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CompTIA Security+ Guide to Network
Security Fundamentals, Sixth Edition
Chapter 8
Wireless Network Security
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use
as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for
classroom use.
Objectives
8.1 Describe the different types of wireless network
attacks
8.2 List the vulnerabilities in IEEE 802.11 security
8.3 Explain the solutions for securing a wireless
network
© 2018 Cengage. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-
protected website for classroom use.
3
Wireless Attacks
• Several attacks can be directed against wireless data system:
• Bluetooth attacks
• Near Field Communication (NFC) attacks
• Radio frequency identification systems
• Wireless local area network attacks
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
4
Bluetooth Attacks (1 of 3)
• Bluetooth
• Wireless technology that uses short-range radio frequency (RF) transmissions
• Provides rapid device pairings
- Example: smartphone and a Bluetooth mouse
• Personal Area Network (PAN) technology
• Piconet
• Established when two Bluetooth devices come within range of each other
• One device (master) controls all wireless traffic
• Other device (slave) takes commands
- Active slaves are sending transmissions
- Parked slaves are connected but not actively participating
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
5
Bluetooth Attacks (2 of 3)
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6
Bluetooth Attacks (3 of 3)
• Bluejacking - an attack that sends unsolicited messages to Bluetooth-
enabled devices
• Text messages, images, or sounds
• Bluejacking is considered more annoying than harmful
• No data is stolen
• Bluesnarfing
• An attack that accesses unauthorized information from a wireless
device through a Bluetooth connection
• Often between cell phones and laptops
• Attacker copies e-mails, contacts, or other data by connecting to the
Bluetooth device without owner’s knowledge
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
7
Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (1 of 4)
• Near field communication (NFC)
• A set of standards used to establish communication between devices in
close proximity
• Once devices are brought within 4 cm of each other or tapped together,
two-way communication is established
• Devices using NFC can be active or passive
• Passive NFC device – contains information that other devices can read
but does not read or receive any information (example, NFC tag)
• Active NFC device – can read information as well as transmit data
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
8
Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (2 of 4)
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9
Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (3 of 4)
• Examples of NFC uses:
• Automobile
• Entertainment
• Office
• Retail stores
• Transportation
• NFC devices are used in contactless payment systems
• A consumer can pay for a purchase by simply tapping a store’s
payment terminal with their smartphone
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
10
Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (4 of 4)
Vulnerability Explanation Defense
Eavesdropping Unencrypted NFC communication
between the device and terminal
can be intercepted and viewed
Because an attacker must be
extremely close to pick up the
signal, users should remain
aware of their surroundings
while making a payment
Data theft Attackers can “bump” a portable
reader to a user’s smartphone in
a crowd to make an NFC
connection and steal payment
information stored on the phone
This can be prevented by
turning off NFC while in a
large crowd
Man-in-the-middle
attack
An attacker can intercept the NFC
communications between devices
and forge a fictitious response
Devices can be configured in
pairing so one device can
only send while the other can
only receive
Device theft The theft of a smartphone could
allow an attacker to use that
phone for purchases
Smartphone should be
protected with passwords or
strong PINs
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otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
11
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Attacks (1 of 2)
• Radio frequency identification (RFID)
• Commonly used to transmit information between employee
identification badges, inventory tags, book labels, and other paper-
based tags that can be detected by a proximity reader
• Most RFID tags are passive
• Do not have their own power supply
• Because they do not require a power supply, they can be very small
• RFID tags are susceptible to different attacks
• Current version of RFID standards known as Generation 2
• Contains some security enhancements over the previous version
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
12
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Attacks (2 of 2)
RFID attack type Description of attack Implications of RFID attack
Unauthorized tag
access
A rogue RFID reader can
determine the inventory on a
store shelf to track the sales
of specific items
Sales information could be
used by a rival product
manufacturer to negotiate
additional shelf space or better
product placement
Fake tags Authentic RFID tags are
replaced with fake tags that
contain fictitious data about
products that are not in
inventory
Fake tags undermine the
integrity of the store’s inventory
system by showing data for
items that do not exist
Eavesdropping Unauthorized users could
listen in on communications
between RFID tags and
readers
Confidential data, such as a
politician’s purchase of
antidepressants, could be sold
to a rival candidate in a “smear”
campaign
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otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
13
Wireless Local Area Network Attacks
• A WLAN is designed to replace or supplement a wired LAN
• It is important to know about the:
