during 1988 summit. During this period both India and China mended their ways through economic
cooperation which helped them stabilize the border. The economic cooperation and the stabilization
of the border between the two increased the bilateral trade relations which touched $74 billion with
China becoming India’s largest trading partner in 2011. Ignoring and inactivating border issue in
order to 120

6. improve economic relationship yielded results in this phase of relationship which resulted in the rise
of China as a second largest global economy in the year 2010 which was sixth at the dawn of the
century and India emerged as the fifth largest which was thirteenth in 2000. During this period the
border issue remained relatively dormant due to their engagement in economic cooperation and trade.
The last but not the least, fourth phase of the relationship began in the year 2013 when Xi Jinping
took command of China followed by Narendera Modi in India in 2014. India and China relationship
during this phase witnessed a mixed feeling of adventurism as well as pragmatism. This phase started
with the Xi’s comment in Durban to settle India-China border dispute peacefully but it was soon
traumatized by the first transgression on the LAC by the Chinese PLA in Depsang Valley by
penetrating 19 km inside Indian side of LAC. Nonetheless, both countries pragmatically managed the
situation and reached an understanding in the form of Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in
2013 which became the last interstate border agreement between the two parties to reduce the border
hostilities. During this phase the border again become unstable due to frequent border standoffs at the
LAC in eastern Ladakh. In 2017 in an unusual standoff both countries further deteriorating their
relationship engaged in Doklam standoff for 73 long days which took two informal summits between
the leaders in Wuhan in 2018 and in Mamallapuram in 2019 where the leaders restored the
confidence directly at the top level. But that didn’t stop the Chinese from pursuing their strategy of
salami slicing in Ladakh which was foiled by Indian army in Galwan Valley in June 2020. The clash
weighs heavy for India as they maintained the sanctity of the border agreements and LAC while the
Chinese violating all the agreements used the medieval war tactics which killed 20 Indian soldiers.
This killing at the border disturbed the fragile India-China relationship making the future bilateral
prospects unpredictable. The Chinese activities and their military manoeuvrings in Ladakh have
changed the de-facto border which rendered all the border agreements ineffective in stabilizing and
settling the border dispute between India and China.
Although both countries through the border management frameworks and Confidence Building
Measures along the military fields at the LAC succeed to establish 121

7. peace and tranquillity at the border for almost two decade from 1993 to 2013. However, President
Xi’s insensitive and aggressive foreign policies had pushed India to take appropriate counter actions
against China which created new rifts between the two countries. The first mega flagship project of
China, CPEC launched by Xi was an attack on the territorial sovereignty of India which passes
through the Gilgit-Baltistan region of India, occupied by Pakistan in 1947. Since then India has kept
a keen eye on its China policy and countered every step taken by China against the national interest
of India.
Both India and China hosts more than 40% of world populations and both are emerging economic
powerhouses of the world. In the 21st Century both India and China are important players in
international politics. Their strategic competition could be a threat to the international peace and
prosperity on the other hand their cooperative engagement could contribute to the peace and stability
in the world. The protracted border dispute in Ladakh complexly combined with its claim on Indian
territories all along the border has always been the impediment in the realization of the potential of
India-China cooperation. In addition, to that China’s increasing engagement with Pakistan and
increasing connectivity projects encircling India has also been contributing in the cold relationship
between India and China.
5.1 Major Findings of the Study
 Independent India has been disinterested in Ladakh sector despite the accession of Jammu and
Kashmir to the Union of India on 26th October, 1947. It is evident from the fact that the two political
maps of India, attached to the White Papers published by the Ministry of States, headed by Sardar
Vallabhai Patel, one in July 1948 and another in February 1950, had showed the border from Ladakh
to Nepal as “undefined”. Subsequently, when Tibet was annexed by China, Sardar Vallabhai Patel
addressed a note to the Prime Minster of India on 7th of November, 1950 cautioning about the China
threat where no mention of Ladakh was found. Moreover, despite intelligence inputs from Indian air
reconnaissance parties about the Chinese survey in Aksai Chin in 1951, the Indian authorities never
paid any attention to the Chinese activities in Aksai Chin. Further, as the region was remote and
desolate, the Indian government never attempted to extend
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8. their administrative control upto its claimed borders in Aksai Chin and remained unknown to Delhi
until the Chinese announced the completion of a road through it in 1957. Had India properly attended
and garrisoned Ladakh after the independence, it would have been impossible for the Chinese to
venture into Aksai Chin and constructing motor roads in the region. Therefore, when Patel asked
Nehru to fundamentally rethink India’s foreign policy (and not just China policy) in the aftermath of
China’s invasion of Tibet, Nehru replied by noting that India’s “major possible enemy” was Pakistan,
while “Chinese aggression” in Tibet could be met by diplomacy and vigilance.2 Majeet S pardesi
(The initiation of China-India rivalry pp 20).
