This document summarizes international standards and recommended practices for securing civil aviation against unlawful interference as outlined in Annex 17. It discusses the organization of national security programs and international cooperation. It also covers preventative security measures related to passengers, baggage, cargo, access control and airport design. Finally, it addresses the management and reporting of responses to acts of unlawful interference.
The document discusses the key aspects of developing an airport emergency plan (AEP) including defining what an AEP is, its objectives, ICAO provisions, types of potential emergencies, structure, agencies involved, responsibilities, equipment, and maps. An AEP establishes procedures to coordinate response to emergencies occurring at an airport or nearby. It considers planning before, response during, and support after emergencies. Relevant maps, contact information, and triage procedures are also included.
This document is Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It provides standards and recommended practices related to security measures to safeguard international civil aviation against unlawful interference. The annex incorporates all amendments adopted by the ICAO Council prior to December 2005 and supersedes all previous editions from July 2006. It contains definitions, general principles, requirements for national organization and security measures at airports, for aircraft operators, and for preventing and managing security incidents.
1. The document discusses emergency response procedures for dangerous goods incidents on aircraft. It outlines the information that must be provided to pilots regarding dangerous cargo and emergency procedures.
2. It describes the different classes of cargo compartments on aircraft and emergency equipment located on board. Checklists are provided for pilots and cabin crew to follow in case of a dangerous goods fire, spill, or leakage in the passenger cabin or cargo areas.
3. An emergency response chart is presented listing different drill codes corresponding to the risks of various dangerous goods and outlining spill and firefighting procedures for each.
Procedure for Safe Ground Handling Practices - (Sample for Edition)Andrew Louis
This document outlines 14 guidelines for safe ground handling practices at ramps and lines. It covers topics like personnel protection, load handling, aircraft loading/unloading, ground equipment handling, fire protection, aircraft chocking, marker cone use, ground support equipment operations, hazards to passengers, aircraft parking safety, and vehicle operations. The guidelines are intended to reduce risks and ensure safety during all ground handling and servicing activities.
This document summarizes a presentation given by Philipp Kriegbaum of Fraport AG at an airport security conference in Prague in 2013. The presentation discusses the challenge of implementing risk-based, traveler-friendly, and efficient airport security. It uses the metaphor of cutting the "Gordian knot" to represent solving seemingly intractable problems through unconventional means. The presentation outlines worldwide efforts toward a risk-based paradigm shift in security and examples of risk-based security trials at various airports. It argues that properly implementing fewer security measures based on risk can be as effective as applying many measures evenly to all passengers.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN agency established in 1944 to manage international civil aviation standards and policies to ensure safe, efficient, and environmentally responsible air transport. ICAO works with its 193 member states to develop global standards and recommends practices, provides technical assistance, and helps states improve their oversight capabilities in aviation safety and security. These global standards allow over 100,000 daily flights to operate reliably and safely worldwide.
This document discusses the requirements for a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organization (CAMO). It outlines that a CAMO must have a Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition (CAME) approved by the aviation regulator that defines its procedures. Key roles like the Accountable Manager, Continuing Airworthiness Manager, and Quality Manager are described along with their responsibilities to ensure compliance with regulations and airworthiness standards. The document also discusses the use of Maintenance Programs, Master Minimum Equipment Lists, and Deferred Item Lists by CAMOs.
The document discusses airport emergency planning, outlining the types of emergencies that can occur at an airport, the roles of different agencies in responding to emergencies, and components of an airport emergency plan. It describes types of aircraft and non-aircraft emergencies, the objectives of emergency planning to minimize impacts and maintain operations, and agencies that should be involved like air traffic services, rescue and fire fighting, and medical services. It provides details on developing mutual aid agreements and sample outlines for airport emergency plans.
The document discusses the key aspects of developing an airport emergency plan (AEP) including defining what an AEP is, its objectives, ICAO provisions, types of potential emergencies, structure, agencies involved, responsibilities, equipment, and maps. An AEP establishes procedures to coordinate response to emergencies occurring at an airport or nearby. It considers planning before, response during, and support after emergencies. Relevant maps, contact information, and triage procedures are also included.
This document is Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It provides standards and recommended practices related to security measures to safeguard international civil aviation against unlawful interference. The annex incorporates all amendments adopted by the ICAO Council prior to December 2005 and supersedes all previous editions from July 2006. It contains definitions, general principles, requirements for national organization and security measures at airports, for aircraft operators, and for preventing and managing security incidents.
1. The document discusses emergency response procedures for dangerous goods incidents on aircraft. It outlines the information that must be provided to pilots regarding dangerous cargo and emergency procedures.
2. It describes the different classes of cargo compartments on aircraft and emergency equipment located on board. Checklists are provided for pilots and cabin crew to follow in case of a dangerous goods fire, spill, or leakage in the passenger cabin or cargo areas.
