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EMV 201: EMV Chip Profiles and
Considerations for Issuers and
Merchants
Philip Andreae, Oberthur Technologies
2© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
No Longer Secure
Circa 1991 – In 1993 Europay, MasterCard And Visa came together to
economically solve for Counterfeit and Lost & Stolen Fraud
EMV Restored “The Token”
In 1996 The EMV Specifications were published with the collective
agreement that global Interoperability is the Goal; each at their own pace
SignatureOnline
PIN
Online
PIN
Match In
PIN
Why EMV?
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 3
What You Have
What You Know
Are You Able
Infra Red InkHologram Magnetic Stripe
OnlineTerminal
Floor Limit
&
cvv2/cvc2
What You Have
A Card/Phone
What You Know
A Secret
Authentication
Verification
Authorization
cvv1/cvc1
In 1998 Global Deployment Began
In 2012 The USA Embraced EMV
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 4
An Extrapolation using First Annapolis, EMVCO, AITA, SPA and First Annapolis input into consideration
These are not the views of Oberthur
23 October 2016
EMV EMPLOYS HARDWARE BASED
CRYPTOGRAPHY TO SECURE PAYMENTS
If Service
Code = 2xx
or 6xx
Magnetic Stripe Processing Was Easy For Everyone
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 6
Read
Track
Data
Total >
Terminal
Floor Limit
Issuer
Authorizes
Transaction
Check Electronic
Stop List
Print
Receipt
Verify
Signature
Data
Capture for
Overnight
Settlement
Yes
No
Yes
No
EMV Start
ISO Specifications EMV Specifications
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 -
EMV 201 - PEA 7
EMV Is Not for the Light Hearted
ISO 8583 - Financial transaction card
originated messages
ISO 7816 – Smart Card
• Part 1: Physical characteristics
• Part 2: Cards with contacts – Dimensions and
location of the contacts
• Part 3: Cards with contacts – Electrical
interface and transmission protocols
• Part 4: Organization, security and commands
for interchange
ISO 14443 – Contactless
• Part 1: Physical characteristics
• Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal
interface
• Part 3: Initialization and anti-collision
• Part 4: Transmission protocol
EMVCo Version 4.3 – Contact
• Book 1: Application independent ICC to
terminal interface requirements
• Book 2: Security and key management
• Book 3: Application specification
• Book 4: Cardholder, attendant and acquirer
interface requirements
EMVCo Version 2.3 – Contactless
• Book A: Architecture and general
requirements
• Book B: Entry point specification
• Books C1-7: Kernel specifications
• Book D: Communications protocol
Payment System Specifications
AEIPS - D-Pas - MChip - VIS - CPA
23 October 2016
ISO Specifications EMV Specifications
ISO 8583 - Financial transaction card
originated messages
ISO 7816 – Smart Card
• Part 1: Physical characteristics
• Part 2: Cards with contacts – Dimensions and
location of the contacts
• Part 3: Cards with contacts – Electrical
interface and transmission protocols
• Part 4: Organization, security and commands
for interchange
ISO 14443 – Contactless
• Part 1: Physical characteristics
• Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal
interface
• Part 3: Initialization and anti-collision
• Part 4: Transmission protocol
EMVCo Version 4.3 – Contact
• Book 1: Application independent ICC to
terminal interface requirements
• Book 2: Security and key management
• Book 3: Application specification
• Book 4: Cardholder, attendant and acquirer
interface requirements
EMVCo Version 2.3 – Contactless
• Book A: Architecture and general
requirements
• Book B: Entry point specification
• Books C1-7: Kernel specifications
• Book D: Communications protocol
Payment System Specifications
AEIPS - D-Pas - MChip - VIS - CPA
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 -
EMV 201 - PEA 8
Based On Standards - Built on Evolving Technology
23 October 2016
Card design
Chip selection
Script processing
Cardholder verification
Authentication requirements
Key management requirements
Fraud and risk management systems
PIN management & PIN synchronization
Cardholder education and marketing messages
Education branch, call center & the team on EMV
Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization
What are merchants doing to filter debit application selection
Credit & debit card processing must perform online authentication
And ….
9© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA
When Implementing EMV Issuers Think About
23 October 2016
Project
Initiation
Vendor
Selection
Negotiate
with
Processor
Define Profile
Select Chip
Define Input
File
Perform Key
Ceremonies
Profile
Development
Staff Training
Develop
Customer
Education
Payment
Scheme
Certification
End to End
Testing
Account
Conversion
Issue Chip
Cards
Accept First
Transaction
Implementing EMV Requires Your “A” Team
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 1023 October 2016
EMV Embedded an Integrated Circuit in the Card
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 11
Hardware CPU, Crypto processor,
Flash, E2PROM or ROM, RAM, Security & Sensors
BIOS Basic Input Output System
Operating System Native or Global Platform & Java Card API
Application AEIPS, CPA, D-Pas, MChip, VSDC … Domestic
Data
Antenna
The Chip Card is a Secure Element with Data Inside
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 12
Hardware Antenna, CPU, Crypto processor,
Flash, E2PROM or ROM, RAM, Security & Sensors
BIOS Basic Input Output System
Operating System Native or Global Platform & Java Card API
Application AEIPS, CPA, D-Pas, MChip, VSDC … Domestic
DataData
ADF(s), AID(s)
AIP, ATC, AUC, Cardholder Name, CID, CVM List, Expiry Date,
IAC(s), LCOL, PAN, UCOL Track 2 Equivalent Data…
Applications and Data are Specified and Structured
Application
The Payment Networks define, license and
approval implementations of their specification
running in the card and on the terminal
• Visa – VIS
• MasterCard – MChip
• Discover - D-Pas
• Amex – AEIPS
• EMVCo – CPA (OT = WISE)
• J/Smart – JCB
• EMVCo – CPA
The terminal specification defines how the
terminal will operate and use the EMV Tool Kit
The Chip Specification defines what the software
in the card must do in response to commands
from the Terminal
Tests Plans allow card and terminal vendors to
prove their products perform as required
AID – Application Identifier
The AID is the name of the Application Directory File
ADF in the chip
The terminal and consumer selects the AID
Application RID PIX
• Visa (credit or debit) A000000003 1010
Visa Plus A000000003 8010
Visa Interlink A000000003 3010
US Common Debit A000000098 0840
• MasterCard A000000004 1010
Maestro Int’l A000000004 3060
Cirrus A000000004 6000
US Maestro A000000004 2203
• Amex A000000025 01XX
• JCB A000000065 1010
• Oberthur A000000077 XXXX
• Discover A000000152 3010
Discover Common Debit A000000152 4010
• DNA Common Debit A000000620 0620
13
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 -
EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
ADF
SFI
EF EF
SFI
EF
Each Account is Stored in an Application Data File
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 1423 October 2016
THE PROFILE AND THE TERMINAL
CAPABILITIES DEFINE THE BEHAVIOR
15
EMV Defines the Terminal to Card Protocal
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 16
Offline by Terminal
Requires RSA Capable Chip
Online on Issuer Host
“What you have”
Authentication
“What you know”
Verification
Signature
Match PIN in Chip
Recommended for Offline Authorization
Online PIN
No CVM
“You have the funds”
Authorization
Online
Host Authorized
Offline at Merchant
Based on Issuer Defined Card Risk
Management Parameters
Requires Offline Authentication
Layering Security is the Right Answer
Offline Data Authentication
The Norm in Europe, Canada and Australia
Merchants and Acquirers
When the Network is down or running slow
the merchant at least knows the Card is
Authentic
If the Terminal Floor limit is not zero
knowing the card is authentic the merchant
can ask the card to approve
Issuers
Card requires a crypto-processor to support
DDA or CDA
Issuer must establish RSA Key Pair and
request Issuer Public Key certificate from
Payment Network
Online Data Authentication
The way PIN Debit transactions are secured
Merchants, Acquirers and Networks
Must manage keys necessary to encrypt the
PIN between POS and Payment Network
Must send Field 55 EMV to Issuer Host for
Authentication
Issuers
Authenticate the Cryptogram to prove the
card was or is present at time of purchase
• ARQC – Application Request Cryptogram
• ARPC – Application Response
Cryptogram
• TC – Transaction Certificate
• AAC – Application Authentication
Cryptogram
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 -
EMV 201 - PEA 1723 October 2016
Transit Authorities see offline data authentication as a requirement
Offline Card Authentication
Provides Merchant Authentication
Requires an RSA capable processor
Personalize the card with
• Card & Issuer public key & certificates
• Unique RSA Secret
Public keys simply need to be loaded
and maintained in the terminal
