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PERPETUAL INSTABILITY IN UKRAINE 1
Perpetual Instability in Ukraine
Dylan Thomas Farley
Training Brain Operations Center

Abstract
The first purpose of this paper is to identify and define a consistent pattern displayed by Russia
in its involvement in separatist conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The second purpose
of this paper is to determine a course of action for responding to the pattern, specifically
exploring the potential use of lethal aid. The paper starts off analyzing conflicts in Georgia and
Moldova, identifying key similarities. From here, the paper continues with applying those
similarities to Ukraine and also identifying the Russian goals. The last segment of the paper
studies the potential use of lethal aid and the possible alternatives.

Perpetual Instability in the Ukraine
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has established a system
of destabilizing states in its ‘Near Abroad’1 in order to create buffer zones. Russia is concerned
about the Western2 encroachment on its sphere of influence and the economic and security
ramifications of these moves. Russia’s destabilization policy has already manifested in Moldova
and Georgia, and is currently happening in Ukraine. Russia will create a destabilized Ukraine by
stalemating the present War in Donbass3, effectually making a buffer zone between itself and the
West. The best way for the United States to react is not to arm the Ukrainians, but train them to
successfully fight the separatists and Russians.
Precedents to Ukraine
Before Ukraine entered the world stage as a major conflict, post-Soviet states had been
embroiled in various levels of conflict ever since the Soviet Union itself fell. Of all the post-
Soviet conflicts, the most important to the international status quo were the separatist conflicts
that arose in several states. All of the conflicts, whether they stemmed from poor Soviet
nationalities policies or improper resource allocation, still involved the Soviet successor state:
the Russian Federation.
The first true post-Soviet separatist conflicts were in Georgia, first with the Ossetians
from 5 January 1991 to 24 June 1992 and then with the Abkhaz from 14 August 1992 to 27
September 1993. As typical with most ethnic conflicts, one ethnic group felt marginalized by the
other and eventually both sides became armed and engaged in varying levels of violence,
1 ‘The Near Abroad’
2 ‘The West’ refers to the European Union, NATO, and their nominally allied democratic states.
3 The ‘War in Donbass’ is the term for the present Ukrainian conflict, whereas ‘Novorossiya’ is
the term for the separatist government operating in the area of the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk
and Donetsk.

whether it is protests or full-scale war and ethnic cleansing. The purpose of this paper is to
analyze the Russian actions and effects in the conflict zone, therefore paying particular attention
to the civil-military pathway after the conflict has already started.
After the initial ethnic conflicts in Georgia, international mediators established ceasefire
lines between the majority Georgians and the respective separatist ethnicities. Russia brokered
both peace deals together as the United Nations liaison and acted as chief of the United Nations
peacekeepers, comprising Russian, Georgian, and North Ossetian provincial forces. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe would act as observers of the peacekeeping
force. The ceasefire lines did not coincide with the territory claimed by the separatist states, as
Georgia maintained control over the Kodori region of Abkhazia and several districts of villages
in South Ossetia. Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia would remain at a low level until 2008,
when a new war broke out (Gahrton 2010).
Prior to 2008, both separatist states and Georgia had settled into their respective
defensive postures and even had began to scale down operations and return refugees across the
borders. The main issues along the border were not ethnic based, because they were actually
rural organized crime and occasionally Islamist extremists operating in the sparsely populated
areas (Baev). Although military action would be taken with each new threat, they were not
ethno-national conflicts. In 2008 however, this trend changed significantly. Georgia had for a
couple of years became increasingly nationalistic in such a manner that appeared threatening to
the separatist states, and the president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, was a well-known hawk.
In South Ossetia, Georgian troops under sporadic attack from the separatists, launched a large-
scale operation to gain control over separatist areas, especially their capital in Tskhinvali. In
response, the Russian military quickly counterattacked, reversing the Georgian gains in South