3. An emergency response chart is presented listing different drill codes corresponding to the risks of various dangerous goods and outlining spill and firefighting procedures for each.
Procedure for Safe Ground Handling Practices - (Sample for Edition)Andrew Louis
This document outlines 14 guidelines for safe ground handling practices at ramps and lines. It covers topics like personnel protection, load handling, aircraft loading/unloading, ground equipment handling, fire protection, aircraft chocking, marker cone use, ground support equipment operations, hazards to passengers, aircraft parking safety, and vehicle operations. The guidelines are intended to reduce risks and ensure safety during all ground handling and servicing activities.
This document summarizes a presentation given by Philipp Kriegbaum of Fraport AG at an airport security conference in Prague in 2013. The presentation discusses the challenge of implementing risk-based, traveler-friendly, and efficient airport security. It uses the metaphor of cutting the "Gordian knot" to represent solving seemingly intractable problems through unconventional means. The presentation outlines worldwide efforts toward a risk-based paradigm shift in security and examples of risk-based security trials at various airports. It argues that properly implementing fewer security measures based on risk can be as effective as applying many measures evenly to all passengers.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a UN agency established in 1944 to manage international civil aviation standards and policies to ensure safe, efficient, and environmentally responsible air transport. ICAO works with its 193 member states to develop global standards and recommends practices, provides technical assistance, and helps states improve their oversight capabilities in aviation safety and security. These global standards allow over 100,000 daily flights to operate reliably and safely worldwide.
This document discusses the requirements for a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organization (CAMO). It outlines that a CAMO must have a Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition (CAME) approved by the aviation regulator that defines its procedures. Key roles like the Accountable Manager, Continuing Airworthiness Manager, and Quality Manager are described along with their responsibilities to ensure compliance with regulations and airworthiness standards. The document also discusses the use of Maintenance Programs, Master Minimum Equipment Lists, and Deferred Item Lists by CAMOs.
The document discusses airport emergency planning, outlining the types of emergencies that can occur at an airport, the roles of different agencies in responding to emergencies, and components of an airport emergency plan. It describes types of aircraft and non-aircraft emergencies, the objectives of emergency planning to minimize impacts and maintain operations, and agencies that should be involved like air traffic services, rescue and fire fighting, and medical services. It provides details on developing mutual aid agreements and sample outlines for airport emergency plans.
ACO-3 Rescue and Firefighting Personnel SafetyBrock Jester
- Airport firefighters must be trained in using personal protective equipment and self-contained breathing apparatus to safely perform their jobs. They should understand firefighter safety at the fire station, during response, and on scene.
- ARFF personnel should anticipate hazards to mutual aid firefighters and be well-versed in general aircraft hazards as well as hazards from systems, materials, cargo, and military aircraft. They should also be able to identify and appropriately respond to potential terrorist incidents.
This document outlines the objectives and content of a training course on dangerous goods regulations.
It begins with welcoming messages and introduces the training method which includes exercises, questions, homework and a final assessment. The course objectives are to identify dangerous goods, understand classifications and labeling, recognize hidden hazards, be aware of provisions for passengers and crew, and be familiar with emergency procedures.
Section 1 of the course discusses applicability, including defining dangerous goods and outlining the responsibilities of shippers and operators. It emphasizes the importance of training requirements, with initial and recurrent training needed depending on job categories.
This document provides an overview of dangerous goods regulations for passenger handling. It covers the applicability and basis of the regulations, which are based on ICAO and UN recommendations. It discusses shipper and operator responsibilities, as well as training requirements for various personnel involved in transporting dangerous goods by air. The training must cover topics such as classification of dangerous goods, labeling, documentation, storage/loading procedures, and emergency response. Recurrent training is required every 24 months.
The document discusses the various regulatory authorities that govern the international air transportation system. It describes the roles of key international organizations like ICAO and IATA in establishing standards and regulations. It also outlines some of the national regulatory bodies like the FAA, EASA, DGCA that oversee civil aviation activities within their respective jurisdictions.
This document outlines regulations regarding airworthiness requirements for aircraft and aeronautical products in the Republic of the Philippines. It defines key terms like continuing airworthiness, major modification, preventative maintenance, overhaul, and rebuild. It describes classifications of Certificates of Airworthiness including standard, special, restricted, and experimental certificates. It also outlines requirements for eligibility, identification, and effective dates of Certificates of Airworthiness as well as allowable purposes for special flight permits.
This document provides an overview of domestic implementation of international laws and international air laws in India. It discusses how international law is implemented domestically through various theories like monism and dualism. India adopts a dualist approach where international law needs to be incorporated into domestic law to be enforceable. The document outlines how various articles of the Indian Constitution provide for implementation of international treaties and obligations. It also discusses how international customary law and treaties have been applied in important court judgments in India. Finally, it provides examples of key aviation laws and amendments that India has passed to implement its obligations under international aviation treaties.
