The document discusses the U.S. policy of containment towards the Soviet Union established by George Kennan in 1946, emphasizing the necessity for a long-term strategy to limit Soviet expansionism while recognizing the Soviet regime as a rival. It highlights the challenges and criticisms faced by this policy, including its theoretical flaws and its implications for international relations during the Cold War. Ultimately, the document illustrates the tension and fear generated between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, marked by the threat of nuclear confrontation.

1. "It is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be
that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies....
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political
intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a
partner, in the political arena."
- George Kennan's "Long Telegram," 1946
World War II distorted the political and societal composition of the world. The repercussion of
World War II was the inauguration of a new era, which was defined by the decline of the old
colossal powers and the rise of two superpowers; the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States
of America (US) creating a bipolar world.
The United States emerged from World War II as one of the leading economic, political, and
military powers as compare to USSR. It began to use economic assistance as a purposeful facet
of its foreign policy and offered considerable support to countries in Europe and Asia. The
United States also took a concentration to the European colonial powers difficulty maintained. In
addition to all these, the United States faced ever-increasing resistance from the Soviet Union.
Contrary the Soviet Union became comparatively weak than it was, in post war times. Now
America as an emerging World power felt the necessity to hold Soviet Power within a certain
limits to maintain his emerging hegemony and for that reason, there were many options of
American i.e. return to isolationism, continuation of the détente policies of friendly relationship,
rollback and containment policy. But the policy which suited US to legitimize their move was
“Containment Policy”.
Containment, coupled with the American diplomat George F. Kennan, was the mainly post-war
manifesto of the US and its allies in dealing with the Soviet Union. Basically the idea of
Containment was propounded by U.S diplomat, George F. Kennan, in 1946. Kennan while
mentioning the core idea of his policy stated that it would intend to contain the spread of
Communism, the greatest ideological thread to Capitalism, by creating strategic alliances. These
very alliances would support to facilitate weak countries to defend Soviet advances.
Now the thought arouse that why American had adopted new policy other than rollback or policy
of isolation? Basically American wanted to create their scenario in which they could be able to
govern the world order authoritatively. As Kissinger rightly stated, that American leaders knew
that that the traditional appeal of maintain balance of power was no more reliable and they need
to adopted an alternative way, which provide them the philosophical and conceptual framework
for interpreting Stalin’s foreign policy.
The Containment Policy would implement double approaches, military and economic, and
several stages: first, reinstallation of a balance of power in areas directly exposed by Soviet
expansionism; second, decrease of the Soviet Union's influence beyond its borders through the

2. suspicious exploitation of antagonisms between Moscow and the international communist
movement; and third, as a long-range purpose, modification of the Soviet notion of international
relations as a means of facilitating a negotiated settlement of differences.
As far as the events moves on, we came to know that the Containment response adopted by the
American had less practical implementation rather it was mixture of idealism and pseudo
understanding of World situation after World War II. Kennan had in mind more than the
containment of Soviet expansion. He believed idealistically that the Soviet Union was primarily
weak; its population was “physically and spiritually tired,” and its economy was alarmingly
collapsed. The problems facing the country were prevalent to the system; they could not be
conquered. If the US and its allies could be tolerant and hold Soviet expansionism without war
over a sufficiently long period of time, than it would lead to a settlement with the Soviet Union
or even to the break-up of the Soviet Union. As Kennan predicted that If the “unity and efficacy”
of the party were interrupted Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest
to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies. Kennan foresaw internal
disagreements within the Soviet system that would possibly became the cause of its collapse.
The primary scheme that he estimated was the Marshall Plan, providing American support for
the improvement of Western Europe so that Europe would not depress and feel it had to look to
the Soviet Union as an alternative.
The policy of containment is not that it seeks to tackle the Soviet power with American power,
but that the policy is disregarded, and must result in a mishandling of American power. For as I
have required to explain, it commits American to a fight which has for its objective nothing more
considerable than the hope that in ten or fifteen years the Soviet power will, as the outcome of
extensive discontent, "break up" or "mellow. It was due to their ideal utopian plans and proposals
Walter Lippmann dismissed containment as a "strategic monstrosity.
American leaders had put forward this plan to stop the possible future thread of war and made
the transformation of hot war with cold war. At the same time it had many theoretical and
conceptual flaws in it. Rationally, it seems as a blunder on the part of America as they
misunderstood the question of what was to be controlled immediately either Soviet expansionism
or intercontinental communism. Kennan failed to make clear whether the roots of Soviet
behavior were ideological or national, and so obscured the feature between Russian
expansionism and international communism. Moreover, US by forcing expend and our substance
upon the uncertain and unnatural allies on the border of the Soviet Union would go to disregard
US natural allies in the Atlantic community, and to disaffect them.
Further it does not deal with the question that what would be the American job in the United
Nations in the clash with the Soviet Union. This indicates that the policy of containment does not
have as its objective settlement, in cause of the conflict with Russia. It is therefore understood in
the policy that the U.N. has no future as a worldwide organization, and that either the U.N. will
be ignore like the League of Nations or it will be transformed into an anti-Soviet association.

3. The policy of Containment subjected the Cold War in a negative way by increasing the tensions
primarily between the US and Russia. Because America does not consent with communism
diffusing and Russia agreed that the extent of communism would be favorable for the European
countries.
People living in the course of the Cold War were in constant alarm. Even though there was no
material combating between America and Russia, there was always a fear of either Russia or
America initiation their nuclear war heads on each other. Since Russia and America both had
long distance nuclear war heads, they could easily reach far places of the earth. They both had
their nuclear war heads skilled on all the major cities. Nuclear War could devastate whole cities
and this created huge fear since Russia had many nuclear war heads. The governments started to
hand out directions on how to create a nuclear protection so that people could shield themselves
and their families in the case of a nuclear bomb being dropped.
This very rigid response of American allowed many critics from all over the world i.e. Robert A
Taft, John Foster Dulles, Walter Lippmann and J. William Fulbright, to analyze that it intensify
discomfort and the fear among all. The most interesting thing is that the chief strategist of
containment, Kennan, soon became its chief critic.