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@NTXISSA
Software Security – My Other
Marathon
Harold Toomey
Past President, ISSA North Texas, 2013
Principal Product Security Architect & PSIRT Manager
Intel Security
April 24, 2015
@NTXISSA
Introduction
• Responsibilities
• PSIRT Manager
• Manage a team of 50+ Sr. Security Architects (PSCs)
• Manage the SDL, policies and PSG program
• Training program
• Metrics
• Experience
• 4 Years: Eng. Software Security
• 2 Years: IT Operational Security
• 11 Years: Product Management
• 10 Years: Software Development (C++)
• ISSA North Texas Chapter, Past President
• CISSP, CISA, CISM, CRISC, CGEIT, ITIL, …
• CVSS Special Interest Group (SIG)
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 2
Harold Toomey
Principal Product
Security Architect
@NTXISSA
Agenda
• Plot #1: Developing Secure Software
• Plot #2: Running a 100 Mile Ultra Marathon
Which is easier?
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 3
vs.
@NTXISSA
Scenario #1 – Secure Software
• 110+ Enterprise and consumer security
products
• 4,000+ software engineers
• 200M+ customers
• Someone reports a vulnerability
• Now what?
• How did this happen?
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 4
@NTXISSA
Scenario #2 – 100M Ultra Run
• You gained 50 pounds over the past 10 years
• You hear running gets you healthy again
• You sign up for a 100 mile ultra marathon
• Are you crazy? (yes, of course)
• How long will it take for you
to pull this off?
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 5
@NTXISSA
#1 The Development Team
• Executive Support
• Software Engineering Teams
• Product Security Group / PSIRT
• Product Security Champions (PSCs)
• Tier III Technical Support
• Knowledgebase Team
• Extended Team
• IT, PR, Legal, Training
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 6
@NTXISSA
#2 Your Running Crew
• Supportive spouse
• Trainer
• Running buddies
• Your dog (Roxy)
• Facebook running friends
• Marathon Maniacs
• Race volunteers
• Pacers
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 7
@NTXISSA
#1 PSIRT Process
• Contact engineering network (PSCs)
• Verify the vulnerability
• Score the vulnerability’s severity (CVSS)
• Communicate fix schedule to the discoverer
• Develop and publish the patch
• Publish Security Bulletin
• Next week: “lather, rinse, repeat”
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 8
@NTXISSA
#2 Ultra Training
• Start running
• Sign up for weekend races (milestones)
• Set goals
• Read about it
• Friend like minded runners
• Learn by experience (pain)
• Build up to it
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 9
@NTXISSA
#2 Possible Training Goals
• Year 1
• Run a 5K to see how out of shape you are
• Run a half marathon after 6 months
• Run a full marathon after 1 year
• Year 2
• Run a half marathon or farther every weekend
• Year 3
• Run an ultra every month, with 2x 100M by end of year
• Try Sprint and Olympic Ironman Triathlons
• Year 4
• Run a 100 miler every month (Jun – Feb)
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 10
@NTXISSA
#1 Named Vulnerabilities
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 11
Date Description
# Vuln.
Products
SB
8 Apr 2014 Heartbleed 19 SB10071
2 Jun 2014 Heartbleed II 22 SB10075
24 Sep 2014 Shellshock/BASH 23 SB10085
14 Oct 2014 POODLE 28 SB10090
14 Oct 2014 3 SSLv3 CVEs 15 SB10091
27 Jan 2015 GHOST 28 SB10100
4 Mar 2015 FREAK 3 SB10108
19 Mar 2015 14 OpenSSL CVEs 22 SB10110
Summer
2015
OpenSSL Security
Audit
TBD TBD
“OpenSSL: The gift that keeps on giving.”
