The document summarizes the 2013 Himalayan tsunami that caused devastating floods and landslides in the Indian state of Uttarakhand from June 14-17. It describes how unusually heavy rainfall of over 375% of the normal amount, combined with other factors like construction, tourism development, and climate change, led to flash floods and landslides that caused widespread destruction and over 10,000 deaths. It discusses the emergency response and relief efforts by government agencies and militaries to conduct search, rescue and evacuation operations in the difficult terrain. It concludes that while heavy rainfall triggered the natural disaster, human activities like infrastructure development contributed greatly to its large scale impacts.

1. Er. Rajan Ranabhat
Er. Ravindra Lal Mul
M.Sc. In PHDE-II/I
Roll no. : 12 And 13
SOE, Pokhara University
2013 HIMALAYAN
TSUNAMI in India
(June 14th-17th 2013)
Date: 28thJune, 2020

2.  In June 2013, a multiday cloudburst centered on the North Indian state of Uttarakhand
caused devastating floods and landslides in the country’s worst natural disaster since the
2004 tsunami.
 From 14th to 17th June 2013, the Indian state of Uttarakhand and adjoining area received
heavy rainfall, which was about 375% more than the benchmark rainfall during a normal
monsoon. This caused the melting of Chorabari Glacier at the height of 3800 meters, and
eruption of the Mandakani River which led to heavy floods near Gobindghat.
 The rainfall resulted in extensive flooding and landslides in the region that is geologically
sensitive due to its geographic location in the Himalayan mountain range. According to the
Meteorological Departments of India and Pakistan, the monsoon advancing towards the
west of South Asia, combined with westerly winds resulted in several days of torrential
rains. The weather interaction of this kind normally occurs between October and April, but
extended to June. The intensity was also much higher than normally seen.
Introduction

3. Figure : Strong westerlies active over Europe in
April-June 2013 and collide over Himalayan region
in June 2013

4. Fig: Growth of Urban Population in
Uttarakhand
Fig: Growths of Registered Vehicles in Uttarakhand
(2002-03 to 2012-13)
Fig: Tourists Flow in Uttarakhand (2000-2012)

5. District Actual rainfall (mm) Normal rainfall (mm) % Departure
Almora 208.7 26.3 694
Bageshwar 391.2 26.3 1387
Chamoli 316.9 22.6 1302
Champawat 351.0 33.5 948
Dehradun 565.4 36.8 1436
Garhwal Pauri 149.7 15.8 847
Garhwal Tehri 327.7 22.0 1390
Hardwar 298.8 21.6 1283
Nainital 506.5 38.8 1205
Pithoragarh 246.9 73.0 238
Rudraprayag 366.3 53.9 580
Udham Singh Nagar 157.7 40.2 292
Uarkashi 375.6 25.8 1356
Table 1: district-wise rainfall distribution from June 13-19, 2013

6. Major causes of Himalayan Tsunami
1. Formation of Small Lake:
Small lake was formed during the rains above Kedarnath town. It was a 100 square
hectare lake which contained 10 million liter of water. The water that collected in the
lake came down along with the water from the glacier.
2. Construction of Roads and Hydro Project destabilizing mountains:
The huge expansion of road and transport brought the mountains in Uttarakhand down.
It was a major destabilizing factor for a mountain and was a new phenomenon for the
Himalaya.

7. 3. Heavy Rainfall and Cloudburst led to Flash flood
There was rainfall of 120 mm in 24 hours before the flash flood of June 16 at Kedarnath.
The lake burst due to a breach in the blockade that formed its boundary. Coupled with
heavy rain in the area, this caused flash flood. It is because of the lake that there was
excessive stream run-off and a third channel was formed.
4. Impact of Climate Change:

Surface air temperatures in the Indian Himalayas have increased by one degree Celsius in
the past decade. As the average global temperature continues to rise, a combination of
"rapidly melting Himalayan glaciers," extreme rainfall, and unpredictable seismic events
caused the GLOFS in which massive waves of water suddenly charged down mountains
and wiped out entire villages and communities.

