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 DNS vulnerabilities are teh shitz
 The Dan Kaminskys find a way to
do dns cache poisoning… on
the Internet
 Everyone freaks out
 He gives some solutions like
DNSSEC
 Everyone goes… yeah right. See
you in 2013
 People freak out again
 Inject a fake DNS result into a caching DNS
server
 Clients requesting that hostname will be given
the malicious response
 Works for as long as TTL is set
 Example:
› Vulnerability in BIND exploited
› Injects a cached response for www.google.com
› Grandma goes to www.google.com, and is
redirected
 DNSSEC (we’re getting there)
 Patch your DNS server (yes of course, but not an actual
solution)
 Disable caching (not realistic in most cases)
 Randomize Name Servers (helps limit the affect of a
poison)
 Prepending a nonce to queries (balls930282-
fwq.www.rochester2600.com - effective but “omg what’s
a nonce”)
 Removing duplicate queries (mitigate birthday attack)
 0x20 Hack
 Refers to the simplest hack to modify the case of a
DNS requests
 0x20 bit manipulation is lower CPU cost compared to
for example Python to change the case of a string
 Turns out every DNS server ever can handle this hack
 Requests need to generate a random bitmask
 Only works if the DNS server does not pay attention
to case
 No entropy for TLR or number domains but helps most
hostnames
www.rochester2600.com
WWW.ROCHESTER2600.COM
wWw.rOChesTer2600.CoM
wWW.ROCheSTeR2600.com
WWW.roCHEsTeR2600.COM
000 0000000000000 000
111 1111111111111 111
010 0110001000000 101
011 1110011010011 000
111 0011101010000 111
 Attackers must brute force all possible
combinations of upper and lower to
successfully poison your cache
 I didn’t know about this and love it’s
simplicity
 Hipster Tor
 A and a are 0x20 apart
 The 0x20 hack
 No one uses this anymore…history lesson
 Nothing. You’re not even looking at the
screen right now.
0x20 hack

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0x20 hack

  • 1.
  • 2.  DNS vulnerabilities are teh shitz  The Dan Kaminskys find a way to do dns cache poisoning… on the Internet  Everyone freaks out  He gives some solutions like DNSSEC  Everyone goes… yeah right. See you in 2013  People freak out again
  • 3.  Inject a fake DNS result into a caching DNS server  Clients requesting that hostname will be given the malicious response  Works for as long as TTL is set  Example: › Vulnerability in BIND exploited › Injects a cached response for www.google.com › Grandma goes to www.google.com, and is redirected
  • 4.
  • 5.  DNSSEC (we’re getting there)  Patch your DNS server (yes of course, but not an actual solution)  Disable caching (not realistic in most cases)  Randomize Name Servers (helps limit the affect of a poison)  Prepending a nonce to queries (balls930282- fwq.www.rochester2600.com - effective but “omg what’s a nonce”)  Removing duplicate queries (mitigate birthday attack)  0x20 Hack
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.  Refers to the simplest hack to modify the case of a DNS requests  0x20 bit manipulation is lower CPU cost compared to for example Python to change the case of a string  Turns out every DNS server ever can handle this hack  Requests need to generate a random bitmask  Only works if the DNS server does not pay attention to case  No entropy for TLR or number domains but helps most hostnames
  • 10.  Attackers must brute force all possible combinations of upper and lower to successfully poison your cache
  • 11.  I didn’t know about this and love it’s simplicity  Hipster Tor
  • 12.  A and a are 0x20 apart  The 0x20 hack  No one uses this anymore…history lesson  Nothing. You’re not even looking at the screen right now.