Ossetia and also attacking Georgian positions in Abkhazia. The Russian peacekeepers, regular
units, and separatist forces pushed the Georgian military completely out of the claimed separatist
territory and even into Georgian territory. Eventually a ceasefire was agreed upon, with
separatists maintaining their territorial claims and Russian peacekeepers remaining behind. Later,
a handful of states would recognize the legal independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Presently, the conflict remains unresolved with both sides settled into their respective sides
(Gahrton 2010).
The early 1990s was the setting for another significant post-Soviet conflict that led to a
de facto state in the new post-Soviet state of Moldova. Although the majority of Moldovans are
ethnically Romanian, a sizable minority are ethnic Russians who live on a strip of land wedged
between the Ukrainian border and the Dniester River, called Transnistria. In 1990 as the Soviet
Union was collapsing, the Moldovan government, still at this point a part of the USSR, began to
prepare to consolidate its government and declare independence. As these steps progressed, such
as creating a Transnistrian Ministry of Defense, the ethnic Russians across the Dniester began to
distance themselves from Moldova and prevent the new Moldovan military from occupying the
Transnistrian region. Although some violent clashes erupted, this merely set the lines until
Moldova officially declared independence on 27 August 1991. Military action between the
Moldovan military and the separatists rose sharply in March 1992 and culminated when a
Russian army came to the relief of the separatists. The Russians brokered a ceasefire on 21 July
1992 that ended the conflict and established lines of control, with the Russian military acting as
peacekeepers in the area. No significant flare-ups have erupted since then (“In Moldova”
Stratfor).

Russian Strategic Similarities
The importance of studying these conflicts as a grouping is their striking similarities. The
first similarity that is necessary to establish is the actual military comparison of the participants
in each conflict. When viewing the conflicts as a whole, there are generally three types of
participants: the separatist military, the sovereign state military, and the intervening Russian
military. In the baseline ethno-national conflict that sparked the larger interventions, the only
participants were the separatist militaries (comprised mainly of militias and other troops not
professionally trained) and the sovereign state militaries, often augmented by national police
forces. These results indicate that in conflict featuring only the first two participants, the conflict
would either be well balanced or sovereign state militaries would have the upper hand. See Table
1. However, if the Russian military is added to the equation, the results change entirely. By
Russia intervening, it causes the war to be decided on its terms. This brings us to the next
comparison set.
Although as demonstrated above, Russia has the capabilities to win a total war with
whatever small post-Soviet state it engages, it has chosen not to both times. Each time though, it
follows an intriguing pathway. Initially, Russia gets involved in the conflict either with direct
military action or with significant financial and material support. Once the Russian-separatist
side gains a clear upper hand, Russia will broker a ceasefire, often with the blessings of the
United Nations. From here, Russia will insist that its military remain in the separatist de facto
state as a peacekeeping force (Gahrton 2010). Although negotiations may continue for years, the
lines set by the initial treaty do not move and the conflict is not resolved. If the conflict heats up,
as depicted in Georgia in 2008, the Russian ‘peacekeepers’ can easily maneuver into a strong
retaliatory posture. The most important thing to identify is that Russia does not help resolve the

conflict immediately, and none of the post-Soviet conflicts with separatist states have been
resolved, hence the term Frozen Conflict.
The question becomes, why does Russia not resolve a conflict poised on its borders?
Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia have all been known for extensive criminal networks,
and threats of terrorist cells have sprung up in the rural Georgian countryside, all as a result of
power vacuums in the conflict zones (Baev). Transnistria is well known as a hotbed for
“trafficking human beings and human organs” and the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia is considered a
“lawless region” home to terrorist groups (Vdovii, Opris, and Mogos; Belfer Center). Further,
Russia does not try to convert the sovereign states into allies, but instead is content with just
politically recognizing the small separatist states. On the extreme end, Russia does not annex
neighboring regions (with the singular exception of Crimea in Ukraine). Then, what is the benefit
to Russia of having a frozen conflict on its doorstep?
Russia’s benefit in not resolving frozen conflicts on its borders is that it can create a
buffer zone around itself, safely separating Russia from Western encroachments. A buffer safety
zone is beneficial because it ensures Russia’s global importance as the hegemon in the Eurasian
borderlands. If states surrounding Russia were nominal Western allies, they would not have any
claims to regional hegemony and instead would be remarkably isolated. In the 1990s, former
Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev said “Russia realizes that no international organization
or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this specific post-Soviet space”,
showing how Russia feels about maintaining a clear sector of control (Fedarko 1993). A further
benefit for Russia is that it maintains secure markets for energy resources and its manufacturing
goods, which are the mainstays of the Russian export economy. Additionally, securing the

