Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on Russia

Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on
Russia’s Periphery
Hard Targets and Intelligence
Week 3
Duggleby
The Florida State University
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Sovereignty?
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Let’s address that sovereignty thing again
Only states deal with sovereignty and exercise authority over
territory
States have “national interests,” which drive decision-making
and policy
History, Culture and Religion play a major role within a state…
So does Nationalism, Patriotism and Pride!

The United States is the only remaining true super-power
following the collapse of the Soviet Union
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What is a ‘Frozen Conflict’?
Armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political
resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the
different sides(1)
Russia is responsible for ALL internationally recognized
‘frozen conflicts’ that began since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in December 1991
Sovereign nations affected represent 1/3 of countries previously
part of the USSR: (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Armenia)
Russia’s response has been to send ‘peacekeepers’, but then
remain in the region and ‘stoke the fire’
Moscow’s pretext and justification is the need to ‘protect’ its
compatriots—ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (1)
It all begins innocently, with attempts to appeal to the
geographically conflicted locals by citing common values, the
Orthodox Church, culture
—leads to handing out Russian citizenship/passports(2)
Internal sovereignty is achieved, but external sovereignty is
not—no international recognition.
The United States and NATO respects the sovereignty of all
states affected
Agnia Grigas: Frozen Conflicts; A Took Kit for US
Policymakers
Beyond Crimea, the new Russian empire

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Frozen Conflicts
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to
the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains
about 1500 “peacekeepers”
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Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)
U.S. sponsored, 18-month, $64 million program aimed at
increasing the capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces and
enhancing Georgia’s CT capabilities
Began in May, 2002, ultimately trained and equipped four 600-
man Special Forces battalions (2 Brigades) with light weapons,
vehicles and communications
Was US SOF lead in the beginning, shifting to the USMC and

the British Army
GTEP ended in April 2004, but actually continued under the
Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program,
preparing Georgian troops for operations in Iraq
3d largest troop contributor in Afghanistan in 2008. Georgia
had its two U.S. trained brigades deployed at the time Russia
invaded in August of that year. This was certainly a calculated
strategic move by Putin
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Georgia Frozen Conflicts
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Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is a military strategy that blends conventional
warfare, irregular warfare and cyberwarfare.[1] In addition,
hybrid warfare is used to describe attacks by nuclear, biological
and chemicalweapons, improvised explosive devices and
information warfare.[2] This approach to conflicts, is a potent,
complex variation of warfare.[3] Hybrid warfare can be used to
describe the flexible and complex dynamics of the battlespace
requiring a highly adaptable and resilient response.[
What we see in Russia now, in this hybrid approach to war, is to
use all the tools they have ... to stir up problems they can then
begin to exploit through their military tool,” said Breedlove,
NATO’s supreme allied commander.

Irregular warfare, Informal aggression, cyber.
http://yle.fi/uutiset/cyber_security_pro_finland_under_hybrid_w
arfare_attack/7470050
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This is OSINT, but we get notifications with more intel through
sharing
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“Sanctity of Borders.” “Lack of Respect for the Sovereignty of
other Countries.” (Robert Shaw – NATO, Brussels 28 June
2017)

Ukraine
Ukraine remains at risk of domestic turmoil, which Russia could
exploit to undermine Kyiv’s pro-West orientation. These factors
will threaten Ukraine’s nascent economic recovery and
potentially lead to changes in its foreign policy that further
inflame tension between Russia and the West.
Popular frustrations with the pace of reforms, depressed
standards of living, perceptions of worsening corruption, and
political polarization ahead of scheduled presidential and
legislative elections in 2019 could prompt early elections.
Opposition leaders will seek to capitalize on popular
discontent to weaken President Petro Poroshenko and the ruling
coalition ahead of elections in 2019.
The conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to remain stalemated
and marked by fluctuating levels of violence. A major offensive
by either side is unlikely in 2018, although each side’s calculus
could change if it sees the other as seriously challenging the
status quo. Russia will continue its military, political, and
economic destabilization campaign against Ukraine to stymie
and, where possible, reverse Kyiv’s efforts to integrate with the
EU and strengthen ties to NATO. Kyiv will strongly resist
concessions to Moscow but almost certainly will not regain
control of Russian-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine in 2018.
Russia will modulate levels of violence to pressure Kyiv and
shape negotiations in Moscow’s favor.
support for Kyiv, but the Kremlin is coping with sanctions at
existing levels.
Russia. We expect that Russia will conduct bolder and more
disruptive cyber operations during the next year, most likely
using new capabilities against Ukraine. The Russian

Government is likely to build on the wide range of operations it
is already conducting, including disruption of Ukrainian energy-
distribution networks, hack-and-leak influence operations,
distributed denial-of-service attacks, and false flag operations.
In the next year, Russian intelligence and security services will
continue to probe US and allied critical infrastructures, as well
as target the United States, NATO, and allies for insights into
US policy.
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16
so much
for sovereignty!
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International Actions after 2014
The NATO – Russia Council in Brussels is dissolved in
Brussels—Russia told to “go home.”
Civilian and Military Cooperation has ceased
Agreement still in force on paper – still functioning in a limited
manner with occasional talks

G-7 member states decided that Russia is no longer welcome
because meaningful discussion would not be possible with
Russia at the table
U.S. – Russia security cooperation programs canceled,
permanently impacted:
Russian exercises in violation of Vienna Documents by not
inviting observers. No transparency
Joint Staff Talks
Naval Ship Visits
Military Exercises and Exchanges
Security Assistance and Defense Education
The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established as a
mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation,
joint decision and joint action. Within the NRC, the individual
NATO member states and Russia have worked as equal partners
on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest.
The NRC was established at the NATO-Russia Summit in Rome
on 28 May 2002 by the Declaration on “NATO-Russia
Relations: a New Quality”. The Rome Declaration builds on the
goals and principles of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, which remains the
formal basis for NATO-Russia relations. The NRC replaced the
Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a forum for consultation and
cooperation created by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
In April 2014, following Russia’s illegal military intervention
in Ukraine and its violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity, the Alliance suspended all practical
cooperation between NATO and Russia including that which
took place in the framework of the NRC. However, the Alliance
agreed to keep channels of communication open in the NRC and

the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Ambassadorial level
and above, to allow the exchange of views, first and foremost
on the crisis in Ukraine.
Three meetings of the NATO-Russia Council took place in 2016
and three in 2017. The first meeting in 2018 took place on 31
May. NATO remains open to a periodic, focused and meaningful
political dialogue with Russia on the basis of reciprocity, as
agreed at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016.
The NATO-Russia Council has an important role to play as a
forum for dialogue and information exchange, to reduce
misunderstandings and increase predictability.
The 29 individual Allies and Russia are equal partners in the
NRC – instead of meeting in the bilateral “NATO+1” format
under the PJC.
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NATO Allies in Europe
Russia
Russia has developed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
that the United States has declared is in violation of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Despite
Russia’s ongoing development of other Treaty-compliant
missiles with intermediate ranges, Moscow probably believes
that the new GLCM provides sufficient military advantages to
make it worth risking the political repercussions of violating the
INF Treaty. In 2013, a senior Russian administration official
stated publicly that the world had changed since the INF Treaty

was signed in 1987. Other Russian officials have made
statements complaining that the Treaty prohibits Russia, but not
some of its neighbors, from developing and possessing ground-
launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500
kilometers.
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Transnational Organized Crime
Use of Energy as a Weapon
Nuclear Power Plant Catastrophe
Hybrid Warfare
Other Threats
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Non-kinetic punishment - Energy
“RUSSIA’S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO PREVENT
OUTSIDE POWERS (USA, NATO) FROM INTERFERING IN
REGIONAL CONFLICTS.”(3)
Dunay, Pal, When Outsiders Interfere, per Concordium

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Two Forever Frozen?
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Two Forever Finished?
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Problems on Russia’s Periphery
2020 was a year to be remembered. In addition to the myriad
challenges surrounding the pandemic, Putin and the Russian
Federation faced several problems maintaining it’s sway and

influence in the post-Soviet space, taking Putin by surprise by
the rapid succession of crises occurring back-to-back on
Russia’s periphery:
In August 2020, demonstrators in Belarus began staging weekly
protests against rigged presidential elections, won “officially”
by long-standing leader Alexander Lukashenko
In September 2020, the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
thawed, and war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan
In October 2020, violent protests led to the ouster of Putin
puppet and Kyrgyz president Soornonbay Jeenbekov
Problems on Russia’s Periphery and Internal Strife
These events affected Vladimir Putin greatly, and contributed to
the growing internal problems in the Russian Federation. 4
Warning Signs of Instability:
Wage Arrears: Russian workers, primarily in Siberia and the
Primorsky regions are not getting paid
Russia’s Banking System: Illegal and irresponsible activity, the
decline in the price of oil, more workers not getting paid and
bankruptcies
Political Protests: Economic difficulties leads to social unrest.
Russians not getting paid and reduced social services points
directly to an inept Putin government
Purges: Political and security purges ordered by Putin—
basically getting rid of political rivals. Most prominent being
Alexey Navalny’s poisoning with Novichok and recent arrest
Navalny is important because he epitomizes and catalyzes
growing political awareness and a perceptible sentiment for
change, especially among younger Russians