 Although India and China agreed to inter-state border agreements and various diplomatic and
political mechanisms to settle the border issue since 1993 but the increasing economic and military
power of China since the beginning of 21st century has diminished China’s interest in settling the
border dispute with India. China’s major security concern looms in the east where as the border
dispute with India is the only secondary security threat, as it had least impact on the national power
and security of China. Rather, China is using the border dispute as leverage to engage India in its
security affairs which would also contribute to contain India’s rise as an alternative global power
house.
 Since the border dispute between India and China has been arisen due to the non- demarcation of
the border. A demarcated Line of Actual Control can help stabilize and settle the border issue. For
instance, on the western border, India fought three full-fledged wars and a limited war in 1999 with
Pakistan. However, both managed to demarcate the Line of Control (LOC) as provisional
international border with the help of United Nations in 1949 which was later mutually formalized by
both countries during the Shimla Agreement of 1972. Since then India and Pakistan witnessed only
Kargil War in 1999 along the LOC, on the other hand India and China had fought only a short war in
1962 and agreed for LAC after the war which was legalized as de-facto border in 1993 but still due to
the non-demarcation of the border both forces witnessed three major border
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9. standoffs in 2013, 2014 and 2015 in Ladakh and one major clash recently in Galwan in 2020. As
long as the border remains un-demarcated border clash between India and China is bound to happen.
A temporary demarcated border on the patterns of LOC can help reduce the border tension between
India and China.
 The un-demarcated border and the strategic highway connecting its two ultra-sensitive regions of
Xinjiang and Tibet in Ladakh has always been the temptation to the Chinese to intrude across the
LAC. The recent Galwan incident also ensued in the same context which rendered all the
foundational border agreements and confidence building measures between India and China
ineffective. The 1993 and 1996 agreements bonded both nations to respect LAC and restrict the use
and threat to use of force and the 2013 agreement prohibited the tailing of patrols and marking of
border, all these border agreements proved ineffective. In 2020, China violated all the border
agreements in a single move by changing status quo in Ladakh, entering the undisputed pockets in
eastern Ladakh and using arms against Indian soldiers, conducting large scale military exercises near
the border, marking the disputed areas with Chinese characters like witnessed in Galwan.
 The border instability and the recent clash between India and China in June 2020 in Galwan
Valley have formidably impacted the psyche of the border residents of Ladakh. They are peace
lovers and they believe that the two countries should not resort to war rather chart out a plan with
pacific intentions to settle the border dispute by using soft power like opening of trading points in
Ladakh so that people across the border can exchange their ideas and develop an understanding of
brotherhood which would help build confidence between the two nations. There are also mutually
agreed points in Ladakh between India and China such as Chushul/Moldo where both countries has
established Border Personnel Meeting points (BPM) and militaries of both sides often meet for flag
meetings. The locals believe that these points should be exploited to forge a good and friendly
relationship between India and China.
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10. 5.2 Validity of Hypotheses
1. The geo-strategic importance of Ladakh attracts Chinese manoeuvrings in the Western
Sector of the India-China border: The Western Sector or Ladakh has always been an important
location for India from security point of view. However, after the annexation of Tibet in 1950 and the
rising turmoil in Xinjiang, China has been attracted by Ladakh where Aksai Chin was the most viable
alternative to Gobi Desert, which can withstand a long road connecting Tibet and Xinjiang which
was crucial for China’s consolidation of state. Thus China built a strategic road in 1957 and since
then China is moving west of the road to gain strategic depths to protect the only vein. Moreover, the
increasing China-Pakistan nexus increased the space for China to maneuver in Ladakh from both
sides. The ‘Shaksgam Valley’, very next to the ‘Siachen Glacier’ was merged with Xinjiang to the
detriment of India in 1963. Moreover, by developing the Karakoram highway through Gilgit-
Baltistan region enhanced its offensive capabilities at the outer edges of Ladakh in the west. In the
east, when India started gradually modernizing its border infrastructures by reactivating its
‘Advanced Landing Grounds’ near Karakoram Pass and completed the strategic Durbuk-Shoyok-
Daulat Beg Oldie (DS-DBO) road running along the LAC, China constantly tried to impede the
process, by disturbing peace and tranquility at the LAC. Since the tactical and strategic balance shifts
in favor of India at the LAC, China sprawled its network in Gilgit-Baltistan through the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to encircle Ladakh which gives strategic advantage to both
Pakistan and China. Thus, without the strategic importance of Aksai Chin, China’s interest in Ladakh
would be minimal and India-China relationship would have been different. Also Pakistan might
never have evolved today as China’s major ally with a direct land contact with Chinese territory by a
motor road through the Pakistan Occupied Ladakh. Thus the first hypothesis is proved.
