The research is conducted in the framework of joint project of Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and Atlantic Council (AC) on perspective of “mutual assured stability” model in Russia-U.S. strategic relations. The research was presented on Russian-US seminar “Russia-U.S. relations: new impetus to cooperation”, March 25, 2013.
In the contemporary era, one of the US government strategies is to prevent Russia could rise to the status of major global or even regional power. In practice, the US government wants to avoid facing the future of a reinvigorated Russia. On Russia, it is important to note that its strategic objectives are: 1) to defend itself from the threat to their territory represented by the United States and with NATO forces; and, 2) achieving world power status lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. To defend against the threat to their territory represented by the United States and the NATO forces, the military strategy of Russia provides for the resetting of the Army and Navy with the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in response to an attack on the country.
The worsening economic situation resulting from Russia's price drop of oil and the economic strangulation resulting of sanctions imposed by the US and European Union may radicalize the conflict with the United States making the Russian government decides on preventive military intervention in Ukraine that could further strengthen the power of Vladimir Putin in charge of Russia mobilizing the nation against foreign enemies. By contrast, the United States and NATO forces should act extending the siege of Russia starting a new Cold War.
The instability of the Caspian region, matters profoundly to the west and to the U.S. for several reasons. First,
its instability permits the operation and growth of terrorist movements that often have a global and specifically
anti-American scope. Second, the Caspian is a emerging oil producing region vital to unimpeded energy access.
Finally, regional conflicts in this volatile area have the potential of developing into major power confrontations
that cannot but affect the security of the U.S. and its allies. US since 1992 have claimed that engaging the
Caspian states is a strategic priority for the United States foreign policy. The region is home to vast unexploited
oil and gas reserves and is an important staging area for the US.
The Northern Sea Route: National Regime in the Changing International ContextRussian Council
Both the Arctic states and other members of the global community are becoming increasingly interested
in the Arctic. The issues of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the legal regulation of navigation
in its waters are pending both for the Russian interests and in the international context, especially since the
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) comes into force on 1 January 2017.
The NSR has a special role among the maritime shipping routes in the world (fig. 1). It is the shortest sea route
between the European part of Russia and the Far East. Its use has always been complicated.
Even in summer, the Arctic seas the NSR crosses are occasionnaly covered with ice. Travelling through the Arctic
ice requires icebreakers and Arctic ice class transportation vessels with a strong hull and powerful engines.
However, even such technically perfect Arctic fleet is not always capable of ensuring navigation in ice-covered
regions. Safe navigation in the NSR water area requires navigational, hydrographic, hydrometeorological,
and search and rescue systems that are constantly improved. Experts note that successful Arctic navigation,
proper management and appropriate legal governance of the route’s use require clear understanding of the
specifics of the Arctic region and of navigation therein.
With 10 months left to run for reelection to the US presidency and facing a congressional impeachment process in which he is accused of using the US diplomatic apparatus for personal and political benefit, Donald Trump personally made the irresponsible decision to carry out an air strike on Iraq's Baghdad International Airport, which led to the drone assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, chief of Iran's Quds intelligence force, last Thursday (2/1/2020). This Trump measure is irresponsible because it threatens to: 1) compromise the world oil supply and raise its prices affecting the global economy; 2) lead to the end of the nuclear agreement with Iran, paving the way for Iran to produce nuclear artifacts; 3) promote political instability in the Middle East region with the possibility of involvement of US ally Israel and major powers such as Iran's allies Russia and China; and 4) at worst, with all this, contributing to the outbreak of a new world war.
In the contemporary era, one of the US government strategies is to prevent Russia could rise to the status of major global or even regional power. In practice, the US government wants to avoid facing the future of a reinvigorated Russia. On Russia, it is important to note that its strategic objectives are: 1) to defend itself from the threat to their territory represented by the United States and with NATO forces; and, 2) achieving world power status lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union. To defend against the threat to their territory represented by the United States and the NATO forces, the military strategy of Russia provides for the resetting of the Army and Navy with the use of conventional and nuclear weapons in response to an attack on the country.
The worsening economic situation resulting from Russia's price drop of oil and the economic strangulation resulting of sanctions imposed by the US and European Union may radicalize the conflict with the United States making the Russian government decides on preventive military intervention in Ukraine that could further strengthen the power of Vladimir Putin in charge of Russia mobilizing the nation against foreign enemies. By contrast, the United States and NATO forces should act extending the siege of Russia starting a new Cold War.
The instability of the Caspian region, matters profoundly to the west and to the U.S. for several reasons. First,
its instability permits the operation and growth of terrorist movements that often have a global and specifically
anti-American scope. Second, the Caspian is a emerging oil producing region vital to unimpeded energy access.
Finally, regional conflicts in this volatile area have the potential of developing into major power confrontations
that cannot but affect the security of the U.S. and its allies. US since 1992 have claimed that engaging the
Caspian states is a strategic priority for the United States foreign policy. The region is home to vast unexploited
oil and gas reserves and is an important staging area for the US.
The Northern Sea Route: National Regime in the Changing International ContextRussian Council
Both the Arctic states and other members of the global community are becoming increasingly interested
in the Arctic. The issues of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the legal regulation of navigation
in its waters are pending both for the Russian interests and in the international context, especially since the
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) comes into force on 1 January 2017.
The NSR has a special role among the maritime shipping routes in the world (fig. 1). It is the shortest sea route
between the European part of Russia and the Far East. Its use has always been complicated.
Even in summer, the Arctic seas the NSR crosses are occasionnaly covered with ice. Travelling through the Arctic
ice requires icebreakers and Arctic ice class transportation vessels with a strong hull and powerful engines.
However, even such technically perfect Arctic fleet is not always capable of ensuring navigation in ice-covered
regions. Safe navigation in the NSR water area requires navigational, hydrographic, hydrometeorological,
and search and rescue systems that are constantly improved. Experts note that successful Arctic navigation,
proper management and appropriate legal governance of the route’s use require clear understanding of the
specifics of the Arctic region and of navigation therein.
With 10 months left to run for reelection to the US presidency and facing a congressional impeachment process in which he is accused of using the US diplomatic apparatus for personal and political benefit, Donald Trump personally made the irresponsible decision to carry out an air strike on Iraq's Baghdad International Airport, which led to the drone assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, chief of Iran's Quds intelligence force, last Thursday (2/1/2020). This Trump measure is irresponsible because it threatens to: 1) compromise the world oil supply and raise its prices affecting the global economy; 2) lead to the end of the nuclear agreement with Iran, paving the way for Iran to produce nuclear artifacts; 3) promote political instability in the Middle East region with the possibility of involvement of US ally Israel and major powers such as Iran's allies Russia and China; and 4) at worst, with all this, contributing to the outbreak of a new world war.
Конфликты на постсоветском пространстве: перспективы урегулирования и роль Ро...Russian Council
Украинский кризис актуализировал тематику замороженных конфликтов на постсоветском пространстве, продемонстрировав, что дезинтеграционные процессы на территории бывшего СССР завершены еще не в полной мере. В связи с эти важным представляется анализ причин возникновения этно-территориальных конфликтов в данном регионе, основные факторы, влияющие на их развитие, и потенциальные точки возникновения аналогичных кризисных ситуаций.
Современные российско-японские отношения и перспективы их развитияRussian Council
Доклад "Современные российско-японские отношения и перспективы их развития".
Авторский коллектив:
д.полит.н. А.Н. Панов (руководитель коллектива); О.И. Казаков; д.и.н., к.э.н. В.О. Ки-
станов; В.В. Кузьминков; к.и.н. В.Н. Павлятенко; д.и.н. Д.В. Стрельцов; д.соц.н.,
к.и.н. С.В. Чугров
В докладе представлены результаты комплексного анализа современных российско-японских отношений, подготовленные группой российских ученых-японоведов
в рамках исследовательской программы Российского совета по международным делам. В качестве ключевых рассмотрены вопросы политического, торгово-экономического, научно-технологического и культурного взаимодействия двух государств, а также подходы к решению «проблемы северных территорий».
Российско-мексиканские отношения: традиционные основы и императивы обновленияRussian Council
Мексика – достаточно влиятельный актор современной мировой политики. Участие России и Мексики в глобальной политике имеет немало точек соприкосновения, однако модель российско-мексиканских отношений до сих пор не устоялась, не определилась и не стала оптимальной. Модели российско-мексиканских отношений свойственна асимметрия: политическая, дипломатическая и культурная составляющие превосходят по объему и масштабам торгово-экономические отношения. В докладе рассматриваются основные тенденции развития двусторонних отношений, сформулированы рекомендации по их углублению.
Авторы доклада признательны Чрезвычайному и Полномочному Послу Мексики в России господину Рубену Бельтрану за полезные замечания к тексту доклада при его подготовке.
О качественной трансформации российско-американских отношений в стратегическо...Russian Council
Данное исследование выполнено в рамках совместного проекта Российского совета по международным делам (РСМД) и Атлантического совета (АС) по изучению перспектив формирования режима «взаимной гарантированной стабильности» в российско-американских стратегических отношениях. Доклад был представлен на российско-американском семинаре «Отношения России
и США: новые импульсы развития», состоявшемся 25 марта 2013 года.
Web Internationalization of Russian Universities (2016–2017). Report No. 31/2017Russian Council
This report is the result of a new stage in the research of the online English-language resources on the websites of Russian universities and is a follow-up to the initial report produced by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) entitled “Web Internationalization: Russian Universities” in 2015.
The authors developed a methodology for assessing the English-language websites of universities. The online resources of 47 universities were analysed and compared with those of 11 QS Top 100 World Universities.
The results of the study are presented in the form of a ranking of the English-language websites of Russian universities. An analysis of common problems and a list of recommendations have also been provided.
Отношения России и стран Вишеградской группы: испытание УкраинойRussian Council
Сдетонировавшая кризис на Украине политика «Восточного партнерства» дала множество оснований для размышлений не только об отношениях Россия – Европейский союз, но в не меньшей степени и об отношениях России со странами Вишеградской группы, на которую после вступления в ЕС выпала одна из главных ролей в воплощении интересов расширяющейся европейской интеграции на востоке.
Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Working paperRussian Council
Authors:
A.G. Savelyev, Dr. of Political Science; V.Z. Dvorkin, Dr. of Technical Science; V.I. Yesin, Ph.D. in Military Science; N.N. Detinov, A.V. Zagorsky, Ph.D. in History
The goal of this research is to examine one of the possible options to continue disarmament process involving all member states of the Big Five. This study represents
a vision of potential actions by Russia to engage third countries in the nuclear disarmament process at it subsequent stages, analyses the current state in nuclear sphere. The author develops the key idea, which could serve as a basis for multilateral
negotiations. The author takes into account viewpoints of the leading experts in the nuclear field, expressed in the interviews.