Recent Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
If the political unrest in Kyrgyzstan and Belarus tested Russia’s
handling of “people power,” the outbreak of war again between
Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 challenged Moscow’s role as
the preeminent power in the South Caucasus and threatened the
Kremlin’s ability to contain hostilities between the countries
Baku (Azerbaijan) is better armed than it has been in the past
due to oil revenues and a lot more defense spending on
sophisticated weapons
Yerevan (Armenia), still has the backing of the Russian
Federation, to include Russian bases and troops on its territory
“Russia was doing all it could to maintain ties both with
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Every day of conflict in Karabakh is
helping zero out Russia’s authority. There is nothing good about
these conflicts for Moscow.” (Konstantin Zatulin, senior
Russian lawmaker and Putin ally)
Public Discontent and Cold War-style foreign policies
Within Russia, the economic hardship caused by the pandemic
has helped deepen public anger against Putin
Some analysts say that public discontent within Russia means
that Putin needs to turn more of his focus to domestic issues
such as economic hardship, pollution and poor health care,
rather than delving into global geopolitics
Moscow is likely to continue Cold War-style confrontation with
the U.S. and its allies, wielding influence through arms and
energy agreements, to further its aims
In the Western Hemisphere, Russia has expanded its
engagement with Venezuela, supported Cuba, and used arms
sales and energy agreements to try to expand access to markets

and natural resources in Latin America
“For Putin, practically his entire mission and his vision of
Russian greatness and success revolve around his foreign-policy
agenda. The new series of crises will very much distract Putin
from domestic problems.” (Tatiana Stanovaya, nonresident
scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center)
Desperately seeking solidarity
The multinational response to the Skripal attack—in which 27
NATO countries expelled 123 Russian diplomats and spies—
remains the single most visible rebuke to the Russian
intelligence challenge and also the most powerful example of a
potential systemic counter
NATO has proven to be a uniquely effective alliance precisely
because of the solidarity it embodies: an attack on one member
state is an attack on all
At NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, it was decided that a ‘hybrid
attack’, mainly through cyber, could potentially lead to the
invocation of Article 5 and retaliation in kind or kinetically
That is a mutual commitment that even Moscow appears to take
seriously, for all Western concerns about potential faint-
heartedness and division
In the context of the NATO alliance, where sharing intelligence
and discussing common plans are a daily necessity, member
states which fail to invest in their counter-intelligence agencies
put not only their own security at risk but also that of their
allies

Concluding Thoughts
Russia has been the cause or enabler of every frozen conflict in
the Post Soviet Space
Putin seeks multipolarity and continues to destablize the region
in his near abroad
I believe there will be more, and most of the current crises will
not be resolved any time soon. What might be next?
Russia is in need of some foreign policy success—aggressive
foreign policies unsupported and definitely not popular with the
U.S., NATO, UN
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BUS499 Capstone
Week 10 Assignment
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References
Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2013). Strategic
management: Concepts and cases: Competiveness and
globalization (10th ed.). Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage
Learning.
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11
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report (Date of Earliest Event Reported): December 24,
2020
THE HOME DEPOT, INC.
(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in Charter)

Delaware 1-8207 95-3261426
(State or Other Jurisdiction
of Incorporation)
(Commission
File Number)
(IRS Employer
Identification No.)
2455 Paces Ferry Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30339
(Address of Principal Executive Offices) (Zip Code)
(770) 433-8211
(Registrant’s Telephone Number, Including Area Code)
Not Applicable
(Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last
Report)
Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is
intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the
registrant under any of the
following provisions (see General Instruction A.2 below):
☐ Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the
Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)
☐ Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the
Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)

☐ Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-
2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))
☐ Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-
4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))
Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act:
Title of each class
Trading
Symbol(s)
Name of each exchange
on which registered
Common Stock, $0.05 Par Value Per Share HD New York
Stock Exchange
Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is an emerging
growth company as defined in Rule 405 of the Securities Act of
1933 (§230.405 of this
chapter) or Rule 12b-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(§240.12b-2 of this chapter).
Emerging growth company ☐
If an emerging growth company, indicate by check mark if the
registrant has elected not to use the extended transition period
for complying with any
new or revised financial accounting standards provided pursuant
to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act. ☐

Item 2.01. Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets.
On December 24, 2020, The Home Depot, Inc., a Delaware
corporation (the “Company”), completed the previously
announced acquisition of HD
Supply Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“HD Supply”),
pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Merger (the “Merger
Agreement”), dated as of
November 15, 2020, by and among the Company, Coronado
Acquisition Sub Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly
owned subsidiary of the
Company (“Merger Sub”), and HD Supply.
As previously disclosed, pursuant to the Merger Agreement and
upon the terms and subject to the conditions thereof, on
November 24, 2020,
Merger Sub commenced a tender offer (the “Offer”) to purchase
all of the outstanding shares of common stock, par value $0.01
per share (the “Shares”),
of HD Supply at a price of $56.00 per Share (the “Offer Price”),
net to the seller in cash, without interest, subject to any
required withholding of taxes.
The Offer expired at 12:00 midnight, New York City time, at
the end of the day on Wednesday, December 23, 2020 (the

“Expiration Time”). The
depositary agent for the Offer has advised the Company that, as
of the Expiration Time, a total of 127,928,897 Shares had been
validly tendered and not
validly withdrawn in the Offer, representing approximately
82.9% of the outstanding Shares. The number of Shares validly
tendered and not validly
withdrawn pursuant to the Offer satisfied the condition to the
Offer that there be validly tendered and not validly withdrawn
prior to the expiration of the
Offer a number of Shares that, together with all other Shares (if
any) beneficially owned by the Company and its affiliates,
represent a majority of the
Shares outstanding at the expiration of the Offer (determined on
a fully diluted basis (which assumes conversion or exercise of
all derivative securities
regardless of the conversion or exercise price, the vesting
schedule or other terms and conditions thereof)). All conditions
to the Offer having been
satisfied or waived, the Company and Merger Sub accepted for
payment all Shares validly tendered and not validly withdrawn
pursuant to the Offer.
On December 24, 2020, in accordance with the Merger
Agreement and Section 251(h) of the General Corporation Law
of the State of Delaware,
Merger Sub merged with and into HD Supply (the “Merger”),
and HD Supply survived the Merger as a wholly owned

subsidiary of the Company. At
the effective time of the Merger (the “Effective Time”), each
Share that was issued and outstanding immediately prior to the
Effective Time (other than
Shares owned by the Company, Merger Sub or HD Supply, or by
any of their respective direct or indirect wholly owned
subsidiaries, and Shares held by
stockholders of HD Supply who were entitled to demand and
who had properly and validly demanded their statutory rights of
appraisal and had neither
withdrawn nor lost such rights prior to the Effective Time) was
converted into the right to receive the Offer Price, net to the
holder thereof, in cash,
without interest thereon.
The foregoing description of the Merger Agreement and the
transactions contemplated thereby as set forth in this Item 2.01
does not purport to be
complete and is subject to, and qualified in its entirety by, the
full text of the Merger Agreement, a copy of which was filed as
Exhibit 2.1 to the Current
Report on Form 8-K filed by the Company with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission on November 18, 2020
and which is incorporated herein
by reference.
Item 8.01. Other Events.

On December 24, 2020, the Company issued a press release
announcing the completion of the acquisition of HD Supply, a
copy of which is
attached as Exhibit 99.1 to this Current Report on Form 8-K and
incorporated by reference herein.
Item 9.01. Financial Statements and Exhibits.
Exhibit Description
2.1
Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of November 15, 2020,
by and among The Home Depot, Inc., Coronado Acquisition Sub
Inc.
and HD Supply Holdings, Inc (incorporated by reference to
Exhibit 2.1 to the Current Report on Form 8-K filed by The
Home Depot, Inc.
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on
November 18, 2020).*
99.1 Press Release of The Home Depot, Inc.
104 The cover page from this Current Report on Form 8-K
formatted in Inline XBRL (included as Exhibit 101).
* Schedules and exhibits have been omitted pursuant to Item
601(a)(5) of Regulation S-K. The Company will furnish the
omitted schedules and

exhibits to the Securities and Exchange Commission upon
request.
2
https://content.edgar-
online.com/ExternalLink/EDGAR/0001193125-20-
296960.html?hash=eb77fe534045c69aca168d5779d7f07ffdac2d3
7f95d1a3523c2289f47dd44f2&dest=D28049DEX21_HTM
7f95d1a3523c2289f47dd44f2&dest=D28049DEX21_HTM
7f95d1a3523c2289f47dd44f2&dest=D28049DEX21_ HTM
SIGNATURE
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on
its behalf by the
undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
THE HOME DEPOT, INC.
Date: December 28, 2020