2. The constant tussle at the border between Indian and China in Ladakh is due to their un-
demarcated nature of border: India and China never fought a war in their history until it broke out
in the year 1962. Until then both enjoyed a 125

11. benign relationship, despite their ideological differences as they were physically separated by the de-
facto independent state of Tibet till 1950s. The integration of Tibet turned India and China into
immediate neighbors which led to the emergences of a serious border dispute between India and
China due to their differences over the border alignment in Aksai Chin which was historically un-
demarcated. Although, there were ideological differences and competition between India and China
for the leadership of the Third World countries, the un-demarcated border remained the primary
strategic concern for both countries. In 1957 India and China witnessed the first ever border clash at
Kongka La, where troops from both sides were aggressively patrolling across the un-demarcated
border to exert maximum claims in Ladakh, which later turned into a war in 1962. The war resulted
in the establishment of a de-facto LAC between India and China which was later given the legal
status in 1993. However, as the border remained unmarked on the ground, it provided a great deal of
leverage to both countries to cross the un-demarcated border by claiming the territories in Ladakh
which were hitherto never claimed by the other.Today India and China have relatively more
differences over their bilateral issues than in 1950s, such as the increasing security dilemma in South
Asia, Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and India’s mounting trade deficit with China. However, their
frustrations could only been seen at the un-demarcated border through the violation of LAC,
changing the status quo, changing facts on ground, transgressions and fist-fight and killings on both
sides along the LAC. Of the Eleven major border incidents between India and China since 1950s six
major border standoffs were witnessed in Ladakh. Therefore, the lack of a clearly defined and
demarcated border line is the major factor for continuous border tension and clashes between India
and China. This hypothesis is also proved.
3. The Border management agreements and CBM’s agreed between India and China are
unable to resolve the border dispute between the two neighbouring countries: by 1988 India and
China normalized their relationship and agreed to resolve the border issue through the mechanism of
Joint Working Group (JWG) which was followed by five interstate border agreements beginning in
1993, 1996, 126
2005, 2012 and 2013. The first two agreements of 1993 and 1996 successfully stabilized the LAC. In
2003 Special Representative Mechanism was established by India and China to explore the political
solution to the border problem. In 2012 the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination
(WMCC) was set up for exchange of information across the border to built trust and confidence
between the two countries. Besides the agreements, the special representatives negotiated border
settlement for the 22nd time in December 2019. The WMCC met for 23rd time till 18 November,
2021. Since, Aksai Chin is under the administrative control of China, the border settlement was not
the strategic priority for Beijing. Moreover, they consider it prudent to keep the CBM’s
unimplemented and the border dispute unresolved to keep India engaged into its border security
affairs. Since 2013, China has been aggressively breaching the LAC and frequently altered the status
quo in the eastern Ladakh such as, the PLA entered 19 km into the Depsang plains inside the Indian
perceived LAC in 2013. In 2014, they intruded into the civilian areas of Chumar and Demchok in the
south-eastern Ladakh. In 2015 the PLA entered Burtse near the DBO and changed facts on the
ground by building observatory towers in the region close to the strategic DBO. In June 2020,
crossing all the red lines the belligerent PLA tailed Indian patrols in Panggong Tso area and Galwan
Valley which were hitherto uncontested. They attacked Indian soldiers using lethal weapons which
were prohibited under the terms of the agreements. They fired warning shots and marked rocks
with Chinese characters which were again restricted under the border agreements. The clash

12. results in the loss of soldiers on both sides which were unanticipated according to the agreements.
Thus this hypothesis is also proved.