Este documento presenta información sobre la documentación aeronáutica requerida para la planificación y ejecución de vuelos. Explica los diferentes tipos de publicaciones como la AIP, suplementos AIP, NOTAM y PIB que contienen información aeronáutica permanente y temporal. También describe cómo se actualizan estos documentos y dónde pueden consultarse. Por último, brinda detalles sobre las regulaciones argentinas de aviación civil y la documentación reglamentaria y operativa que debe llevarse a bordo según la parte 91 de
ICAO is a specialized agency of the UN that promotes safe and orderly development of international civil aviation. It sets standards in aviation safety, security, efficiency and environmental protection. ICAO's structure includes the Assembly of 191 member states, Council of 36 elected states, and technical commissions and committees. Key documents include the Chicago Convention, Annexes establishing standards and recommended practices, and procedural documents. ICAO is moving towards performance-based standards and collaborating with outside organizations.
101 of International Civil Aviation Organizations (ICAO)KuainaEzanie
The document lists the names of 5 students and their student IDs. It then provides a summary of the history and establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Key points include that ICAO was preceded by the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO) and replaced PICAO on April 4, 1947 after enough countries ratified the Chicago Convention. ICAO became a United Nations agency linked to ECOSOC in October 1947. The roles of ICAO are then outlined as well as details about the Assembly and Council. ICAO language proficiency requirements are introduced to improve communication and reduce errors. Examples of accidents caused by language issues are also listed.
This document provides an overview of air law and its history and development. It discusses:
- The basic principles of air sovereignty and how states have complete sovereignty over their territorial airspace.
- The main international organizations that govern civil aviation, including ICAO and IATA.
- The sources of air law including international treaties, conventions, and customary law.
- Key conventions regarding penal law in aviation, including the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions.
- Theories of jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed on aircraft, and how jurisdiction is determined.
The document provides information on airport emergencies and procedures. It includes a table of contents listing sections on airport emergencies, bomb threat emergencies, and a conclusion. The introduction discusses the importance of preparing for various emergency situations that airports may face. The airport emergencies section then outlines different types of hazards airports need to plan for, such as aircraft incidents, natural disasters, bomb incidents, and hazardous materials. The bomb threat emergency section provides procedures for responding to bomb threats involving aircraft or buildings. This includes evacuating areas and notifying authorities.
The document discusses concepts related to Crew Resource Management (CRM), which aims to enhance safety in aircraft operations through effective teamwork and management. It covers basic CRM concepts, training components, risk factors, accident causation models, and strategies for managing risk and situational awareness. CRM principles should be applied to entire operations from pilots to ground crews and management to improve safety culture.
The document discusses several important international maritime conventions developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to regulate safety and environmental protection in shipping. It provides background on the establishment of IMO in 1958 and its responsibility for maintaining and developing international treaties related to maritime matters. Key conventions summarized include the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
The document provides an overview of requirements for airworthiness management as per Part M, including:
1) The scope and extent of approval for a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO), which includes developing maintenance programs and managing approvals.
2) Requirements for the Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition (CAME) that specifies the CAMO's procedures and scope.
3) Requirements for facilities, personnel, and contracting maintenance to approved organisations.
4) Requirements for the CAMO's quality system to monitor compliance and ensure airworthy aircraft.
There are approximately 1.5 million people flying on planes at any given time. The world's busiest airport is Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, which sees over 94 million passengers annually. An Airbus A380 double-decker is as long as eight buses and can park 70 cars on its wings.
This section defines dangerous goods and outlines the responsibilities of shippers and operators when transporting dangerous goods by air. It notes that dangerous goods are articles or substances that pose a risk and are listed in the regulations. Both shippers and operators have responsibilities to properly identify, classify, pack, mark, label and document dangerous goods. Initial and recurrent training is required for all personnel involved in transporting dangerous goods to ensure regulations are properly applied and risks are understood.
This document outlines the key components and requirements of a Safety Management System (SMS) as defined by CAR Section 1 Series C Part 1. An SMS is a management system for organizing safety practices through defined processes. It includes establishing a safety policy, identifying hazards, managing risk, training personnel, reporting/analyzing incidents, auditing the system, and monitoring safety performance. The Accountable Executive has overall responsibility for the SMS, and a Safety Manager is responsible for implementing and maintaining the SMS processes. An SMS Manual documents all SMS processes and personnel responsibilities.
The document provides an overview of changes between the new AC 43.13-1B advisory circular and the old AC 43.13-1A version. Key changes include expanded sections on welding, nondestructive testing, corrosion protection, hardware, and electrical systems. Additional topics such as fiberglass/plastics repair and avionics were also added. The new version aims to provide more detailed guidance and safety information to help aircraft technicians in their inspection and repair tasks.