By: /s/ Richard V. McPhail
Name: Richard V. McPhail
Title: Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
3
Exhibit 99.1
THE HOME DEPOT COMPLETES ACQUISITION OF HD
SUPPLY
Dec 24, 2020
ATLANTA, Dec. 24, 2020 /PRNewswire/ — The Home Depot®,
the world’s largest home improvement retailer, has completed
the acquisition of HD
Supply Holdings, Inc., for a total enterprise value (including net
cash) of approximately $8 billion. HD Supply is a leading
national distributor of
maintenance, repair and operations (MRO) products in the
multifamily and hospitality end markets. The agreement to
acquire HD Supply was
announced on November 16, 2020.
“We’re thrilled to welcome HD Supply associates to The Home

Depot,” said Craig Menear, chairman and CEO of The Home
Depot. “The combination
of the two businesses will enable us to better serve both
existing and new MRO customers, and I look forward to the
value this acquisition will bring to
our associates, customers and shareholders.”
1/4
The acquisition of HD Supply is expected to position The Home
Depot as a premier provider in a highly fragmented MRO
marketplace, which the
company estimates to be approximately $55 billion. HD Supply
complements The Home Depot’s existing MRO business with a
robust product offering
and value-added service capabilities, an experienced salesforce,
and an extensive, MRO-specific distribution network throughout
the U.S. and Canada.
The tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of HD Supply
expired at midnight, New York City time, at the end of the day
on December 23, 2020.
American Stock Transfer & Trust Company, LLC, the
depository and paying agent for the tender offer, advised The
Home Depot that as of the tender
offer expiration, a total of 127,928,897 shares had been validly

tendered and not validly withdrawn, representing approximately
82.9% of the
outstanding shares. All of the conditions of the offer have been
satisfied and The Home Depot and its subsidiary Coronado
Acquisition Sub Inc. have
accepted for payment for $56 per share in cash, without interest,
subject to any required withholding taxes, all shares validly
tendered and not validly
withdrawn and will promptly pay for all such shares. Following
its acceptance of the tendered shares, The Home Depot
completed the acquisition of HD
Supply through a merger of Coronado Acquisition Sub Inc. with
and into HD Supply. As a result of the merger, HD Supply
became a wholly owned
subsidiary of The Home Depot. In connection with the merger,
all HD Supply shares not validly tendered (other than shares
held by The Home Depot,
Coronado Acquisition Sub Inc., HD Supply or any of their
respective direct or indirect wholly owned subsidiaries and
shares held by stockholders of
HD Supply who have perfected their statutory appraisal rights)
have been cancelled and converted into the right to receive the
same $56 in cash (without
interest and subject to any required withholding taxes) as will
be paid for all HD Supply shares that were validly tendered and
not validly withdrawn.
About The Home Depot

The Home Depot is the world’s largest home improvement
specialty retailer, with 2,295 retail stores in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, 10 Canadian provinces and
Mexico. In fiscal 2019, The Home Depot had sales of $110.2
billion and earnings of
$11.2 billion. The Company employs more than 400,000
associates. The Home Depot’s stock is traded on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE: HD)
and is included in the Dow Jones industrial average and
Standard & Poor’s 500 index.
2/4
About HD Supply
HD Supply is one of the largest wholesale distributors in North
America. The company provides a broad range of products and
value-add services to
approximately 300,000 customers with leadership positions in
the living space maintenance, repair and operations sector.
Through approximately 44
distribution centers, across 25 states and two Canadian
provinces, the company’s approximately 5,500 associates
provide localized, customer-tailored

products, services and expertise. For more information, visit
www.hdsupply.com.
Certain statements contained herein constitute “forward-looking
statements” as defined in the federal securities laws. Forward-
looking statements may
relate to, among other things, the acquisition of HD Supply that
involves substantial risks and uncertainties that could cause
actual results to differ
materially from those expressed or implied by such statements
(the “acquisition”); statements about the potential benefits of
the acquisition; HD
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r u s s i a - d i r e c t . o r g
| # 2 3 | a u g u s t 2 0 1 5
ava i l a b l e f o r s u b s c r i b e r s o n ly
2 BRIEF russia-direct.org | #23 | august 2015
NIKOLAY SILAEV, Ph.D., is a political scientist and a
specialist on the Caucasus. He has
been a senior research associate at the Center for Caucasian
Studies and Regional Security
of MGIMO-University since 2004. He compiled and edited the

collection “Conflicts in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia” in 2008. He is the director of
Caucasian Cooperation and the
editor of the analytical online portal, Russia-Georgia: Expert
Dialog. | Page 4
WILLIAm h. hILL, Ph.D., is a retired U.S. diplomat. Dr. Hill
served two terms (1999-2001,
2003-2006) as Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, where he
was charged with negotiation
of a political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict and
facilitation of the withdrawal of Russian
forces, arms, and ammunition from Moldova. He is the author of
“Russia, The Near Abroad, and
the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria Conflict,”
as well as a forthcoming study of
European security institutions since 1989. The opinions
expressed in his article are entirely his
own. | Page 10
IRAKLII KhINTBA is the head of the expert department of the
Presidential
Administration of Abkhazia and professor of political science
and sociology at
Abkhaz State University. A graduate of the Peoples’ Friendship
University of Russia,
Khintba previously served as an assistant to the Foreign
Minister of Abkhazia (2011-
2012) and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia (2012-
2014). | Page 16
AUTHORS

The ongoing escalation of tensions in Eastern Ukraine has once
again raised the
issue of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space. According to
many observers,
the crisis in Ukraine is part of a continuing pattern that began
seven years ago
with the start of the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, in which
Moscow has con-
sistently sought to intervene in former republics of the Soviet
Union in order to
advance its own geopolitical goals. Yet, as this report makes
clear, the frozen con-
flicts in the post-Soviet space – Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh,
South Ossetia and
Transnistria – differ significantly in both their root causes and
in how Russia has
attempted to resolve them. This report describes Russia’s
overarching security
concerns in the post-Soviet space, analyzes the important
factors at play in each
of these frozen conflicts and provides an overview of Russia’s
new red lines in the
region. The report also includes first-hand assessments from the
representatives
of Abkhazia and Transnistria as well as the list of
recommendations for how to
normalize the situation in the region and achieve better
interaction between all
parties involved.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With recent signs that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine
is heating up, other conflicts in the post-Soviet space
are once again in the news. In addition to Ukraine, there
are the two frozen conflicts with Georgia (Abkhazia
and South Ossetia), one frozen conflict with Moldova
(Transnistria), and the frozen conflict involving Armenia
and Azerbaijan over the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.
However, what does the state of a “frozen conflict”
actually mean in today’s geopolitical context? And how
has Russia shifted its foreign policy in response to these
conflicts?
This August report looks into four frozen conflicts in the
post-Soviet space and then predicts what might happen
next in Ukraine. Of all the frozen conflicts analyzed, the
situation in Georgia provides perhaps the best clues as
to how the Ukraine crisis might develop. Seven years
ago, in August of 2008, Georgia and Russia had a
direct military confrontation over Georgia’s breakaway
republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The result
is well known, yet its interpretation still differs signifi -
cantly in Russia and the West. In order to present these
differing interpretations on Russia’s frozen conflicts, we
turned to both Russian and U.S. experts. Nikolay Silaev
presents the Russian side of the story while William Hill
counters this with the Western view. In addition, Sergey
Markedonov sheds light on Moscow’s new red lines in
the post-Soviet space. Finally, Iraklii Khintba and Vitaly
Ignatiev provide an insider’s view into the lives of people
caught in these two frozen conflicts — Abkhazia and
Transnistria. Please do not hesitate to send me an email
at [email protected] if you have any
questions or suggestions.
© Russia Direct 2015 All rights reserved. ISSN 2412-8171.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in

any form or by any means, including photocopying, or by any
information storage and retrieval
system. The views expressed are those of certain participants in
the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all
participants or of Russia Direct.
FROM
THE
EDITOR
Are Russia’s
frozen
conflicts
warming up?
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Resolving the conflicts in the
post-Soviet space
The crisis in Ukraine
underlined how inherent
contradictions between
the former Soviet
republics might emerge
as new conflict zones
threatening the stability
on Russia’s borders
and on the European
continent more generally.

T
he crisis in Ukraine has had minimal impact on the nature of
Mos-
cow’s engagement with most members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). Contrary to alarmist forecasts that
Rus-
sia’s neighbors would perceive the annexation of Crimea as a
potential
threat to themselves, the leaders of most CIS countries have
shown either
understanding or neutrality.
For its part, Moscow has not insisted on unconditional support
from
its closest partners, or demanded that they share some of the
risks in-
curred in the face of the crisis stirred up by the West and
radical forces
in Ukraine. Overall, Russia’s relations with its neighbors are
developing
in line with the trends that took shape before February 2014.
Moreover,
its high-priority integration projects with neighboring countries
are pro-
gressing steadily.
Paradoxically, the established system of intergovernmental
relations
within the CIS — for all the internal contradictions and
inconsistencies
— has proven to be more stable and flexible than is often
thought to be
the case.