Россия–Вьетнам: 20 предложений по повышению эффективности всеобъемлющего стра...Russian Council
Российско-вьетнамские отношения больше не могут развиваться по инерции – чтобы наполнить двустороннее сотрудничество новым содержанием, необходимы новые импульсы. К таким выводам приходят авторы «20 предложений по повышению эффективности всеобъемлющего стратегического партнерства» Россия-Вьетнам, подготовленных Российским советом по международным делам (РСМД) и опубликованных в преддверии визита во Вьетнам премьер-министра Дмитрия Медведева.
Предложения по улучшению образа России в КитаеRussian Council
Рабочая тетрадь подготовлена Российским советом по международным делам (РСМД) в рамках проекта «Россия и АТР: концептуальные основы политики в области безопасности и развития». Данная работа развивает парадигму «мягкой силы» в российско-китайских отношениях.
Автор выделяет основные составляющие образа России в Китае, формулирует конкретные задачи по усилению положительного и сдерживанию отрицательного влияния образа на интересы России, а также предлагает действия, направленные на решение этих задач в краткосрочной и долгосрочной перспективе.
Автор: Л.Н. Смирнова
Россия и Прибалтика: сценарии безопасности в условиях политической напряженностиRussian Council
Регион Балтийского моря долгое время после 1991 г. считался территорией относительного благополучия и политической стабильности. Вместе с тем постепенно накапливались противоречия как объективного, так и субъективного характера. Милитаризация региона началась задолго до «Крыма».
После «Крыма» эта проблема лишь вышла на первый план во всем комплексе политических и экономических противоречий. Авторы рассматривают вопросы военного противостояния в регионе и предлагают три сценария безопасности в регионе.
Russia—EU Relations at a Crossroads. Common and Divergent InterestsRussian Council
Russia and the EU proceed on the basis that “business as usual” is no longer possible. However, neither of them has specified what legacy of their relations before the crisis they are willing or ready to sacrifice, except for the strategic partnership rhetoric. Nor have they formulated any particular vision for their future relations that could become a “new business”.
The working paper includes analysis of common and divergent interests, of mechanisms for cooperation, and gives recommendations on the first steps for renewing the cooperation.
Relaciones ruso-mexicanas: fundamentos tradicionales e imperativos de renovaciónRussian Council
México es un actor bastante infl uyente de la política mundial actual. La participación de Rusia y de México en la política global coincide en numerosos aspectos. No obstante, el modelo de las relaciones rusomexicanas no está asentado del todo y todavía no es óptimo. De hecho, es de carácter asimétrico: los componentes políticos, diplomáticos y culturales superan en volumen y alcance los vínclulos económicocomerciales.
El presente informe analiza las principales tendencias del desarrollo de las relaciones bilaterales y ofrece recomendaciones para impulsar su afi anzamiento.
Los autores del informe expresan su agradecimiento al Sr. Rubén Beltrán, Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de México en Rusia, por sus valiosos comentarios sobre el texto del informe ofrecidos durante su preparación.
Современные российско-иранские отношения: вызовы и возможностиRussian Council
Рабочая тетрадь подготовлена в рамках проекта Российского совета по международным делам «Современные российско-иранские отношения». Два государства обладают большим потенциалом двустороннего сотрудничества, который на сегодняшний день реализован далеко не в полной мере.
Наметившийся прогресс на переговорах по иранской ядерной программе и перспектива ослабления санкций в отношении Ирана открывают новые возможности для развития и укрепления двусторонних отношений России и Ирана. Материалы рабочей тетради анализируют современное состояние торгово-экономических отношений двух государств, возможные направления сотрудничества в Каспийском регионе, в Центральной Азии и на Ближнем Востоке, потенциал дальнейшего взаимодействия и участия России в разрешении ситуации с ядерной программой Ирана. Авторы обозначают ряд конкретных направлений и рекомендаций для развития двустороннего диалога и мер, способных вывести двустороннее сотрудничество на новый, более высокий уровень.
Потенциал российской Арктики для международного сотрудничества: доклад № 17/2015Russian Council
Доклад продолжает серию аналитических материалов Российского совета по международным делам (РСМД) в рамках проекта «Дорожная карта международного сотрудничества в Арктике». В работе детально рассматривается система связей циркумполярных регионов, межрегиональное международное сотрудничество в новых промышленных районах на арктическом шельфе, задачи образовательного взаимодействия, а также возможности для сотрудничества малого и среднего бизнеса в регионе. Отдельное внимание уделяется вопросам стратегического управления российской Арктикой. Авторы предлагают своё видение задач межмуниципального сотрудничества в береговой зоне России, создания единого центра ответственности за реализацию арктической политики России, а также комплексного экосистемного управления арктическими территориями.
Авторский коллектив:
докт. геогр. наук А.Н. Пилясов (руководитель); канд. экон. наук А.В. Котов
ISBN 978-5-91891-434-2
Modern Russian–Iranian Relations: Challenges and OpportunitiesRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s (RIAC) project Modern Russian–Iranian Relations. These two nations have great potential for bilateral cooperation, but that potential has not yet been fully realized. Incipient progress in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and a prospective easing of the sanctions against Iran open up new possibilities for fostering and strengthening ties between Russia and Iran. This working paper analyses the current state of these two countries’ trade and economic ties; potential areas of cooperation in the Caspian region, Central Asia and the Middle East; and Russia’s future role in resolving the situation with Iran’s nuclear programme. The authors outline several specific areas and recommendations for bilateral dialogue, as well as actions that could bring cooperation to a new and higher level.
Материалы научно-практической конференции «Евроатлантическое сообщество безоп...Russian Council
Материалы подготовлены по итогам научно-практической конференции «Евроатлантическое сообщество безопасности: миф или реальность», организованной Российским советом по международным делам (РСМД) при поддержке Администрации Президента Российской Федерации и Правительства Российской Федерации 23 марта 2012 г. в Москве.
Bearing in mind the particular importance Russia attaches to its relations with India, the Russian International Affairs Council has arranged a series of expert workshops dedicated to specific areas of bilateral relations. The following postulates represent the preliminary results of this work. The key objective here is to test some hypotheses related to developing cooperation between Russia and India. We address readers anticipating some sort of feedback. Taking into account readers’ comments and proposals a final version of the postulates will be subsequently prepared and published.
International conference materials “Russia—European Union: Potential for Part...Russian Council
This brochure includes key issues of speeches at the international conference “Russia—European Union: Potential for Partnership”, held by Russian international Affairs Council (RIAC), Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO), Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) with the support of the Government of the Russian Federation. The conference took place in Moscow, on March 21st, 2013. The brochure includes key points presented by
the speakers at the sessions: “General parameters of the Russia—EU partnership”, “Economic parameters of the Russia—EU partnership”, “Eurasian integration in the framework of the Russia—EU partnership”.
Ten years without ABM Treaty. The issue of missile defense in Russia-US relat...Russian Council
What is the real threat posed by the U.S. Missile Defense to Russia now and in the foreseeable future?
What are the possibilities of reaching military and political compromise on missile defense? These issues are dealt with in this short version of the scientific paper entitled "Ten years without the ABM Treaty. The issue of missile defense in Russia-US relations" authored by experts from the Institute for US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the research program of the Russian International Affairs Council.
Конфликты на постсоветском пространстве: перспективы урегулирования и роль Ро...Russian Council
Украинский кризис актуализировал тематику замороженных конфликтов на постсоветском пространстве, продемонстрировав, что дезинтеграционные процессы на территории бывшего СССР завершены еще не в полной мере. В связи с эти важным представляется анализ причин возникновения этно-территориальных конфликтов в данном регионе, основные факторы, влияющие на их развитие, и потенциальные точки возникновения аналогичных кризисных ситуаций.
Современные российско-японские отношения и перспективы их развитияRussian Council
Доклад "Современные российско-японские отношения и перспективы их развития".
Авторский коллектив:
д.полит.н. А.Н. Панов (руководитель коллектива); О.И. Казаков; д.и.н., к.э.н. В.О. Ки-
станов; В.В. Кузьминков; к.и.н. В.Н. Павлятенко; д.и.н. Д.В. Стрельцов; д.соц.н.,
к.и.н. С.В. Чугров
В докладе представлены результаты комплексного анализа современных российско-японских отношений, подготовленные группой российских ученых-японоведов
в рамках исследовательской программы Российского совета по международным делам. В качестве ключевых рассмотрены вопросы политического, торгово-экономического, научно-технологического и культурного взаимодействия двух государств, а также подходы к решению «проблемы северных территорий».
Российско-мексиканские отношения: традиционные основы и императивы обновленияRussian Council
Мексика – достаточно влиятельный актор современной мировой политики. Участие России и Мексики в глобальной политике имеет немало точек соприкосновения, однако модель российско-мексиканских отношений до сих пор не устоялась, не определилась и не стала оптимальной. Модели российско-мексиканских отношений свойственна асимметрия: политическая, дипломатическая и культурная составляющие превосходят по объему и масштабам торгово-экономические отношения. В докладе рассматриваются основные тенденции развития двусторонних отношений, сформулированы рекомендации по их углублению.
Авторы доклада признательны Чрезвычайному и Полномочному Послу Мексики в России господину Рубену Бельтрану за полезные замечания к тексту доклада при его подготовке.
О качественной трансформации российско-американских отношений в стратегическо...Russian Council
Данное исследование выполнено в рамках совместного проекта Российского совета по международным делам (РСМД) и Атлантического совета (АС) по изучению перспектив формирования режима «взаимной гарантированной стабильности» в российско-американских стратегических отношениях. Доклад был представлен на российско-американском семинаре «Отношения России
и США: новые импульсы развития», состоявшемся 25 марта 2013 года.
Web Internationalization of Russian Universities (2016–2017). Report No. 31/2017Russian Council
This report is the result of a new stage in the research of the online English-language resources on the websites of Russian universities and is a follow-up to the initial report produced by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) entitled “Web Internationalization: Russian Universities” in 2015.
The authors developed a methodology for assessing the English-language websites of universities. The online resources of 47 universities were analysed and compared with those of 11 QS Top 100 World Universities.