This document provides a history of international air law, beginning with early international conferences and conventions in the early 20th century. It summarizes key events and conventions, including the Paris Convention of 1919, the Havana Convention of 1928, the Madrid Convention of 1926, and the Warsaw Convention of 1929. These established foundational principles of air law and sovereignty over airspace, but also had limitations that led to later conventions like the Chicago Convention of 1944.
This document outlines the objectives and content of an aviation security course taught by Dr. Paul Mears. The 5-day course aims to teach participants how to ensure passenger and crew safety, identify and manage security threats, and work as a team to maintain security. It covers topics such as security mindsets, passenger profiling, restraint techniques, and how to handle various inflight incidents. Participants conduct workshops where they must apply their skills to mock aircraft scenarios and respond appropriately to security issues while minimizing flight disruption.
The document outlines the requirements for an airport security program according to Annex 17 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It states that each country must require airports serving international flights to establish a written security program to meet national requirements. It also requires the establishment of an airport security committee to help coordinate security controls. The document then discusses the objectives and sources of regulations for security programs, the relevant security authorities, and provides an overview of security measures, training, and emergency response procedures that must be included.
ACO-3 Rescue and Firefighting Personnel SafetyBrock Jester
- Airport firefighters must be trained in using personal protective equipment and self-contained breathing apparatus to safely perform their jobs. They should understand firefighter safety at the fire station, during response, and on scene.
- ARFF personnel should anticipate hazards to mutual aid firefighters and be well-versed in general aircraft hazards as well as hazards from systems, materials, cargo, and military aircraft. They should also be able to identify and appropriately respond to potential terrorist incidents.
This document outlines the objectives and content of a training course on dangerous goods regulations.
It begins with welcoming messages and introduces the training method which includes exercises, questions, homework and a final assessment. The course objectives are to identify dangerous goods, understand classifications and labeling, recognize hidden hazards, be aware of provisions for passengers and crew, and be familiar with emergency procedures.
Section 1 of the course discusses applicability, including defining dangerous goods and outlining the responsibilities of shippers and operators. It emphasizes the importance of training requirements, with initial and recurrent training needed depending on job categories.
This document provides an overview of dangerous goods regulations for passenger handling. It covers the applicability and basis of the regulations, which are based on ICAO and UN recommendations. It discusses shipper and operator responsibilities, as well as training requirements for various personnel involved in transporting dangerous goods by air. The training must cover topics such as classification of dangerous goods, labeling, documentation, storage/loading procedures, and emergency response. Recurrent training is required every 24 months.
The document discusses the various regulatory authorities that govern the international air transportation system. It describes the roles of key international organizations like ICAO and IATA in establishing standards and regulations. It also outlines some of the national regulatory bodies like the FAA, EASA, DGCA that oversee civil aviation activities within their respective jurisdictions.
This document outlines regulations regarding airworthiness requirements for aircraft and aeronautical products in the Republic of the Philippines. It defines key terms like continuing airworthiness, major modification, preventative maintenance, overhaul, and rebuild. It describes classifications of Certificates of Airworthiness including standard, special, restricted, and experimental certificates. It also outlines requirements for eligibility, identification, and effective dates of Certificates of Airworthiness as well as allowable purposes for special flight permits.
This document provides an overview of domestic implementation of international laws and international air laws in India. It discusses how international law is implemented domestically through various theories like monism and dualism. India adopts a dualist approach where international law needs to be incorporated into domestic law to be enforceable. The document outlines how various articles of the Indian Constitution provide for implementation of international treaties and obligations. It also discusses how international customary law and treaties have been applied in important court judgments in India. Finally, it provides examples of key aviation laws and amendments that India has passed to implement its obligations under international aviation treaties.
Este documento presenta información sobre la documentación aeronáutica requerida para la planificación y ejecución de vuelos. Explica los diferentes tipos de publicaciones como la AIP, suplementos AIP, NOTAM y PIB que contienen información aeronáutica permanente y temporal. También describe cómo se actualizan estos documentos y dónde pueden consultarse. Por último, brinda detalles sobre las regulaciones argentinas de aviación civil y la documentación reglamentaria y operativa que debe llevarse a bordo según la parte 91 de
ICAO is a specialized agency of the UN that promotes safe and orderly development of international civil aviation. It sets standards in aviation safety, security, efficiency and environmental protection. ICAO's structure includes the Assembly of 191 member states, Council of 36 elected states, and technical commissions and committees. Key documents include the Chicago Convention, Annexes establishing standards and recommended practices, and procedural documents. ICAO is moving towards performance-based standards and collaborating with outside organizations.