8. Fig : Landslide in lower
Rudraprayag destroyed a road,
making relief work difficult
5. Massive Landslide:
It is meant that more than 340 millimeters of
rainfall (normal rainfall being about 66mm)
coincided with the pilgrimage season in the
region. Some areas experienced the wettest
season in over 50 years. To make matters
worse, there was snow on the ground,
therefore, heavy rainfall combined with the
snow created suitable conditions for landslides
in the affected region.

9. Impacts of the disaster
 Social impact was felt by communities that lost over 10,000 people, found over a million
tourists stranded/evacuated, and lost account of thousands of missing persons. The total
number of affected persons was estimated as an astonishing 1.6 million. Over 15,700 villages
suffered destruction covering an estimated area of 96,000 sq. km. At the time of tragedy,
about 30 million tourists/pilgrims were present in the region.
 Economic impact became evident when thousands of livestock were found dead, illegal
housing on riverbeds were discovered and reported, and thousands of illegal mining sites
were uncovered, notified, and stopped in the region. Close to USD 500 million were lost in
damages – most of which was uninsured.

10.  Environmentally, there were water contamination
concerns, millions of dollars lost in forest damage
and loss of flora and fauna in this extremely
ecologically valuable and sensitive region. Critical
facilities and essential services were severely
crippled by the shortage of medicines and drinking
water in hundreds of villages.
 Critical infrastructure, such as important bridges ,
roads connecting remotely located villages, water
distribution and hydroelectric plants, and power
lines were critically compromised and damaged.
Estimates suggest that 695 water schemes were
affected and over a thousand bridges were
damaged.

11. Figure : Kedarnath temple area afer the
landslide in June 2013
Figure : A bridge on the verge of collapse
in Kedarnath valley

12. Devastating effects of the Himalayan tsunami
 Chorabari glacier was the epicentre of this Himalayan Tsunami. People recall that on
June 16 the Chorabari lake exploded when clouds burst over it. Ensuing rains cut off
the hilly districts of Uttarkashi, Rudraprayag, Chamoli and Pithoragarh from the
mainland and battered the land till it crumbled.
 The raging Bhagirathi, Alaknanda and Mandakini had swollen like never before and
swept away whatever came in their way. As many as 2,052 houses had been wiped
out, 147 bridges had collapsed and 1,307 roads destroyed. The upper reaches of
Uttarakhand looked as if the region had travelled a hundred years back in time.

13.  The Gangotri and Yamunotri highways were
damaged at several places.
 The rivers had damaged the 36-km stretch
from Uttarkashi to Bhatwari at six places.
 The stretch of road between Matli to Maneri
in Uttarkashi was so badly damaged that it
could not be making functional for many
months.
 Three drinking water projects had got
washed away , while 71 streams and 40
canals had been damaged.

14. Disaster natural but damage manmade
 Uttarakhand the hill state in the Himalayan range is so far the worst hit by the extreme
rains that struck northern India . Heavy rainfall had wreaked havoc on the region because
of the fragile nature of the Himalayan range and poor soil stability in its steep slopes. But it
was human-induced factors that had compounded the scale of the disaster.
 The indiscriminate cutting of mountain slopes for construction of buildings had resulted in
filling of the flood plains.
 Unabated expansion of hydro-power projects and construction of roads to accommodate
ever-increasing tourism, especially religious tourism, were major causes for the
unprecedented scale of devastation.
 Shortage of dwelling units had led to mushrooming of illegal structures, some right on the
riverbanks.
 The main indicator of a thriving real estate business was the Himalayas itself, hollowed
down for boulders, pebbles, sand and gravel. Statistics of the forest department showed
that between 2000 and 2010, as many as 3,903.24 hectares forestland was diverted for
mining projects .

15. Figure : Evidence of poor building codes and lack of
safe development practices .
Figure: Kedarnath temple area in 2010, showing
urban growth.

16. Emergency Rescue and Relief Operations
 Search, rescue and relief operations during Uttarakhand disaster were the most difficult
operations carried out in the Indian history of disaster management.
 Various Central and State level government and non-government agencies played a
significant role in making this operation successful, despite difficult terrain, adverse weather
conditions, disrupted roads and lack of telecom connectivity.

