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Hurricane Electric is expanding in 2017 into some of the following locations:
Nairobi, Kenya
Djibouti
Dubai, UAE
Also the following:
Oslo, Norway
Montgomery, Alabama, USA
It is important to remember that bgp.he.net uses data from public sources and other
places to gather the data presented on the website.
BGP best path selection is used for the one direction. If you want to understand it
more please look at the following link
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271
Also remember this is just one direction you would need to do traceroute or MRT to
understand the return paths.
Visiting from: this is your devices ip address
Announced: subnet that your device is on
Your ISP AS4766
In the search bar we typed in AS12779
This was used as it is an interesting example and as you can see it shows a
summary of the IPS including all the internet exchanges and prefixes
You can see from this slide that there is a probable transit relationship with Cogent.
More details will be examined on slide 12 showing the ipv4 graph.
It is key to note that there is no way to tell if there is any commercial relationship
between AS12779 and any of the connected ASNs. We can only infer.
This is an interesting page and should be looked at closely.
As we can see there is some growth in both IPv4/v6 peers as we can see the two
graphs growing up and to the left.
If we take a look into in both IPv4/v6 graphs we can see a sharp downward spike
right around Feb
This view shows that there is a ipv4 transit relationship between AS12799 and
AS174 as well as AS3257 as they both are propagating routes to the rest of the
world.
This view shows that there is a ipv6 transit relationship between AS12799 and
AS174, AS3257 as well as AS6939 as they both are propagating routes to the rest
of the world.
What is also shown on this page is that AS6939 looks to be preferred for IPv6
transit.
ROA - Route Origin Authorization is a technique which helps in validating a given
route against its origin AS. ROA helps to verify whether a given ASN is authorized to
announce a prefix or not. It helps in dealing with accidental or intentional route
hijacks. Routers can be configured to give priority to routes where ROA check has
been successful. HE’s BGP tool shows a “green key” next to prefixes where ROA is
present and is being validated against the announcement. Incase if a origin AS is
not matching origin AS in ROA, tool shows a red key. No key appears incase ROA
is not present.
This is the same details for the next slide
This shows the ASNs that have a direct connection to AS12779. It does not show if
there is any paid peering arrangements.
Whois shows the “who is” data for the given ASN or prefix and it is taken from
appropriate RIR which has allocated the ASN. It helps in identifying contact details
for the given resource.
IRR or Internet Routing Registry tab shows the data for a given ASN from IRR
records. By default HE’s BGP tool pulls data for a given ASN from all popular IRRs
(RADB, RIPE, and other private registries). It also has direct links to AS sets
appearing in the ASN.
This show all the IXs that AS12779 is connected.
However if AS12779 is connected to an IX that is not in the peeringdb.com it will not
show up.
This simply shows the growth of the subnets being advertised over time.
It does not show disaggregation of subnets. there is now an active feature request
but no release date has been provided.
The areas of unallocated address space are called the bogon space. A network
should never advertise bogon space.
This simply shows the growth of ASNs over time.
A unique ASN is allocated to each AS for use in BGP routing. AS numbers are
important because the ASN uniquely identifies each network on the Internet.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_system_(Internet)#Types
If you want to learn more about each country and what provider and subnets are
visible this is a great starting place! Selecting the report will launch more details on
the country
Prefix distribution shows distribution of /8s to /24s visible in the routing table (IPv4)
and /16 to /32 (IPv6). It shows count of announcement with each of those masks
and changes in last 1000 days.
This shows you the top 10 most connected networks.
Internet peering is the relationship whereby two networks reciprocally provide
access to each other’s customers.
This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 connectivity over time.
It is important to note that this is for unique networks not all peering sessions.
So for example if you had 6 sessions with AS6939 it would count as one.
This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 prefixes over time.
This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 addresses.
This this of exchanges is generated from peeringdb.com and several other sources.
The exchange most connected networks
This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 bogons over time.
You do not want to be announcing bogons
When AS81 removes the bogon announces red bar will no longer be there.
What you can see here is the report of the Philippines
Take the time to click on AS132199 and you can see that that ASN is connected to
AS4775.
Question. What ASN on this page is single attached to AS9299?
Multi-origin routes are the cases where a given prefix is being announced by
different ASNs. This can be done for various administrative reasons. First column
shows prefix and third column shows the ASNs which are originating that prefix.
Table is a formed by aggregated data and it may be reflecting case where an AS is
announcing pool in one region & other ASN is announcing it in other region.
bgp.he.net
bgp.he.net

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bgp.he.net

  • 1.
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4. Hurricane Electric is expanding in 2017 into some of the following locations: Nairobi, Kenya Djibouti Dubai, UAE Also the following: Oslo, Norway Montgomery, Alabama, USA
  • 5.