greater Caspian and Black Sea regions specifically ensure that Russia controls the majority
energy trade routes to European markets, an important leveraging tool (Ciobanu 2009).
Russia’s method of not resolving a frozen conflict is can be understood as ‘perpetual
destabilization’. Perpetual destabilization means that Russia is ensuring that the frozen conflicts
are not resolved in order to make the sovereign post-Soviet states non-functional in the
international system.
A Destabilized Ukraine
Russia wants to ensure that Ukraine is perpetually destabilized, therefore unable to join
international organizations and be useful as a pro-Western ally. Russia is trying to do this in the
same model as Georgia and Moldova, by empowering a separatist region that will become an
allied puppet state of Russia.
The Russian executive is following the same path in Ukraine that it utilized in Georgia
and Moldova. See Chart 1. The path begins with a local conflict between ideological separatists
and a sovereign state. Once the sovereign state mobilizes and starts to gain the upper hand, the
Russian military intervenes and establishes a limit of advance, where the lines are stabilized in
order to negotiate. The negotiations are by nature conciliatory towards the Russian-supported
separatists and establish lines of control and a peacekeeping force dominated by Russians. From
hereon, the sovereign state continues to try to negotiate a true and lasting settlement but is unable
too, while the separatists are able to consolidate their positions. From the Russian perspective, a
bonus would be the sovereign state getting so frustrated that the conflict would begin to cause
human rights abuses along ethno-national lines.
Russia pursues this policy in order to prevent states in their Near Abroad from becoming
too closely tied to the West, as Russia believes this to be dangerous. Although economics do

factor heavily into these moves, the largest factor is that Russia does not want NATO or the EU
to be directly on its borders. Russia seeks instead to keep its own sphere of influence in the post-
Soviet states and encourage their membership in Russian-led international organizations. They
do this in order to not just strengthen their own power and influence, but to keep their own
borders protected. Russia sees post-Soviet NATO expansion into Eastern Europe as aggressive
and unnecessary moves that directly contest Russian feelings of regional hegemony.
Over the next several months and even years, Russia is not seeking to annex parts of
Ukraine. It is not looking to wipe Ukraine off the map, nor is it looking to carve Ukraine up into
multiple states. Instead, Russia wants to foment a perpetually destabilized Ukraine via an
unresolved separatist region. The next few Russian steps are important for setting the scale of the
destabilization, as Ukraine cannot be too enfranchised by a ceasefire agreement, nor condemned
by one. Russia has already started solidifying its final limit of advance in Ukraine. Although it
initially wanted to take the port of Mariupol in order to connect Novorossiya with Crimea, they
were unsuccessful and have settled into the Donetsk-Debaltseve-Luhansk line.
The first major step for the Russians then is to broker a ceasefire agreement with the
Ukrainian and Novorossiya governments. By establishing a ceasefire, Russia prevents any
unwanted international action in the area, although unlikely. The next step for Russia is to use its
peacekeepers to make sure that no flare-ups occur to threaten the status quo. Next, Russia will
act as an international proxy for the separatists, encouraging Russian allies to recognize the
sovereignty of Novorossiya. By getting international recognition, even if only a couple of states,
the separatists gain legitimacy in their negotiations, which would extend them significantly.
Additionally, the sovereign state may have some negative ethno-national tensions that devolve
into ethnic conflict and human rights abuses, which would further delegitimize it and force

Western states to stop encouraging involvement in Western politics. By this point, Russia will be
done with its active work and will simply react to any new developments. Fast forwarding years
down the road, the conflict will be resolved, probably with a reintegration and regional autonomy
for the former separatists At this point, Russia will demand that the newly reformed state join
pro-Russian international organizations, instead of the pro-Western equivalents.
With this game plan, Russia destabilizes the states on its borders so that they will be
prevented from effectively joining pro-Western organizations. States that would be nominally be
poised to gain membership in NATO and the EU would go back several steps, as they would
now have to contend with a separatist state, the negative impacts of a war, and probable human
rights issues. After a rehabilitation period under Russian guidance and with Russian
peacekeepers and diplomats, the state may become reintegrated in a pro-Russian mindset. Then,
it would join the Russian international organizations, forming a Russian sphere of influence and
buffer zone to combat the rising influence of the West in the post-Soviet region.
Supply Options
Seeing the Russian stance on perpetuating the conflict in Ukraine, the United States must
choose to either act or remain a bystander. Although the United States and its allies have
emplaced sanctions against Russia, it has not yet committed resources to Ukraine. The United
States should not provide lethal weaponry to the Ukrainian military, but should instead train
them and empower them to stand up to the Russian forces deployed in Novorossiya.
When the United States becomes invested ideologically in a conflict, one of its common
steps is to send military aid to the pro-American side. This side sometimes prevails, and
sometimes does not. Regardless, American military equipment is put in the hands of untrained
foreign nationals who are not loyal to the United States. The American lethal aid policy is