• History and specifications of IEEE WLANs
• Hardware necessary for a wireless network
• Different types of WLAN attacks directed at enterprise and home users
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14
IEEE WLANs (1 of 3)
• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) WLANS
• Most influential organization for computer networking and wireless
communications
• Dates back to 1884
• Began developing network architecture standards in the 1980s
• 1997: release of IEEE 802.11
• Standard for wireless local area networks (WLANs)
• Higher speeds (5.5 Mbps and 11 Mbps) added in 1999: IEEE 802.11b
• IEEE 802.11a
• Specifies maximum rated speed of 54Mbps using the 5GHz spectrum
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15
IEEE WLANs (2 of 3)
• IEEE 802.11g
• Preserves stable and widely accepted features of 802.11b and
increases data transfer rates similar to 802.11a
• IEEE 802.11n
• Ratified in 2009
• Improvements: speed, coverage area, resistance to interference,
and strong security
• IEEE 802.11ac
• Ratified in early 2014 and has data rates over 7 Gbps
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16
IEEE WLANs (3 of 3)
blank 802.11 802.11b 802.11a 802.11g 802.11n 802.11ad 802.11ac
Frequency 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 5 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz &
5 GHz
60 GHz 5 GHz
Maximum data
rate
2 Mbps 11 Mbps 54 Mbps 54 Mbps 600 Mbps 7 Gbps 7.2 Gbps
Indoor range
(feet/meters)
65/20 125/38 115/35 115/35 230/70 32/10 115/35
Outdoor range
(feet/meters)
328/100 460/140 393/120 460/140 820/250 N/A 460/140
Ratification
date
1997 1999 1999 2003 2009 2013 2014
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17
WLAN Hardware (1 of 3)
• Wireless client network interface card adapter
• Performs same functions as wired adapter
• Antenna sends and receives signals through airwaves
• Access point (AP) major parts
• Antenna and radio transmitter/receiver send and receive wireless signals
• Bridging software to interface wireless devices to other devices
• Wired network interface allows it to connect by cable to standard wired
network
• Access point (AP) functions
- Acts as “base station” for wireless network
- Acts as a bridge between wireless and wired networks
•Can connect to wired network by a cable
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18
WLAN Hardware (2 of 3)
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19
WLAN Hardware (3 of 3)
• A WLAN using an AP is operating in infrastructure mode
• Network that are not using an AP operate in ad hoc mode
• Devices can only communicate between themselves and cannot
connect to another network
• The Wi-Fi Alliance has created a similar technical specification called
Wi-Fi Direct
• Residential WLAN gateway
• Used by small offices or home users to connect to the Internet
• Features included are AP, firewall, router, dynamic host configuration
protocol (DHCP) server, and others
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20
WLAN Enterprise Attacks (1 of 7)
• In a network, a well-defined boundary protects data and resources
• Boundary is known as a “hard edge”
• The introduction of WLANs in enterprises has changed hard edges
to “blurred edges”
• Types of wireless attacks
• Rogue access points
• Evil twins
• Intercepting wireless data
• Wireless replay attacks
• Denial of service attacks
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21
WLAN Enterprise Attacks (2 of 7)
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22
WLAN Enterprise Attacks (3 of 7)
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23
WLAN Enterprise Attacks (4 of 7)
• Rogue access point
• An unauthorized access point that allows an attacker to bypass
network security configurations
• Usually set up by an insider (employee)
• May be set up behind a firewall, opening the network to attacks
• Evil twin
• AP set up by an attacker
• Attempts to mimic an authorized AP
• Attackers capture transmissions from users to evil twin AP
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24
WLAN Enterprise Attacks (5 of 7)
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25
WLAN Enterprise Attacks (6 of 7)
• Intercepting Wireless Data
• An attacker can pick up the RF signal from an open or misconfigured
AP
• Using a WLAN to read this data could yield significant information to
an attacker regarding the wired enterprise network
• Wireless Replay Attack
• Also known as “hijacking”
• The attacker captures transmitted wireless data, records it, and then
sends it on to the original recipient without the attacker’s presence
being detected
• Can be accomplished using an evil twin AP
• Known as a man-in-the-middle attack
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26
WLAN Enterprise Attacks (7 of 7)
• Wireless Denial of Service Attack
• RF jamming - attackers use intentional RF interference to flood the RF spectrum with
enough interference to prevent a device from communicating with the AP
• Spoofing - attackers craft a fictitious frame that pretends to come from a trusted client
when it actually comes from the attacker
• Manipulating duration field values - attackers send a frame with the duration field set to
a high value, preventing other devices from transmitting for that period of time
• Wireless Home Attacks - most home users fail to configure any security on their home
networks
• Attackers can:
- Steal data
- Read wireless transmissions
- Inject malware
- Download harmful content
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otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
27
Vulnerabilities of IEEE Wireless Security
• Original IEEE 802.11 committee recognized wireless transmissions
could be vulnerable
• Implemented several wireless security protections in the standard
• Left others to WLAN vendor’s discretion
• Protections were vulnerable and led to multiple attacks
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28
Wired Equivalent Privacy