Terminal authenticates the card
Online Data Authentication
Provides Issuer Authentication
Personalization of the card with a
unique set of secret keys
Card generates a Cryptogram “ARQC”
& “TC” by signing card, terminal and
transaction data with the secret key
Terminal forwards Field 55 “ICC or
EMV data” including “ARQC” or “TC”
and signed data to Issuer
Issuer authenticates card data when
authorizing the transaction
Issuer returns “ARPC” and Scripts in
Field 55 to card allowing Issuer
authentication and parameter updates
23 October 2016 18© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA
EMV Gives The Merchant and Issuer Assurance
Public Key loaded
in Terminal
• Public keys are distributed to all
terminals supporting Offline Data
Authentication
Issuer is a
Member
• At personalization an RSA key pair
and issuer certificates are loaded
into the secure element
Card is Authentic
• The card generates a unique
certificate
• Point of sale authenticates the card
Authentication Addresses Counterfeit Fraud
EMV supports 4 methods of card
authentication methods:
• Online Data Authentication: The
Card creates a Unique Digital
Signature delivered to the Issuer
Host for Authentications
• Offline Data Authentication
• Static data authentication (SDA):
The data verified by the POS is
always the same
• Dynamic data authentication
(DDA): The data verified by the POS
is dynamic for each transaction
• Combined DDA and application
cryptogram (CDA): Merges DDA
with the application cryptogram
International schemes require DDA
or CDA if offline capable
Authentication
19© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
Issuer Keys
Clear text
SDA signature
Issuer Public Key certificate
Issuer Public Key
ICC Public Key certificate
EMV Offers Combined or Dynamic Data Authentication
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 20
Public Key
Private
Key
RSASign
RSASign
CAPKi
Public Key
Private
Key
RSASign
23 October 2016
Certificate
Authority
Plaintext PIN For ICC verification
Enciphered PIN for Online verification
Signature (paper)
Enciphered PIN for offline verification
NO CYM required
23 October 2016 21© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA
Each Kernel Has a Set of CVM Capabilities
Signature Preferring
• Signature
• No CVM
Pin Preferring
• Online PIN
• Signature
• No CVM
International Traveler
• Online PIN
• Offline Enciphered PIN
• Offline Clear Text PIN
• Signature
• No CVM
23 October 2016 22© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA
The Card Carries The CVM List
Common Debit
• Online PIN
• No CVM
Alternate Debit
• Online PIN
• Offline Enciphered PIN
• Offline Clear Text PIN
• No CVM
Address Unattended Terminals
• Online PIN
• Signature
• Offline Enciphered PIN
• Offline Clear Text PIN
• No CVM
Chip and Signature
Chip and PIN (lost and Stolen Fraud)
Chip and Choice
Support for PIN Selection
Pin Synchronization
Verified in ICC or Online
EMV Cardholder Verification For Every Occasion
Selectable Kernel
The terminal selects the EMVCo
approved Kernel based on
amount & tender type
The Kernel has a predefined set
of Terminal CVM Capabilities
The CVM List presents the
terminal with a prioritized list
e.g.
• Online PIN verification
• PIN verification in ICC
• Signature
• No CVM
The terminal selects the CVM
By comparing
The CVM List of the selected AID
To
Kernel’s CVM Capabilities
Verification
23© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
POS Must Understand the EMV Transaction Flow
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 24
EMV Start EMV Continue EMV Complete
Data
Authentication
Terminal Risk
Management
Processing
Restrictions
Cardholder
Verification
Terminal
Action
Analysis
Card Action
Analysis
Answer to
Reset
Application
Selection
Initiate
Application
Read
Application
Data
Completion
Online
Processing
Script
Processing
Online
Offline
Issuer
Authentication
Online/
Offline
Decision
Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization
Offline Capable, Online Preferring or 100% Online
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 25
If <
Floor Limit
Clearing (x240) - Clearing when not in a x200 message
Optionally Includes the TC or AAC
Issuing
Processor
Acquiring
Processor
ConsumerMerchant Scheme
If >
Floor Limit
Network
Down
Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization
Offline Capable, Online Preferring or 100% Online
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 26
Authorization (x100) or Financial Request (x200)
Includes the ARQC or AAC
Clearing (x240)
Includes the TC or AAC
Issuing
Processor
Acquiring
Processor
ConsumerMerchant Scheme
X
Always
Online
Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization
Offline Capable, Online Preferring or 100% Online