The results of the study are presented in the form of a ranking of the English-language websites of Russian universities. An analysis of common problems and a list of recommendations have also been provided.
Отношения России и стран Вишеградской группы: испытание УкраинойRussian Council
Сдетонировавшая кризис на Украине политика «Восточного партнерства» дала множество оснований для размышлений не только об отношениях Россия – Европейский союз, но в не меньшей степени и об отношениях России со странами Вишеградской группы, на которую после вступления в ЕС выпала одна из главных ролей в воплощении интересов расширяющейся европейской интеграции на востоке.
Multilateral Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Working paperRussian Council
Authors:
A.G. Savelyev, Dr. of Political Science; V.Z. Dvorkin, Dr. of Technical Science; V.I. Yesin, Ph.D. in Military Science; N.N. Detinov, A.V. Zagorsky, Ph.D. in History
The goal of this research is to examine one of the possible options to continue disarmament process involving all member states of the Big Five. This study represents
a vision of potential actions by Russia to engage third countries in the nuclear disarmament process at it subsequent stages, analyses the current state in nuclear sphere. The author develops the key idea, which could serve as a basis for multilateral
negotiations. The author takes into account viewpoints of the leading experts in the nuclear field, expressed in the interviews.
Россия–Вьетнам: 20 предложений по повышению эффективности всеобъемлющего стра...Russian Council
Российско-вьетнамские отношения больше не могут развиваться по инерции – чтобы наполнить двустороннее сотрудничество новым содержанием, необходимы новые импульсы. К таким выводам приходят авторы «20 предложений по повышению эффективности всеобъемлющего стратегического партнерства» Россия-Вьетнам, подготовленных Российским советом по международным делам (РСМД) и опубликованных в преддверии визита во Вьетнам премьер-министра Дмитрия Медведева.
Предложения по улучшению образа России в КитаеRussian Council
Рабочая тетрадь подготовлена Российским советом по международным делам (РСМД) в рамках проекта «Россия и АТР: концептуальные основы политики в области безопасности и развития». Данная работа развивает парадигму «мягкой силы» в российско-китайских отношениях.
Автор выделяет основные составляющие образа России в Китае, формулирует конкретные задачи по усилению положительного и сдерживанию отрицательного влияния образа на интересы России, а также предлагает действия, направленные на решение этих задач в краткосрочной и долгосрочной перспективе.
Автор: Л.Н. Смирнова
Россия и Прибалтика: сценарии безопасности в условиях политической напряженностиRussian Council
Регион Балтийского моря долгое время после 1991 г. считался территорией относительного благополучия и политической стабильности. Вместе с тем постепенно накапливались противоречия как объективного, так и субъективного характера. Милитаризация региона началась задолго до «Крыма».
После «Крыма» эта проблема лишь вышла на первый план во всем комплексе политических и экономических противоречий. Авторы рассматривают вопросы военного противостояния в регионе и предлагают три сценария безопасности в регионе.
Russia—EU Relations at a Crossroads. Common and Divergent InterestsRussian Council
Russia and the EU proceed on the basis that “business as usual” is no longer possible. However, neither of them has specified what legacy of their relations before the crisis they are willing or ready to sacrifice, except for the strategic partnership rhetoric. Nor have they formulated any particular vision for their future relations that could become a “new business”.
The working paper includes analysis of common and divergent interests, of mechanisms for cooperation, and gives recommendations on the first steps for renewing the cooperation.
Relaciones ruso-mexicanas: fundamentos tradicionales e imperativos de renovaciónRussian Council
México es un actor bastante infl uyente de la política mundial actual. La participación de Rusia y de México en la política global coincide en numerosos aspectos. No obstante, el modelo de las relaciones rusomexicanas no está asentado del todo y todavía no es óptimo. De hecho, es de carácter asimétrico: los componentes políticos, diplomáticos y culturales superan en volumen y alcance los vínclulos económicocomerciales.
El presente informe analiza las principales tendencias del desarrollo de las relaciones bilaterales y ofrece recomendaciones para impulsar su afi anzamiento.
Los autores del informe expresan su agradecimiento al Sr. Rubén Beltrán, Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de México en Rusia, por sus valiosos comentarios sobre el texto del informe ofrecidos durante su preparación.
Современные российско-иранские отношения: вызовы и возможностиRussian Council
Рабочая тетрадь подготовлена в рамках проекта Российского совета по международным делам «Современные российско-иранские отношения». Два государства обладают большим потенциалом двустороннего сотрудничества, который на сегодняшний день реализован далеко не в полной мере.
Наметившийся прогресс на переговорах по иранской ядерной программе и перспектива ослабления санкций в отношении Ирана открывают новые возможности для развития и укрепления двусторонних отношений России и Ирана. Материалы рабочей тетради анализируют современное состояние торгово-экономических отношений двух государств, возможные направления сотрудничества в Каспийском регионе, в Центральной Азии и на Ближнем Востоке, потенциал дальнейшего взаимодействия и участия России в разрешении ситуации с ядерной программой Ирана. Авторы обозначают ряд конкретных направлений и рекомендаций для развития двустороннего диалога и мер, способных вывести двустороннее сотрудничество на новый, более высокий уровень.
Потенциал российской Арктики для международного сотрудничества: доклад № 17/2015Russian Council
Доклад продолжает серию аналитических материалов Российского совета по международным делам (РСМД) в рамках проекта «Дорожная карта международного сотрудничества в Арктике». В работе детально рассматривается система связей циркумполярных регионов, межрегиональное международное сотрудничество в новых промышленных районах на арктическом шельфе, задачи образовательного взаимодействия, а также возможности для сотрудничества малого и среднего бизнеса в регионе. Отдельное внимание уделяется вопросам стратегического управления российской Арктикой. Авторы предлагают своё видение задач межмуниципального сотрудничества в береговой зоне России, создания единого центра ответственности за реализацию арктической политики России, а также комплексного экосистемного управления арктическими территориями.
Авторский коллектив:
докт. геогр. наук А.Н. Пилясов (руководитель); канд. экон. наук А.В. Котов
ISBN 978-5-91891-434-2
Modern Russian–Iranian Relations: Challenges and OpportunitiesRussian Council
This working paper was prepared as part of the Russian International Affairs Council’s (RIAC) project Modern Russian–Iranian Relations. These two nations have great potential for bilateral cooperation, but that potential has not yet been fully realized. Incipient progress in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and a prospective easing of the sanctions against Iran open up new possibilities for fostering and strengthening ties between Russia and Iran. This working paper analyses the current state of these two countries’ trade and economic ties; potential areas of cooperation in the Caspian region, Central Asia and the Middle East; and Russia’s future role in resolving the situation with Iran’s nuclear programme. The authors outline several specific areas and recommendations for bilateral dialogue, as well as actions that could bring cooperation to a new and higher level.
Материалы научно-практической конференции «Евроатлантическое сообщество безоп...Russian Council
Материалы подготовлены по итогам научно-практической конференции «Евроатлантическое сообщество безопасности: миф или реальность», организованной Российским советом по международным делам (РСМД) при поддержке Администрации Президента Российской Федерации и Правительства Российской Федерации 23 марта 2012 г. в Москве.
Bearing in mind the particular importance Russia attaches to its relations with India, the Russian International Affairs Council has arranged a series of expert workshops dedicated to specific areas of bilateral relations. The following postulates represent the preliminary results of this work. The key objective here is to test some hypotheses related to developing cooperation between Russia and India. We address readers anticipating some sort of feedback. Taking into account readers’ comments and proposals a final version of the postulates will be subsequently prepared and published.
International conference materials “Russia—European Union: Potential for Part...Russian Council
This brochure includes key issues of speeches at the international conference “Russia—European Union: Potential for Partnership”, held by Russian international Affairs Council (RIAC), Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO), Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) with the support of the Government of the Russian Federation. The conference took place in Moscow, on March 21st, 2013. The brochure includes key points presented by
the speakers at the sessions: “General parameters of the Russia—EU partnership”, “Economic parameters of the Russia—EU partnership”, “Eurasian integration in the framework of the Russia—EU partnership”.
Ten years without ABM Treaty. The issue of missile defense in Russia-US relat...Russian Council
What is the real threat posed by the U.S. Missile Defense to Russia now and in the foreseeable future?
What are the possibilities of reaching military and political compromise on missile defense? These issues are dealt with in this short version of the scientific paper entitled "Ten years without the ABM Treaty. The issue of missile defense in Russia-US relations" authored by experts from the Institute for US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the research program of the Russian International Affairs Council.
Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on RussiaJeanmarieColbert3
Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on Russia’s Periphery
Hard Targets and Intelligence
Week 3
Duggleby
The Florida State University
1
Sovereignty?
2
Let’s address that sovereignty thing again
Only states deal with sovereignty and exercise authority over territory
States have “national interests,” which drive decision-making and policy
History, Culture and Religion play a major role within a state…
So does Nationalism, Patriotism and Pride!
The United States is the only remaining true super-power following the collapse of the Soviet Union
3
What is a ‘Frozen Conflict’?
Armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the different sides(1)
Russia is responsible for ALL internationally recognized ‘frozen conflicts’ that began since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991
Sovereign nations affected represent 1/3 of countries previously part of the USSR: (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia)
Russia’s response has been to send ‘peacekeepers’, but then remain in the region and ‘stoke the fire’
Moscow’s pretext and justification is the need to ‘protect’ its compatriots—ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (1)
It all begins innocently, with attempts to appeal to the geographically conflicted locals by citing common values, the Orthodox Church, culture
—leads to handing out Russian citizenship/passports(2)
Internal sovereignty is achieved, but external sovereignty is not—no international recognition.
The United States and NATO respects the sovereignty of all states affected
Agnia Grigas: Frozen Conflicts; A Took Kit for US Policymakers
Beyond Crimea, the new Russian empire
4
5
Frozen Conflicts
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
6
Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)
U.S. sponsored, 18-month, $64 million program aimed at increasing the capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces and enhancing Georgia’s CT capabilities
Began in May, 2002, ultimately trained and equipped four 600-man Special Forces battalions (2 Brigades) with light weapons, vehicles and communications
Was US SOF lead in the beginning, shifting to the USMC and the British Army
GTEP ended in April 2004, but actually continued under the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, preparing Georgian troops for operations in Iraq
3d largest troop contributor in Afghanistan in 2008. Georgia had its two U.S. trained brigades deployed at the time Russia invaded in August of that year. This was certainly a calculated strategic move by Putin
7
Georgia Frozen Conflicts
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
8
9
10
11
Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is a military st ...
