The Simla Agreement signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan on 2nd July 1972 was much more than a peace treaty seeking to reverse the consequences of the 1971 war (i.e. to bring about withdrawals of troops and an exchange of PoWs). It was a comprehensive blue print for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. Under the Simla Agreement both countries undertook to abjure conflict and confrontation which had marred relations in the past, and to work towards the establishment of durable peace, friendship and cooperation.

1. P a g e | 1
Foreign Policy of Pakistan;
Simla Agreement
Submitted By: - Zubaida Batool
Submitted To: - FarooqAhmed Dar

2. P a g e | 2
Contents
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Developments towards summit
4. Importance of Agreement for Pakistan
5. Simla Summit
6. Reactions
7. Outcomes
8. Conclusion
Bibliography

3. P a g e | 3
Simla Agreement
Introduction
Pakistan and India got independence from Colonial power and are neighbors. It is
necessary to maintain cordial relation with neighbours for internal stability and peace. That’s
why both countries, Pakistan and India, had started maintaining their diplomatic relation from
Nehru Liaquat times. Simla Agreement was the eighth step between India and Pakistan towards
this aim.1 It was signed, to normalize the situation and to settle the pre war issue of 1971,
between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Indira Ghandi.
It distinguish from all peace agreements as it laid emphasized on bilateral talks and
denied intervention of any third party. It somewhat questioned the diplomatic skill of Prime
Minister of India, Indira Ghandi and personified the tactics of President of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto. The Agreement have a kind of secret in itself as it followed by the Bhutto’s back stance
on Kashmir in years to come. Further the one to one meeting, after which the agreement was
dramatically signed also, questioned the credibility of the agreement. Despite all this the Press
and Parliament of both countries acknowledged it.
Background
The situation in which Simla Summit conducted was critical in its nature. The war of
1971 transformed the entire course of diplomacy between India and Pakistan. The two post-war
1 Kamaleshwar Sinha. ZulfiqarAli Bhutto: Six Steps to Summit. (New Delhi: Indian School Supply Depot, Publication
Division,1972) 12.

4. P a g e | 4
independent countries became three pre-war independent countries. Their internal stability were
also varies from one another.
Before the Simla agreement the situation of Pakistan was on stake. The Bhutto’s
government had to face the issue of lost territory, POW’s2, and dismemberment of Eastern wing,
altered the geo-political situation. International media was propagating against the West Pakistan
army. The confidences of masses were lost.3 Besides that the internal instability, and the exposed
ineffectiveness of military created the atmosphere of unrest and desperate in Pakistan.4
On the contrary, Indira Ghandi emerged as “DURGA”5 after 1971and the steadiness of
her government during war of 1971 made her position more dominant. It was the victorious
position of Indira that she desired to hold a bilateral talks or direct negotiation with Pakistan
without intervention of any third party. She was willing to settle Kashmir Issue by making some
arrangements. Her statements offered indirect declaration of negotiation for the long term
interest of Pakistan and India.6
While the attitude of Bhutto, probably because of internal situation, was vary on different
occasions. He accused India for Liberation of Bangladesh in front of common masses and talked
about negotiation between the elected leaders of East and West Pakistan “in an atmosphere free
from coercion and intimidation” to arrive at a settlement, in UN general Assembly. He was
somewhat confused in his statement or shrewd enough to gain popular support.
2 The general estimate of 93,000 POWs was denied in the defence ministry’s Annual reportfor 1971-2.According
to the report it was 75,323.(IDSA, News Review on South Asia, April 1972,21).
3 Hina Rizvi.Simla Pact:the great success for Pakistan. Pakistan Vision; Jun2013, Vol. 14 Issue1, 64.
4 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent to Simla Agreement. (New Delhi:Deep & Deep Publications,1981).
204-207.
5 Goddess of war
6 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations. 207-209.