101 of International Civil Aviation Organizations (ICAO)KuainaEzanie
The document lists the names of 5 students and their student IDs. It then provides a summary of the history and establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Key points include that ICAO was preceded by the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO) and replaced PICAO on April 4, 1947 after enough countries ratified the Chicago Convention. ICAO became a United Nations agency linked to ECOSOC in October 1947. The roles of ICAO are then outlined as well as details about the Assembly and Council. ICAO language proficiency requirements are introduced to improve communication and reduce errors. Examples of accidents caused by language issues are also listed.
This document provides an overview of air law and its history and development. It discusses:
- The basic principles of air sovereignty and how states have complete sovereignty over their territorial airspace.
- The main international organizations that govern civil aviation, including ICAO and IATA.
- The sources of air law including international treaties, conventions, and customary law.
- Key conventions regarding penal law in aviation, including the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions.
- Theories of jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed on aircraft, and how jurisdiction is determined.
The document provides information on airport emergencies and procedures. It includes a table of contents listing sections on airport emergencies, bomb threat emergencies, and a conclusion. The introduction discusses the importance of preparing for various emergency situations that airports may face. The airport emergencies section then outlines different types of hazards airports need to plan for, such as aircraft incidents, natural disasters, bomb incidents, and hazardous materials. The bomb threat emergency section provides procedures for responding to bomb threats involving aircraft or buildings. This includes evacuating areas and notifying authorities.
The document discusses concepts related to Crew Resource Management (CRM), which aims to enhance safety in aircraft operations through effective teamwork and management. It covers basic CRM concepts, training components, risk factors, accident causation models, and strategies for managing risk and situational awareness. CRM principles should be applied to entire operations from pilots to ground crews and management to improve safety culture.
The document discusses several important international maritime conventions developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to regulate safety and environmental protection in shipping. It provides background on the establishment of IMO in 1958 and its responsibility for maintaining and developing international treaties related to maritime matters. Key conventions summarized include the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
The document provides an overview of requirements for airworthiness management as per Part M, including:
1) The scope and extent of approval for a Continuing Airworthiness Management Organisation (CAMO), which includes developing maintenance programs and managing approvals.
2) Requirements for the Continuing Airworthiness Management Exposition (CAME) that specifies the CAMO's procedures and scope.
3) Requirements for facilities, personnel, and contracting maintenance to approved organisations.
4) Requirements for the CAMO's quality system to monitor compliance and ensure airworthy aircraft.
There are approximately 1.5 million people flying on planes at any given time. The world's busiest airport is Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, which sees over 94 million passengers annually. An Airbus A380 double-decker is as long as eight buses and can park 70 cars on its wings.
This section defines dangerous goods and outlines the responsibilities of shippers and operators when transporting dangerous goods by air. It notes that dangerous goods are articles or substances that pose a risk and are listed in the regulations. Both shippers and operators have responsibilities to properly identify, classify, pack, mark, label and document dangerous goods. Initial and recurrent training is required for all personnel involved in transporting dangerous goods to ensure regulations are properly applied and risks are understood.
This document outlines the key components and requirements of a Safety Management System (SMS) as defined by CAR Section 1 Series C Part 1. An SMS is a management system for organizing safety practices through defined processes. It includes establishing a safety policy, identifying hazards, managing risk, training personnel, reporting/analyzing incidents, auditing the system, and monitoring safety performance. The Accountable Executive has overall responsibility for the SMS, and a Safety Manager is responsible for implementing and maintaining the SMS processes. An SMS Manual documents all SMS processes and personnel responsibilities.
The document provides an overview of changes between the new AC 43.13-1B advisory circular and the old AC 43.13-1A version. Key changes include expanded sections on welding, nondestructive testing, corrosion protection, hardware, and electrical systems. Additional topics such as fiberglass/plastics repair and avionics were also added. The new version aims to provide more detailed guidance and safety information to help aircraft technicians in their inspection and repair tasks.
This document provides a history of international air law, beginning with early international conferences and conventions in the early 20th century. It summarizes key events and conventions, including the Paris Convention of 1919, the Havana Convention of 1928, the Madrid Convention of 1926, and the Warsaw Convention of 1929. These established foundational principles of air law and sovereignty over airspace, but also had limitations that led to later conventions like the Chicago Convention of 1944.
This document outlines the objectives and content of an aviation security course taught by Dr. Paul Mears. The 5-day course aims to teach participants how to ensure passenger and crew safety, identify and manage security threats, and work as a team to maintain security. It covers topics such as security mindsets, passenger profiling, restraint techniques, and how to handle various inflight incidents. Participants conduct workshops where they must apply their skills to mock aircraft scenarios and respond appropriately to security issues while minimizing flight disruption.