17. Government of India Initiatives
 Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India provided necessary support in managing the
Uttarakhand Disaster in an effective and efficient manner.
 Ministry of Defense and other ministries during June 17-19 to review evacuation and relief
operations. The National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) reviewed the situation in the State
on day-to-day basis.
 Government of India supported the State Government in carrying out its evacuation and relief
operations by providing support of armed forces and paramilitary forces, including NDRF.
 The supply of aviation turbine fuel (ATF) for the air operations was a challenge, which was
successfully met by the combined efforts of the Indian Air Force and the Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Gas.
 To restore the communication, 105 satellite phones were distributed by the Government of
India to various Central and state agencies. Besides, the efforts of BSNL towards restoration
of communication were closely monitored by the National Crisis Management Committee.

18. Government of Uttarakhand Initiatives
 During the entire crisis period, the Uttarakhand Government did its best to manage the
calamity notwithstanding the gigantic proportion of the disaster.
 Soon after the disaster struck, the State Government initiated massive rescue and
evacuation operations with the help of various Central and State Government agencies.
 The entire rescue and evacuation operation was a joint effort of both the Government of
India agencies and the State Government.
 Despite the most arduous and difficult terrain, inclement weather and lack of connectivity,
approximately 1,20,000 persons stranded/ trapped in different locations (which included
both pilgrims and local residents) were safely evacuated and taken to the relief camps.
 The major part of the evacuation was accomplished in less than a fortnight making it one of
the largest and swiftest rescue/evacuation operations by the civil administration.
 All the essential supplies like food, drinking water, medicines, kerosene oil, solar lamps, etc.
were continuously provided by air dropping as well as by surface means.

19. Government of Uttarakhand Initiatives
 A total of 69 relief camps were run, where 1,51,629 pilgrims/ local residents were looked
after. Some camps continued operating beyond the emergency phase for the local residents.
Approximately 900 trucks of relief material were received from other states and dispatched
to the affected districts from a nodal/ relief centre, set up at Dehradun
 Forty-three medical teams comprising of 313 doctors and 4977 para-medical staff, were
deployed and essential medicines, bleaching powder and chlorine were regularly supplied.
The Health Department of the State coordinated the effort to prevent outbreak of any
epidemic.
 The State Government established a Missing Persons Cell on June 27 at the Disaster
Mitigation and Management Centre (DMMC) at Dehradun. The “missing persons” data was
managed with the support of International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)
professionals.
 Facebook and Twitter accounts were opened, where state-wise photographs and other
accounts were posted which provided a very successful backup.

20. Government of Uttarakhand Initiatives
 Missing Persons Cell made nearly 43,000 calls using the mobile numbers provided by the
Department of Telecommunications which they could collect using the call data between 14
June and 19 June 2013. Statewise lists of missing persons were sent to Chief Secretaries of
the concerned states and repeated follow up was made to validate the information.
 After sifting the information through multiple filters, the Missing Persons Cell provided
name-wise information of missing persons, which became the basis of issuing death
certificates, as per procedure prescribed.

21. Role of the Armed Forces
 The Armed Forces carried out the rescue and relief operations with a remarkable sense of
urgency and professionalism. While doing so, the most important task was to trudge every
trail and comb the entire area of responsibility, find survivors, lift and assist the stranded and
shift them to relief centres. Thereafter, arrangements were made to evacuate them safely.

22. The Indian Army Operations
 At the commencement of operations, about 5600 troops were deployed. But seeing the
magnitude of the problem two days later, the strength was reinforced to approximately
8,000 troops. On 21 Jun 2013, 150 Special Forces Paratroopers were deployed to undertake
search and rescue operations in valleys, gorges and inaccessible areas.
 Fourteen helicopters of Army Aviation were pressed into action, which flew 737 sorties and
transported about 30 tons of relief material. Army aviation helicopters were also used to
establish a helicopter bridge at Govindghat which fast tracked evacuation operation to
Joshimath significantly
 Additional Engineer Task Forces were deployed along each axis to clear the landslides and
breaches. The troops were tasked to construct ropeways, makeshift rope bridges and foot
bridges.
 Twenty-four medical teams were deployed by the Army in the affected areas from Military
Hospitals located in Dehradun / Uttarakhand. Two psychologists from Military Hospitals at
Bareilly and Jabalpur were also deployed.