@NTXISSA
#2 Popular/Local Races
• Boston Marathon (20 Apr 2015)
• Badwater 135 (28-30 July 2015)
• Big Cedar 100M (30-31 Oct 2015)
• Brazos Bend 100M (11-12 Dec 2015)
• Rocky Raccoon 100M (1-2 Feb 2016)
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 12
@NTXISSA
#1 Doing the Basics
1. Minimum SDL activities
2. Compile with security flags set
3. Remove banned C/C++ functions
4. Fix high severity vulnerabilities
5. Complete Static/Dynamic Analysis/Fuzzing
6. Manual code reviews
7. Validate inputs
8. Build in privacy/protect PII
9. Remove debugging code
10. Scan for viruses/malware
11. Don’t implement backdoors
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 13
@NTXISSA
#2 Doing the Basics
• You can’t outrun a bad diet
• 15% Exercise
• 85% Diet
• Sleep
• Regular run schedule
• Buy good equipment
• Positive attitude (“Never give up”), but
• Never run on an injury
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 14
@NTXISSA
#1 Proactive Measures – Waterfall
• SDL
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 15
Security
Assessment
Architecture Design & Development Ship Post-Release,
Legacy, & M&A
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
• Product security team is
looped in early
(Product Security Group
& Product Security
Champions)
• Product security team
hosts a discovery
meeting
• Product security team
creates an SDL project
plan
(states what further
work will be done)
• Product team initiates a
Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA)
• S1 Security Plan
• SDL policy
assessment &
scoping
• Threat modeling /
architecture
security analysis
• Privacy information
gathering and
analysis
• S2 Security Plan
• Security test plan
composition
• Static analysis
• Threat model
updating
• Design security
analysis & review
• Secure coding
• Privacy
implementation
assessment
• S3 Security Plan
• Security test case
execution
• Static analysis
• Dynamic analysis
• Fuzz testing
• Manual code
review
• Privacy validation
and remediation
• S4 Security Plan
• Final security
review
• Vulnerability scan
• Penetration test
• Open source
licensing review
• Final privacy
review
• External vulnerability
disclosure response
(PSIRT)
• Reviews by 3rd party
service contractors
• Post-release
certifications
• Internal review for
new product
combinations or cloud
deployment
• Security architectural
reviews & tool-based
assessments of legacy
and M&A products
0 1 2 3 4 5
Concept Planning Design &
Development
Readiness Release &
Launch
Support & Sustain
@NTXISSA
#1 Proactive Measures – Agile
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 16
Sprint
User/abuser
stories
(chewable
design bites)
Potentially
Shippable
Increments
(PSI)
@NTXISSA
#2 Proactive Measures
• Heart Rate
• Muscle Fatigue
• Pain Killers
• Breathing
• Timing
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 17
@NTXISSA
#1 Learn from Pain
• Lessons Learned from Heartbleed
• New “Crisis Scenario” policy
• Updated security bulletin template
• Product buckets
• Customer communication policy
• Shared technology inventory
• Early notification expectations
• PSIRT process training
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 18
@NTXISSA
#2 Learn from Pain
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 19
• Countermeasures
• Advil
• Bandages
• Body Glide
• Mustard
• Weather
• Sun screen
• Mosquito
repellant
• Course Review
@NTXISSA
#1 Do it Better
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 20
None Initial Basic Acceptable Mature
• Preventive measures
modeling
• Defect rates near 0
• Best-in-class tools
• All products pen
tested
• Open source SLAs
• Standards adapted to
environment
• Metrics integrated
into risk mgt. tools
• Frequent
attacks
• No reviews
• No
constraints
• Email
tracking
• Major releases
threat modeled
• All primary tools
used
• BlackDuck
• Standards
adopted
• PSIRT XLS
• All releases
threat modeled
• Defect rates
decreasing
• Fuzzing scripts
written
• Accept risks of
open source
• Tracking DB
w/dashboard
• Major attack
vectors
addressed
• Freeware tools
used
• Standard
awareness
Level of
Maturity
PSMM
Phase
@NTXISSA
#1 PS Maturity Model Parameters
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 21
Operational Technical
1. Program
2. Process
3. Resources
4. Training
5. Security Reviews