RAND_PEA2510-1 - AVOIDING A LONG WAR.pdfEdouardHusson
Rapport de la Rand Corporation plaidant pour une fin négociée rapide de la guerre entre l'Ukraine et la Russie. Le débat est lancé à Washington sur la meilleure manière de terminer la guerre sans avoir à concéder une défaite américaine.
Us boosts special operations forces presence at russiaChris Helweg
The deployment of US Special Operations Forces in Europe is never in spotlight but it is rapidly increasing. There can be no other purpose than acquisition of capability to deliver strikes deep into Russia’s territory.
The United States increased the presence of SOF in Europe four times last year. The forces are mainly deployed near Russia’s borders, including such countries as the Baltic States, Romania, Poland, Ukraine
Russia—Republic of Korea Relations: Revising the Bilateral AgendaRussian Council
This Working Paper was prepared by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) as a part of the project “Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region: Conceptual Basis for Security and Development Policy”. The team of authors has conducted comprehensive analysis of Russia—Republic of Korea relations, as well as individual
aspects thereof in a regional context, including economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The research proceeded with practical recommendations aimed at fulfilling Russia’s interests in the Asia-Pacific and strengthening efficient bilateral interaction with ROK.
Over the last years relations between Russia and the US have significantly deteriorated in the majority of cooperation areas. However, Russia-US interaction in the Arctic remains largely shielded from the general climate of mistrust.
Given the current strained relationship, it is realistic to expect that particularly in the short term Russia—US cooperation on Arctic issues is easier to improve, and thus more likely to be expected within multilateral frameworks, such as the Arctic Council, International Maritime Organization, or ad hoc forums, rather than through bilateral formats.
The Working Paper focuses on the US and Russia’s interests, challenges and opportunities for maintaining and consolidating a cooperative relationship in the Arctic and seeks to identify particular issues that could and should be pursued in the near-term (next three years) and mid-term (next five years) taking into account the results of the US Chairmanship of the Arctic Council.
Current state of Russia’s relations with Japan and prospects for their develo...Russian Council
The report presents the results of a comprehensive analysis of contemporary Russian-
Japanese relations made by a team of Russian Japanologists within a framework of the
Russian International Affairs Council’s research program. Political, trade and economic,
scientific, technological and cultural cooperation and also the approaches to the resolution
of “the northern territories’ problem” are among the key issues considered by the authors.
Предложения по российско-американскому сотрудничеству в сфере кибербезопаснос...Russian Council
Текущее состояние российско-американских отношений отличается высоким уровнем недоверия. Напряженность нарастала в течение трех лет, государства наложили друг на друга санкции, активно распространяют пропаганду и обмениваются взаимными обвинениями. Ситуация в двусторонних отношениях непредсказуема: если эскалация продолжится, вся система международных отношений может быть дестабилизована. Текущее ухудшение отношений между двумя странами затронуло все сферы взаимодействия, включая кибербезопасность.
Взаимодействие в сфере кибербезопасности – достаточно новый аспект, который никогда не входил в число приоритетных направлений наравне с борьбой с терроризмом, украинским и сирийским кризисами, экономическими санкциями и др.
Несмотря на то, что государства по обе стороны Атлантического океана осознают необходимость решения ключевых вопросов кибербезопасности, мнения сторон относительно необходимых мер и применения норм международного права к вопросам киберпространства расходятся.
В этой связи требуется работа по двум направлениям. Первое – сотрудничество в предотвращении киберпреступлений и принятие мер по борьбе с кибертерроризмом. Россия и США не могут найти общий язык при обсуждении предотвращения киберпреступлений. Отчасти это вызвано отсутствием общепринятой терминологии применительно к киберпространству.
Кроме того, анонимность киберпреступлений не только затрудняет процесс атрибуции, но и зачастую подрывает статус-кво в двусторонних отношениях. Второе направление включает в себя разработку норм поведения, а также защиту объектов критической инфраструктуры от кибератак. Хотя группа правительственных экспертов ООН ведет активную работу над разработкой правил игры, государствам необходимо найти способы применения существующих и потенциальных норм на практике. Также необходимо дать четкие определения объектам критической инфраструктуры и киберпреступлений.
На данном этапе критически важно продолжение диалога и налаживание взаимопонимания при помощи экспертных встреч и публикаций, сотрудничества на техническом уровне и сбалансированного участия СМИ.
На протяжении 2016 г. российские и американские эксперты по вопросам кибербезопасности совместно работали над предложениями по решению проблем в двусторонних отношениях, связанных с этой сферой.
В результате двусторонних усилий Российский совет по международным делам (РСМД) и Институт Восток-Запад (ИВЗ) выделили ряд вызовов и проблем в сфере кибербезопасности, а также предложений по их решению для улучшения российско-американского сотрудничества в киберпространстве. Стороны выражают надежду, что изложенные ниже предложения смогут лечь в основу будущего сотрудничества.
A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program and the Russian International Affairs Council
At a time when tension between the US and Russia is higher than it has been in decades, we cannot forget that the relationship between these two countries is among the most important for global security. On any number of issues, from arms control to the Middle East, failure of the U.S. and Russia to communicate will make things much, much worse, with repercussions that will last for generations and affect the entire world. For this reason, CSIS and RIAC convened some of Russia’s and America’s top experts to think through the future of the bilateral relationship. The result is a series of papers that identify both the spheres where coordination is crucial and those where it may be possible, responding to mutual interests and potentially helping to stabilize the relationship and buffer against conflict in the future. For both, they offer concrete recommendations and a clear-eyed take on what can, and what cannot be done.
The analyses that follow examine prospects for Russia-U.S. cooperation in several crucial regions and fields: economics, energy, the Arctic, Euro-Atlantic security, the Middle East, strategic stability, cybersecurity, and countering terrorism and extremism. They offer actionable recommendations in each area, some of which can, and should be undertaken today, and some of which should be considered by policymakers in Moscow and Washington as they chart a course through dangerous and uncertain times.
Презентация Лоуренса Макдоннелла. Дебаты «Fake News и мировая политика»Russian Council
18 июля 2017 г. в библиотеке им. Ф.М. Достоевского РСМД провел дебаты на тему «Fake News и мировая политика».
Лекторами на мероприятии выступили бывший корреспондент ВВС в Москве Лоуренс Макдоннелл и заместитель редактора международного отдела РБК, бывший главный редактор англоязычного аналитического ресурса Russia Direct Павел Кошкин. В роли модератора дискуссии выступал менеджер по связям со СМИ и правительственными структурами РСМД Николай Маркоткин.
Россия и Запад: как управлять «холодным миром»?Russian Council
Пятый позиционный документ Рабочей группы проекта «Строительство Большой Европы: необходимые меры до 2030 г.».
Группа видных членов и сторонников Панъевропейской Рабочей группы по сотрудничеству в Большой Европе, в которую входят бывшие министры иностранных дел и обороны, а также высшие должностные лица России, Великобритании, Турции, Польши, Германии, Италии и Финляндии, призвала руководство стран евроатлантического региона остановить дальнейшее раскручивание нисходящей спирали в отношениях между Россией и Западом и эффективно управлять рисками путем повышения стабильности в сфере безопасности.
Отмечая серьезность ситуации, члены Рабочей группы предупреждают, что она чревата военной конфронтацией между Россией и Западом — как умышленной, так и ненамеренной. Отдавая себе отчет в том, что рассчитывать на скорое улучшение отношений не приходится, они считают, что стабилизация ситуации требует общей приверженности всех стран евроатлантического региона отказу от применения силы, более осторожного и сдержанного подхода к наращиванию военного потенциала и активного использования возможностей контроля над вооружениями и укрепления доверия.
Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West. Fifth Task Force Positio...Russian Council
A group of prominent Members and Supporters of the Pan-European Task Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe, including former foreign and defence ministers and senior officials from Russia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Poland, Germany, Italy and Finland has joined forces to appeal to the leadership of the countries in the Euro-Atlantic area to halt the downward spiral in West-Russia relations and manage its risks better through developing a more stable and sustainable security relationship.
Theses on Russia’s Foreign Policy and Global Positioning (2017–2024)Russian Council
5 years ago, in 2012, Postulates on Russia's Foreign Policy (2012-2018) marked the beginning of RIAC’s project work. This report has become RIAC’s trademark for several years, its amendments being used in the updated Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.
The world is now standing at a road fork, and Russia’s key task is to ensure no era of extremes, to promote comfortable and manageable international environment without limitations, conflicts, and splits.
Addressing the changed international situation, quantitative and qualitative growth of challenges for Russia’s foreign policy RIAC and Center for Strategic Research (CSR) presented Theses on Russia’s Foreign Policy and Global Positioning (2017–2024).
As part of the project, 30 interviews were conducted with RIAC members: prominent diplomats, major international relations experts, media executives and entrepreneurs. As a separate part of the project, a series of case studies were conducted with the participation of experts and RIAC members.
.
The theses were based upon the results of a parallel study conducted by a team of researchers at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Text: Ivan Timofeev, RIAC Director of Programs.
Edited by Andrey Kortunov, RIAC Director General and Sergey Utkin, Head of Foreign and Security Policy Department of the Centre for Strategic Research.
Тезисы по внешней политике и позиционированию России в мире (2017–2024 гг.)Russian Council
5 лет назад, в 2012 г. РСМД открыл проектную деятельность изданием Тезисов о внешней политики России (2012–2018). Доклад стал визитной карточкой Совета на несколько лет, а предложения были использованы в новой редакции Концепции внешней политики РФ.
Сейчас мир стоит на развилке, перед Россией стоит задача не допустить новой эпохи крайностей, способствовать созданию комфортной, управляемой международной среды без ограничительных линий, конфликтов и расколов.
Отвечая на изменившуюся международную ситуацию, количественный и качественный рост вызовов для российской внешней политики, РСМД и Центр стратегических разработок (ЦСР) представили «Тезисы по внешней политике и позиционированию России в мире».
В рамках проекта было проведено 30 интервью с членами РСМД — известными дипломатами, крупными учеными-международниками, руководителями СМИ, представителями бизнеса.
Отдельной составляющей проекта стала серия ситуационных анализов с участием экспертов и сотрудников РСМД.
Подготовке тезисов помогли результаты работы группы ученых из Института мировой
экономики и международных отношений имени Е. М. Примакова (ИМЭМО РАН), которая велась параллельно с исследованием РСМД.
Автор текста: Иван Тимофеев, программный директор РСМД.