An important caveat is needed. The concept of the “post-Soviet
space”
is a broader notion than the “Commonwealth of Independent
States.”
Georgia left the latter in 2008, and the Baltic States were never
part of it.
nikolay SilaEv
ap
KAZAKHSTANKAZAKHSTAN
TURKMENISTANTURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTANTAJIKISTAN
KYRGYZSTANKYRGYZSTAN
UZBEKISTANUZBEKISTAN
UKRAINEUKRAINE
MOLDOVAMOLDOVA
BELARUSBELARUS
ESTONIAESTONIA
LATVIALATVIA
AZERBAIJANAZERBAIJAN
ARMENIAARMENIA

GEORGIAGEORGIA
LITHUANIALITHUANIA
RUSSIARUSSIA
MoscowMoscow
The Caucasus
The EU bu�er zone
The Baltic republics
Central Asia
Policy orientation
(according to Russian expert Alexei
Fenenko)
Integration projects
with Russia
Balancing between
Russia and other actor
Resisting Russia and
blocking its initiatives
The wealth of nations
GDP per capita in current USD
Georgia
Moldova

Latvia
Estonia
Armenia
Ukraine
Lithuania
Belarus
Russia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Georgia
Moldova
Latvia
Estonia
Armenia

Ukraine
Lithuania
Belarus
Russia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
4.8
4.5
3.7
3.5
2.6
1.9
1.5
1.3
3.5
52
2.9

45.3
3.7
2.9
10
9.4
148
143.8
16.4
17.2
4.4
5.8
7.2
9.5
5.4
8.4
20.9
30.7
3.7
5.3
1,315
3,670
835
2,234

n/a
16,038
n/a
19,720
589
1,490
3,647
3,083
n/a
16,445
1,747
8,040
3,427
12,736
1,513
12,276
576
1,269
1,209
7,884
468
1,099
659
2,038

848
9,031
1991 2014 1991 2014
Population
In million
How the former Soviet republics have changed since 1991
alyo
n
a repkin
asource: world bank
russia’s traditional role
A feature of the CIS and other unions of post-Soviet
countries is that Russia plays a dominating role in all of
them. This is not the result of a deliberate policy, but
simply due to its overall economic, political and mili -
tary power. This dominance will continue at least for
the next decade, and will remain an important factor
in post-Soviet relations.
Over the past decade this status quo has been vio-
lated by just two countries: Georgia under Mikhail
Saakashvili and Ukraine after the coups d’etat of
2004 and 2014. In these instances the second part of
the formula — avoiding overdependence on Russia
in internal and external affairs — was interpreted as

“oppose Russia by all available means.”
In the case of Georgia, the balance was restored
immediately when power changed hands. Without
abandoning the former foreign policy priorities of
NATO membership and rapprochement with the EU,
the government of the Georgian Dream coalition be-
gan the process of normalizing relations with Rus-
sia. That includes the restoration and development
of trade and economic ties, i.e. securing the benefits
of access to the Russian market. As a result, Georgia
is returning to the trajectory common, in varying de-
grees, to most post-Soviet countries.
red lines
In explaining Russian policy with respect to the post-
Soviet space and its conflicts, some initial theses need
to be formulated. Although some will sound abstract,
they are important for an understanding of Moscow’s
motives and strategies.
Over the past two centuries Russia has waged war
on three occasions to protect its very existence (1812-
1814, 1914-1918 and 1941-1945). All three of these wars
were fought against strong coalitions centered in
Western Europe.
This means that Russia’s security policy is based on
existential threats from the West. One of the axioms
of Russian policy is to prevent the encroachment of
Western military infrastructure or military-political
blocs on Russia’s borders.
At the same time, since at least the 16th century,
with the advent of artillery as the key to military

superiority, Russia has been keen to establish unim-
peded economic, technological and cultural ties with
Western Europe. It is the removal of barriers to such
exchange that was the driving force behind the Livo-
nian War and the founding of St. Petersburg.
That is why Russia is so sensitive to the threat of
alliances in Eastern Europe that could isolate it from
Western European partners.
That Russian strategy should take account of the
West’s dual nature as both threat and donor of
knowledge and technology is perfectly natural for a
“semi-peripheral” country. From this perspective, the
priorities of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet
space are to check the approach of Western military
infrastructure on its borders and prevent the creation
of a “cordon” separating it from Western Europe.
In Russian eyes the threats as existential and poli-
cies to limit these threats are based on real-world
experience of international processes and on calcu-
lations of the balance of the military and political po-
tential of Russia and its allies, on one side, and likely
adversaries, on the other.
Herein lies a key misunderstanding between Russia
and the West: Time and again circumstances arise in
which the West sees itself as an arbiter, while Russia
sees it as part of the problem.
Talk about Russian restrictions on the sovereignty
of post-Soviet countries is only pertinent in the con-
text of steps taken to directly or indirectly alter the
military-political balance in the vast Russia-West

borderlands. Hence Moscow’s suspicions of any re-
gime change attempts in neighboring countries.
Historically Russia has not regarded interaction
with the U.S. and NATO in the post-Soviet space
as a zero-sum game. For instance, in 2001-2009
Kyrgyzstan hosted an airbase for an antiterrorist
coalition in support of the operation in Afghanistan.
Russia did not oppose the siting of the base, since
it was in solidarity with the U.S. in the fight against
international terrorism. This solidarity was greatly
undermined by the unilateral actions of the U.S. in
international affairs, in particular the operation in
Iraq, NATO’s expansion in the post-Soviet space, and
plans to deploy a missile defense shield in Europe.
Russia did not even strongly object to the three
Baltic countries’ accession to NATO in 2004. Fur-
thermore, whereas NATO membership of the three
Baltic countries is tolerable, the accession of Georgia
and Ukraine would be wholly unpalatable for Rus-
sia. A NATO military presence in the Caucasus and
on the Russian-Ukrainian border would make Rus-
sia vulnerable. The small potential that existed for
peaceful NATO expansion in the post-Soviet space
has been used up in the Baltic region.
Russia does not want international crises on its bor-
ders. The experience of the past two decades shows
that its tasks in the post-Soviet space can be imple-
mented more effectively in a stable environment.
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Lastly, Russia is well aware that overall it is weaker
than the collective West, and only in exceptional ca-
ses can it resort to unilateral action, while hoping at
the same time for a swift return to multilateral talks
on dispute settlement thereafter.
the matrix of conflict
The term “frozen conflict” is intended to describe a
situation in which fighting has either stopped or be-
come low-intensity, but without a settlement at the
institutional level. The term is slippery, because every
situation it refers to is unique; not to mention the fact
that sometimes the criteria for conflict resolution are
not clear-cut.
Therefore, the question of Russian policy in respect
of frozen conflicts is meaningless in practice. If one
discards the most common theses about the inad-
missibility of conflict resolution by force, and about
the possibility of broad dialogue and compromise
between the warring parties, it appears that Mos-
cow’s attitude toward various conflicts has changed
over time, and the unique nature of each of them
makes it hard to draw comparisons.

It would be more productive to present the con-
flicts in the post-Soviet space as a matrix, with val-
ues assigned to indicate the extent of the bloodshed
(the “bitterness” factor) and the importance of the
geopolitical context (the “geopolitics” factor).
The bitterness factor shows how much the parties
are willing to compromise, the extent to which vio-
lence and the memory of violence permeates their
relations, and the mutual exclusivity of their visions
of the future. The geopolitics factor indicates the de-
gree to which the conflict plays a part in the ge neral
Russia-West dispute over the post-Soviet space.
That said, the position of any given conflict in the
matrix is not be set in stone. It is free to move in ac-
cordance with the actions of the warring parties and
third countries.
abkhazia and south ossetia
Russia’s approach to settling the conflicts in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia was determined by several factors.
First, its own experience of the threat of fragmen-
tation and armed separatist movements meant that
it was unwilling to consider revising the boundaries
of CIS countries. Second, Russia took great pains to
stabilize Georgia, largely through military support
for Eduard Shevardnadze. Third, Russia’s special re-
sponsibility for peace and stability in the post-Soviet
space was generally recognized by the West, with
which Moscow had no antagonisms on the scale of
those of the past decade.
Moscow made many attempts to settle the two
conflicts. But the obstacle to the settlement was the

memory of violence: There was a permanent threat
of renewed hostilities. As per the Abkhaz national
project, which formed particularly during the conflict
years of the early 1990s, Abkhazians inside Georgia
faced an existential threat.
Russian and Western diplomats put forward fewer
initiatives to settle the Georgian-Ossetian conflict,
which was essentially eclipsed by the Georgian-Ab-
khazian feud next door. Since 1992 the Joint Control
Commission, made up of representatives from Geor-
gia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and the Russian
federal authorities, has been in operation. Despite
the ferocity of the conflict, its severe humanitarian
consequences, and the mutually exclusive elements
in the Georgian and South Ossetian national projects,
interaction between the two ethnic communities “on
the ground” has frequently been active and positive.
The situation around the Georgian-Abkhazian and
Georgian-Ossetian conflicts changed after the arrival
A statue of former
Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin is
seen from a window
shattered by bullets
in Gori, Georgia,
Aug. 16, 2008.