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 27
Authorization (x100) or Financial Request (x200)
Includes the ARQC or AAC
Authorization (x110) or Financial Response (x210)
Includes the ARPC and Scripts
Clearing (x240) - Clearing when not in a x200 message
Optionally Includes the TC or AAC
Funds
Available
Issuing
Processor
Acquiring
Processor
ConsumerMerchant Scheme
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 28
EMV Ensures Issuer Control of Authorization
The design of EMV assured Issuer
control of the authorization for each
transaction at the Point of
Interaction
• Terminal Risk Management allows the
merchant / acquirer and scheme to set
a floor limit under which the terminal
will ask the card to approve the
transaction
• Card Risk Management employs a
dynamic set of parameters, allowing
the Issuer to authorize the transaction
without the expense of an online
authorization request
The purpose - guarantee cardholder
satisfaction, manage financial risk
and reduce the cost of processing
payments for all stakeholders
T
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
R
e
q
u
e
s
t
s
Card/Issuer Decision is Final
TC
Offline
ARQC
Online
AAC
Decline
TC -
Offline
Card
Decides
Card
Decides
Card
Decides
ARQC -
Online
Not
Allowed
Card
Decides
Card
Decides
AAC -
Decline
Not
Allowed
Not
Allowed
Card
Decides
Authorization
23 October 2016
APPLICATION SELECTION - DESIGNED
TO SUPPORT MULTI-ACCOUNT CARDS
29
Insert
Cards
Consumer
Selection
The Terminal Must Read the Card
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 30
Answer
to reset
Select AID(s)
Typically Associated with Payment Brand
Develop Candidate
AID List
The Debit Conundrum
Consumer
Selection
$xxx.xx
Pay With
1. Your Bank’s Credit Card
2. Your Bank’s Debit Card
3. Your Bank’s T&E Card
1,2 or 3?
Application Selection Enables Multi Account Cards
23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 31
Approved
Please Remove Card
Consumer
Selection
US Debit Is Different
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 32
US Debit Card
One Account
1. Visa or MasterCard
2. Pulse
3. Shazam
4. Star
Route and AID
are Linked in the
Payment
Network Rules
Consumer
Selection
$132.95
Pay With?
1. Visa or MasterCard
2. US Debit
Enter 1 or 2
To select payment method?
Out of the Box EMV
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 33
Consumer
Selection
Credit
Debit
As Today
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 34
Consumer
Selection
An alternate
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 35
Credit
Debit
Consumer
Selection
$132.95
Pay With?
1. US Debit
PIN Steering
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 36
PSE – Payment Systems Environment
AID – Application Identifier
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
23 October 2016© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 37
Shared Data Enables Distinct Behaviors
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - IC-Group Seminar 38
PIN,PINTryCounterandPINRetryLimit
10/23/2016
The Profile Defines The CPU, Applet and Memory
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - IC-Group Seminar 3910/23/2016
Key Management Assure the Security EMV Enables
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 40
Cosmo S v5
MC4 Multi-App VSDC 2.8.1t
VSDC 2.8.1am2s
Chrysalis v3.2
MC4 + NMC
VIS1.5.4
Operating System & Applications Each with an LOA
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 41
D-PAS v1.1
MC4 Multi-App VSDC2.8.1f1
AEIPS v4.2
Contact
(SDA)
Contact
RSA
(DDA, CDA)
Cosmo RSA v5
Offline Capable
Online Only
Application & Version
Application & Version
Application & Version
Application & Version
OT’s products are certified, available in multiple memory sizes and support data sharing for US Debit
Cosmo Fly v5
Dual
(DDA, CDA)
Offline Capable
PPMC1.3.1 VSDC2.8.1f D-PAS v1.1 + CL v1.0
MCA1.1 AEIPS v4.2 & EP2.0VSDC2.8.1G
MCA v1.1
MC4 Multi-App VSDC2.8.1g
AEIPS v4.2
Cosmo RSA v5.8
MCA v1.2 Multi-App
Cosmo Fly v5.9
MC2 +MC4 + NMC
VIS1.5.4
Chrysalis v4.0
PPMC1.3.1
VIS1.5.4 + VCPS2.1.2
MCA v1.1
Chrysalis Fly v3.4
The LOA Assures Compliance and Security
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 42
43
Account creation
or card renewal
Application is
transferred to
Issuer CMS
Account and card
request are created
Batch or Real
Time Card
request is
sent to CPS
Card request
blob is
generated
EMV blob is
retrieved by
workstation
APDUs are
exchanged
with Chip
Branch and Bureau Issuance
© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - IC-Group Seminar10/23/2016
OT Service Centre
Cards Prepared
for production
EMV file is
generated
44© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA
Philip Andreae
Vice President, Field Marketing
p.andreae@oberthur.com