  • 6. It is important to remember that bgp.he.net uses data from public sources and other places to gather the data presented on the website. BGP best path selection is used for the one direction. If you want to understand it more please look at the following link https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271 Also remember this is just one direction you would need to do traceroute or MRT to understand the return paths.
  • 7. Visiting from: this is your devices ip address Announced: subnet that your device is on Your ISP AS4766
  • 8. In the search bar we typed in AS12779 This was used as it is an interesting example and as you can see it shows a summary of the IPS including all the internet exchanges and prefixes
  • 9. You can see from this slide that there is a probable transit relationship with Cogent. More details will be examined on slide 12 showing the ipv4 graph. It is key to note that there is no way to tell if there is any commercial relationship between AS12779 and any of the connected ASNs. We can only infer.
  • 10. This is an interesting page and should be looked at closely. As we can see there is some growth in both IPv4/v6 peers as we can see the two graphs growing up and to the left. If we take a look into in both IPv4/v6 graphs we can see a sharp downward spike right around Feb
  • 11.
  • 12. This view shows that there is a ipv4 transit relationship between AS12799 and AS174 as well as AS3257 as they both are propagating routes to the rest of the world.
  • 13. This view shows that there is a ipv6 transit relationship between AS12799 and AS174, AS3257 as well as AS6939 as they both are propagating routes to the rest of the world. What is also shown on this page is that AS6939 looks to be preferred for IPv6 transit.
  • 14. ROA - Route Origin Authorization is a technique which helps in validating a given route against its origin AS. ROA helps to verify whether a given ASN is authorized to announce a prefix or not. It helps in dealing with accidental or intentional route hijacks. Routers can be configured to give priority to routes where ROA check has been successful. HE’s BGP tool shows a “green key” next to prefixes where ROA is present and is being validated against the announcement. Incase if a origin AS is not matching origin AS in ROA, tool shows a red key. No key appears incase ROA is not present. This is the same details for the next slide
  • 15.
  • 16. This shows the ASNs that have a direct connection to AS12779. It does not show if there is any paid peering arrangements.
  • 17.
  • 18. Whois shows the “who is” data for the given ASN or prefix and it is taken from appropriate RIR which has allocated the ASN. It helps in identifying contact details for the given resource.
  • 19. IRR or Internet Routing Registry tab shows the data for a given ASN from IRR records. By default HE’s BGP tool pulls data for a given ASN from all popular IRRs (RADB, RIPE, and other private registries). It also has direct links to AS sets appearing in the ASN.
  • 20. This show all the IXs that AS12779 is connected. However if AS12779 is connected to an IX that is not in the peeringdb.com it will not show up.
  • 21. This simply shows the growth of the subnets being advertised over time. It does not show disaggregation of subnets. there is now an active feature request but no release date has been provided.
  • 22. The areas of unallocated address space are called the bogon space. A network should never advertise bogon space.
  • 23. This simply shows the growth of ASNs over time. A unique ASN is allocated to each AS for use in BGP routing. AS numbers are important because the ASN uniquely identifies each network on the Internet. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_system_(Internet)#Types
  • 24. If you want to learn more about each country and what provider and subnets are visible this is a great starting place! Selecting the report will launch more details on the country
  • 25.
  • 26. Prefix distribution shows distribution of /8s to /24s visible in the routing table (IPv4) and /16 to /32 (IPv6). It shows count of announcement with each of those masks and changes in last 1000 days.
  • 27. This shows you the top 10 most connected networks. Internet peering is the relationship whereby two networks reciprocally provide access to each other’s customers.
  • 28. This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 connectivity over time. It is important to note that this is for unique networks not all peering sessions. So for example if you had 6 sessions with AS6939 it would count as one.
  • 29.
  • 30. This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 prefixes over time.
  • 31. This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 addresses.
  • 32. This this of exchanges is generated from peeringdb.com and several other sources.
  • 33. The exchange most connected networks
  • 34. This is a graphical representation of ipv4/6 bogons over time.
  • 35. You do not want to be announcing bogons
  • 36. When AS81 removes the bogon announces red bar will no longer be there.
  • 37.
  • 38. What you can see here is the report of the Philippines Take the time to click on AS132199 and you can see that that ASN is connected to AS4775. Question. What ASN on this page is single attached to AS9299?
  • 39. Multi-origin routes are the cases where a given prefix is being announced by different ASNs. This can be done for various administrative reasons. First column shows prefix and third column shows the ASNs which are originating that prefix. Table is a formed by aggregated data and it may be reflecting case where an AS is announcing pool in one region & other ASN is announcing it in other region.