• WEP – an IEEE 802.11 security protocol designed to ensure that only
authorized parties can view transmissions
• Encrypts plaintext into ciphertext
• Secret key is shared between wireless client device and AP
• WEP vulnerabilities
• WEP can only use 64-bit or 128-bit number to encrypt
-Initialization vector (IV) is only 24 of those bits
-Short length makes it easier to break
• Violates cardinal rule of cryptography: avoid a detectable pattern
-Attackers can see duplication when IVs start repeating
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29
Wi-Fi Protected Setup
• WPS is an optional means of configuring security on WLANS
• Two common WPS methods:
• PIN method - utilizes a PIN printed on a sticker of the wireless router
or displayed through a software wizard
-User enters Pin and security configuration automatically occurs
• Push-button method - user pushes buttons and security configuration
takes place
• Design and implementation flaws:
• There is no lockout limit for entering PINs
• The last PIN character is only a checksum
• The wireless router reports the validity of the first and second halves
of the PIN separately
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otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
30
MAC Address Filtering (1 of 3)
• Method of controlling WLAN access
• Limit a device’s access to AP
• Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering
• Used by nearly all wireless AP vendors
• Permits or blocks device based on MAC address
• Vulnerabilities of MAC address filtering
• Addresses exchanged in unencrypted format
-Attacker can see address of approved device and substitute it on
his own device
• Managing large number of addresses is challenging
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31
MAC Address Filtering (2 of 3)
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32
MAC Address Filtering (3 of 3)
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33
SSID Broadcasting
• Service Set Identifier (SSID)
• The user-supplied network name of a wireless network; usually
broadcast so that any device can see it
-The broadcast can be restricted
• Some wireless security sources encourage users to configure their APs
to prevent the broadcast of the SSID
• Not advertising the SSID only provides a weak degree of security and
has limitations:
• SSID can be discovered when transmitted in other frames
• May prevent users from being able to freely roam from one AP
coverage area to another
• It’s not always possible to turn off SSID beaconing
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34
Wireless Security Solutions
• A unified approach to WLAN security was needed
• IEEE and Wi-Fi Alliance began developing security solutions
• Resulting standards used today
• IEEE 802.11i
• WPA and WPA2
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35
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
• Introduced in 2003 by the Wi-Fi Alliance
• A subset of IEEE 802.11i
• Two modes of WPA:
• WPA Personal
• WPA Enterprise
• WPA addresses both encryption and authentication
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36
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)
Encryption
• Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) Encryption
• Used in WPA
• Uses a longer 128 bit key than WEP
• Dynamically generated for each new packet
• Includes a Message Integrity Check (MIC), designed to prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks
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37
Preshared Key (PSK) Authentication
• Authentication for WPA Personal is accomplished by using a
preshared key (PSK)
• After AP configured, client device must have same key value entered
• Key is shared prior to communication taking place
• Uses a passphrase to generate encryption key
• Must be entered on each AP and wireless device in advance
• Devices that have the secret key are automatically authenticated by
the AP
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38
WPA Vulnerabilities
• Key management
• Key sharing is done manually without security protection
• Keys must be changed on a regular basis
• Key must be disclosed to guest users
• Passphrases
• PSK passphrases of fewer than 20 characters subject to cracking
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39
Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)
• Second generation of WPA is known as WPA2
• Introduced in 2004
• Based on final IEEE 802.11i standard
• Two modes of WPA2:
• WPA2 Personal
• WPA2 Enterprise
• Addresses to major security areas of WLANs:
• Encryption
• Authentication
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40
AES-CCMP Encryption
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher
• AES performs three steps on every block (128 bits) of plaintext
• Within second step, multiple iterations are performed
• Bytes are substituted and rearranged
• Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication
Code Protocol (CCMP) is the encryption protocol used for WPA2
• Specifies the use of CCM with AES
• The Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC)
component of CCMP provides data integrity and authentication
• Both CCMP and TKIP use a 128-bit key for encryption
• Both methods use a 64-bit MIC value
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41
IEEE 802.1x Authentication (1 of 3)
• Originally developed for wired networks
• Provides greater degree of security by implementing port-based
authentication
• Blocks all traffic on a port-by-port basis until client is authenticated
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42
IEEE 802.1x Authentication (2 of 3)
• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
• A framework for transporting authentication protocols
• Defines message format
• Uses four types of packets
-Request
-Response
-Success
-Failure
• A common EAP protocol is Protected EAP (PEAP)
• Simplifies deployment of 802.1x by using Microsoft Windows logins