+1 404 680 9640
23 October 2016

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EMV 201 EMF June 2016

  • 1. EMV 201: EMV Chip Profiles and Considerations for Issuers and Merchants Philip Andreae, Oberthur Technologies
  • 2. 2© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
  • 3. No Longer Secure Circa 1991 – In 1993 Europay, MasterCard And Visa came together to economically solve for Counterfeit and Lost & Stolen Fraud EMV Restored “The Token” In 1996 The EMV Specifications were published with the collective agreement that global Interoperability is the Goal; each at their own pace SignatureOnline PIN Online PIN Match In PIN Why EMV? © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 3 What You Have What You Know Are You Able Infra Red InkHologram Magnetic Stripe OnlineTerminal Floor Limit & cvv2/cvc2 What You Have A Card/Phone What You Know A Secret Authentication Verification Authorization cvv1/cvc1
  • 4. In 1998 Global Deployment Began In 2012 The USA Embraced EMV © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 4 An Extrapolation using First Annapolis, EMVCO, AITA, SPA and First Annapolis input into consideration These are not the views of Oberthur 23 October 2016
  • 5. EMV EMPLOYS HARDWARE BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY TO SECURE PAYMENTS
  • 6. If Service Code = 2xx or 6xx Magnetic Stripe Processing Was Easy For Everyone 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 6 Read Track Data Total > Terminal Floor Limit Issuer Authorizes Transaction Check Electronic Stop List Print Receipt Verify Signature Data Capture for Overnight Settlement Yes No Yes No EMV Start
  • 7. ISO Specifications EMV Specifications © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 7 EMV Is Not for the Light Hearted ISO 8583 - Financial transaction card originated messages ISO 7816 – Smart Card • Part 1: Physical characteristics • Part 2: Cards with contacts – Dimensions and location of the contacts • Part 3: Cards with contacts – Electrical interface and transmission protocols • Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange ISO 14443 – Contactless • Part 1: Physical characteristics • Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal interface • Part 3: Initialization and anti-collision • Part 4: Transmission protocol EMVCo Version 4.3 – Contact • Book 1: Application independent ICC to terminal interface requirements • Book 2: Security and key management • Book 3: Application specification • Book 4: Cardholder, attendant and acquirer interface requirements EMVCo Version 2.3 – Contactless • Book A: Architecture and general requirements • Book B: Entry point specification • Books C1-7: Kernel specifications • Book D: Communications protocol Payment System Specifications AEIPS - D-Pas - MChip - VIS - CPA 23 October 2016
  • 8. ISO Specifications EMV Specifications ISO 8583 - Financial transaction card originated messages ISO 7816 – Smart Card • Part 1: Physical characteristics • Part 2: Cards with contacts – Dimensions and location of the contacts • Part 3: Cards with contacts – Electrical interface and transmission protocols • Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange ISO 14443 – Contactless • Part 1: Physical characteristics • Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal interface • Part 3: Initialization and anti-collision • Part 4: Transmission protocol EMVCo Version 4.3 – Contact • Book 1: Application independent ICC to terminal interface requirements • Book 2: Security and key management • Book 3: Application specification • Book 4: Cardholder, attendant and acquirer interface requirements EMVCo Version 2.3 – Contactless • Book A: Architecture and general requirements • Book B: Entry point specification • Books C1-7: Kernel specifications • Book D: Communications protocol Payment System Specifications AEIPS - D-Pas - MChip - VIS - CPA © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 8 Based On Standards - Built on Evolving Technology 23 October 2016
  • 9. Card design Chip selection Script processing Cardholder verification Authentication requirements Key management requirements Fraud and risk management systems PIN management & PIN synchronization Cardholder education and marketing messages Education branch, call center & the team on EMV Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization What are merchants doing to filter debit application selection Credit & debit card processing must perform online authentication And …. 9© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA When Implementing EMV Issuers Think About 23 October 2016
