Because We Are Just
Humans
EHB Keynote - April 2014 - Xavier Mertens
TrueSec
$ whoami
• Xavier Mertens (@xme)	

!
• Consultant @ day	

!
• Blogger, Hacker @ night	

!
• BruCON co-organizer
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The InfoSec World…
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$ cat disclaimer.txt
“The opinions expressed in this presentation
are those of the speaker and do not necessarily
reflect those of past, present employers,
partners or customers.”
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Agenda
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• Introduction	

• Historical examples	

• Why and how?	

• In our digital world	

• Conclusion
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“Social What?”
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“Social engineering (SE) is the use of techniques
to manipulate people into performing actions or
divulging confidential information, rather than by
breaking in or using technical hacking
techniques”	

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OR	

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“A fancier way of lying”
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Attackers Are Lazy!
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Why make it complicated?
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First in the analog life
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Vendors: “It’s the last one, hurry up!”	

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Headhunters: “I’m Alice from Marketing, May I
speak to Bob, please?”	

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Kids: “May I go to this party?”	

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… Women of course! (Maybe the wickests! ;-)
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Sand in the gears
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Really?
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$ man 3 human
• People aren’t stupid (…well, only some :-])	

• But they are…	

• Kind	

• Naive	

• Trustful	

• Voluntary	

• Scared
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PeopleVS. Computers
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Agenda
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• Introduction	

• Historical examples	

• Why and how?	

• In our digital world	

• Conclusion
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The Trojan Horse
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Victor Lustig
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Bernie Madoff
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Christophe Rocancourt
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Agenda
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• Introduction	

• Historical examples	

• Why and how?	

• In our digital world	

• Conclusion
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Why?
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… Because it works!
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How?
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… Sometimes being a good guy, sometimes being evil!
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It’s Cheap!
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A nice target
• People know useful information
(passwords, procedures, paths, phone
numbers)	

• People have access to 	

• Files	

• Papers	

• Badges
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A “Swiss Army Knife”
• People can interact with systems or people	

• Download a file	

• Disconnect a system	

• Introduce to someone else	

• Send a mail or fax	

• Get personal info
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Attacks
• Physical	

• Tailgating	

• Shoulder surfing	

• Trashing
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• Technical	

• Phishing	

• XSS	

• Human DoS
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Our toolbox
• Mail → Easy, anonymous and free	

• Phone → Quick and direct access to the
target	

• Fax → Don’t under estimate the power of
a fax in 2014!	

• Snail mail → A stamp or nothing…
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Psychology
• Fear	

• Credulity	

• Desire	

• Solidarity
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The Process
• The target	

• The objective	

• The plan
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The Target
• People	

• Age, sex, social status, studies, …	

• Company	

• Open hours	

• Jargon	

• Procedures	

• “Names”
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The Objective
• Which info are we looking for?	

• Which questions to ask?	

• Cross-check
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The Plan
• Write down a scenario	

• Work below the radar	

• Reminders, lexique, …	

• Path	

• “B” Plan!
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TrainYourself
• Challenge your friends!	

• It’s a game!
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Agenda
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• Introduction	

• Historical examples	

• Why and how?	

• In our digital world	

• Conclusion
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A fact…
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“We located the problem: It is 	

located between the keyboard	

and the chair”
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Pwn3d!
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This is a mass-pwnage device!
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The new OSI-model
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Layer 1 - 6
Layer 7
Layer 8	

(“user” or “political”)
Over used
Getting better defended
Can’t be patched! ;-)
(Source: @jaysonstreet)
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You’ve been “Doxed”
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Your Footprint
• In our modern life, we are 24x7 online	

• We like to share	

• We like to contribute	

• Want an example?
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At Home?
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Maltego
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B.Van Rillaer
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B.Van Rillaer
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• bert.van.rillaer(at)ehb(dot)be	

• vanrillaer(at)gmail(dot)com	

• +32 2 559 15 xx	

• +32 486 33 xx xx	

• Study @ KUL 1999-2003 (License in
Computer Science)	

• Clarinet player?
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B.Van Rillaer
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• Twitter: @bvanrillaer	

• 72 followers, last tweet 22/03	

• Tweet most between 11:00 - 17:00	

• Tablet Acer A200	

• Mobile Samsung Galaxy S3 (GT-I9300)	

• Active on G+, sell/buy on Kapaza
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B.Van Rillaer
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Classic IT requests
• Could you give me the password?	

• Could you power on/off this device	

• Could you “put your idea here”
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Interested?
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Interested?
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• SET (https://www.trustedsec.com/
downloads/social-engineer-toolkit/)	

• Maltego (https://www.paterva.com/)	

• Your own toolbox!
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Conclusions
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Conclusions
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Conclusions
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“You don’t know what you can get away with	

until you try.”	

!
- Colin Powell
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Thank you! More info?	

@xme	

xavier@truesec.be	

http://blog.rootshell.be	

https://www.truesec.be
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Because we are just humans