6. Tools
7. PSIRT
8. SDL
9. Policy
10. Privacy
11. Certification
12. M&A
13. Extended Team
14. Threat Modeling / Architecture
Reviews
15. Static Analysis
16. Dynamic Analysis (Web Apps)
17. Fuzz Testing
18. Vulnerability Scans /
Penetration Testing
19. Manual Code Reviews
20. Secure Coding Standards
21. Open Source / 3rd Party Libraries
22. Tracking Tools
@NTXISSA
#2 Push Farther / Faster
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 22
• Distance
1. 5K (3.1)
2. 10K (6.2)
3. ½ Marathon (13.1)
4. Marathon (26.2)
5. 50K (31.1)
6. 50M
7. 100K (62.2)
8. 100M
9. 72 Hour Endurance
• Speed
• 6:00 Marathon Limit (US)
• 5:00 Marathon Limit (EU)
• 4:00 Marathon (25%)
• 3:30 Boston Qualifier
• 2:00 Marathon Glass
Ceiling (2:03:23)
• 12:00 100M USA Record
(11:59:28)
@NTXISSA
#1 Metrics
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 23
@NTXISSA
#2 Measuring Progress
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 24
@NTXISSA
Continual Evolution
• There is always a better way – find it
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 25
@NTXISSA
#1 The Reward
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 26
• Secure code = Less fire stomping (PSIRT)
• Customer satisfaction = Increased business
• Protects the brand
• Meets compliance requirements
@NTXISSA
#2 The Reward
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 27
@NTXISSA
Finishing the Hawk Hundred
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 28
13 Sep 2014
Finish Time:
31:38
@NTXISSA
Finishing the Brazos Bend 100
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 29
13 Dec 2014
Finish Time:
28:22
@NTXISSA
Conclusion
• Plot #1: Developing Secure Software
• Plot #2: Running a 100 Mile Ultra Marathon
Which is easier?
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 30
vs.
@NTXISSA
Q&A
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 31
Harold Toomey
Principle Product Security Architect
Product Security Group
Intel Security
Harold_Toomey@IntelSecurity.com
(801) 830-9987
@NTXISSA@NTXISSA
The Collin College Engineering Department
Collin College Student Chapter of the North Texas ISSA
North Texas ISSA (Information Systems Security Association)
NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 32
Thank you

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  • 1. @NTXISSA Software Security – My Other Marathon Harold Toomey Past President, ISSA North Texas, 2013 Principal Product Security Architect & PSIRT Manager Intel Security April 24, 2015
  • 2. @NTXISSA Introduction • Responsibilities • PSIRT Manager • Manage a team of 50+ Sr. Security Architects (PSCs) • Manage the SDL, policies and PSG program • Training program • Metrics • Experience • 4 Years: Eng. Software Security • 2 Years: IT Operational Security • 11 Years: Product Management • 10 Years: Software Development (C++) • ISSA North Texas Chapter, Past President • CISSP, CISA, CISM, CRISC, CGEIT, ITIL, … • CVSS Special Interest Group (SIG) NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 2 Harold Toomey Principal Product Security Architect
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  • 9. @NTXISSA #2 Ultra Training • Start running • Sign up for weekend races (milestones) • Set goals • Read about it • Friend like minded runners • Learn by experience (pain) • Build up to it NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 9
  • 10. @NTXISSA #2 Possible Training Goals • Year 1 • Run a 5K to see how out of shape you are • Run a half marathon after 6 months • Run a full marathon after 1 year • Year 2 • Run a half marathon or farther every weekend • Year 3 • Run an ultra every month, with 2x 100M by end of year • Try Sprint and Olympic Ironman Triathlons • Year 4 • Run a 100 miler every month (Jun – Feb) NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 10
  • 11. @NTXISSA #1 Named Vulnerabilities NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 11 Date Description # Vuln. Products SB 8 Apr 2014 Heartbleed 19 SB10071 2 Jun 2014 Heartbleed II 22 SB10075 24 Sep 2014 Shellshock/BASH 23 SB10085 14 Oct 2014 POODLE 28 SB10090 14 Oct 2014 3 SSLv3 CVEs 15 SB10091 27 Jan 2015 GHOST 28 SB10100 4 Mar 2015 FREAK 3 SB10108 19 Mar 2015 14 OpenSSL CVEs 22 SB10110 Summer 2015 OpenSSL Security Audit TBD TBD “OpenSSL: The gift that keeps on giving.”