5. P a g e | 5
Development towards Summit
Though both sides, India and Pakistan were willing to continue the peace process, yet
showed reluctance to initiate a step. Indian officials were of the view that invitation would not be
forwarded as Pakistan did not declare end of war with India. While Bhutto said that the direct
talks with India would be held after the visit of US president to China.
Despite Bhutto personal utterance and Moscow visit, India did not send official invitation
till 27th March. Bhutto became disappointed and on 30th March clarified that “we had conveyed
our feeling for having talks with India through many friendly countries like the Soviet Union and
these in return communicated them to India”.7
Finally Indira Ghandi sent official correspondence to Bhutto purposing negotiation for
durable peace. She declared that: “the triumphs of peace are greater than the triumph of war”. It
was decided that the emissary talks would be held at Hill Station of Murree. Aziz Ahmed8 and
D.P. Dhar9 represented Pakistan and India respectively. It is to be said that the emissary talks had
no agenda though both parties wanted to solve their preferred issues. As the talks were going on,
the Pakistani media including Jung, Mashriq and Nawa-i-Waqt showed diverse response on the
attitude and behavior of dealing.10 The emissary signed the agreement on 26th April, which was
intended to serve as roadmap of the May Summit, New Delhi. Overall the attitude of Pakistan
gave a positive impression to establish durable peace.11
7 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations. 211.
8 Secretary General for Foreign Affairs.
9 Chairman of the Policy PlanningCommittee of the Indian External Affairs Ministry.
10 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations. 213-214.
11 Hina Rizvi. Simla Pact. 66.

6. P a g e | 6
The atmosphere of stability and mutual cooperation faced setback on 5th May Tithwal
Incident following few more minor incidents. It gave the notion that some military high
command did not want to normalize the tense relation. Besides the attitude of Pakistani
Government i.e., G.M.Jatoi and Qadar Ambalvi showed aggressiveness. The credibility of the
Summit came into questioned when Bhutto showed change in tone in an interview with the
American Broadcasting Corporation and Oriana Fallaci.12
Importance of Simla Agreement and Pakistan
It is to clarify here that to maintain the peaceful diplomatic relation with India was not the
choice, it was compulsion for Bhutto. The domestic politics, public demonstration, POW’s, lost
territory and Bangladesh liberation were the facts which compelled Bhutto to have peace terms
with India.13
Probably, Bhutto was aware of the weak position of Pakistan. Therefore, He decided to
visit Moscow in April and told them his desire to establish the durable peace in the Indian
Subcontinent. Some scholars are of the view that Bhutto wanted U.S.S.R to convey the stand of
Pakistani Government, of cooperation, to India.
It was fact that Bhutto had to solve many issue i.e., Kashmir issue, POW’s, and issue of
territory. Kashmir issue being a core problem of Indo-Pak relations; every leader tired to exploit
it to gain popularity. Bhutto did the same thing. While addressing Pakistani crowd, he showed
his rigid stance regarding Kashmir issue. On the other hand, in an interview with Dilip
12 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations. 214-216.
13 P.R Chariand PervaizIqbal Cheema. The Simla Agreement 1972; Its Wasted Promise.( Srilanka:RCSS,2001)118-
120.

7. P a g e | 7
Mukherjee, Bhutto showed completely flexible attitude over the self-determination of
Kashmiris.14
The most crucial task for Bhutto was the return of POW’s. Bhutto was pressurized to
initiate talks with India by the relatives of POW’s.15 He assured them that he tried to put
international pressure on India and also showed his readiness to meet Indira Ghandi. Bhutto
thought negotiating over POW’s with India would restrain the possible involvement of military
in state affairs.16 It was the issue in which the involvement of Bangladesh was inevitable. It was
impossible for Indian government to deal the tri-literal issue bilaterally. Indira Ghandi refused to
negotiate over POW’s, unless Pakistan recognized Bangladesh.17
Simla Summit
Bhutto left for India with his Harvard return Daughter, Benazir Bhutto.18 Indira Ghandi
graciously welcomed Pakistani delegation. Bhutto also showed his desire to establish durable
peace.19 Bhutto might take his daughter along with delegation to divert the Indian media
attention from the summit. Benazir autobiography, although offered different depiction.20
The sharp contrast in the objectives at Simla was reflected from the drafts. India tried to
dictate over Kashmir issue: Pakistan wanted to settle pre war issues.21 The opposite stance of
14 P.R Chariand PervaizIqbal Cheema. The Simla Agreement 1972.37-38.
15 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations. 209.
16 Syed Jamal Naqvi. Partition and Convergence: South Asia in the Twenty-first Century. (Lahore: Fiction House,
2006) 114.
17 Brian Cloughley. War,Coups and Terror Pakistan Army in Years of Turmoil. (South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books
Ltd,2003) 15.
18 Benazir Bhutto. Daughter of the East. (London: Hamilton Publishers,1988) 51.
19 M.P.Ajithkumar. India-Pakistan Relations: the story of a fractured fraternity. (Delhi: KalpazPublication,2006)
146-147.
20 Benazir Bhutto. Daughter of the East. 52-53
21 Abdul Sattar. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005:A concise history. (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007).126-127.