The document outlines the requirements for an airport security program according to Annex 17 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It states that each country must require airports serving international flights to establish a written security program to meet national requirements. It also requires the establishment of an airport security committee to help coordinate security controls. The document then discusses the objectives and sources of regulations for security programs, the relevant security authorities, and provides an overview of security measures, training, and emergency response procedures that must be included.
The document discusses an airport operations and aviation security fellowship program that aims to go beyond expectations. It notes that activities were conducted not just at the airport but also outside of it through various programs and initiatives. However, no specifics are provided about the programs, initiatives, or activities discussed.
This document provides guidance on standards and recommended practices for securing civil aviation against unlawful interference. It covers definitions, general principles, organization of national aviation security programs, and components of effective security systems. Key areas discussed include designation of appropriate security authorities, national security legislation and regulations, threat assessment, security training, airport security programs, contingency planning, and international cooperation. The document aims to establish comprehensive security measures to safeguard international air transport.
Can the civil aviation industry learn from terrorist attacks carried out on the ground? This presentation compares the 2012 Bangkok explosions with the 1988 Pan Am flight 103 attack to expose possible vulnerabilities in today's aircraft and airport security measures.
Have a look through our research and let us know what you think.
For more information about us, please visit: http://www.iata.org/training-security
This document discusses aviation security and the importance of protecting the aviation industry from criminal and terrorist threats. It notes that aviation is a target due to its role in worldwide economic stability and transportation. The document outlines some of the challenges in securing the complex aviation system and infrastructure. It also examines the economic impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on aviation and stresses the need for proactive security strategies to prevent further deterioration of the economy or stability from terrorist activities.
The document compares security measures at Changi International Airport in Singapore and Johannesburg International Airport in South Africa. It outlines the different types of security checks at each airport, including immigration, customs, and passenger and baggage screening. It notes that Changi Airport has more advanced screening technology and monitoring systems compared to Johannesburg Airport, which faces issues like a lack of screening equipment, understaffing, and poor infrastructure and coordination between security agencies. The document also discusses future plans to implement new passenger screening technologies at airports to enhance security.
This is from a webinar presented by Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University-Worldwide called “General Aviation Security.” The presenter is Dr. Daniel Benny.
India stepped up airport security after the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814. [1] The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) is responsible for security at Indian airports under the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security. [2] The CISF formed an Airport Security Group and assigns Airport Security Units (APSUs) to each airport to protect against unlawful interference. [3]
A presentation by David Alexander, ICAO AVSEC PM, Professional Aviation Services.
Delivered during the 34th annual Southern African Transport Conference (SATC) held in Centurion, South Africa.
The number of terrorist attempts on civil aviation has steadily increased since September 2011. Learn why standardized, practical training is needed to prepare security staff for future terror attempts.
http://www.iata.org/training-security
This document provides an overview of India's aviation security system and the implementation of a Hold Baggage Screening (HBS) system at major Indian airports. It describes the key functions of HBS including multi-level baggage screening at Level 1, 2, 3 and manual screening at Level 4. It also discusses the management information system used to monitor screening data and generate reports. Training procedures are in place to certify baggage screening operators. The HBS system was implemented in phases at major private airports in India following technical standards and considering best practices from major international airports.
This document provides an overview of an x-ray baggage inspection system. It begins with an introduction describing how the system uses x-rays to scan and analyze baggage components. The document then discusses the evolution of such security systems from being initially developed in the 1940s. It includes a block diagram showing the key components. Advantages include saving time and ensuring privacy while detecting harmful materials. The system has applications at places like post offices and ports for checking luggage.
The document discusses Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS) and how it compares to the Instrument Landing System (ILS). GBAS provides precision approaches for all runways at an airport, supports curved and segmented approaches, and can change procedures without infrastructure changes. It also enables Category I through III precision approaches with minima down to no decision height or visibility required. GBAS signals are more stable than ILS in adverse weather. The document outlines the benefits of GBAS for airlines, airports, and air navigation service providers, such as reduced track miles, increased airport capacity and flexibility in procedure design.
X-ray baggage inspection systems analyze baggage components using x-rays. It uses scanning to indicate different baggage items based on their atomic numbers with different colors. XBIS was first developed in 1972 at the University of Manchester to reduce manual security checks. It has a block diagram that includes an x-ray generator and I-V converter. XBIS provides advantages like saving time, ensuring privacy, minimizing radiation exposure to operators, and effectively detecting harmful materials. It is applied at places like post offices, government buildings, ports for checking luggage.
Soft skills for airport security personnelNilendra Kumar
The security personnel posted at airports have to routinely come in contact and deal with large number of personnel. They have to be vigilant, alert and security conscious. As such, their call of duty makes them take decisions and operate in a manner which may appear to be rude or offensive. Hence, the need for training in soft skills assumes importance for the persons deployed for airport security.