  • 12. @NTXISSA #2 Popular/Local Races • Boston Marathon (20 Apr 2015) • Badwater 135 (28-30 July 2015) • Big Cedar 100M (30-31 Oct 2015) • Brazos Bend 100M (11-12 Dec 2015) • Rocky Raccoon 100M (1-2 Feb 2016) NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 12
  • 13. @NTXISSA #1 Doing the Basics 1. Minimum SDL activities 2. Compile with security flags set 3. Remove banned C/C++ functions 4. Fix high severity vulnerabilities 5. Complete Static/Dynamic Analysis/Fuzzing 6. Manual code reviews 7. Validate inputs 8. Build in privacy/protect PII 9. Remove debugging code 10. Scan for viruses/malware 11. Don’t implement backdoors NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 13
  • 14. @NTXISSA #2 Doing the Basics • You can’t outrun a bad diet • 15% Exercise • 85% Diet • Sleep • Regular run schedule • Buy good equipment • Positive attitude (“Never give up”), but • Never run on an injury NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 14
  • 15. @NTXISSA #1 Proactive Measures – Waterfall • SDL NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 15 Security Assessment Architecture Design & Development Ship Post-Release, Legacy, & M&A S0 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 • Product security team is looped in early (Product Security Group & Product Security Champions) • Product security team hosts a discovery meeting • Product security team creates an SDL project plan (states what further work will be done) • Product team initiates a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) • S1 Security Plan • SDL policy assessment & scoping • Threat modeling / architecture security analysis • Privacy information gathering and analysis • S2 Security Plan • Security test plan composition • Static analysis • Threat model updating • Design security analysis & review • Secure coding • Privacy implementation assessment • S3 Security Plan • Security test case execution • Static analysis • Dynamic analysis • Fuzz testing • Manual code review • Privacy validation and remediation • S4 Security Plan • Final security review • Vulnerability scan • Penetration test • Open source licensing review • Final privacy review • External vulnerability disclosure response (PSIRT) • Reviews by 3rd party service contractors • Post-release certifications • Internal review for new product combinations or cloud deployment • Security architectural reviews & tool-based assessments of legacy and M&A products 0 1 2 3 4 5 Concept Planning Design & Development Readiness Release & Launch Support & Sustain
  • 16. @NTXISSA #1 Proactive Measures – Agile NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 16 Sprint User/abuser stories (chewable design bites) Potentially Shippable Increments (PSI)
  • 17. @NTXISSA #2 Proactive Measures • Heart Rate • Muscle Fatigue • Pain Killers • Breathing • Timing NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 17
  • 18. @NTXISSA #1 Learn from Pain • Lessons Learned from Heartbleed • New “Crisis Scenario” policy • Updated security bulletin template • Product buckets • Customer communication policy • Shared technology inventory • Early notification expectations • PSIRT process training NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 18
  • 19. @NTXISSA #2 Learn from Pain NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 19 • Countermeasures • Advil • Bandages • Body Glide • Mustard • Weather • Sun screen • Mosquito repellant • Course Review
  • 20. @NTXISSA #1 Do it Better NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 20 None Initial Basic Acceptable Mature • Preventive measures modeling • Defect rates near 0 • Best-in-class tools • All products pen tested • Open source SLAs • Standards adapted to environment • Metrics integrated into risk mgt. tools • Frequent attacks • No reviews • No constraints • Email tracking • Major releases threat modeled • All primary tools used • BlackDuck • Standards adopted • PSIRT XLS • All releases threat modeled • Defect rates decreasing • Fuzzing scripts written • Accept risks of open source • Tracking DB w/dashboard • Major attack vectors addressed • Freeware tools used • Standard awareness Level of Maturity PSMM Phase
  • 21. @NTXISSA #1 PS Maturity Model Parameters NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 21 Operational Technical 1. Program 2. Process 3. Resources 4. Training 5. Security Reviews 6. Tools 7. PSIRT 8. SDL 9. Policy 10. Privacy 11. Certification 12. M&A 13. Extended Team 14. Threat Modeling / Architecture Reviews 15. Static Analysis 16. Dynamic Analysis (Web Apps) 17. Fuzz Testing 18. Vulnerability Scans / Penetration Testing 19. Manual Code Reviews 20. Secure Coding Standards 21. Open Source / 3rd Party Libraries 22. Tracking Tools
  • 22. @NTXISSA #2 Push Farther / Faster NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 22 • Distance 1. 5K (3.1) 2. 10K (6.2) 3. ½ Marathon (13.1) 4. Marathon (26.2) 5. 50K (31.1) 6. 50M 7. 100K (62.2) 8. 100M 9. 72 Hour Endurance • Speed • 6:00 Marathon Limit (US) • 5:00 Marathon Limit (EU) • 4:00 Marathon (25%) • 3:30 Boston Qualifier • 2:00 Marathon Glass Ceiling (2:03:23) • 12:00 100M USA Record (11:59:28)