8. P a g e | 8
both countries nearly collapsed the atmosphere of negotiation. The deadlock in the summit was
seems inevitable. Bhutto knew the importance of summit for his power consolidation. He said
that he was not going to “shut the doors”.22
Till the 2nd day of summit, the negotiations lacked any consensus. The Pakistani
delegation took the stance to dissolve the issues emerged after war; Indian delegation wanted to
establish cordial relation solving Kashmir issue.23 The clash of opinion nearly destroyed the
spirit of summit. Pakistan delegations had packed their luggage. Bhutto made his last attempt to
negotiate with Indira, in his farewell meeting. He was finally succeeded to convince Indira.24
Indira was reluctant to decide any clause prior to her advisor consult.
At farewell dinner hosted by Pakistani delegation, Indira showed her eagerness to settle
the issue. Bhutto and Indira went in a room to discuss issue mutually. The rest of delegation
members were sat in billiard room. Finally the agreement was signed on 2nd July. Though the
actual day was 3rd July, it is dated officially as 2nd July.25
The secretive atmosphere of Simla stakes its reliability. It was signed when the delegation
had packed their belongings for return.26 Despite the victorious position, Indira failed to bargain
over Kashmir issue. Kaul identifies the behavior of Indira as her policy of appeasement.27 Bhutto
had given two options in Simla. He had to choose between POW’s or lost territory. His
22 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations, 220.
23 M.P. Ajitkumar. India-Pakistan Relations. 147
24 Hina Rizvi.Simla Pact. 68-69
25 Benazir Bhutto. Daughter of the East. 55-56
26 Triloki Nath Kaul.A Diplomat’s Diary 1947-1999:China,India, and USA, the tantalising triangle. (Delhi:Macmillan
India,2000),150.
27 Ibid., 150

9. P a g e | 9
diplomatic experience preferred lost territory for agreement.28 The decision of Bhutto in favor of
re-gaining territory showed his diplomatic wisdom.29
The main clauses of Simla Agreement laid emphasized on bilateral negotiation, respect
for territorial integrity, and on prevention of hostile propaganda. It also restored the trade,
economic cooperation and communication between India and Pakistan. The main and important
clause of the agreement is that is encouraged the future negotiation and meetings of both
countries for durable peace.30
Simla agreement no doubt, succeeded to solve the pre-war issues, yet it creates some
fundamental and conceptual clashes in long term.31 Pakistan paid high price of bilateralism and
of vacation of its territories under Simla agreement.32
Reactions
The reactions in India were mixed. Vajpayee called it Black agreement, Samar Guba, (the
leader of the socialist party group) criticized it. Sadiq Ali (the congress O president), Sureendra
Moham (the joint secretary of the socialist party), S.P Mukherjee (the secretary of the CPI group)
and all Muslims of India welcomed it.33 The Indian press also favored this agreement Statesman,
Hindustan times, Indian express, Hindu and Blitz represented it as victory for the 700 million
people of the sub continent.34
28 Benazir Bhutto. Daughter of the East. 56
29 Jamsheed Marker. Quiet Diplomacy. (New York: Oxford University Press,2010) 181.
30 P.R Chariand PervaizIqbal Cheema. The Simla Agreement 1972. 133-142.
31 WilliamB.Milam. Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting Failure in South Asia. (London: HURST PublishersLtd, 2009)
45-46.
32 Abdus Sattar. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy. 141
33 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations, 222-223.
34 ibid., 223