Под редакцией: Андрея Кортунова, генерального директора РСМД и Сергея Уткина, руководителя направления «Внешняя политика и безопасность» ЦСР.
70th Anniversary of Russia-India Relations: New Horizons of Privileged Partne...Russian Council
In 2017, Russia and India celebrate the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations. Over the years, the two states have steadily developed mutually beneficial ties. Their cooperation has achieved the level of special and privileged strategic partnership. Regular contacts between the two leaders have become an established practice. On June 1–2, 2017, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi is visiting Russia. On May 30, 2017, President of Russia Vladimir Putin’s article “Russia and India: 70 years together” was published in the Times of India. In the article the Russian President stated that the enormous potential of cooperation between the two great powers will be further explored for the benefit of the peoples of India and Russia and the international community in general.
However, in order to make full use of the collaboration potential, ties between Russia and India should be taken to a qualitatively new level. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF) have drafted a joint report in order to open up a new discussion on the prospects of Russia-India relations and the steps required to develop them further. The authors express hope that ideas and recommendations expressed in the paper will provide the necessary expert support for state level contacts and will be helpful in foreign policy decision-making by the two governments.
70-летие дипломатических отношений России и Индии: Новые горизонты привилегир...Russian Council
В 2017 г. Россия и Индия отмечают 70-летие дипломатических отношений. Россия и Индия последовательно формировали взаимовыгодные отношения; их взаимодействие достигло уровня особо привилегированного стратегического партнерства. Регулярные контакты лидеров двух стран вошли в практику российско-индийских отношений. 1–2 июня 2017 г. состоялся официальный визит премьер-министра Н. Моди в Россию. 30 мая 2017 г. в газете The Times of India опубликована статья президента РФ В. Путина «Россия и Индия: 70 лет вместе». В материале президент России выразил уверенность, что «колоссальный потенциал взаимодействия двух великих держав будет и впредь реализовываться на благо народов России и Индии, международного сообщества в целом».
Однако для полноценного использования потенциала сотрудничества необходимо вывести российско-индийские связи на качественно новый уровень. Российский совет по международным делам (РСМД) и Международный фонд им. Вивекананды (VIF) подготовили совместный доклад, призванный открыть широкую экспертную дискуссию о перспективах развития отношений между двумя странами, а также мерах, необходимых для дальнейшего совершенствования и повышения эффективности этих отношений.
Авторы выражают надежду, что идеи и рекомендации, изложенные в данном документе, окажутся востребованными на уровне межгосударственных контактов и будут полезны государственным органам обеих стран при принятии соответствующих внешнеполитических решений.
Дорожная карта российско-американских отношенийRussian Council
Доклад – результат работы ведущих российских и американских экспертов. Основная идея доклада состоит в том, что даже в обстановке геополитической напряженности и взаимного недоверия Россия и США должны сотрудничать. И не только в тех областях, где от их взаимодействия зависит глобальная безопасность, но и в более широком спектре направлений, в которых конкретные совместные действия не менее важны для нормализации отношений между двумя странами и для предотвращения конфликтов в будущем. В докладе анализируются перспективы российско-американского сотрудничества в таких важнейших регионах и сферах как Арктика, Ближний Восток, экономика, энергетика, евроатлантическая безопасность, стратегическая стабильность, кибербезопасность, борьба с терроризмом и экстремизмом. В докладе предлагаются практические рекомендации по налаживанию сотрудничества на каждом из направлений.
Lies, Spies and Big Data: How Fake News Is Rewriting Political LandscapesRussian Council
On November 7, 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States after a bitterly-fought campaign against Hillary Clinton. The election was very closely-run, with Hillary Clinton winning the popular vote, but losing the presidency based on the U.S. electoral college structure. However, months after Donald Trump was declared President of the United States, questions remain about the legitimacy of the U.S. elections. The central issues are the emergence and use of so-called ‘Fake News’ and the accusation that Russia, through espionage and online hacking operations, sought to influence the presidential elections to promote Donald Trump and denigrate the reputation of Hillary Clinton.
The issues thrown up in the wake of the U.S. presidential election have fundamentally undermined trust in the workings of the international media and further damaged U.S.–Russia relations. A report by the U.S. intelligence services accusing Russia of attempting to influence the outcome of the election, prepared for President Obama and published in the election’s immediate aftermath, led to the expulsion1 of 35 Russian diplomats from Washington just days after the results were announced. President Putin, on the other hand, opted not to expel any U.S. diplomats from Russia. The investigation into Russia’s involvement and influence on the U.S. elections continues today.
This policy brief provides an overview of how the gathering and dissemination of news has changed in a globalized digital environment, how consumers digest and share news at an ever-increasing pace, and how the management of big data can influence electorates across borders. It will also define ‘fake news’ and the extent to which it might have influenced the results of the U.S. elections.
Damage Assessment: EU-Russia relations in crisisRussian Council
A new Special Report edited by Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and European Leadership Network (ELN) assesses the damage to EU-Russia relations after three years of crisis.
Featuring Russian and European experts, the report presents their analysis on fundamental aspects of deteriorating EU-Russia relations, including economic impact, political relations and people-to-people contact. For each of these areas the Russian experts present and assess developments inside their own country, while Western authors describe the situation at the EU level and in selected European Union countries.
Перспективы развития проекта ЕАЭС к 2025 годуRussian Council
Рабочая тетрадь подготовлена Российским советом по международным делам (РСМД) в рамках проекта «Евразийская экономическая интеграция: эффективные модели взаимодействия экспертов».
Цель издания — представить взгляды экспертов на развитие проекта ЕАЭС в перспективе до 2025 г. В издании рассмотрены некоторые перспективные направления интеграции: транспорт и логистика, агропромышленная политика, свобода перемещения товаров, трудовых ресурсов, образование на пространстве ЕАЭС, международные связи ЕАЭС в перспективе до 2025 г. Безусловно, этот перечень не является исчерпывающим с точки зрения перспективных направлений интеграции, однако он представляется реализуемым с учетом национальных приоритетов и ожиданий государств — членов Союза, анализу которых посвящен отдельный раздел тетради, и без понимания которых едва ли возможна проработка общих перспективных направлений интеграции.
Экономическое развитие стран ЕАЭС и перспективы экономической интеграции до 2...Russian Council
Евразийский экономический союз создавался для укрепления национальных экономик и возможностей государств–членов в мировой экономике при условии создания четырех свобод – передвижения товаров, услуг, финансов и рабочей силы. Его создание пришлось как на период мировой экономической нестабильности, так и геополитических изменений в Евразии, что повлияло на ситуацию внутри ЕАЭС. Сегодня актуален вопрос перспективности развития экономик государств–членов в формате их участия в евразийском интеграционном проекте.
В аналитической записке рассматриваются вопросы сочетаемости национальных и интеграционных интересов в программах развития как самих стран, так и в рамках ЕАЭС в перспективе до 2025 г.
Российско-британский диалог по проблемам безопасности: перспективы двусторонн...Russian Council
В настоящее время российско-британские отношения находятся в глубоком кризисе. Удастся ли странам восстановить регулярный и системный диалог на высшем уровне? Каковы перспективы сотрудничества России и Великобритании в сфере безопасности, борьбы с международным терроризмом и противодействия насильственному экстремизму, в том числе на Большом Ближнем Востоке? Какие механизмы необходимо выработать для укрепления мер доверия, предотвращения радикализации и развития сотрудничества в борьбе с киберпреступностью. Эти и другие вопросы, связанные с прошлым, настоящим и будущим российско-британских отношений в области безопасности рассматриваются в совместном докладе Российского совета по международным делам (РСМД) и Королевского объединенного института оборонных исследований (RUSI).
Defining Dialogue: How to Manage Russia-UK Security RelationsRussian Council
At present, Russian-British relations are in deep crisis.
Will countries be able to restore a regular and systematic dialogue at the highest level?
What are the prospects for cooperation between Russia and Britain in the sphere of security, combating international terrorism and countering extremism, including in the Greater Middle East?
What mechanisms need to be worked out to strengthen confidence-building measures, prevent radicalization and develop cooperation in the fight against cybercrime.
These and other issues related to the past, present and future of Russian-British security relations are discussed in the joint report of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI).
role of women and girls in various terror groupssadiakorobi2
Women have three distinct types of involvement: direct involvement in terrorist acts; enabling of others to commit such acts; and facilitating the disengagement of others from violent or extremist groups.
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
In a May 9, 2024 paper, Juri Opitz from the University of Zurich, along with Shira Wein and Nathan Schneider form Georgetown University, discussed the importance of linguistic expertise in natural language processing (NLP) in an era dominated by large language models (LLMs).
The authors explained that while machine translation (MT) previously relied heavily on linguists, the landscape has shifted. “Linguistics is no longer front and center in the way we build NLP systems,” they said. With the emergence of LLMs, which can generate fluent text without the need for specialized modules to handle grammar or semantic coherence, the need for linguistic expertise in NLP is being questioned.
हम आग्रह करते हैं कि जो भी सत्ता में आए, वह संविधान का पालन करे, उसकी रक्षा करे और उसे बनाए रखे।" प्रस्ताव में कुल तीन प्रमुख हस्तक्षेप और उनके तंत्र भी प्रस्तुत किए गए। पहला हस्तक्षेप स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करके, वास्तविकता पर आधारित काउंटर नैरेटिव का निर्माण करके और सत्तारूढ़ सरकार द्वारा नियोजित मनोवैज्ञानिक हेरफेर की रणनीति का मुकाबला करके लोगों द्वारा निर्धारित कथा को बनाए रखना और उस पर कार्यकरना था।
‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
4. Contents
1. Current Model of Strategic Cooperation Between Russia
and the United States............................................................................................4
1.1. Mutual Assured Destruction.............................................................................5
1.2. Broad Definition of Strategic Stability...............................................................6
2. Official Views in Russia and the United States..............................................8
2.1 Russia’s Official Views......................................................................................8
2.2. The United States’ Official Views.....................................................................9
2.3. Problems........................................................................................................10
2.4. Roadmap........................................................................................................11
3. New Agreements on the Reduction of Strategic Nuclear Weapons...........13
3.1. A New Russian-American Agreement on START Reduction?.......................13
3.2. Destabilizing Factors......................................................................................14
4. New Strategic Stability Model in the XXI Century........................................16
4.1. New Approaches Needed...............................................................................16
4.2. Mutual Assured Stability and Security............................................................17
4.3. Political Transformation..................................................................................19
5. 4
1. Current Model of Strategic Cooperation Between
Russia and the United States
The positive changes achieved during the reset in Russian-
American relations, for all the emerging problems, made it possible
to consider a transition to a new model for strategic interaction
between Moscow and Washington in the 21st century. This ap-
proach to Russian-American relations should provide for the tran-
sition from “mutual assured destruction” to a positive system of
security based on “mutual assured stability”. This requires current
concepts to be reassessed and new approaches to safeguarding
mutual security to be developed.