  • 23. @NTXISSA #1 Metrics NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 23
  • 24. @NTXISSA #2 Measuring Progress NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 24
  • 25. @NTXISSA Continual Evolution • There is always a better way – find it NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 25
  • 26. @NTXISSA #1 The Reward NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 26 • Secure code = Less fire stomping (PSIRT) • Customer satisfaction = Increased business • Protects the brand • Meets compliance requirements
  • 27. @NTXISSA #2 The Reward NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 27
  • 28. @NTXISSA Finishing the Hawk Hundred NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 28 13 Sep 2014 Finish Time: 31:38
  • 29. @NTXISSA Finishing the Brazos Bend 100 NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 29 13 Dec 2014 Finish Time: 28:22
  • 30. @NTXISSA Conclusion • Plot #1: Developing Secure Software • Plot #2: Running a 100 Mile Ultra Marathon Which is easier? NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 30 vs.
  • 31. @NTXISSA Q&A NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 31 Harold Toomey Principle Product Security Architect Product Security Group Intel Security Harold_Toomey@IntelSecurity.com (801) 830-9987
  • 32. @NTXISSA@NTXISSA The Collin College Engineering Department Collin College Student Chapter of the North Texas ISSA North Texas ISSA (Information Systems Security Association) NTX ISSA Cyber Security Conference – April 24-25, 2015 32 Thank you

Editor's Notes

  1. Good morning. My name is Harold Toomey. I work for Intel Security. I attended the first Cyber Security Conference last year and wanted to contribute more this year, so here I am. I have worked for McAfee/Intel Security for the past 9 years. Before that I worked for Symantec for 8 years. For the past 4 years I have worked in software security. I manage our PSIRT team as well as other SDL programs.
  2. “Product Security is like running a marathon. It’s not a sprint. Prepare for the long haul.”
  3. Redshirts “Well gentlemen, you’re all going to die.” Product Security Champions (PSCs) Qualification: A minimum of 3-5 years software development experience (architects preferred) A passion for or background in software security Approved by the BU General Manager & BU PSC Lead Dedicate 10% - 20% of their time doing product security tasks Time to be trained in software security, tools, plans, and processes Must not only know how to develop (build) software, but also know how to deconstruct it (take it apart) while “thinking like a hacker” Responsibilities: Enforce the SDL: Assist the PSG in assuring the security tenants of confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy are adhered to Reviews: Assist the PSG’s software security architects in conducting architecture security analysis, reviews, and threat modeling Escalations: Assist with Security Bulletins and patches for externally disclosed vulnerabilities (PSIRT) Tools Expert: e.g. static, dynamic – which includes fuzzing, within each product development team, and/or business unit (BU) Collocated: Be the eyes, ears, and advocate of the PSG within each product development team / BU Attend Meetings: Participate in weekly Admin / Technical meetings as a team
  4. OpenSSL Facts April 8, 2014 – The Heartbleed OpenSSL vulnerability was announced. This vulnerability went undetected for several years. OpenSSL is widely used in the public. We have seen it used in ¼ of our products. In 2012 & 2013, we only saw one (1) OpenSSL vulnerability per year. Then, in April 2014 we saw our first cutely named vulnerability - “Heartbleed”. Every quarter since then we have seen a new named OpenSSL vulnerabilities. We call OpenSSL “The gift that keeps on giving.” We expect to see more OpenSSL vulnerabilities. Cryptography Services, a part of the Linux Foundation's Core Infrastructure Initiative (CII), has begun an extensive audit of OpenSSL security. Preliminary results of the audit could be out by the beginning of the summer, Cryptography Services said. http://gcn.com/blogs/cybereye/2015/03/openssl-audit.aspx Linux/UNIX The crisis created by the Heartbleed bug fed into our concern about open source software overall. I am sure you have all heard of other named vulnerabilities, such as Shellshock and GHOST. Both have a CVSS score of 10.0. Both primarily impact Linux and UNIX systems. Shellshock affected only the Linux and Unix operating systems. This vulnerability allows malicious code execution within the Bash shell. GHOST was caused by a Linux glibc library vulnerability. It allows attackers to remotely take complete control of the target system without having any prior knowledge of system credentials.