and passwords
• Creates encrypted channel between client and authentication server
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43
IEEE 802.1x Authentication (3 of 3)
EAP name Description
EAP-TLS This protocol uses digital certificates for
authentication
DAP-TTLS This protocol securely tunnels client password
authentication within Transport Layer Security
(TLS) records
EAP-FAST This protocol securely tunnels any credential
form for authentication (such as a password or
a token) using TLS
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44
Additional Wireless Security Protections
• Other security steps can be taken:
• Rogue AP system detection
• Using the correct type of AP
• AP configuration settings
• Wireless peripheral protection
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45
Rogue AP System Detection
• Rouge AP Discovery Tools - 4 types of wireless probes can monitor
airwaves for traffic:
• Wireless device probe
• Desktop probe
• Access point probe
• Dedicated probe
• Once a suspicious signal is detect by a wireless probe
• The information is sent to a centralized database where WLAN
management system software compares it to a list of approved APs
• Any device not on the list is considered a rogue AP
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46
AP Type (1 of 4)
• AP types can be divided into:
• Fat vs. thin
• Controller vs. standalone
• Captive portal APs
• Fat vs. Thin APs
• Autonomous APs have the intelligence required to manage wireless
authentication, encryption, and other functions for the wireless devices
they serve (called fat APs)
• “Lightweight” APs do not contain all the management and configuration
functions found in fat APs (called thin APs)
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47
AP Type (2 of 4)
• Standalone vs. Controller APs
• Controller APs can be managed through a dedicated wireless LAN
controller (WLC)
• The WLC is the single device that can be configured and settings are
automatically distributed to all controller APs
• Other advantages of controller APs:
-Handoff procedure is eliminated because all authentications are
performed in the WLC
-Offers tools that provide for monitoring the environment and
providing information regarding the best locations for APs, wireless
AP configuration settings, and power settings
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48
AP Type (3 of 4)
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49
AP Type (4 of 4)
• Captive Portal APs
• Uses a standard web browser to provide information
• Gives the wireless user the opportunity to agree to a policy or present
valid login credentials
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50
AP Configuration and Device Options (1 of 3)
• Other AP configuration settings are designed to limit the spread
of the wireless RF signal
• So that a minimum amount of signal extends past the physical
boundaries of the enterprise to be accessible to outsiders
• Site Surveys
• An in-depth examination and analysis of a wireless LAN site
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51
AP Configuration and Device Options (2 of 3)
• Signal Strength Settings
• Some APs allow adjustment of the power level at which the LAN
transmits
• Reducing power allows less signal to reach outsiders
• Spectrum Selection
• Some APs provide the ability to adjust frequency spectrum settings,
including:
-Frequency band
-Channel selection
-Channel width
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52
AP Configuration and Device Options (3 of 3)
• Antennas
• AP should be located near the center of coverage area
• Place high on a wall to reduce signal obstructions and deter theft
• If possible, the AP and antenna should be positioned so that a minimal
amount of signal reaches beyond the security perimeter of the building
• Wireless Peripheral Protection
• Vulnerabilities in wireless mice and keyboards are common
• One attack could let a threat actor inject mouse movements or keystrokes
from a nearby antenna up to 100 yards away
• Protections include:
- Updating or replacing any vulnerable devices
- Switching to more fully tested Bluetooth mice and keyboards
- Substitute with a wired mouse or keyboard
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53
Chapter Summary (1 of 3)
• Bluetooth is a wireless technology using short-range RF transmissions
• Near field communication (NFC) is a set of standards primarily for
smartphones and smartcards used to communicate with devices in
close proximity
• A wireless technology similar to NFC is radio frequency identification
(RFID)
• A wireless local area network (WLAN) is designed to replace or
supplement a wired LAN
• The IEEE has developed standards for WLANs
• A rouge AP is an unauthorized AP that allows an attacker to bypass
network security and open the network and its users to attacks
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
54
Chapter Summary (2 of 3)
• IEEE 802.11 committee implemented several wireless security
protections in the 802.11 standard
• WEP and WPS, however, have significant design and implementation
flaws
• Controlling access to the WLAN can be accomplished using MAC
filtering on the AP
• Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and WPA2 have become the foundations
of wireless security today
• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a framework for transporting
authentication protocols by defining the format of the messages
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
55
Chapter Summary (3 of 3)
• Other steps to protect a wireless network include:
• Detecting rogue access points
• Choose the best type of AP to match the needs of the network
• Manage APs through a wireless LAN controller (WLC)
• Use a captive portal AP
• Access point power level adjustment
• Antenna positioning
© 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or
otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.