shortsighted, because it solves the immediate issue but in the end, a lot of those weapons either
go directly into the hands of America’s enemies or go to the black market and then into the hands
of America’s enemies. By giving untrained foreign militaries American weapons, the United
States gives them significant power that can be later used against the United States, which has
been the case in Afghanistan and Somalia, and could possibly happen in Syria in the future. For
example, the United States gave Iraq significant equipment during the various campaigns in Iraq
since 2003. As soon as the Iraqi army was attacked by their opponents, whether it be al Qaeda in
Fallujah in 2004 or ISIS in Mosul in 2014, the Iraqis would retreat and leave significant amounts
of equipment behind which would fall into the hands of the enemy. This clearly would enhance
the capabilities of the enemy and would oftentimes be brought to bear on American forces, such
as when the US Marines retook Fallujah in November 2004.
The United States should be training the Ukrainians and other potential post-Soviet allies
into effective and confident fighting forces. Currently, the United States has already deployed
300 soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade out of Vicenza, Italy to help train the Ukrainian
military. This is a good first step, but needs to be dramatically increased in order to show true
effect (as of right now, only 300 Ukrainians can be trained at a time by the American
contingent). Needless to say, the United States needs to make sure that these trainers do not get
embroiled in the conflict directly, like what happened in Vietnam. This policy is the ideal policy
for a scaled-down American military because it shows a commitment to Ukrainian defense
without making military alliances or permanently stationing troops. Additionally, training the
military will make it a better force that can deal with the separatist militias as well as with any
Russian troops in the conflict. Although Ukraine has mobilized significant forces, its military is

still very untrained, for example “the role of non-commissioned officers…is virtually nonexistent
within the Ukrainians’ ranks” (Peterson 2015).
Training the Ukrainian military is not only the safest option but also is the most effective
option to combat infractions on Ukrainian sovereignty.
Conclusion
As the War in Ukraine continues, the United States must decide on its path in the region.
Although the United States has verbally chastised Russian involvement and emplaced various
sanctions on Russia, it is still deciding on what further steps to take in the region. It is integral
that the United States recognizes that Russia has a very specific plan and goals in Ukraine that
mirror its practices elsewhere. Ukraine is not a new phenomenon, just the most recent in a very
clear pattern on post-Soviet intervention. By crafting the conflict into a state of perpetual
destabilization, Russia ensures that the West cannot pull Ukraine into its fold and instead the
region can become realigned with Russia.
The United States cannot supply Ukraine with lethal weaponry because they could fall
into the wrong hands. The Ukrainian military may lose them, or down the road a new pro-
Russian Ukraine could use those weapons against America. An appreciably better option is for
the United States to deploy advisors to Ukraine in order to better train their military. A program
has already started, but needs to be significantly expanded. In order to prevent a resurgent
Russia, the United States must take a stance on Ukraine with meaningful action behind this. A
new, well-trained Ukrainian army could prevent Russia from manipulating the conflict into
perpetual destabilization and prove to be a strong future ally for America. The Russian practice
of perpetual destabilization is inherently dangerous to American interests, and must be

combatted in a concentrated, intelligent manner reasserting the United States as a positive option
for democracy in the post-Soviet region.

Annex
Table 1 – Military Forces in Post-Soviet Intervention Conflicts
States Military Strength
Georgia 21,150
South Ossetia 3000
Abkhazia 5000
Moldova 6000
Transnistria 5000
Ukraine 129,950
Novorossiya 30,000-35,000
Russia 845,000

Chart 14 - The Path of Perpetual Destabilization
4 Dashed line is not a definitive step, but is a possible step that would quite powerfully play
into Russia’s game plan. The double lines stand for end results of the pathway.
Local conflict starts (Regional Separatists vs. Sovereign State)
Sovereign State mobilizes, gains upper hand
Russian military intervenes, establishes limit of advance against
Sovereign State and stabilizes lines
Conciliatory negotiations start, Separatists solidify gains
Russia creates 'Peacekeeping Force'
Sovereign State tries to negotiate lasting settlement,
but is unable to
Separatists solidify political control
Sovereign State gets frustrated and starts committing human rights
abuses
Sovereign State prevented from joining pro-Western organizations
Russia stays regional hegemon

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