  • 10. Project Initiation Vendor Selection Negotiate with Processor Define Profile Select Chip Define Input File Perform Key Ceremonies Profile Development Staff Training Develop Customer Education Payment Scheme Certification End to End Testing Account Conversion Issue Chip Cards Accept First Transaction Implementing EMV Requires Your “A” Team © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 1023 October 2016
  • 11. EMV Embedded an Integrated Circuit in the Card 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 11 Hardware CPU, Crypto processor, Flash, E2PROM or ROM, RAM, Security & Sensors BIOS Basic Input Output System Operating System Native or Global Platform & Java Card API Application AEIPS, CPA, D-Pas, MChip, VSDC … Domestic Data Antenna
  • 12. The Chip Card is a Secure Element with Data Inside 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 12 Hardware Antenna, CPU, Crypto processor, Flash, E2PROM or ROM, RAM, Security & Sensors BIOS Basic Input Output System Operating System Native or Global Platform & Java Card API Application AEIPS, CPA, D-Pas, MChip, VSDC … Domestic DataData ADF(s), AID(s) AIP, ATC, AUC, Cardholder Name, CID, CVM List, Expiry Date, IAC(s), LCOL, PAN, UCOL Track 2 Equivalent Data…
  • 13. Applications and Data are Specified and Structured Application The Payment Networks define, license and approval implementations of their specification running in the card and on the terminal • Visa – VIS • MasterCard – MChip • Discover - D-Pas • Amex – AEIPS • EMVCo – CPA (OT = WISE) • J/Smart – JCB • EMVCo – CPA The terminal specification defines how the terminal will operate and use the EMV Tool Kit The Chip Specification defines what the software in the card must do in response to commands from the Terminal Tests Plans allow card and terminal vendors to prove their products perform as required AID – Application Identifier The AID is the name of the Application Directory File ADF in the chip The terminal and consumer selects the AID Application RID PIX • Visa (credit or debit) A000000003 1010 Visa Plus A000000003 8010 Visa Interlink A000000003 3010 US Common Debit A000000098 0840 • MasterCard A000000004 1010 Maestro Int’l A000000004 3060 Cirrus A000000004 6000 US Maestro A000000004 2203 • Amex A000000025 01XX • JCB A000000065 1010 • Oberthur A000000077 XXXX • Discover A000000152 3010 Discover Common Debit A000000152 4010 • DNA Common Debit A000000620 0620 13 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
  • 14. ADF SFI EF EF SFI EF Each Account is Stored in an Application Data File © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 1423 October 2016
  • 15. THE PROFILE AND THE TERMINAL CAPABILITIES DEFINE THE BEHAVIOR 15
  • 16. EMV Defines the Terminal to Card Protocal 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 16 Offline by Terminal Requires RSA Capable Chip Online on Issuer Host “What you have” Authentication “What you know” Verification Signature Match PIN in Chip Recommended for Offline Authorization Online PIN No CVM “You have the funds” Authorization Online Host Authorized Offline at Merchant Based on Issuer Defined Card Risk Management Parameters Requires Offline Authentication
  • 17. Layering Security is the Right Answer Offline Data Authentication The Norm in Europe, Canada and Australia Merchants and Acquirers When the Network is down or running slow the merchant at least knows the Card is Authentic If the Terminal Floor limit is not zero knowing the card is authentic the merchant can ask the card to approve Issuers Card requires a crypto-processor to support DDA or CDA Issuer must establish RSA Key Pair and request Issuer Public Key certificate from Payment Network Online Data Authentication The way PIN Debit transactions are secured Merchants, Acquirers and Networks Must manage keys necessary to encrypt the PIN between POS and Payment Network Must send Field 55 EMV to Issuer Host for Authentication Issuers Authenticate the Cryptogram to prove the card was or is present at time of purchase • ARQC – Application Request Cryptogram • ARPC – Application Response Cryptogram • TC – Transaction Certificate • AAC – Application Authentication Cryptogram © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 1723 October 2016 Transit Authorities see offline data authentication as a requirement
  • 18. Offline Card Authentication Provides Merchant Authentication Requires an RSA capable processor Personalize the card with • Card & Issuer public key & certificates • Unique RSA Secret Public keys simply need to be loaded and maintained in the terminal Terminal authenticates the card Online Data Authentication Provides Issuer Authentication Personalization of the card with a unique set of secret keys Card generates a Cryptogram “ARQC” & “TC” by signing card, terminal and transaction data with the secret key Terminal forwards Field 55 “ICC or EMV data” including “ARQC” or “TC” and signed data to Issuer Issuer authenticates card data when authorizing the transaction Issuer returns “ARPC” and Scripts in Field 55 to card allowing Issuer authentication and parameter updates 23 October 2016 18© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA EMV Gives The Merchant and Issuer Assurance