23. Indian Air Force Operations
 The unprecedented magnitude of destruction caused by the flash floods in Uttarakhand
called for an immediate and large scale relief and rescue effort.
 The IAF responded to this enormous challenge with characteristic speed, resolve and
fortitude launching ‘Operation Rahat’.
 IAF resources were marshalled from different corners of the country, and up to 45
helicopters and 13 transport aircraft were involved during the major part of the operations.
 The entire IAF team, be it the men or women who flew the helicopters in a difficult
environment marred by frequent spells of bad weather or the transport crew, pitched in
with all the resolve.
 The C-130J Hercules transport aircraft provided innovative solution and was used as mobile
weather platform as well as an Airborne Command Post.
 The Hercules was also used as an ‘Air Bridge’ to ferry fuel and rescue people from Dharasu
to Delhi. Bridging equipment from distant locations was airlifted by AN-32 aircraft to Jolly
Grant airfield to support BRO efforts.

24. Figure : The satellite images ISRO acquired on June 20, 2013 shows the extensive damage Kedarnath suffered
after the June 2013 floods .

25. Conclusion
 Four ancient holy sites of Uttarakhand (Kedarnath, Badrinath, Gangotri, and Yamnotri) in northern
Himalayan region of India that are visited by millions of Hindu pilgrims and tourists every year were
in the impact area. If there is another event in the future that is similar to this one, the potential
impact could be ten times as compared to the June 2013 event.
 Changing natural environment and human interactions with it needs to be addressed in order to
bring meaningful awareness among stakeholders.
 A challenging aspect of the particular event discussed here is that it crosses administrative
boundaries which makes it difficult to prepare for potential risk and respond to the disaster. Every
summer season (May-August) millions of religious devotees participate in the pilgrimage to the
difficult Himalayan terrain. Therefore, it is important that resilience building in communities and
institutions is taken seriously.
 Identification of unsafe locations and conditions and assessment of is a vital first step toward
mitigation of future disasters. risk and vulnerability
 Mitigation measures should address improving of roads and tourist accommodations, reducing
soil erosion in the hilly terrain, and regularly monitoring rainfall and river flows in the area.

26. Lessons learnt from the Uttarakhand tragedy / Suggestions
 Govt. must ensure credible environmental and social impact assessment of
all activities including all dams and all hydropower projects of above 1 MW
capacity, such assessments should also include how the projects can increase the
disaster potential of the area, how they will affect the adaptation capacity of the
local people in the context of climate change, how the projects themselves
would be affected in changing climate, among other aspects.
 Govt. must ensure credible environmental compliance mechanism in place for
each project in which local people have a key role. No projects should be cleared
until and unless there is credible cumulative impact assessment for all projects in
any river basin and sub basin, which includes carrying capacity study.

27.  Certain rivers and certain high risk zones should be declared as no project areas in each
basin.
 In any case, there should be at least 5 km of free flowing rivers between two projects. At
least 50% of river flows in lean season and at least 30% of river flows in monsoon season.
This should be applicable for all projects, including existing and under construction projects.
 Govt. must put in place system of early warning, forecasting and dissemination for all kinds
of disasters, particularly those related to rainfall and landslides. It is technologically feasible
to predict even cloud bursts at least 3 hours in advance. A Doppler Radar System was
sanctioned for Uttarakhand since 2008 that would have enabled, but due to lack of
coordination between NDMA, IMD and Uttarakhand government, this was not in place.
 Put in place a clearly defined monitoring system in place that will give prompt report of
actual rainfall events even as the event starts so that the downstream area people and
administration.

28.  Protection and conservation of rivers, riverbeds and
flood plains, including aquatic biodiversity.
 Encroachment of riverbeds and floodplains should not be
allowed.
 Prepare clearly defined space for rivers, have river
regulation zone in place and remove all illegal
encroachments in river beds and flood plains in a
time bound manner urgently through legislative,
followed by executive action.
 Unsustainable mining of riverbeds should not be allowed.
Fig: NASA satellite imagery of
Northern India on 17 June