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Chapter 8 Wireless Network Security

  • 1. 1 CompTIA Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Sixth Edition Chapter 8 Wireless Network Security © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 2. Objectives 8.1 Describe the different types of wireless network attacks 8.2 List the vulnerabilities in IEEE 802.11 security 8.3 Explain the solutions for securing a wireless network © 2018 Cengage. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password- protected website for classroom use.
  • 3. 3 Wireless Attacks • Several attacks can be directed against wireless data system: • Bluetooth attacks • Near Field Communication (NFC) attacks • Radio frequency identification systems • Wireless local area network attacks © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 4. 4 Bluetooth Attacks (1 of 3) • Bluetooth • Wireless technology that uses short-range radio frequency (RF) transmissions • Provides rapid device pairings - Example: smartphone and a Bluetooth mouse • Personal Area Network (PAN) technology • Piconet • Established when two Bluetooth devices come within range of each other • One device (master) controls all wireless traffic • Other device (slave) takes commands - Active slaves are sending transmissions - Parked slaves are connected but not actively participating © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 5. 5 Bluetooth Attacks (2 of 3) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 6. 6 Bluetooth Attacks (3 of 3) • Bluejacking - an attack that sends unsolicited messages to Bluetooth- enabled devices • Text messages, images, or sounds • Bluejacking is considered more annoying than harmful • No data is stolen • Bluesnarfing • An attack that accesses unauthorized information from a wireless device through a Bluetooth connection • Often between cell phones and laptops • Attacker copies e-mails, contacts, or other data by connecting to the Bluetooth device without owner’s knowledge © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 7. 7 Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (1 of 4) • Near field communication (NFC) • A set of standards used to establish communication between devices in close proximity • Once devices are brought within 4 cm of each other or tapped together, two-way communication is established • Devices using NFC can be active or passive • Passive NFC device – contains information that other devices can read but does not read or receive any information (example, NFC tag) • Active NFC device – can read information as well as transmit data © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 8. 8 Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (2 of 4) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 9. 9 Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (3 of 4) • Examples of NFC uses: • Automobile • Entertainment • Office • Retail stores • Transportation • NFC devices are used in contactless payment systems • A consumer can pay for a purchase by simply tapping a store’s payment terminal with their smartphone © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 10. 10 Near Field Communication (NFC) Attacks (4 of 4) Vulnerability Explanation Defense Eavesdropping Unencrypted NFC communication between the device and terminal can be intercepted and viewed Because an attacker must be extremely close to pick up the signal, users should remain aware of their surroundings while making a payment Data theft Attackers can “bump” a portable reader to a user’s smartphone in a crowd to make an NFC connection and steal payment information stored on the phone This can be prevented by turning off NFC while in a large crowd Man-in-the-middle attack An attacker can intercept the NFC communications between devices and forge a fictitious response Devices can be configured in pairing so one device can only send while the other can only receive Device theft The theft of a smartphone could allow an attacker to use that phone for purchases Smartphone should be protected with passwords or strong PINs © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 11. 11 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Attacks (1 of 2) • Radio frequency identification (RFID) • Commonly used to transmit information between employee identification badges, inventory tags, book labels, and other paper- based tags that can be detected by a proximity reader • Most RFID tags are passive • Do not have their own power supply • Because they do not require a power supply, they can be very small • RFID tags are susceptible to different attacks • Current version of RFID standards known as Generation 2 • Contains some security enhancements over the previous version © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 12. 12 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Attacks (2 of 2) RFID attack type Description of attack Implications of RFID attack Unauthorized tag access A rogue RFID reader can determine the inventory on a store shelf to track the sales of specific items Sales information could be used by a rival product manufacturer to negotiate additional shelf space or better product placement Fake tags Authentic RFID tags are replaced with fake tags that contain fictitious data about products that are not in inventory Fake tags undermine the integrity of the store’s inventory system by showing data for items that do not exist Eavesdropping Unauthorized users could listen in on communications between RFID tags and readers Confidential data, such as a politician’s purchase of antidepressants, could be sold to a rival candidate in a “smear” campaign © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 13. 13 Wireless Local Area Network Attacks • A WLAN is designed to replace or supplement a wired LAN • It is important to know about the: • History and specifications of IEEE WLANs • Hardware necessary for a wireless network • Different types of WLAN attacks directed at enterprise and home users © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 14. 