  • 19. Public Key loaded in Terminal • Public keys are distributed to all terminals supporting Offline Data Authentication Issuer is a Member • At personalization an RSA key pair and issuer certificates are loaded into the secure element Card is Authentic • The card generates a unique certificate • Point of sale authenticates the card Authentication Addresses Counterfeit Fraud EMV supports 4 methods of card authentication methods: • Online Data Authentication: The Card creates a Unique Digital Signature delivered to the Issuer Host for Authentications • Offline Data Authentication • Static data authentication (SDA): The data verified by the POS is always the same • Dynamic data authentication (DDA): The data verified by the POS is dynamic for each transaction • Combined DDA and application cryptogram (CDA): Merges DDA with the application cryptogram International schemes require DDA or CDA if offline capable Authentication 19© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
  • 20. Issuer Keys Clear text SDA signature Issuer Public Key certificate Issuer Public Key ICC Public Key certificate EMV Offers Combined or Dynamic Data Authentication © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 20 Public Key Private Key RSASign RSASign CAPKi Public Key Private Key RSASign 23 October 2016 Certificate Authority
  • 21. Plaintext PIN For ICC verification Enciphered PIN for Online verification Signature (paper) Enciphered PIN for offline verification NO CYM required 23 October 2016 21© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA Each Kernel Has a Set of CVM Capabilities
  • 22. Signature Preferring • Signature • No CVM Pin Preferring • Online PIN • Signature • No CVM International Traveler • Online PIN • Offline Enciphered PIN • Offline Clear Text PIN • Signature • No CVM 23 October 2016 22© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA The Card Carries The CVM List Common Debit • Online PIN • No CVM Alternate Debit • Online PIN • Offline Enciphered PIN • Offline Clear Text PIN • No CVM Address Unattended Terminals • Online PIN • Signature • Offline Enciphered PIN • Offline Clear Text PIN • No CVM
  • 23. Chip and Signature Chip and PIN (lost and Stolen Fraud) Chip and Choice Support for PIN Selection Pin Synchronization Verified in ICC or Online EMV Cardholder Verification For Every Occasion Selectable Kernel The terminal selects the EMVCo approved Kernel based on amount & tender type The Kernel has a predefined set of Terminal CVM Capabilities The CVM List presents the terminal with a prioritized list e.g. • Online PIN verification • PIN verification in ICC • Signature • No CVM The terminal selects the CVM By comparing The CVM List of the selected AID To Kernel’s CVM Capabilities Verification 23© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA23 October 2016
  • 24. POS Must Understand the EMV Transaction Flow 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 24 EMV Start EMV Continue EMV Complete Data Authentication Terminal Risk Management Processing Restrictions Cardholder Verification Terminal Action Analysis Card Action Analysis Answer to Reset Application Selection Initiate Application Read Application Data Completion Online Processing Script Processing Online Offline Issuer Authentication Online/ Offline Decision
  • 25. Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization Offline Capable, Online Preferring or 100% Online 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 25 If < Floor Limit Clearing (x240) - Clearing when not in a x200 message Optionally Includes the TC or AAC Issuing Processor Acquiring Processor ConsumerMerchant Scheme
  • 26. If > Floor Limit Network Down Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization Offline Capable, Online Preferring or 100% Online © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 26 Authorization (x100) or Financial Request (x200) Includes the ARQC or AAC Clearing (x240) Includes the TC or AAC Issuing Processor Acquiring Processor ConsumerMerchant Scheme X
  • 27. Always Online Card Risk Management and Transaction Authorization Offline Capable, Online Preferring or 100% Online © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 27 Authorization (x100) or Financial Request (x200) Includes the ARQC or AAC Authorization (x110) or Financial Response (x210) Includes the ARPC and Scripts Clearing (x240) - Clearing when not in a x200 message Optionally Includes the TC or AAC Funds Available Issuing Processor Acquiring Processor ConsumerMerchant Scheme