ap
of Mikhail Saakashvili as president. His attempts to
“unfreeze” the conflict, in particular by deploying
troops and police forces in South Ossetia in summer
2004, created a new set of problems. The strategy
of the Georgian government was aimed at pushing
both conflicts into the narrative of the Georgian-
Russian confrontation and integrating the latter
into the context of the rising discrepancies between
Russia and the U.S. on a range of European security
issues. Thus, both conflicts were part of the same
geopolitical context, which for Russia was associ-
ated with existential threats.
Not without reason did Russia suppose that Geor-
gia expected its NATO aspirations to be rewarded
with Alliance patronage for a military operation to
establish control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Moscow could not allow such an operation — and
not only for humanitarian reasons. Such scenario
would also be an indication that Russia’s position
on security matters on its very borders could be ig-
nored even by a relatively weak country like Georgia.
The original text of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan
proposed international discussions on the status
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its implementation
would remove the issue of recognition of the two re-
publics as independent states and would preserve,
at least legally, the territorial integrity of Georgia.
However, the Georgian government rejected this

point, which left no option to ensure the safety of
residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia other than
recognition of their independence.
nagorno-karabakh
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is quite different.
The protracted fighting with heavy losses on both
sides, the fragile cease-fire with continuous clashes
and frontline skirmishes, and the very active (espe-
cially in Azerbaijan) propaganda of hate make it ex-
tremely difficult to achieve a settlement.
Nonetheless, there is a stable agreement between
the key intermediaries — the members of the Minsk
Group — on the principles of settling the conflict.
Even the sharp deterioration in relations between
Russia and the U.S. has not undermined this accord.
In July 2015 U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group, James
Warlick, described the Karabakh issue as “an area
where the views of Moscow and Washington actually
coincide.” It is this accord that enables the intermedi-
aries to just about keep the lid on armed confronta-
tion in Karabakh.
transnistria
The Transnistria conflict has a low bitterness factor.
There have been no relapses into violence. The con-
flicting parties cooperate on a wide range of issues. At
the same time the geopolitical context of the Transn-
istria conflict is significant. Under the 2003 Kozak
Memorandum, the only obstacle to a resolution of the
conflict was the clause on the stationing of Russian
peacekeepers in Transnistria.

At the eleventh hour Moldovan President Vladimir
Voronin, following a meeting with the U.S. ambassa-
dor, refused to sign their already initialed agreement
to settle the conflict. For Russia, its continued mili-
tary presence in this strategically important area was
and remains important in terms of its own security.
ukraine
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is similar. Despite the
fighting, casualties and humanitarian consequences,
the prospect of a settlement with the preservation of
Ukraine’s territorial integrity (as of March 18, 2014) has
not died. The principal difference between this conflict
and other conflicts in the post-Soviet space is that the
self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Re-
publics (DPR and LPR) do not insist on independence.
The status of the breakaway territories is already set-
tled and provided for in the documents signed by the
parties: the Minsk Protocol of September 5, 2014, and
the Minsk II package of measures of February 12, 2015.
In accordance with these documents, the DPR and
LPR remain part of Ukraine on condition of autonomy.
If the cease-fire had been effectively maintained over
the past six months, the conflict could be assigned a
low bitterness score.
The geopolitical context of the Donbas is impor-
tant. Ukraine’s foreign policy tug-of-war was one of
the causes of the mass protests in Kiev in February
2014. The internal conflict in Ukraine was a major
(but not the only) factor in the sharp deterioration
in Russia-West relations. Russia wants Ukraine to be

over
200,000
people were
displaced as a
result of the conflict
between Abkhazia
and Georgia.
The principal difference between
the Ukrainian conflict and other
conflicts in the post-Soviet space is
that the self-proclaimed Donetsk and
Luhansk People’s Republics do not
insist on independence.
stabilized on a guaranteed non-hostile (i.e. not anti-
Russian) basis. Judging by the results of the Nor-
mandy Four meetings, this approach is shared by
France and Germany. The question of whether the
U.S. has the same view remains open. The paradox
lies in the fact that Ukrainian officials are now calling
for the conflict to be frozen and the settlement to be
effectively rejected.
how the major powers can help
Russia and its Western partners would be advised to
recognize that they cannot be totally neutral in resolv-
ing conflicts in the post-Soviet space. It should also

be remembered that the world knows very few ex-
amples of conflict resolution on the basis of recon-
solidating a ruptured state. Breakaway Chechnya’s
return to Russia is perhaps the only instance, yet this
merely underlines how long and complicated the re-
covery process can be.
Nor should we forget that the resolution of the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia is an argument in
favor of the managed division of formerly integrat-
ed states, not their restoration. The conflicts in the
post-Soviet space are at various stages of the settle-
ment process. The circumstances do not suggest a
common approach to resolving these conflicts. The
major international players who mediate — or claim
to mediate — conflicts should remember that the
prospects for settlement depend on the willingness
of the parties involved.
The 20-year history of conflict resolution in the
post-Soviet space is littered with failed peace initia-
tives. In fact, the choice faced by the major powers
is whether they hold the inhabitants of conflict areas
hostage to their geopolitical contradictions. They
control the extent to which the geopolitical context
is isolated from the conflict settlement process. This
means that a broad, equitable and mutually-binding
discussion of security in Europe is still relevant. The
events of recent years should have convinced every-
one on the continent that attempts to build such a
system on the basis of unilateral action by NATO or
the European Union are counter-productive.
A fitting precedent here is the discussion of ways
to apply the economic part of the Association

Agreement between Kiev and Brussels under the
EU-Ukraine-Russia format. Also required is an in-
stitutionalized form of cooperation between NATO
and the CSTO, no matter how unattainable that may
seem at present. But what is needed above all is a
new agreement on European security, the ground-
work for which could involve a reassessment of the
conflicts in the post-Soviet space, but only after
having securely ruled out the factor of geopolitical
schism on a shared continent.
An Ossetian
woman stands in
front of the house
destroyed in a
Georgian assault
in Tskhinvali, the
capital of South
Ossetia.
ap
The thawing of
Russia’s frozen
conflicts

as conflicts broke out in the post-
Soviet space, the Western strategy by
and large was to support the territorial
integrity of states. That approach is
now being tested during the current
Ukraine crisis.
T
he term “frozen conflicts” came into gene-
ral use in the 1990s to refer to conflicts over
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and Na-
gorno-Karabakh, each of which seemed impossible
to settle. These conflicts broke out in the late 1980s
and early 1990s as the Soviet Union was collapsing.
They were never really “frozen,” as their nature,
dynamics, and prospects changed over time. They
were each quite different from the others, with the
chief similarity that they all occurred in small states
on the periphery of the former Soviet Union.
It is therefore difficult to speak of an overall Rus-
sian or Western position or strategy at any point
in time for all of these conflicts. Perhaps the most
important common element in the Western ap-
proach to these conflicts has been to support the
principle of territorial integrity of states, and to call
for the protection of the rights of the inhabitants of
Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Transnistria by granting these entities a special,
agreed upon political status within the recognized
states of Azerbaijan, Georgia or Moldova.
This general approach preserves the 1991 decision
by the international community to recognize only

the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. within their
existing borders as independent states, while not
affording recognition to subordinate republics or
autonomous regions, such as Chechnya. The over-
all Western approach has thus been to support ne-
gotiations aimed at winning the agreement of the
four breakaway entities to return to the states of
which they were once a part as Soviet republics.
reuters
William h. hill
the current situation in
nagorno-karabakh
The situation around Nagorno-Karabakh and the
standoff between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue
to be extremely dangerous. Neither Baku nor Yerevan
appears to be at all willing to engage in any of the se-
rious compromises necessary to resolve this conflict.
In the meantime, Armenian and Azerbaijani armed
forces remain in close proximity to one another. Vio-
lent incidents along the line of contact are a regular
occurrence, and there are no serious physical barri -
ers to rapid, serious escalation.
Some unilateral Russian efforts at mediation in
recent years have not produced a settlement, but
these do not appear to have seriously weakened
the Russian, French, and U.S. cooperation as Minsk

Group co-chairs.
new tensions in moldova
In Moldova, political settlement negotiations resumed
in late 2011 after a hiatus of almost six years. However,
the results of the resumed talks have not been par-
ticularly impressive, and the positions of Russian and
Western mediators and observers generally diverge,
with Moscow almost always supporting Tiraspol and
the U.S. and EU supporting Chisinau.
The outbreak of war in Eastern Ukraine appears to
be causing Kiev to re-think its positions on this con-
flict, with results that are not fully evident or predict-
able. The presence of Russian troops in Transnistria
continues to be a point of bitter disagreement be-
tween Moscow and the West.
the georgia-russia war
The Georgia-Russia War of 2008 greatly complicated
the attainment of any lasting resolution of the con-
flicts in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. It is easy to agree
with and accept almost all of the conclusions of the
Tagliavini Report, with respect to the missteps, mis-
deeds, and mistakes on the part of both Georgia and
Russia. The renewed hostilities make it unlikely that
either the local Abkhaz, Ossete or Georgian popula-
tions will be reconciled any time soon.
In particular, Moscow’s decision to afford diplo-
matic recognition to South Ossetia and Abkhazia has
made it extremely difficult for Western interlocutors
to find common ground with Russia on resolving

these conflicts.
Some Russian representatives and observers cited
Western recognition of Kosovo as an independent
state in early 2008 as a precedent for Russia’s action
with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
One might easily question the wisdom of using a
Western move in the Balkans, which Moscow criti-
cized at the time, as a model for its own action in the
Caucasus. Not even Russia’s closest allies and part-
ners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were
disputed territories in the post-soviet space
Black
Sea
Caspian
Sea
UKRAINE
RUSSIARUSSIAMOLDOVA
GEORGIA
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
Crimea
Transnistria Donetsk
Luhansk
South