14 IEEE WLANs (1 of 3) • Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) WLANS • Most influential organization for computer networking and wireless communications • Dates back to 1884 • Began developing network architecture standards in the 1980s • 1997: release of IEEE 802.11 • Standard for wireless local area networks (WLANs) • Higher speeds (5.5 Mbps and 11 Mbps) added in 1999: IEEE 802.11b • IEEE 802.11a • Specifies maximum rated speed of 54Mbps using the 5GHz spectrum © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 15. 15 IEEE WLANs (2 of 3) • IEEE 802.11g • Preserves stable and widely accepted features of 802.11b and increases data transfer rates similar to 802.11a • IEEE 802.11n • Ratified in 2009 • Improvements: speed, coverage area, resistance to interference, and strong security • IEEE 802.11ac • Ratified in early 2014 and has data rates over 7 Gbps © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 16. 16 IEEE WLANs (3 of 3) blank 802.11 802.11b 802.11a 802.11g 802.11n 802.11ad 802.11ac Frequency 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 5 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz & 5 GHz 60 GHz 5 GHz Maximum data rate 2 Mbps 11 Mbps 54 Mbps 54 Mbps 600 Mbps 7 Gbps 7.2 Gbps Indoor range (feet/meters) 65/20 125/38 115/35 115/35 230/70 32/10 115/35 Outdoor range (feet/meters) 328/100 460/140 393/120 460/140 820/250 N/A 460/140 Ratification date 1997 1999 1999 2003 2009 2013 2014 © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 17. 17 WLAN Hardware (1 of 3) • Wireless client network interface card adapter • Performs same functions as wired adapter • Antenna sends and receives signals through airwaves • Access point (AP) major parts • Antenna and radio transmitter/receiver send and receive wireless signals • Bridging software to interface wireless devices to other devices • Wired network interface allows it to connect by cable to standard wired network • Access point (AP) functions - Acts as “base station” for wireless network - Acts as a bridge between wireless and wired networks •Can connect to wired network by a cable © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 18. 18 WLAN Hardware (2 of 3) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 19. 19 WLAN Hardware (3 of 3) • A WLAN using an AP is operating in infrastructure mode • Network that are not using an AP operate in ad hoc mode • Devices can only communicate between themselves and cannot connect to another network • The Wi-Fi Alliance has created a similar technical specification called Wi-Fi Direct • Residential WLAN gateway • Used by small offices or home users to connect to the Internet • Features included are AP, firewall, router, dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) server, and others © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 20. 20 WLAN Enterprise Attacks (1 of 7) • In a network, a well-defined boundary protects data and resources • Boundary is known as a “hard edge” • The introduction of WLANs in enterprises has changed hard edges to “blurred edges” • Types of wireless attacks • Rogue access points • Evil twins • Intercepting wireless data • Wireless replay attacks • Denial of service attacks © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 21. 21 WLAN Enterprise Attacks (2 of 7) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 22. 22 WLAN Enterprise Attacks (3 of 7) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 23. 23 WLAN Enterprise Attacks (4 of 7) • Rogue access point • An unauthorized access point that allows an attacker to bypass network security configurations • Usually set up by an insider (employee) • May be set up behind a firewall, opening the network to attacks • Evil twin • AP set up by an attacker • Attempts to mimic an authorized AP • Attackers capture transmissions from users to evil twin AP © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 24. 24 WLAN Enterprise Attacks (5 of 7) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 25. 25 WLAN Enterprise Attacks (6 of 7) • Intercepting Wireless Data • An attacker can pick up the RF signal from an open or misconfigured AP • Using a WLAN to read this data could yield significant information to an attacker regarding the wired enterprise network • Wireless Replay Attack • Also known as “hijacking” • The attacker captures transmitted wireless data, records it, and then sends it on to the original recipient without the attacker’s presence being detected • Can be accomplished using an evil twin AP • Known as a man-in-the-middle attack © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 26. 26 WLAN Enterprise Attacks (7 of 7) • Wireless Denial of Service Attack • RF jamming - attackers use intentional RF interference to flood the RF spectrum with enough interference to prevent a device from communicating with the AP • Spoofing - attackers craft a fictitious frame that pretends to come from a trusted client when it actually comes from the attacker • Manipulating duration field values - attackers send a frame with the duration field set to a high value, preventing other devices from transmitting for that period of time • Wireless Home Attacks - most home users fail to configure any security on their home networks • Attackers can: - Steal data - Read wireless transmissions - Inject malware - Download harmful content © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 27. 27 Vulnerabilities of IEEE Wireless Security • Original IEEE 802.11 committee recognized wireless transmissions could be vulnerable • Implemented several wireless security protections in the standard • Left others to WLAN vendor’s discretion • Protections were vulnerable and led to multiple attacks © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 28. 