  • 28. © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 28 EMV Ensures Issuer Control of Authorization The design of EMV assured Issuer control of the authorization for each transaction at the Point of Interaction • Terminal Risk Management allows the merchant / acquirer and scheme to set a floor limit under which the terminal will ask the card to approve the transaction • Card Risk Management employs a dynamic set of parameters, allowing the Issuer to authorize the transaction without the expense of an online authorization request The purpose - guarantee cardholder satisfaction, manage financial risk and reduce the cost of processing payments for all stakeholders T e r m i n a l R e q u e s t s Card/Issuer Decision is Final TC Offline ARQC Online AAC Decline TC - Offline Card Decides Card Decides Card Decides ARQC - Online Not Allowed Card Decides Card Decides AAC - Decline Not Allowed Not Allowed Card Decides Authorization 23 October 2016
  • 29. APPLICATION SELECTION - DESIGNED TO SUPPORT MULTI-ACCOUNT CARDS 29
  • 30. Insert Cards Consumer Selection The Terminal Must Read the Card 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 30 Answer to reset Select AID(s) Typically Associated with Payment Brand Develop Candidate AID List The Debit Conundrum
  • 31. Consumer Selection $xxx.xx Pay With 1. Your Bank’s Credit Card 2. Your Bank’s Debit Card 3. Your Bank’s T&E Card 1,2 or 3? Application Selection Enables Multi Account Cards 23 October 2016 © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 31 Approved Please Remove Card
  • 32. Consumer Selection US Debit Is Different © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 32 US Debit Card One Account 1. Visa or MasterCard 2. Pulse 3. Shazam 4. Star Route and AID are Linked in the Payment Network Rules
  • 33. Consumer Selection $132.95 Pay With? 1. Visa or MasterCard 2. US Debit Enter 1 or 2 To select payment method? Out of the Box EMV © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 33
  • 34. Consumer Selection Credit Debit As Today © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 34
  • 35. Consumer Selection An alternate © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 35 Credit Debit
  • 36. Consumer Selection $132.95 Pay With? 1. US Debit PIN Steering © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 36 PSE – Payment Systems Environment AID – Application Identifier
  • 37. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 23 October 2016© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 37
  • 38. Shared Data Enables Distinct Behaviors © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - IC-Group Seminar 38 PIN,PINTryCounterandPINRetryLimit 10/23/2016
  • 39. The Profile Defines The CPU, Applet and Memory © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - IC-Group Seminar 3910/23/2016
  • 40. Key Management Assure the Security EMV Enables © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 40
  • 41. Cosmo S v5 MC4 Multi-App VSDC 2.8.1t VSDC 2.8.1am2s Chrysalis v3.2 MC4 + NMC VIS1.5.4 Operating System & Applications Each with an LOA © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 41 D-PAS v1.1 MC4 Multi-App VSDC2.8.1f1 AEIPS v4.2 Contact (SDA) Contact RSA (DDA, CDA) Cosmo RSA v5 Offline Capable Online Only Application & Version Application & Version Application & Version Application & Version OT’s products are certified, available in multiple memory sizes and support data sharing for US Debit Cosmo Fly v5 Dual (DDA, CDA) Offline Capable PPMC1.3.1 VSDC2.8.1f D-PAS v1.1 + CL v1.0 MCA1.1 AEIPS v4.2 & EP2.0VSDC2.8.1G MCA v1.1 MC4 Multi-App VSDC2.8.1g AEIPS v4.2 Cosmo RSA v5.8 MCA v1.2 Multi-App Cosmo Fly v5.9 MC2 +MC4 + NMC VIS1.5.4 Chrysalis v4.0 PPMC1.3.1 VIS1.5.4 + VCPS2.1.2 MCA v1.1 Chrysalis Fly v3.4
  • 42. The LOA Assures Compliance and Security © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA 42
  • 43. 43 Account creation or card renewal Application is transferred to Issuer CMS Account and card request are created Batch or Real Time Card request is sent to CPS Card request blob is generated EMV blob is retrieved by workstation APDUs are exchanged with Chip Branch and Bureau Issuance © Oberthur Technologies 2016 - IC-Group Seminar10/23/2016 OT Service Centre Cards Prepared for production EMV file is generated
  • 44. 44© Oberthur Technologies 2016 - EMV 201 - PEA Philip Andreae Vice President, Field Marketing p.andreae@oberthur.com +1 404 680 9640 23 October 2016