The document discusses the prevalence and impact of political dynasties in the Philippines, particularly in the 15th Congress, highlighting that 70% of lawmakers belong to dynastic families. It explores the empirical link between political dynasties and poverty, suggesting both negative and positive effects on poverty and inequality outcomes. The study concludes that while dynasties are dominant and may provide short-term benefits, their association with socio-economic stability and development remains complex and warrants further investigation.

1. Can Exclusive Politics Produce
Inclusive Development?
Ronald Umali Mendoza, PhD
AIM Policy Center

3. Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap. 2012.
“Inequality in democracy: Insights from an
empirical analysis of political dynasties in the
15th Philippine Congress”. Philippine Political
Science Journal 33(2):132-145.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1969605
70% of the 15th Philippine Congress is dynastic; and dynasties
dominate all of the major political parties.
On average, there are more dynasties in regions with higher
poverty and lower human development.
Dynasties tend to be richer (higher SALNs) when one outlier is
removed among present non-dynasties (MP).
80% of the youngest Congressmen (age 26-40) are from dynastic
clans.

4. Political Dynasties and Poverty/Inequality
Empirical link between political dynasties and poverty/inequality:
•PREDATORY VIEW: Dynasties increase P/I -- If dynasties are associated with rent-seeking
and state capture, corruption and ineffective and poorly designed policies (e.g.
Proud’homme, 1995; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003).
•STATIONARY BANDIT: Dynasties reduce P/I -- If dynasties have longer “runways” for reform
and are more firmly associated with socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Olson, 2003; Solon et
al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009).
•LONG RUNWAY FOR REFORMS: Dynasties are better able to pursue reforms with longer-
term gestation periods for results; policy stability and continuity that investors would prefer
Additional complexity:
•PATRONAGE: High P/I tends to increase dynastic prevalence: the poor vote for dynasties as
long as these are able to directly provide support during elections or in times of income shocks
(e.g. Coronel, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2005).
•SELF-PERPETUATION: Politicians are capable of developing dynasties: being in public office
affords politicians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to increase their heirs’
chances of winning (e.g. Dal Bo et al, 2009; Querrubin 2010).

5. Innovations in this Study
• THIN DYNASTY • FAT DYNASTY

6. A Snapshot of One Political Dynasty: “Fat –type”
Sibling
Spouse
Cousin
PBM (Provincial Board Member)
Note: Incumbent positions are in brackets.

7. Province
LGU
Revenue
•Taxes
•IRA
Governor
Municipal Mayor
A
Municipal Mayor
B
Municipal Mayor
C
Cong
•PDAF
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan

8. Distortions in Local Public Finance?
Ravanilla (2012): study of legislators and their use of
“pork barrel” funds from 2001-2010;
Legislators bias distribution of their constituency
development fund (CDF) in favor of local patrons and
allies ;
More political competition (tighter Congressional races)
tend to exacerbate this clientelistic distribution bias.

9. Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Elected Officials (2013):
Maguindanao
AMPATUAN
6 MAYORS
4 VICE MAYORS
13 COUNCILORS
AMPATUAN, 23
MIDTIMBANG, 12
MANGUDADATU, 11
SINSUAT, 7
LUMENDA, 5
ABDULLAH, 4
ANGAS, 4
KALI, 4
MAMALAPAT, 4PAGLAS, 4
SANGKI, 4
UTTO, 4
ALI, 3KASIM, 3
MASUKAT, 3
PENDATUN, 3
SABAL, 3
ALIM, 2
BIANG, 2
BUAT, 2
DAGALANGIT, 2
DELNA, 2
DILANGALEN, 2
DIMAUKOM, 2
DIOCOLANO, 2
DUKAY, 2
EBUS, 2
IBRAHIM, 2
IMAM, 2
KATAMBAK, 2
LANGKUNO, 2
LAUBAN, 2
MACAPEGES, 2
MALAGUIAL, 2
MAMA, 2MAMALO, 2
MAMASABULOD, 2
MATALAM, 2 MUSTAPHA, 2
SALENDAB, 2
SANDIGAN, 2
SEMA, 2
TALUSAN, 2 MUSA, 1
PIANG, 1
155
115
58
0 50 100 150 200 250
DYNASTIC
NONDYNASTIC
FAT THIN
Distribution of “Fat” Dynasties

10. Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Elected Officials (2013):
Dinagat Islands
ECLEO
1 GOVERNOR
1 VICE GOVERNOR
3 MAYORS
2 COUNCILORS
2 PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS
Distribution of “Fat” Dynasties
ECLEO, 10
LONGOS, 3
BORJA, 2CREENCIA, 2
LADAGA, 2
LISONDRA, 2
LLAMERA, 2
LUIB, 2
PELISMINO, 2
TAN, 2
VARGAS, 2
31
49
3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
DYNASTIC
NONDYNASTIC
FAT THIN

11. Top 10 Provinces in terms of the following dynastic indicators:
DYNASTIC SHARE
LARGEST DYNASTIC CLAN
(SHARE OF TOTAL POSITIONS)
DYNASTIC COMPETITION-
HERFINDAHL
TOP 1 MAGUINDANAO DINAGAT ISLANDS DINAGAT ISLANDS
TOP 2 APAYAO SIQUIJOR MAGUINDANAO
TOP 3 SULU MAGUINDANAO SIQUIJOR
TOP 4 TAWI-TAWI CAMIGUIN APAYAO
TOP 5 ILOCOS NORTE BILIRAN QUIRINO
TOP 6 ABRA LANAO DEL SUR TAWI-TAWI
TOP 7 NEGROS OCCIDENTAL BATANES BILIRAN
TOP 8 ILOCOS SUR GUIMARAS SULU
TOP 9 QUIRINO AGUSAN DEL SUR CAMIGUIN
TOP 10 CEBU SAMAR (WESTERN SAMAR) DAVAO ORIENTAL

12. Snapshot of Inequality – Ecleo Castle and
fishing villiage in Dinagat Islands

13. Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap. 2013.
“Political dynasties and poverty:
Resolving the ‘chicken or the egg’ question.”
AIM Working Paper. Makati City.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292277
•Media (proxied by more AM radio stations) increases the share of dynasties in
total positions, but it reduces “fat” dynasties. (Interpretation: Media levels the
playing field, but it is still dominated by dynasties or would-be dynasties)
•Higher poverty incidence increases the chance for dynasties to grow (become
“fat”) and dominate the political positions under analysis.
•There is weak evidence that suggests that the level of education is negatively
associated with the share of political dynasties in the total positions under
analysis.
•Dynasties (using our proxy indicators) are not associated with increasing (or
decreasing) poverty, on average.

14. How do Non-Dynasties Stack Against Dynasties?
Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey.
9 40 19 4 3 5
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
GOVERNOR
DYN UNCON
DYN BEAT DYN
DYN BEAT NONDYN
NONDYN BEAT DYN
NONDYN UNCON
NONDYN BEAT NONDYN

15. Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey.
How do Non-Dynasties Stack Against Dynasties?
172 425 445 215 67 215
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
MAYOR
DYN UNCON
DYN BEAT DYN
DYN BEAT NONDYN
NONDYN BEAT NONDYN
NONDYN UNCON
NONDYN BEAT NONDYN

16. Balimbing Nation
Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elections Survey.
2013 MAYORS CAREER SWITCHINGS DISTRIBUTION
214
32
32
40
240
125
153
78
287 130
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
SWITCH OP 1
SWITCH OP 2
SWITCH OP 3
SWITCH OP 4
WINSWI 0 WINSWI 1 WINSWI 2 WINSWI 3 WINSWI 4

17. This presentation builds on: Mendoza, R.U., E.Beja, V.Venida and D.Yap. 2012. “An Empirical Analysis of
Political Dynasties in the 15th Congress.” Philippine Political Science Journal 33(2):132-145. This study is
conducted with the support of the Asian Institute of Management Scientific Research Foundation and
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The views expressed herein are the authors’ and these do not
necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Institute of Management, and the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation.
DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH
AIM Policy Center / http://Policy.aim.edu

18. Presented during the Foundation for Economic Freedom’s Fellows Monthly Meeting
April 30, 2014, 7:00PM
Manila Golf and Country Club
Contact Details:
Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc.
105 Philippine Social Science Center (PSSC)
Commonwealth Ave., Diliman, Quezon City
Telefax: (632) 4532375 (Main Office)
Tel No.: (632) 8939602 (Accounting)
Website: www.fef.org.ph
Email: fefphilippines@gmail.com / fef@fef.org.ph