28 Wired Equivalent Privacy • WEP – an IEEE 802.11 security protocol designed to ensure that only authorized parties can view transmissions • Encrypts plaintext into ciphertext • Secret key is shared between wireless client device and AP • WEP vulnerabilities • WEP can only use 64-bit or 128-bit number to encrypt -Initialization vector (IV) is only 24 of those bits -Short length makes it easier to break • Violates cardinal rule of cryptography: avoid a detectable pattern -Attackers can see duplication when IVs start repeating © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 29. 29 Wi-Fi Protected Setup • WPS is an optional means of configuring security on WLANS • Two common WPS methods: • PIN method - utilizes a PIN printed on a sticker of the wireless router or displayed through a software wizard -User enters Pin and security configuration automatically occurs • Push-button method - user pushes buttons and security configuration takes place • Design and implementation flaws: • There is no lockout limit for entering PINs • The last PIN character is only a checksum • The wireless router reports the validity of the first and second halves of the PIN separately © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 30. 30 MAC Address Filtering (1 of 3) • Method of controlling WLAN access • Limit a device’s access to AP • Media Access Control (MAC) address filtering • Used by nearly all wireless AP vendors • Permits or blocks device based on MAC address • Vulnerabilities of MAC address filtering • Addresses exchanged in unencrypted format -Attacker can see address of approved device and substitute it on his own device • Managing large number of addresses is challenging © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 31. 31 MAC Address Filtering (2 of 3) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 32. 32 MAC Address Filtering (3 of 3) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 33. 33 SSID Broadcasting • Service Set Identifier (SSID) • The user-supplied network name of a wireless network; usually broadcast so that any device can see it -The broadcast can be restricted • Some wireless security sources encourage users to configure their APs to prevent the broadcast of the SSID • Not advertising the SSID only provides a weak degree of security and has limitations: • SSID can be discovered when transmitted in other frames • May prevent users from being able to freely roam from one AP coverage area to another • It’s not always possible to turn off SSID beaconing © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 34. 34 Wireless Security Solutions • A unified approach to WLAN security was needed • IEEE and Wi-Fi Alliance began developing security solutions • Resulting standards used today • IEEE 802.11i • WPA and WPA2 © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 35. 35 Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) • Introduced in 2003 by the Wi-Fi Alliance • A subset of IEEE 802.11i • Two modes of WPA: • WPA Personal • WPA Enterprise • WPA addresses both encryption and authentication © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 36. 36 Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) Encryption • Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) Encryption • Used in WPA • Uses a longer 128 bit key than WEP • Dynamically generated for each new packet • Includes a Message Integrity Check (MIC), designed to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 37. 37 Preshared Key (PSK) Authentication • Authentication for WPA Personal is accomplished by using a preshared key (PSK) • After AP configured, client device must have same key value entered • Key is shared prior to communication taking place • Uses a passphrase to generate encryption key • Must be entered on each AP and wireless device in advance • Devices that have the secret key are automatically authenticated by the AP © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 38. 38 WPA Vulnerabilities • Key management • Key sharing is done manually without security protection • Keys must be changed on a regular basis • Key must be disclosed to guest users • Passphrases • PSK passphrases of fewer than 20 characters subject to cracking © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 39. 39 Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) • Second generation of WPA is known as WPA2 • Introduced in 2004 • Based on final IEEE 802.11i standard • Two modes of WPA2: • WPA2 Personal • WPA2 Enterprise • Addresses to major security areas of WLANs: • Encryption • Authentication © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 40. 40 AES-CCMP Encryption • Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher • AES performs three steps on every block (128 bits) of plaintext • Within second step, multiple iterations are performed • Bytes are substituted and rearranged • Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) is the encryption protocol used for WPA2 • Specifies the use of CCM with AES • The Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) component of CCMP provides data integrity and authentication • Both CCMP and TKIP use a 128-bit key for encryption • Both methods use a 64-bit MIC value © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 41. 41 IEEE 802.1x Authentication (1 of 3) • Originally developed for wired networks • Provides greater degree of security by implementing port-based authentication • Blocks all traffic on a port-by-port basis until client is authenticated © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 42. 42 IEEE 802.1x Authentication (2 of 3) • Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) • A framework for transporting authentication protocols • Defines message format • Uses four types of packets -Request -Response -Success -Failure • A common EAP protocol is Protected EAP (PEAP) • Simplifies deployment of 802.1x by using Microsoft Windows logins and passwords • Creates encrypted channel between client and authentication server © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 43. 