The arrival of nuclear missile weapons as a factor in the bi-
polar system of international relations fundamentally changed the
concept of strategic military balance, reducing it to parity in in-
tercontinental nuclear weapons (range of action over 5,500 km)
between the two superpowers, the United States. and the USSR.
These new weapons could provide decisive results in a short time
by annihilating half the population and two-thirds of the industrial
potential in the enemy country (mutual assured destruction).
This narrow definition was limited to warheads carried by inter-
continental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy
bombers. No attention was paid to medium- and short-range nu-
clear weapons, or to the giant stocks of conventional weapons that
the United States and the USSR possessed. Furthermore, other
countries’ nuclear and non-nuclear weapons were also excluded
from this scheme.
At the same time, this understanding also included limitations
on anti-missile defense. This led to the narrow interpretation of the
concept of “strategic stability” that became the basis for Soviet-
American accords on nuclear weapons control. The SALT agree-
ments and BMD Treaty of 1972 imposed quantitative limitations on
START and strategic missile defense.
6. 5
1.1. Mutually Assured Destruction
The model of “mutual nuclear deterrence”, or “mutually assured
destruction” (MAD) took shape in the Soviet-American relations by
the early 1970s. It was codified in a system of arms control treaties
including the SALT (START) and BMD agreements.
The MAD model includes a series of important characteristics,
which distinguishes it from nuclear deterrence as such.
1. Moscow and Washington maintain quantitative and qualitative
parity in strategic forces. Other nuclear powers do not aim for
parity.
2. Russia and the United States have agreed to classify their nu-
clear forces as strategic (i.e. with a range of action of over 5,500
km) and tactical. Other nuclear powers do not apply this strate-
gic-nonstrategic classification to their nuclear weapons.
3. The United States and Russia are the only countries with “coun-
terforce nuclear potential”, that is, an ability to deliver a prompt
strike at military targets and military command and political ad-
ministration centers. Other nuclear states have countervalue po-
tential, i.e. the ability to attack large cities and industrial areas.
4. Only the Russian and United States’ strategic forces are able
to strike and destroy military and political command and con-
trol systems. Other countries’ nuclear forces lack the capacity to
carry out plans like this.
5. As a result, only Russia and the United States are potentially
capable of delivering a surprise preemptive strike at any time.
6. Given this situation, Moscow and Washington created and main-
tain early warning systems (both land and satellite based) to de-
tect a nuclear missile attack. Other nuclear states do not have
comparable systems at their disposal.
7. Russia and the United States therefore keep their strategic nu-
clear forces on high alert (combat-ready) so as to be able to
launch their missiles (chiefly Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles,
ICBMs) in a matter of minutes following a warning of a missile
launch by the opposite side. Other nuclear powers have no ca-
pabilities to launch on warning.
8. In order to mitigate the consequences of a preemptive strike,
the USSR and United States agreed to limit their strategic anti-
missile defense by parameters that leave no chance of avoiding
retaliation in the event of a preemptive strike.
9. The MAD model does not take into account the conventional
armed forces and non-nuclear weapons that the parties have at
their disposal.
7. 6
Arms control was expanded at the end of the Cold War. The INF
Treaty was signed in 1987 and under it the two superpowers de-
stroyed their land-based missiles that have a range of action from
500 to 5,500 km. In addition, Washington and Moscow in 1991 an-
nounced their unilateral, but parallel measures towards tactical nu-
clear weapons reduction. The multilateral Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed in 1990 to impose
limitations on five types of conventional weapons (tanks, armored
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and strike helicopters).
Along with the United States and the USSR, the list of signatories
included all NATO and Warsaw Treaty member countries on a par-
ity basis. But no limitations were set on navy armaments, except for
submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
1.2. Broad Definition of Strategic Stability
The MAD model survived the end of the Cold War and remains
the basis of military-strategic relations between Russia and the Unit-
ed States. The new START Treaty, signed in 2010, does not revoke
MAD, and in fact makes this model more lasting and stable.
This narrow definition of “strategic stability” persisted until recent-
ly, and this was registered in the new START Treaty that covered
only traditional components of the strategic triad.
In the early 21st century, however, the military-strategic balance
is not confined to strategic nuclear forces. Today, achieving decisive
objectives in war (hitting a wide range of military targets and eco-
nomic areas, destroying political administration and military com-
mand systems) is possible using non-nuclear weapons. New non-
nuclear weapons boast destructive capacities that are increasingly
close to that of nuclear weapons. In the coming decades, strategic
non-nuclear weapons will, it seems, mature to a point at which they
are able to exert a considerable impact on the military-strategic bal-
ance. In fact, the United States takes the lead in creating strategic
non-nuclear weapons.
In the polycentric world, the overall balance of forces involves
numerous factors. An ever-greater role is played by counter-missile
technologies, the potential for Prompt Global Strike (PGS) using
conventional warheads, and the possibility to orbit space-to-surface
weapons. Cyber weapons are being developed rapidly. Great imbal-
ances have appeared in conventional weapons. The links between
these different factors are becoming increasingly evident. There is a
clear need to develop an integrated approach to dealing with prob-
lems arising as a result of breakthroughs in military technologies.
8. 7
It is significant that the first decade of this century saw the remit
of the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) expand
considerably as part of its fundamental, root and branch, reorga-
nization. USSTRATCOM initially brought together the strategic nu-
clear forces of the U.S. Air Force and Navy. Its structure comprises
the Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike (JF-
CC-GS) that includes nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, the Joint
Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaisance (JFCC-ISR), the United States Space Command
(USSPACECOM), the Joint Functional Command Component for
Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), the United States Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM) let by the director of the National Se-
curity Agency, among others.
In late 2011 and early 2012, official representatives of Russia and
the United States held consultations on strategic stability. Certain
differences came to the fore in their respective approaches.
9. 8
2. Official Views in Russia
and the United States
2.1. Russia’s Official Views
The Russian side defines “strategic stability” as a stable balance
of overall military potential, including both offensive and defensive
weapons. This is an extremely broad definition. Russia calls for re-
fraining from any steps in building up military potentials, weapons
development and deployment, troop deployment, the adoption and
implementation of doctrines and concepts, formation and reconfigu-
ration of military-political alliances, establishing military bases in for-
eign territories, and other actions that the other side could perceive
as a threat to its national security.
They add that Russia will seek to involve other states, above
all those with nuclear weapons, and those that have a stake in
joint action to support security, in the process to build up strategic
stability. The Russian side declares that any further steps in the
area of nuclear weapons reduction and limitation should be mul-
tilateral.
Russia defines “strategic deterrence” as a set of measures in-
tended to forestall or reduce any threat of destructive action from
an aggressor state (or coalition of states). They add that nuclear
deterrence is fundamental to maintaining strategic stability. More-
over, for the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons will remain an
important factor in preventing emergence of nuclear conflicts and
military conflicts involving conventional weapons that could be
modified into nuclear ones. Under its military doctrine, Russia as-
serts its right to use nuclear weapons to retaliate application of
nuclear or other mass destruction weapons against it and/or its al-
lies, and also in the event of conventional weapons used in an ag-
gression against the Russian Federation that endangers the very
survival of the state1
.
The Russian side, therefore, states that further nuclear arms
reduction should be considered taking due account of the broader
combination of factors that are key to strategic stability. These in-
clude, but are not limited to, BMD, PGS, ratification of the Compre-
hensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the threat of space-orbited weap-
ons, and quantitative and qualitative imbalances in conventional
weapons.
1
Military Doctrine of Russian Federation. 2010. February 5.
10. 9
2.2. The United States’ Official Views
The American side tends towards the narrow understanding of
strategic stability that was accepted in the Cold War and chiefly in-
volved the balance of strategic offensive nuclear forces. This ap-
proach is sometimes identified in the U.S. as “arms race stability”,
requiring approximate parity in the size and composition of strategic
nuclear forces. This is the approach that served as the foundation
for the SALT, START and SORT treaties.
The Obama Administration concedes that, despite considerable
reductions in nuclear forces by both the U.S. and Russia, these forc-
es remain targeted against each other as if the two states were still
enemies.
The American side proceeds from the premise that, in normalcy
and crisis, both sides retain a considerable contingent of strategic
nuclear forces and systems of command and control over nuclear
forces in a position that makes it possible to survive the first disarm-
ing strike from the opposite side, and to retaliate with destructive
force against a wide range of vital targets.
At the same time, certain shifts have occurred under the Obama
Administration. This was reflected in the preamble to the new
START Treaty, recognizing the interrelation between strategic of-
fensive and strategic defensive weapons. The American side notes
that both sides’ strategic offensive forces should have the ability to
overcome the air and ballistic missile defense of the opposite side
to destroy designated targets. They also assert that neither Russia
nor the United States have deployed air or ballistic missile defense
forces that are powerful enough to blunt a retaliatory strike by the
other side in any serious way.
Moreover, they raise the question of reducing the number of tar-
gets subject to this attack risk.
The American side, therefore, suggests further bilateral reductions
to U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, with no participation by other
nuclear countries in the effort. This involves both strategic and non-
strategic, and both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons.
The United States also proposes discussions on nuclear doc-
trines and terminology, since Russia raises the possible use of
nuclear weapons in the event of war with an adversary relying on
superiority in conventional weapons.
On one hand, the American side recognizes Russia’s concerns
about the development of U.S. BMD and Prompt Global Strike
(PGS). On the other hand, they express their own concern about
the modernization of strategic nuclear forces in Russia.
11. 10
Particular emphasis is laid on transparency. The American side
points out that information on BMD plans and programs and de-
velopment of cooperation, for example, in monitoring BMD system
tests, joint training, joint analyses and planning, could prove instru-
mental in delivering better understanding, greater predictability and
enhanced confidence.
The American side is also prepared to discuss emerging threats to
critically important satellite capabilities and cyber networks, threats
that may undermine strategic stability, and also joint approaches to
countering these threats.
2.3. Problems
It is therefore clear that there are considerable differences in the
U.S. and Russian approaches to strategic stability. This is due to
asymmetry in their military potentials and their national security in-
terests.