Ossetia
Nagorno-
Karabakh
Abkhazia
200km
200 milesDisputed territories
Moscow
alyona repkinasource: bbc
willing to grant such recognition, irrespective of the
position they took on responsibility for the outbreak
of hostilities in Georgia.
crimea and the ukraine crisis
One might reasonably argue that the current war in
Ukraine is a delayed consequence of the break-up of
the Soviet Union. The status of Crimea was questioned
repeatedly during the early 1990s, but votes that oc-
curred at the time indicate that at least a small major-
ity appeared to favor remaining a part of Ukraine.
During the 1990s, assisted by the OSCE, Kiev en-
gaged in negotiations with Crimean authorities
that produced an agreement on autonomy, which
seemed to resolve that dispute without bloodshed.

However, the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 and
then the events of 2013-2014 revived the issue.
Irrespective of Moscow’s claims, the bulk of West-
ern opinion generally views the seizure and annexa-
tion of Crimea in March 2014 as initiated and directed
from outside, rather than the result of a spontane-
ous, indigenous popular movement.
eastern ukraine, the newest
frozen conflict?
Touching upon the question of the possibility of
new conflict zones to emerge in proximity to Russia,
it is necessary to point out that there is a war in
Eastern Ukraine being fought right now on Russia’s
doorstep. Russia and the West appear in near total
disagreement over the reasons for this conflict.
Even when Russia and some of its major interlocu-
tors can agree on how to approach a settlement,
such as the Minsk II accords, they do not appear ca-
pable of implementing these agreements. The pres-
ence of high-level NATO visitors in Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine or elsewhere, does not seem to be a sign
that the West has any intention of escalation.
Such visits are, however, evidence that the West by
and large remains committed to its long-standing,
well-established position of support for the full in-
dependence and sovereignty of these post-Soviet
states. Similarly, the presence of U.S., Canadian, or
UK trainers in Ukraine is not an indication of any de-
sire to go to war with Russia. Ukraine has a sovereign
right to provide for its own defense, and to seek as-
sistance for that where possible.

If Moscow were more transparent about its rela-
tionship to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and more
forthcoming in brokering a resolution, Kiev might
feel less of a need to seek military assistance.
russia’s role in resolving these
frozen conflicts
As the largest state in the region, with deep historical,
cultural, economic, and personal ties with the other
states and peoples in the region, Russia cannot be
excluded and must play an important role in the set-
tlement of all these conflicts. No reasonable person
would argue that Russia has no interests and should
have no influence in its neighbors and the states in
the region.
The key objection of many Western officials and
observers is how Russia has chosen to pursue those
Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.
Read his interview at www.russia-direct.org.
“ T h e e v e n t s i n C r i m e a w e r e n ’ t i m p r o v i s a
t i o n , y e t i t w a s n ’ t a n i n i t i a t i v e o f R u s s i a
e i t h e r ; i t w a s a r e s p o n s e t o w h a t t h e K r e m
l i n a n d P u t i n p e r s o n a l l y s a w a s a s e r i o u s
t h r e a t t o
R u s s i a . ”
A girl in an
apartment of
a residential

building damaged
as a result of the
fighting between
pro-Russian rebels
and the Ukrainian
forces in Gorlovka.
©
irina geraschenko / ria novosti
interests and to exercise that influence. Coercive
measures, such as embargoes on Moldovan wines,
fruits, and vegetables; prohibitions on Georgian
wines and mineral water; or threats to reduce or cut
off natural gas deliveries to Ukraine, seem more like-
ly to make more enemies in those countries than to
convince policymakers to adopt positions favorable
to Russia.
Such coercive reactions also provide more ammu-
nition for that group of Western policymakers and
observers which argues that Russia is simply bent on
dominating the countries around it, and, therefore,
must be met with further sanctions and isolation.
normalizing relations between

russia and the west
Relations between Russia and its major Western part-
ners and intermediaries have grown so embittered
that it will take a long time and considerable effort to
bring them back close to what might be considered
“normal.” Nonetheless, all involved need to try. The
RECOmmENdATIONS
FROM THE AUTHOR
1 Start, re-open, and/or ensure a blunt, private dialogue at
senior working levels between Russia
and its chief Western interlocutors about the situation
in Ukraine and other important, disputed issues in the
former Soviet space. The point is not to recite eloquent
fictions to one another, but to acknowledge areas
where there are genuine differences in perceptions, to
identify red lines and bottom lines of all involved, and
to focus on common elements or areas of agreement
that might be pursued in the interest of reducing
tensions and building confidence, while managing
areas of clear disagreement.
2 Consider areas and issues that might be entrusted to the
mediation or intermediary role
of neutral actors (or as neutral as one can achieve),
either through the OSCE or the UN. The presence
of Russian, U.S., EU, or NATO representatives has
rightly or wrongly become a red flag in some areas.
Where practical or possible, movement toward other
intermediaries or mediators might be a positive step.
3 Encourage authorities in the metropolitan states and in the
breakaway entities to

focus on what powers or competencies of
governance they really need, rather than on
absolutist demands, such as a centralized
unitary state or independence. More realistic
wish lists may become the basis for ultimate
settlements; absolutist demands rarely will be.
4 Think seriously about whether possession of Crimea and
independence for South
Ossetia and Abkhazia are worth long-term
rocky relations with the EU and the U.S. While
some Western states may come to accept such
faits accomplis, many others likely will not.
A large number of key Western states never
recognized the incorporation of the Baltic
States into the U.S.S.R. While this alone did not
lead to war, it did help prevent the U.S.S.R. from
attaining full acceptance and reconciliation with
much of Europe.
most dangerous conflict now is not one of the four
“frozen conflicts,” but the war in Ukraine, which could
easily heat up again.
While there are indisputably plenty of Russophobes
scattered throughout the West, they are far from a
majority. However, there is a majority in the West
that supports full independence and sovereignty for
all of the former Soviet states.
To the extent that Western leaders and observers
perceive Russia’s actions or policies to be restricting
the independence and sovereignty of these states,
it will be difficult to near impossible to build better
relations and true partnerships between Russia and
many major Western intermediaries.

No reasonable person would argue
that Russia has no interests and
should have no influence in its
neighbors and the states in the region.
Sergey markedonov talks about the nature of frozen conflicts
and assesses the chances that the Ukrainian conflict might
end in military confrontation.
russia direct: How has the perception of frozen con-
flicts changed since Crimea’s incorporation into Rus-
sia?
sergey Markedonov: I usually describe the changes
in perceptions as the “Crimean spectacles.” This trend
emerged last year, shortly before the referendum in
Crimea. Today this trend is dominating. The “Crime-
an spectacles” mean that ethno-political conflicts
in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and, to a lesser extent in
Transnistria, are assessed in the context of Crimea. In
particular, [the conflict along the borders of] South
Ossetia and Abkhazia is seen as a sort of precursor
for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Likewise, such logic
is broadened to Transnistria. If we look at the recent
statement of the General Secretary of the Council of
Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, who said that Moldova will
soon be the next hot spot, Transnistria is seen as an
upcoming “aftertaste” of the so-called annexation of
Crimea.
However, all these conflicts differ significantly. The
decisions on South Ossetia and Crimea were un-

dertaken independently of each other. In 2008, the
question “Who is next?” was most significant and
many experts talked about Crimea, Transnistria or
even Nagorno-Karabakh. But shortly after the war
between Russia and Georgia, the German TV Channel
ARD broadcast an interview with then Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin, who said that Crimea was not a dis-
INTERVIEW
pavEl koShkin, RUSSia DiREcT
What are the Kremlin’s new
red lines in the post-Soviet
space?
Associate professor
at Russian State
University for the
Humanities based in
Moscow. From May
2010 to october
2013, he was a
visiting fellow at the
Center for Strategic
and International
Studies (Washington,
D.C.). In April-May
2015 he was a
visiting fellow at the
Center for Russia
and Central Asia
Studies, Institute of
International Studies
(IIS), Fudan University
(Shanghai, China).