10. P a g e | 10
The reaction in Pakistan was more favorable. It was welcomed by all party including the
main opposition party, NAP. Mohammad Aslam khan khattak (speaker of the provincial
Assembly of the NWFP), Mahmoodul Haq Usmani (the Secretary-General of the pro-Moscow
National Awami Party), Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (Pakistan Political Affairs and Communication
Minister), Hayat Mohammad Sherpao (The Minister for Natural Resources), Malik Miraj Khalid
(The West Punjab Chief Minister), Arbab Sikander Khan Khalil (The North West Frontier
Province Governor), all hailed the agreement.35 The unanimous support of Simla Agreement
strengthens the political status of President Bhutto.
The world Super Powers i.e. USSR, USA, China, UK and even Bangladesh hailed the
agreement of durable peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan. The Manchester
Guardian, the Yorkshire Post, the Montreal Gazette and the Morning News recognized Simla
agreement as a positive step towards stability.36
Outcomes
Simla agreement was the best possible solution to normalize the tense diplomatic relation
in 1970’s. It also emerged as a contented agreement between India and Pakistan, in long terms.
The slogan of bilateralism of Simla Agreement nullifies the UN intervention in Kashmir.37 The
separation of Northern Areas from Kashmir and their integration into Federal Territories of
Pakistan was the greatest outcome of Simla agreement.38
35 Kamaleshwar Sinha. ZulfiqarAli Bhutto. 18-19.
36 Dr.S.S.Bindra. Indo-Pak Relations. 225-226.
37 Brain Cloughley. War, Coup and Territory. 15.
38 J.N Dixit.Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo-Pak relations 1970-1995.(Delhi:Konark Publishers PvtLTD,
1995) 36.

11. P a g e | 11
It converted the ceasefire line of Dec 17,1971into LOC. The conversion of ceasefire line
into Line of Control questioned the appointment of United Nations Military Observer Group in
India and Pakistan. In fact the duty of UNMOGIP was to monitor cease fire line which was no
longer existed after Simla Agreement.
In Simla Agreement, both India and Pakistan, agreed to respect LOC and to avoid
altering it unilaterally. Despite the fact, India repeated intervened in LOC in 1972 (Chorbat La
sector), 1984 (Siachen glacier), 1988 (Qamar sector) and in 1990’s (Dras sector).The repeated
interference and occupation of territory by Indian forces ultimately led to the development of
Kargil conflict.39
Conclusion
According to some of Bhutto associate, the impact of Bhutto-Brezhnev meeting can
clearly be seen in Simla Agreement40. At Simla Bhutto raised his position from lower to the
higher position. His diplomatic experience and political understanding led Pakistan out of
humiliation. Indians like Ajithkumar viewed Simla Agreement as diplomatic failure of Indira
Ghandi.41
However, it paved the way to recognize Bangladesh and to return of POW’s. It accepted
the Jammu and Kashmir as disputed area and the bilateral negotiation marginalized the
involvement of Kashmiris in Kashmir issue. The Simla Agreement clearly shows that the
stability and peace of South Asia is related to friendly Indo-Pak relation.
39 Sartaj Aziz. Between dreams and reality.(New York: Oxford University Press,2009) 251-252.
40 Jamsheed Marker. Quiet Diplomacy .161.
41 http://www.peacekashmir.org/views-articles/2011/0607-secret-of-shimla-agreement.htm. Last accessed on 13
DEC 2014.

12. P a g e | 12
Selected Bibliography
Ajithkumar. M.P. India-Pakistan Relations: the story of a fractured fraternity. Delhi: Kalpaz
Publication, 2006.
Aziz, Sartaj. Between dreams and reality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Bhutto, Benazir. Daughter of the East. London: Hamilton Publishers, 1988.
Bindra, S.S. Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent to Simla Agreement. New Delhi: Deep & Deep
Publications, 1981.
Chari, P.R and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema. The Simla Agreement 1972; Its Wasted Promise.
Srilanka:RCSS, 2001.
Cloughley, Brian. War,Coups and Terror Pakistan Army in Years of Turmoil. South Yorkshire:
Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2003.
Dixit, J.N. Anatomy of a Flawed Inheritance: Indo-Pak relations 1970-1995. Delhi: Konark
Publishers Pvt LTD, 1995.
Kaul, Triloki Nath .A Diplomat’s Diary 1947-1999: China, India, and USA, the tantalizing
triangle. Delhi: Macmillan India, 2000.
Marker, Jamsheed. Quiet Diplomacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Milam, William B. Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting Failure in South Asia. London: HURST

13. P a g e | 13
Publishers Ltd, 2009.
Naqvi, Syed Jamal. Partition and Convergence: South Asia in the Twenty-first Century. Lahore:
Fiction House, 2006.
Rizvi, Hina. Simla Pact: the great success for Pakistan. Pakistan Vision 14, no.1 (Jun2013).
Sattar, Abdul. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A concise history. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007.
Sinha, Kamaleshwar. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Six Steps to Summit. New Delhi: Indian School
Supply Depot, Publication Division, 1972.