The United States is prepared to opt for accords on nuclear
weapons where the two countries have approximate parity. But
Washington does not agree to rigid limitations in those areas where
the United States has clear superiority. Moscow, meanwhile, is wary
of threats to its nuclear potential from U.S. non-nuclear weapons
and considers limitations in this area a priority.
The United States adheres to a narrow interpretation of strate-
gic stability, suggesting it should be supported by legally binding
bilateral agreements on further nuclear arms reductions, and also
by political, but not legal, measures to achieve a certain degree
of transparency in such areas as BMD, PGS, aerospace devices,
and cyber space. When it comes to multilateral accords, the U.S.
position is limited solely to non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
Russia tends towards an extremely broad interpretation of stra-
tegic stability. Moscow is in no hurry to agree to new nuclear arms
reductions, especially regarding tactical nuclear weapons (TNW).
At the same time, the Russian side wants to achieve legally bind-
ing limitations on strategic non-nuclear military systems, an area in
which it is lagging considerably behind the United States. Russia
also advocates a military balance of forces established multilaterally
under international law.
There are influential political groups in both countries that, as
a matter of principle, reject any need to support strategic stability
through arms control accords. For example, the Republican Party’s
stance leaves very little room for the ratification of a new disarma-
12. 11
ment treaty by the U.S. Senate. This further complicates diplomatic
efforts to achieve a compromise acceptable to both Russia and the
United States.
At the same time, Moscow and Washington both have to deal
with financial and economic problems that cannot but impact de-
fense spending. Modern weapons systems require massive outlays.
Therefore, U.S. budget cuts will have an impact on spending on the
nuclear complex, BMD and other weapons programs. The Russian
Federation, too, has its own budget problems. It is indicative that
Russia currently has under the number of deployed launchers and
warheads allowed by the new START Treaty.
2.4. Roadmap
In order to analyze how the Russian-American dialogue on stra-
tegic stability can develop, we first need to understand whether the
United States is prepared to conclude further legally binding agree-
ments on strategic nuclear and non-nuclear arms control. If it is,
then there are quite realistic prospects for strengthening strategic
stability in both the narrow and broader senses. But, it is not, then
strategic stability will start to erode. If no compromise is reached,
arms control as a restraining mechanism could be consigned to “the
dustbin of history”.
It seems that the narrow interpretation of strategic stability that
corresponded to the bi-polar world in the late 20th century, when
there were two opposing superpowers, is now obsolete. The 21st
century requires a broader understanding of strategic stability that
corresponds to today’s technological and geopolitical realities.
Viewed conceptually, however, this issue requires serious analysis.
Neither Russia nor the United States is currently prepared to seek
political solutions covering all aspects of this broader interpretation
of strategic stability.
The shift from the outdated, narrow concept of strategic sta-
bility that dominated in the late 20th century to a broader under-
standing that is relevant to today’s realities could involve several
stages.
The initial stage could involve the examination of prospects for
further bilateral nuclear arms reductions by the United States and
Russia. One reason is that other nuclear powers have refused to un-
dertake any official commitments to limit their arsenals. It is not clear
how states that have nuclear weapons but that are not recognized
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can be involved in
the disarmament process.
13. 12
The second stage could involve the three other “officially recog-
nized” nuclear powers – France, the UK and China – in the treaty
regime. They would have to agree to some sort of quantitative ceil-
ings on nuclear weapons and to measures of verification and con-
trol. Even the most optimistic assessments do not suggest that this
could happen any sooner than the end of the decade.
The third stage should involve efforts to include the “unofficial”
nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – in this
nuclear arms control regime. But when and how this can be achieved
is, for now, conjecture. This may require amendments to be made in
the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself, and this is fraught with extremely
dangerous consequences.
14. 13
3. New Agreements on the Reduction of Strategic
Nuclear Weapons
3.1. New Russian-American Agreement for START Reduction?
The U.S. approach to new nuclear arms reductions was outlined
in a report by the State Department’s International Security Advisory
Board of November 27, 20122
. The report examines several scenar-
ios: adopting an amendment to the new START Treaty; concluding
a treaty on non-strategic and non-deployed weapons; concluding
a treaty covering all nuclear warheads; and parallel mutual political
commitments. The report noted that unilateral and coordinated ac-
tions could be carried out faster and at lower political cost (meaning
ratification difficulties). It also considered the prescheduled fulfill-
ment of the START Treaty, which would make it possible to avoid
deployment by Russia of a new type of heavy ICBM. The report
also proposed discussing additional measures for transparency (for
instance, information exchanges on TNW reductions already imple-
mented), and possible verification of nuclear warheads reductions.
In our assessment, new American-Russian accords could be
concluded as additional agreements on more far-reaching reduc-
tions of strategic nuclear weapons than envisaged under the START
Treaty. The sides could agree, for instance, within the framework of
the current treaty, to set a ceiling of 1,400 warheads deployed on
strategic carriers in 2014, and 1,000 deployed warheads in 2017.
But this reduction would only make sense if a ceiling of 500 units is
established for ICBM and SLBM. It might also be possible to limit the
number of heavy bomber aircraft to 40 units (with an actual load of
approximately 300 nuclear warheads).
Consequently, the ratio between nuclear warheads that could
be used in a preemptive strike and the number of targets poten-
tially subject to strikes would be less than 2 to 1. This ratio makes
preventing a retaliatory strike extremely difficult, and, consequently,
would help strengthen crisis stability.
At the same time, the possibility of switching a considerable pro-
portion of “active” nuclear weapons to lower combat readiness is
emerging. This will be instrumental in overcoming apprehensions
concerning a sudden mass preemptive attack to disarm and inca-
pacitate. However, the ability to carry out a counterattack cannot
be eliminated by technical measures. Therefore, START reductions,
coupled with a partial diminishment of combat readiness, will not
radically alter the MAD setup, although they will make this model
2
Options for Implementing Additional Nuclear Force Reductions: report / International Security
Advisory Board. 2012. November 27.
15. 14
more reliable and stable. The Russian and American strategic nu-
clear forces will retain their function of mutual deterrence.
3.2. Destabilizing Factors
This, however, leaves out a host of destabilizing factors such as
BMD, non-strategic nuclear weapons, PGS, and other high-preci-
sion conventional weapons.
Russia is unlikely to agree to any further reductions in nuclear
weapons, so long as the United States is intent on building up its
strategic anti-ballistic missile defense. However, expecting Wash-
ington to sign and ratify a new BMD treaty is not realistic.
At the same time, the United States will seek to limit non-strategic
nuclear forces, an area in which Russia boasts quantitative superi-
ority. But Moscow will not agree to talks on this issue unless they
include high-precision conventional weapons, such as PGS forces,
and disparities between Russia and NATO in conventional armed
forces. In addition, the CFE Treaty’s termination renders it impos-
sible to verify the fulfillment of the TNW agreement. Solving these
problems will require a number of additional accords to support new
START agreements. These are as follows.
1. Limiting strategic BMD (interceptors with a speed of 4.5 km/
sec. and over) to a ceiling of not more than 100 weapons.
2. Limiting PGS forces to 20 weapons. These forces will have to
be included in Russian-American accords on reduction of strategic
ICBM launchers and SLBM.
3. Including non-strategic nuclear warheads in the overall ceiling
of non-deployed nuclear warheads.
4. Agreeing on transparency and, possibly, verification measures
for BMD, PGS and TNW.
5. Implementing additional confidence-building measures (ex-
changes of notifications, etc.) on naval forces.
6. Setting restrictions (self-restrictions) on increases in certain
types of high-precision conventional weapons.
The need to achieve these accords greatly complicates the task
as compared to the provisions already available in the START trea-
ty. Prospects for concluding the relevant legally binding treaties look
doubtful, and above all because of the stance taken by the United
States. Political commitments may prompt doubts in Moscow, where
there is every reason for concern over a possible shift in American
policies following a change of administration in Washington.
As for the problems of cyber weapons and orbiting strike systems
in space, these cannot be resolved on a bilateral basis. Meanwhile,
16. 15
involving China and other powers in possible agreements will at
best take a long time.
In his State of the Union message, president Obama called for
negotiations with Russia about further cuts to nuclear arsenals.
Washington understands that no progress in these talks is possible
without a compromise solution to the BMD problem3
. On March 15,
the new U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced a “re-
structuring” of the American BMD program4
. Undersecretary of De-
fense Jim Miller, responding to a question at the Pentagon news
conference, clarified that the SM-3 Block 2B program has been can-
celled5
.
The Obama administration demonstrated that has no intention
of seeing relations with Russia deteriorate, and is (to an extent)
ready to compromise. It the next decade, U.S. BMD is unlikely to ex-
ceed the ceiling of 100 interceptors established by the ABM Treaty
a long time ago. Russia meanwhile has almost 500 ICBM and SLBM
launchers and heavy bombers with 1,500 nuclear warheads.
Despite this, it is too soon to suggest that the problem has been
resolved. First, Washington intends to implement the 2nd and the
3rd phases of its Adaptive Approach, including deploying SM-3
Block 2A in Romania and Poland in the 3rd stage. Second, under
pressure from Republicans in Congress, the Pentagon promised
to conduct a “study” of the Third Site on the Eastern shore of the
United States. But Hagel emphasized that it is just a “study”, not
a commitment to deploy. Nevertheless it is impossible to rule out
the possibility that, when the Republicans come to power, we will
see renewed efforts to create a “thick” ballistic missile defense to
protect U.S. territory.
We now have a “window of opportunity”. It is time for serious
negotiations between Moscow and Washington. Hopefully we can
reach compromise agreements that will respond to each country’s
security interests and strengthen strategic stability.
If a Russian-American compromise on BMD is achieved in 2013-
2014, we can hope to maintain strategic stability, in the narrow
meaning, until at least the end of this decade, or the beginning of
the next decade. Alongside new reductions in nuclear weapons by
Russia and the U.S., this will help strengthen the non-proliferation
regime.