Read the full
interview on our
website
www.russia-direct.org.
SeRGey
MARKeDonov
puted territory and Moscow didn’t give any signs that
it was going to reassess the status of the peninsula.
Not only did Putin make statements that Crimea was
a part of Ukraine, but also Russia made some moves
to extend the Big Agreement on cooperation between
Russia and Ukraine, which was based on the recogni-
tion of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. It indicates
that the Russian logic is not like the one described by
the Western media and politicians. It’s not the logic of
the proactive move. It’s a reactive logic, which means
responding to problems as soon as they arise.
rd: But what about Putin’s speech during the 2008
NATO-Russia summit in Bucharest when he warned
that further NATO expansion would provoke Russia to
incorporate Crimea; Ukraine would no longer exist as
a unitary state and Abkhazia and South Ossetia would
become Russia’s buffer zones?
s.M.: These warnings were expressed not formally,
but rather, emotionally. Yet, when Western opponents
give this example, they tend to present Russia’s policy
as a one-sided move: Moscow wanted to do some-
thing and finally did it. We should not forget about
NATO’s expansion from the other side. If there were
any frameworks in place — no NATO expansion, no
ignoring the interests of Russia — Russia would not
have behaved in the way that it finally did.

rd: Following your logic, NATO expansion is a sort of
“red line” for the Kremlin. Could other events — like
NATO military exercises in Eastern Europe or Ameri-
can military assistance to Ukraine — be seen by Mos-
cow as new red lines that will lead to a much graver
conflict?
s.M.: Actually, Russia drew these red lines long ago
and they haven’t significantly changed: NATO expan-
sion is acceptable for the Baltic States, but not for the
core territory of the former Soviet Union. Russia’s red
lines were clearly expressed by Russian Foreign Min-
ister Sergey Lavrov and his deputy Grigory Karasin in
their statements on Transnistria. In fact, they framed
them within two extreme viewpoints: Lavrov said if
Moldova gives up its neutrality and enters NATO, Rus-
sia will raise the question about the status of Transnis-
tria, while Karasin added that Russia would like to see
Transnistria as autonomous within Moldova.
At first glance, there is a contradiction in their state-
ments. But there is no contradiction. It’s just two
frameworks that require taking into account Russian
national interests. This means that Russia’s new red
lines — NATO military exercises and assistance to
Ukraine or Georgia — are hardly likely to provoke a
war. But what can really lead to a war is a question of
status. For example, if Ukraine or Georgia join NATO
tomorrow, then serious escalation in the confrontation
is highly likely.
rd: After the Minsk II Agreements, there were signs
that Ukraine could become another frozen conflict,

with many observers pinning hopes on this scenario.
What is your assessment?
s.M.: I would be happy if the Ukraine conflict were
frozen. As soon as both sides finally understand they
could totally destroy each other, the conflict might be
frozen. The problem is that the West’s position is that
it’s only Russia that should be to blame for the de-
velopment of the Ukraine crisis. So, many in Ukraine
probably disregard the possibility of compromise and
prefer to wait, when the West exerts pressure on Rus-
sia through sanctions or others means. I respect this
position, but it doesn’t lead to compromise.
Regarding Russia, the danger is that it is very diffi-
cult to say what the Kremlin wants. But it’s possible
to say what Russia doesn’t want. It doesn’t want the
same type of failure [in Donbas] as it was in the case
of the Republic of Serbian Krajina [a self-proclaimed
Serb republic within the territory of Croatia during the
Croatian War of Independence in 1991-1995; the rebels
from this republic were defeated by Croatia’s army
because of the lack of support from Yugoslavia, which
they wanted to join – Editor’s note]
Probably, we will witness some attempts to unfreeze
conflicts and flex muscles. And if these attempts fail
and all stakeholders understand this, they might come
up with a compromise. After all, the Minsk Agree-
ments, with its flaws and contradictions, resulted from
the failure of all sides to reach their goals. Today there
might be attempts to reassess these agreements and
there will be Minsk III, Minsk IV, etc. The only positive
moment in this situation is that all players are talking
about commitments to these agreements, although
they question them.
rd: What should Russia do to avoid exacerbating the

Ukrainian conflict and prevent other protracted con-
flicts in the post-Soviet space from unfreezing?
s.M.: It should at least not intensify confrontation. It
should take more of a defensive (not offensive) pol-
icy, because the intensification of the conflict could
lead to toughening sanctions, which will aggravate
economic challenges and, finally, result in failure. The
failure is even more dangerous in the current context,
because it could fuel emotion-driven thinking among
Russian political elites and take them away from
pragmatism.
©
al
ex
ey
ku
de
nk
o /
ri
a n
ov
os
ti

T
he lack of international recognition for
Abkhazia represents a serious obstacle in
building full-fledged relations with the world.
In this regard, the consolidation of Abkhaz-Russian
ties is a determining factor in Abkhazia’s develop-
ment as a sovereign and prosperous state.
The signing of an Abkhaz-Russian agreement on
joint efforts to protect the state border of Abkha-
zia in 2009 was followed in 2010 by an agreement
on a joint military base (up to 4,000 Russian troops
are stationed in Abkhazia). Agreements in financial,
economic and social spheres ensure Russian funding
for social and economic development programs in
Abkhazia and for the payment of pensions to Rus-
sian citizens residing in the republic. As of Dec. 31,
2014, Russia had remitted around 35 billion rubles
(around $625 million) in total.
Against the difficult financial and economic back-
drop in Russia and other post-Soviet countries,
and the processes of devaluation and inflation, the
leadership of Abkhazia is striving for self-sufficiency.
President Raul Khajimba has introduced the phrase
“engagement of internal reserves” into the political
lexicon, by which he means elimination of the sha-
dow economy, improved collection of taxes, customs
and other payments, optimization of staff numbers
at state-financed institutions, introduction of non-
cash forms of payment, and legislative reform in the
area of tax and business.
As a result of measures taken in the first half of
2015, the state budget performance plan was ex-

ceeded by 3.5 percent in terms of revenue. Growth
was up 23 percent compared to 2014 and 10 percent
compared to 2013.
Relations with Georgia since August 2008 have
developed under the paradigm of non-military
confrontation. Though toning down the aggressive
rhetoric, Georgia’s new government, which took of-
fice in 2013, has failed to break the inertia of recent
years. The new administration, like the old, refuses to
sign an agreement with Abkhazia on the non-use of
iRaklii khinTba
Case study #1:
Abkhazia
force. Thus, technically Georgia remains at war with
Abkhazia.
Moreover, Tbilisi has erected artificial barriers to re-
strict Abkhazia’s international contacts. For instance,
the Law on Occupied Territories, adopted by Georgia
in 2008, stipulates mechanisms for restricting foreign
economic activity in Abkhazia. By exerting pressure
through the governments of the relevant countries,
Georgia has repeatedly terminated the contracts of
Western firms with counterparties in Abkhazia.
Restrictions have also been imposed on visits by
foreign nationals, who are allowed to enter Abkha-
zia only through the territory of Georgia. Those who
enter Abkhazia through Russian territory could face
prosecution in Georgia.
Abkhazia, in turn, has adopted various workarounds

to raise foreign capital — from Russian and Turkish
sources. European funding is seeping into Abkhazia
through humanitarian development projects imple-
mented by international non-governmental organi-
zations and specialized UN agencies.
va
le
ry
m
at
yt
si
n
/
ta
ss
Matthew Dal Santo, a Danish Research Council post-
doctoral fellow at the University of Copenhagen, met
Transnistria’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev
in Tiraspol, where they discussed the frozen conflict
in Transnistria as well as post-Soviet Russian identity.
Matthew dal santo: Transnistria has spent a long
time negotiating with Moldova about its status. How
does Transnistria envision its future relations with

the Moldovan government in Chisinau?
Vitaly ignatiev: In accounts published in the foreign
press it is possible to come across a number of as-
sertions: that Transnistria’s pursuit of independence
and the Russian vector for our republic’s development
only serve the interests of certain political forces and
that, allegedly, no real conflict actually exists, and so
forth. In this connection, I must emphasize that the
aspiration for independence is the will of Transnis-
tria’s people expressed more than once in a number
of nationwide referenda. We want to be independ-
ent and are pursuing integration with Russia — as
the people have decided — and the people’s deci-
sion remains the most important thing in a demo-
cratic society.
Therefore, Transnistria has consistently followed
a course for legal recognition of its statehood and
its convergence with Russia. In turn, we have pro-
posed to Chisinau a “civilized divorce” and, further, a
peaceful, mutually beneficial and open co-existence
as sovereign and friendly states. We are convinced
maTThEW Dal SanTo
Case study #2: Transnistria
that precisely such a format of further relations will
be the most effective from the point of view of both
security and economic and political cooperation.
Mds: How would you describe relations between
Transnistria and Russia?
V.i.: Ours are relations between a country, a civiliza-
tion, a whole cultural and historical world on the one
hand, and a part that has been artificially separated
from it on the other. Transnistria remains an insepa-
rable part of the Russian world. In the West, perhaps,

this isn’t fully understood, not least because the inter-
national media have created a slanted idea of Trans-
nistria in people’s minds.
Frankly, it would never occur to you that Denmark
were not a part of Europe, would it? On both a geo-
graphical and a historical-cultural level Denmark is
part of Europe. In the same way, Transnistria is part
of Russia. Historically, Transnistria was not part of
Moldova or Ukraine but of the Russian Empire. To-
day, the situation hasn’t changed — the citizens of
Transnistria associate themselves with Russia and
the Russian world. They rejoice in its successes and
share its tribulations. Russia replies in kind: It keeps
the peace in Transnistria, supports our republic in
every domain, helps build the future and is always
ready to come to our assistance.
Mds: What is the most important thing for
Westerners to understand about Transnistria’s
foreign policy?
V.i.: The most important thing for Westerners to un-
derstand is that in Transnistria people are the same as
everywhere else — they are people with the right to
free self-determination, the right to be prosperous, to
defend their own rights and interests. The world has
to stop looking at Transnistria as some indeterminate
territory, as if it were just a “fragment of the Soviet
Union.” Instead, the world has to see Transnistria as a
state possessing lawful sovereignty, a state that has
friends, partners and enemies in the global commu-
nity, a state with its own economic and political con-
nections, interests and goals. If Transnistria’s foreign
policy were viewed as the foreign policy of any other
state, everything would be in order and nothing would
seem unusual. We have to avoid using double stan-
dards in evaluating developments in world politics.