  5. Static Analysis: A method of examining software at compile time, reporting potential defects Dynamic Analysis: A method of examining software at runtime, by executing the code over multiple test cases Fuzz Testing: Providing unexpected, invalid, or random data to an application with the intention of triggering a bug
  6. Static Analysis: A method of examining software at compile time, reporting potential defects Dynamic Analysis: A method of examining software at runtime, by executing the code over multiple test cases Fuzz Testing: Providing unexpected, invalid, or random data to an application with the intention of triggering a bug
  7. 1. Heartbleed Post-Mortem Listing All Products in Advisories Post-Mortem = Retrospective Problem Policy states only publish a security bulletin if there is a patch or workaround (something actionable). Customers demand to know immediately if their products are vulnerable or not to highly publicized named vulnerabilities. Facts April 8, 2014 – The Heartbleed OpenSSL vulnerability was announced. This vulnerability went undetected for several years. OpenSSL is widely used in the public. We have seen it used in ¼ of our products. Lessons Learned Created a shared technologies security bulletin template Updated PSIRT Procedures with the “Crisis Scenario” For publicly known high-severity vulnerabilities affecting multiple products Consolidated Security Bulletin listing all enterprise products into buckets “Being Investigated” bucket only used if vulnerability is readily identified by customers Shared technology inventory needed What you can tell customers Policy on communicating products known “Not Vulnerable” “Not Patched Yet” exception SNS Expectations – Early Notification
  8. 8. Measuring How Well Teams Do Product Security The Intel Security Product Security Maturity Model (PSMM) Problem We have an SDL. It is well defined for both waterfall and agile. How well are the product teams following it? Facts This metric indicates how well the BUs are implementing the product security program. Lessons Learned We designed our own MM to match our SDL Engineers asked for a spreadsheet with drop-downs so they can easily rate their product teams Automation Peer review
  9. PSMM Parameters Our simple maturity model categorizes 22 parameters into two categories: Operational for the program and Technical for the engineers. Operational Program Process Resources Training Security Reviews Tools PSIRT SDL Policy Privacy Certification M&A Extended Team Technical Threat Modeling / Architecture Reviews Static Analysis Dynamic Analysis (Web Apps) Fuzz Testing Vulnerability Scans / Penetration Testing Manual Code Reviews Secure Coding Standards Open Source / 3rd Party Libraries Tracking Tools
  10. 100-Mile American Record Smashed On October 4, 2013 Jon Olsen ran 11:59:28 to break 24-year old record.
  11. 8. Measuring How Well Teams Do Product Security The Intel Security Product Security Maturity Model (PSMM) Problem We have an SDL. It is well defined for both waterfall and agile. How well are the product teams following it? Facts This metric indicates how well the BUs are implementing the product security program. Lessons Learned We designed our own MM to match our SDL Engineers asked for a spreadsheet with drop-downs so they can easily rate their product teams Automation Peer review
  12. May vary by individual. I feel an Ultra is easier since, unlike software security, it has an end … until you sign up for another ultra.