The document discusses baggage handling systems at airports. It describes how baggage handling systems transport checked luggage from ticket counters to airplanes and from airplanes to baggage claims. The systems perform functions like bag detection, volume regulation, load balancing, bag counting, tracking, and redirection. They have three main jobs - moving bags from check-in to departure gates, between gates during transfers, and from arrival gates to baggage claims. The document also outlines the basic processes that bags go through and how the systems work to sort bags to their proper destinations.
This document provides information about ground handling services at airports. It discusses the major categories of ground handling which include onboard servicing, ramp service, passenger service, and field services. It also describes the types of powered equipment used like tugs, tractors, refuelers, and belt loaders. Non-powered equipment such as chocks, dollies, and belts are also outlined. Finally, it provides a layout of typical ground handling operations when an aircraft arrives and departs.
The document is an assignment submitted by Abdur Rahim Khan for his course on airport handling procedures at Skylark Aviation Training School. It includes an introduction to aviation history and governing bodies like IATA, ICAO, and BCAS. The document then provides an index and outlines of sections on aviation history, governing bodies, and the various stages of airport handling procedures like reservations, check-in, boarding, and arrivals.
This document is the ninth edition of Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, which provides standards and recommended practices for safeguarding international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. It incorporates all amendments adopted by the Council prior to November 2010 and supersedes all previous editions as of July 2011. The annex contains definitions, general principles for security organization and measures, and guidance for preventing and managing responses to acts of unlawful interference.
The document is a European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions. It contains 8 sections that provide recommendations to reduce runway incursions. The recommendations are directed at aerodrome operators, air navigation service providers, aircraft operators, and national aviation authorities. They address issues like communications procedures, signage and markings, training, and safety management systems. The goal is to implement the recommendations by certain completion dates to improve runway safety through consistent application of ICAO standards and increased situational awareness.
The sources of Annex 19, 1st Edition derives from overarching safety management provisions, as contained in the following. Annexes:.The sources of Annex 19, 1st Edition derives from overarching safety management provisions, as contained in the following. Annexes:.
The sources of Annex 19, 1st Edition derives from overarching safety management provisions, as contained in the following. Annexes:.
The document discusses regulations and standards for the safe transport of dangerous goods by air as outlined by ICAO in Annex 18. It provides an overview of key aspects such as applicability, classification, limitations, packing, labeling, and responsibilities of shippers and operators. It also describes the Technical Instructions issued by ICAO that provide detailed requirements amplifying the basic provisions in Annex 18. States are expected to comply with the Standards in Annex 18 and notify any differences, while variations from the Technical Instructions should be reported to ICAO.
ICAO Safety Management SARPs - Development and EvolutionBruce W. Joseph
This document outlines the development and evolution of the ICAO's standards and recommended practices (SARPs) for safety management. It introduced initial safety management SARPs between 2001-2010 across several annexes. Annex 19 was first adopted in 2013 to consolidate these provisions. Amendment 1 was adopted in 2016 to further enhance the SMS framework, integrate state safety program and oversight elements, and strengthen protection of safety data. The amendments aim to support more efficient implementation of safety management systems globally.
GLOBAL AVIATION SECURITY ISSUES _Dr. Afen Sena_2023.pptxAfenSena1
This document discusses global aviation security issues and ICAO's role in addressing them. It covers ICAO's strategic objectives, the aviation security policy section, Annex 17 standards, the aviation security manual, ICAO's Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) and its key priorities, the facilitation program, the traveller identification program (TRIP), the Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) and its continuous monitoring approach, aviation security training, cybersecurity, and ICAO's cybersecurity strategy framework pillars. The document provides an overview of ICAO's comprehensive approach to enhancing global aviation security.
This document summarizes the deliberations of the 44th session of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's Working Group on Electronic Commerce. The Working Group discussed provisions for a draft convention on electronic contracting. They reviewed and adopted 14 draft articles of the convention. They also had initial discussions on the preamble, final clauses, and additional proposed provisions. The Working Group requested changes to the draft final provisions and to circulate an updated draft convention to governments for comments ahead of the 38th Commission session.
Symposium CONF. 101 International Aviation - How we will manage a 120 Billion...PMI-Montréal
Le transport aérien devenant de plus en plus accessible à la majorité de la population, l’aviation, en tant que secteur innovant, a connu ces dernières décennies une évolution technologique à bord des aéronefs plus rapide que celle touchant les systèmes de navigation aérienne. Étant donné les questions de souveraineté sur l’espace aérien et d’espace aérien réservé aux forces armées, sans compter que la plupart des services de navigation aérienne sont fournis par des organismes publics et privés, les gouvernements doivent jouer un rôle clé dans cette évolution. La transformation de notre système de transport aérien prendra une dizaine d’années et nécessitera l’accord de tous les pays et de leurs industries, ainsi que l’exécution d’un projet mondial bien coordonné sous l’égide de l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale (OACI), en coopération avec ses partenaires internationaux en matière de sécurité à travers le monde. Le présent exposé mettra en lumière les moyens employés par l’OACI pour mener cet effort coordonné.