43 IEEE 802.1x Authentication (3 of 3) EAP name Description EAP-TLS This protocol uses digital certificates for authentication DAP-TTLS This protocol securely tunnels client password authentication within Transport Layer Security (TLS) records EAP-FAST This protocol securely tunnels any credential form for authentication (such as a password or a token) using TLS © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 44. 44 Additional Wireless Security Protections • Other security steps can be taken: • Rogue AP system detection • Using the correct type of AP • AP configuration settings • Wireless peripheral protection © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 45. 45 Rogue AP System Detection • Rouge AP Discovery Tools - 4 types of wireless probes can monitor airwaves for traffic: • Wireless device probe • Desktop probe • Access point probe • Dedicated probe • Once a suspicious signal is detect by a wireless probe • The information is sent to a centralized database where WLAN management system software compares it to a list of approved APs • Any device not on the list is considered a rogue AP © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 46. 46 AP Type (1 of 4) • AP types can be divided into: • Fat vs. thin • Controller vs. standalone • Captive portal APs • Fat vs. Thin APs • Autonomous APs have the intelligence required to manage wireless authentication, encryption, and other functions for the wireless devices they serve (called fat APs) • “Lightweight” APs do not contain all the management and configuration functions found in fat APs (called thin APs) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 47. 47 AP Type (2 of 4) • Standalone vs. Controller APs • Controller APs can be managed through a dedicated wireless LAN controller (WLC) • The WLC is the single device that can be configured and settings are automatically distributed to all controller APs • Other advantages of controller APs: -Handoff procedure is eliminated because all authentications are performed in the WLC -Offers tools that provide for monitoring the environment and providing information regarding the best locations for APs, wireless AP configuration settings, and power settings © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 48. 48 AP Type (3 of 4) © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 49. 49 AP Type (4 of 4) • Captive Portal APs • Uses a standard web browser to provide information • Gives the wireless user the opportunity to agree to a policy or present valid login credentials © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 50. 50 AP Configuration and Device Options (1 of 3) • Other AP configuration settings are designed to limit the spread of the wireless RF signal • So that a minimum amount of signal extends past the physical boundaries of the enterprise to be accessible to outsiders • Site Surveys • An in-depth examination and analysis of a wireless LAN site © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 51. 51 AP Configuration and Device Options (2 of 3) • Signal Strength Settings • Some APs allow adjustment of the power level at which the LAN transmits • Reducing power allows less signal to reach outsiders • Spectrum Selection • Some APs provide the ability to adjust frequency spectrum settings, including: -Frequency band -Channel selection -Channel width © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 52. 52 AP Configuration and Device Options (3 of 3) • Antennas • AP should be located near the center of coverage area • Place high on a wall to reduce signal obstructions and deter theft • If possible, the AP and antenna should be positioned so that a minimal amount of signal reaches beyond the security perimeter of the building • Wireless Peripheral Protection • Vulnerabilities in wireless mice and keyboards are common • One attack could let a threat actor inject mouse movements or keystrokes from a nearby antenna up to 100 yards away • Protections include: - Updating or replacing any vulnerable devices - Switching to more fully tested Bluetooth mice and keyboards - Substitute with a wired mouse or keyboard © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 53. 53 Chapter Summary (1 of 3) • Bluetooth is a wireless technology using short-range RF transmissions • Near field communication (NFC) is a set of standards primarily for smartphones and smartcards used to communicate with devices in close proximity • A wireless technology similar to NFC is radio frequency identification (RFID) • A wireless local area network (WLAN) is designed to replace or supplement a wired LAN • The IEEE has developed standards for WLANs • A rouge AP is an unauthorized AP that allows an attacker to bypass network security and open the network and its users to attacks © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 54. 54 Chapter Summary (2 of 3) • IEEE 802.11 committee implemented several wireless security protections in the 802.11 standard • WEP and WPS, however, have significant design and implementation flaws • Controlling access to the WLAN can be accomplished using MAC filtering on the AP • Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and WPA2 have become the foundations of wireless security today • Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a framework for transporting authentication protocols by defining the format of the messages © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.
  • 55. 55 Chapter Summary (3 of 3) • Other steps to protect a wireless network include: • Detecting rogue access points • Choose the best type of AP to match the needs of the network • Manage APs through a wireless LAN controller (WLC) • Use a captive portal AP • Access point power level adjustment • Antenna positioning © 2018 Cengage. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license distributed with a certain product or service or otherwise on a password-protected website for classroom use.