3
State of the Union Address. 2013. February 12. URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/
video/2013/02/12/2013-state-union-address
4
Hagel С. U.S. Bolstering Missile Defense / U.S. Department of Defense. 2013. March 15. URL: http://
www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119543
5
U.S. Announces EPAA Phase IV cancellation, increase in number of GMD national missile defense
interceptors from 30 to 44 (March 15, 2013). Mostly Missile Defense. URL: http://mostlymissiledefense.com
17. 16
4. New Strategic Stability Model in the XXI Century
4.1. New Approaches Needed
Further down the line, maintaining the military-strategic balance
will necessitate some fundamentally new approaches to strategic
offensive and defensive weapons. It would seem that in the 21st
century, the arms control mechanism created during the Cold War
based on legally binding accords (setting quantitative ceilings, and
verification and control measures) is far from applicable when it
comes to the possible regulation of the numerous components that
comprise today’s military-strategic balance at both a bilateral and
multilateral level.
The traditional arms control mechanism can still be effective on
nuclear weapons when it comes to Russia and the United States, as
has been confirmed in the new START Treaty. That said, this mech-
anism does elide the two countries’ non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Theoretically, it could be possible to achieve new legally binding ac-
cords between Russia and the United States on nuclear weapons. It
is, however, highly unlikely that it will be possible to achieve a new
legally binding agreement on limits to anti-ballistic missile defense
(ABM-2 Treaty). It is even less possible, or indeed necessary, to
revive the CFE Treaty, although efforts should continue to reach
accords on a new framework of international legal control over con-
ventional armaments that involves all European countries.
Therefore, there is a clear need to develop new instruments to
regulate the military-strategic balance and supplement preexisting
legally binding accords. Supporting and strengthening the military-
strategic stability is a process that should ensure the situation re-
mains predictable, while also preventing any sudden shifts in the
balance, ruling out unnecessary arms race expenditures, and fore-
stalling the emergence and escalation of military-political crises.
These instruments could include confidence-building measures
and enhanced transparency regarding particularly sensitive compo-
nents of the military-strategic balance. The sides are surely aware
of the need for restraint, and the importance of refraining from at-
tempts to achieve superiority. As history indicates, this superiority
is only ever fleeting in nature and risks igniting a new, and very
dangerous, arms race.
We can anticipate that these measures could include unilateral,
parallel steps at a bilateral level (for example, between Russia and
the United States, or China and India). These measures could relate
to both quantitative parameters of certain types of weapons and the
18. 17
supply of information regarding their operational application. These
measures could be adopted via political accords, rather than legal
commitments under a treaty.
Of course, the Russian-American accords on nuclear arms re-
ductions described above cannot be regarded as sufficient to up-
hold the military-strategic balance if we accept the broad definition
of strategic stability, which has to deal with both non-nuclear strate-
gic systems and the multi-polar nature of the world today. It is par-
ticularly important to be aware the stability of the military-strategic
balance will be increasingly influenced by the need to avoid or dis-
incentivize the militarization of space and the development of cyber
weapons. Obviously, supporting strategic stability in the multi-polar
world in the 21st century will require new efforts to neutralize serious
threats arising in these areas of military rivalry.
Strategic stability in the world and the situation in particular re-
lating to European security, for the coming decade, will depend di-
rectly on whether Russia and the U.S. together with other NATO
member countries are able to ensure predictability on the BMD is-
sue. This system has to be based on an operational cooperation
mechanism.
4.2. Mutual Assured Stability and Security
The U.S. approach to Mutual Assured Stability (MAS) was pre-
sented in a special report by the U.S. State Department’s Interna-
tional Security Advisory Board on August 14, 20126
.
In this report, MAS is defined as relations characterized by the
following features:
• Nuclear weapons no longer play the central role in ensuring se-
curity;
• Deterrence on the basis of nuclear destruction is no longer ne-
cessary;
• Probability of nuclear war is extremely low;
• The chief, key challenges to security (ideological or territorial
conflicts, rivalry in the access to natural resources) do not exist;
• Benefits from peaceful integration in the economic, political and
diplomatic spheres outweigh any advantages from a nuclear con-
flict.
Forming an MAS model is, the report’s authors feel, critically im-
portant in Russian-American relations, because the two countries’
nuclear arsenals are greater than the nuclear weapons stocks of all
other countries in the world.
6
Report on Mutual Assured Stability: Essential Components and Near Term Actions / International
Security Advisory Board. 2012. August 14.
19. 18
The authors support the idea of conducting talks on strategic sta-
bility between the United States and Russia in order to discuss the
composition and adoption of a plan for this transition to MAS. They
particularly emphasize the need for a joint analysis of the require-
ments in national and multilateral BMD. In addition, they recognize
it necessary to make changes (on a reciprocal basis) to the U.S.
nuclear doctrine, in order to move from a nuclear policy that deems
Russia the chief menace, to a doctrine of general deterrence with
no concrete enemies specified. It is also proposed that the sides
should jointly work out issues relating to nuclear weapons classifica-
tion, the security of nuclear materials, and other countries’ adoption
of appropriate standards. They note the need to exchange data on
missile warning systems (MWS), and for 5-year plans for nuclear
systems modernization. The report also proposes developing eco-
nomic interaction, stepping up the anti-drug struggle, and enhancing
cooperation in science and technology. This transition to MAS, the
authors feel, will take years and even decades.
It should be noted that members of the Obama Administration
concede that MAS indeed has an impact on the evolution of rela-
tions between Russia and the United States in both political and
military areas, and emphasize the inter-connectedness of these two
aspects of MAS. They say the aim is to make the transition to mutual
security and normal relations. MAS is considered a mechanism of
joint response to common challenges to security, a mechanism de-
void of ulterior motivations that could prompt crises, spark conflict,
or ignite an arms race.
An important form of support for MAS could be cooperative ac-
tion to provide for joint security and joint defense. This would make
it possible to move from “negative” to “positive” rules of interaction.
It could be mentioned in this connection that the creation of the
North Atlantic Alliance led to a situation in which any military con-
frontation between NATO member states has been virtually ruled
out, although historically they have fought among themselves on nu-
merous occasions. One apposite example here would be relations
between Great Britain and France: the two countries have been able
to overcome their thousand-year-old confrontation, and although
they possess nuclear weapons, they interact positively in their ap-
proach to key problems. These former adversaries have become
allies, with whatever differences there were between them no longer
leading to armed conflicts.
Evidently, this experience is instructive for future interaction be-
tween Russia and the United States - countries that have never
been adversaries in the multi-polar system of international relations.
20. 19
Moreover, Washington and Moscow were allies in World War II de-
spite their ideological differences.
4.3. Political Transformation
The 22 years that have elapsed since the end of the Cold War are
evidence that the stated strategic partnership has failed to deliver
any qualitative changes in Russian-American relations. The forma-
tion of a new model for partnership between Russia and the United
States took place in conditions of rapidly growing asymmetry in the
two countries’ potentials and interests.
First, the declarations were not followed by practical measures to
create lasting institutions. More precisely, half-measures were taken
that had little hope of ever proving efficient. Random efforts were not
molded into an overall strategic concept, they were sporadic, and
with rare exceptions had no significant consequences. “The partner-
ship” also became little more than rhetoric.
Second, no solid international legal framework has been created
for strategic partnership. Russia and the United States singed new
nuclear arms reduction agreements on three occasions: START-II in
1993, SORT in 2002, and the new START Treaty in 2010. But just
as during the Cold War, these agreements only established “nega-
tive rules”, that is, what should not be done. No positive clauses
were outlined such as a potential treaty on mutual security or coun-
ter-terror agreement.
Some of the “negative rules” previously contained in the military-
strategic rivalry were even eroded. The unilateral withdrawal by the
United States from the ABM Treaty was a heavy blow to the entire
arms control regime. The moratorium on the CFE Treaty also played
its role.
Third, the Moscow-Washington strategic partnership has no eco-
nomic basis. Russia accounts for less than 1 percent of the volume
of American foreign trade and capital exports.
Fourth, strategic partnership between Russia and the United
States is not supported in domestic policies. This is largely due to
the weakness of economic ties, as it is the business community that
usually comes out to lobby for political cooperation. But there are
well-organized groups that have links to the defense sector and re-
lated industries (military-industrial complex) that direct their efforts
against arms reduction or the development of cooperation in military
and political areas.
As the Advisory Board report dated August 14, 2012 points out;
transition to MAS will be difficult, if it is achievable at all. Although
21. 20
the Cold War has ended, mutual mistrust remains, as do some fun-
damental differences in values and conflicts in interests. But then,
MAS does not require absolute trust, or comprehensive coopera-
tion, or even fully coinciding national interests. The authors point
out that neither side threatens the key security interests of the other
side, especially concerning border disputes, ideological conflicts or
rivalry over natural resources.
The report admits that there are risks associated with the transi-
tion to MAS, in particular if other nuclear powers are not involved in
the process of strengthening strategic stability. The authors add that
a shift in Russian-American relations in this direction risks creating
problems for the United States in its relations with other countries.
We have to admit that although there are no ideological or geo-
political conflicts between Moscow and Washington today compa-
rable to the confrontation in the Cold War period, and although the
reset has made it possible to achieve accords on START, WTO and
several other issues, Russian-American relations remain fragile and
unstable. MAD represents one of the “built-in” elements destabiliz-
ing these relations.
An analysis of approaches taken by Russia and the United States
to the problem of strategic stability indicates that no radical improve-
ments should be expected here in the short-term. While not denying
the necessity and possibility of new accords on military-strategic is-
sues, we have to conclude that new agreements on arms reductions
and limitations cannot in themselves lead Moscow and Washington
to MAS instead of MAD.
A radical solution to this problem lies, chiefly, in the political and
economic spheres.
Russia and the United States share common interests in their ap-
proaches to a host of key issues in international security. This primarily
concerns non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There are
opportunities for interaction over Iran and North Korea. Cooperation
is developing on Afghanistan, too. The repeal of the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment and Russia’s accession to the WTO laid the groundwork
for trade and investment relations to be imbued with new momentum.
In our opinion, qualitative changes in the political and economic
spheres will also render inevitable the transformation of military-
strategic interaction between Russia and the United States. Further-
more, both political and legal international approaches to coordinat-
ing the two sides’ positions are possible, up to concluding a mutual
security treaty.
Therefore, strategic stability in the 21st century could rest on the
following pillars:
22. 21
1. Treaty obligations on limitations and reductions in armaments.
2. Confidence-building and transparency measures on the basis of
political obligations.
3. Unilateral parallel measures to demonstrate the absence of
threat.
4. Cooperation in the area of security and defense on the basis of
reciprocal political and legal commitments, including those relat-
ed to BMD.
5. Development of political and economic cooperation between
Russia and the United States.
Ideally, transition from mutually assured destruction to mutually
assured stability should lead to mutually assured security for Russia
and the United States. This requires considerable political will from
both sides.