Deputy Foreign
Minister of
Transnistria. Read
his full interview at
http://www.russia-
direct.org.
vITAly
IGnATIev
Ju
ssi n
u
kari / tass
1. Nadezhda Arbatova, “Frozen Conflicts and European
Security,”
Security Index, Volume 16, Issue 3, September 10, 2010.
2. Judy Dempsey, “Europe’s New Frozen Conflict,” Carnegie
Europe, September 22, 2014, http://carnegie europe.eu/
strategiceurope/?fa=56686.
3. Svante E. Cornell, “Crimea and the Lessons of Frozen
Conflicts,” The American Interest, March 20, 2014, http://www.
the-american-interest.com/2014/03/20/crimea-and-the-lessons-
of-frozen-conflicts/.
4. Dmitry Danilov, Sergei Karaganov, Dov Lynch, Alexey

Pushkov,
Dmitri Trenin and Andrei Zagorski, “What Russia Sees,”
European
Union Institute for Security Studies, January 2005,
http://www.iss.
europa.eu/uploads/media/cp074.pdf
5. Edward W. Walker, “Ukraine: Lessons Learned From Other
‘Frozen Conflicts’ in the Soviet Successor States,” Eurasian
Geopolitics, October 30, 2014. http://eurasiangeopolitics.
com/2014/10/30/ukraine-lessons-learned-from-other-frozen-
conflicts-in-the-soviet-successor-states/.
6. Sergey Markedonov, Maxim A. Suchkov, “The Caucasus
After
Ukraine,” The American Interest, January 6, 2015,
http://www.the-
american-interest.com/2015/01/06/the-caucasus-after-ukraine/.
7. A.V. Gushin et al. “The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia:
Working
Paper 24/2015,” Russian International Affairs Council, 2015.
BOOKS ANd ARTICLES
ON fROZEN CONfLICTS
@ecfr The Euopean Council on Foreign Relations provides
academic analysis on security and conflict issues impacting the
European continent.
@rconflictnews Breaking news on conflicts around the world.
@eu_iss Tweets from the EU Institute for Security Studies on
foreign, security and defense policy issues.

@carnegierussia Carnegie Russia offers analysis on Russia, the
post-Soviet space and Eurasia.
@osce_smm Tweets from the Special Monitoring Mission of the
OSCE to Ukraine.
@cfr_org The Council on Foreign Relations features research
and
analysis of international relations topics including regional
conflicts
in the post-Soviet space.
@russian_council The Russian International Affairs Council
provides analysis and research by Russian and international
scholars and policy thinkers on a variety of issues, including
frozen
conflicts in the post-Soviet space.
@iiss_org Tweets from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, which also does analysis of regional conflicts.
TWITTER ACCOuNTS
fOR #fROZENCONfLICTS
EDITOR’S
PICKS
How Russian
Society Has
Changed Since
Ukraine
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r e p o r t
C o m i n g u p i n s e p t e m b e r
notwithstanding the ongoing
confrontation with the west over ukraine
and the recent economic downturn,
public opinion polls carried out in russia
over the past year show that russian
citizens are by and large positive about
the direction the country is headed. why
is that? and how have the perceptions
of russians towards the world changed
over the past year?
Atlantic Council
DINU PATRICIU EURASIA CENTER
Agnia Grigas
A Tool Kit
for US Policymakers
This report would not have been possible without the generous
support of Frontera Resources for the

Atlantic Council’s work on Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
The author would like to thank Congressman Gerald “Gerry”
Connolly, the United States Representative
from Virginia’s 11th congressional district, and his staff for
feedback in the development of this report. The
author would also like to thank Jeanne Frechede for research
support.
Second edition
ISBN: 978-1-61977-478-0
Cover photo credit: Mikhail Voskresenskiy/RIA
Novosti/Sputnik. Russian troops during exercises at the
Kanchaveli advanced outpost in South Ossetia, July 2013.
This report is written and published in accordance with the
Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual
Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its
analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic
Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessar ily
endorse or advocate for, any of this
report’s conclusions.
July 2016
Agnia Grigas
A Tool Kit
for US Policymakers
Frozen
Conflicts

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
12
8
7
2
US Policy Toward Frozen Conflicts
Implications of Frozen Conflict Conditions
Manufacturing Frozen Conflicts
Post-Soviet Frozen Conflicts
Introduction
About the Author
Policy Recommendations for the US
Government and Congress
1
15
Endnotes16

FROZEN CONFLICTS
1ATLANTIC COUNCIL
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s, a number of separatist movements
and conflicts have challenged the borders of the
states of the former Soviet Union and created quasi-
independent territories under Russian influence
and control. Unrecognized by the international
community but generally supported by Moscow,
these so-called “frozen conflicts” include the regions
of Transnistria in Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh in
Azerbaijan, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in
Georgia. Since 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea
and the emergence of pro-Moscow separatist
territories in eastern Ukraine—the so-called
“people’s republics” of Luhansk and Donetsk—
created a new set of potential frozen conflicts. These
seemingly disparate conflicts across different states
are, in fact, inherently interconnected; together,
they demonstrate a pattern of Russian foreign
policy, which manufactures frozen conflicts as a
means of increasing Moscow’s long-term influence
and leverage over target states in its near abroad.
The resulting separatist territories create “gray
zones” that are problematic for the international
community and international law because they
challenge the post-Cold War political order,
destabilize Europe’s frontier states, and because
they are often used by local and transnational
groups for money laundering, organized crime, and
human and arms trafficking.
The US government has generally supported the
territorial integrity of such states facing separatism

and sought to contain the fallout from these frozen
conflicts. In the aftermath of Crimean annexation
and war in the Donbas, it is necessary to reconsider
the successes and failures of past US government
policies vis-à-vis Moscow’s manufactured frozen
conflicts. It is important to establish a policy toolbox
for policymakers to use in the event of future
Russian assaults on the sovereign territories of
other countries. Moreover, because frozen conflicts
by their very nature are likely to last for decades, it
is important to establish “policy memory” of these
conflicts and to consider the policy options for
managing these conflicts in the near and long term.
Going forward, the quasi-states of Transnistria,
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia will continue to seek
either independence or integration with the Russian
Federation. The US government will have to be
prepared to address such processes. Likewise, the
territories of Luhansk and Donetsk are likely to
seek greater autonomy from Ukraine on the basis
of international concepts of human rights and
self-determination or instead seek integration into
the Russian Federation. The flaring of violence in
Nagorno-Karabakh in mid-2016 shows that the
United States will have to be continuously prepared
for reignited conflict. Meanwhile, since Russia seems
determined to maintain its occupation of Crimea
despite Western sanctions and non-recognition by
the international community, Washington will have
to pursue a long-term policy regarding this issue
vis-à-vis Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea. The following
policy memo seeks to frame the issues at stake and
available policy options for both current and future
policymakers in the US government and Congress.

POST-SOVIET
FROZEN CONFLICTS
The term “frozen conflict” is used to describe
conditions on territories where active armed
conflict may have ended, but no peace treaty or
political resolution has resolved the tensions to the
satisfaction of the different sides. In the separatist
territories that have become frozen conflict
zones, internal sovereignty is often achieved
in the breakaway territory but at the expense
of “external sovereignty” or recognition in the
international system.1 The term frozen conflict is
almost completely associated with the breakaway
territories of post-Soviet republics. Such conflicts
emerged as a result of Moscow-stoked separatism
often with the ultimate aim of gaining influence
and control over foreign territories. With the sole
exception of Nagorno-Karabakh,2 Moscow’s pretext
and justification for such actions is cited as the
need to protect its so-called compatriots—ethnic
Russians, Russian speakers, and other minorities—
residing abroad. Usually, but not always, these
target territories border the Russian Federation
(South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Donbas, and Crimea) and
are inhabited by minorities who are experiencing
some discord with the central government or
who are open in one degree or another to the
influence of Moscow. With the exception of Crimea,
Moscow’s creation of separatist frozen conflicts has
not escalated to Russia’s annexation. Nonetheless,
these territories generally become de facto
separated from the states in question and under
Moscow’s direct political influence and military
protection.3

Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on Russia

Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on Russia

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