This document is the fourth edition of the Safety Management Manual published by ICAO. It provides guidance for States and service providers on implementing safety management systems as required by Annex 19. The manual is divided into nine chapters that progressively build understanding of safety management fundamentals, developing safety intelligence through data analysis, and implementing safety management at the State and service provider level. It aims to help States establish effective State safety programs and ensure service providers implement safety management systems in accordance with Annex 19 standards.
This document contains part of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations regarding aviation security. It outlines regulations for various entities involved in aviation including aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, air traffic service providers, regulated agents, flight catering operators, tenant restricted area operators, and other allied aviation service providers. The regulations address requirements for security programs, screening, reporting security incidents, training, and other security measures aimed at safeguarding civil aviation against unlawful interference.
This document presents proposals to innovate aviation security policy and revise existing resolutions to ensure security measures remain effective against evolving terrorist threats. It proposes greater transparency of ICAO's Universal Security Audit results to facilitate technical cooperation. It also proposes replacing liquid restrictions with screening technologies, funding security from ICAO's regular budget, recognizing the importance of screening all persons, and ensuring proper training of security personnel. The Assembly is invited to include these matters when revising resolutions and direct the Council and Aviation Security Panel to further evaluate Annex 17, technologies, information sharing, and standards on screening and training.
The document provides background information on the IMO's role in monitoring member states' implementation of maritime standards over time. It describes how the IMO developed from a self-assessment system to the current IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS). Key developments included the Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme (VIMSAS) in 2005 and the transition to the mandatory IMSAS in 2016. The document also outlines IMSAS procedures and reference documents and provides statistics on audit findings categorized by the IMO Instruments Implementation Code.
Areas of convergence related to areas of cooperation on the issue of the impa...Dr Lendy Spires
The document discusses areas of convergence for cooperation among parties related to the impact of implementing climate change response measures. It identifies three key areas: 1) assessing and analyzing the impact of response measures, including improving reporting and ex ante/ex post assessments; 2) supporting economic diversification in developing countries to minimize adverse impacts; and 3) facilitating a just transition of the workforce through job training, social protections, and other measures. Parties and observers proposed strengthening cooperation through forums, mechanisms, modeling collaboration, and other processes to help address these issues.
How to Get CNIC Information System with Paksim Ga.pptxdanishmna97
Pakdata Cf is a groundbreaking system designed to streamline and facilitate access to CNIC information. This innovative platform leverages advanced technology to provide users with efficient and secure access to their CNIC details.
For the full video of this presentation, please visit: https://www.edge-ai-vision.com/2024/06/building-and-scaling-ai-applications-with-the-nx-ai-manager-a-presentation-from-network-optix/
Robin van Emden, Senior Director of Data Science at Network Optix, presents the “Building and Scaling AI Applications with the Nx AI Manager,” tutorial at the May 2024 Embedded Vision Summit.
In this presentation, van Emden covers the basics of scaling edge AI solutions using the Nx tool kit. He emphasizes the process of developing AI models and deploying them globally. He also showcases the conversion of AI models and the creation of effective edge AI pipelines, with a focus on pre-processing, model conversion, selecting the appropriate inference engine for the target hardware and post-processing.
van Emden shows how Nx can simplify the developer’s life and facilitate a rapid transition from concept to production-ready applications.He provides valuable insights into developing scalable and efficient edge AI solutions, with a strong focus on practical implementation.
Goodbye Windows 11: Make Way for Nitrux Linux 3.5.0!SOFTTECHHUB
As the digital landscape continually evolves, operating systems play a critical role in shaping user experiences and productivity. The launch of Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 marks a significant milestone, offering a robust alternative to traditional systems such as Windows 11. This article delves into the essence of Nitrux Linux 3.5.0, exploring its unique features, advantages, and how it stands as a compelling choice for both casual users and tech enthusiasts.
Unlocking Productivity: Leveraging the Potential of Copilot in Microsoft 365, a presentation by Christoforos Vlachos, Senior Solutions Manager – Modern Workplace, Uni Systems
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingAftab Hussain
Imagine a world where software fuzzing, the process of mutating bytes in test seeds to uncover hidden and erroneous program behaviors, becomes faster and more effective. A lot depends on the initial seeds, which can significantly dictate the trajectory of a fuzzing campaign, particularly in terms of how long it takes to uncover interesting behaviour in your code. We introduce DIAR, a technique designed to speedup fuzzing campaigns by pinpointing and eliminating those uninteresting bytes in the seeds. Picture this: instead of wasting valuable resources on meaningless mutations in large, bloated seeds, DIAR removes the unnecessary bytes, streamlining the entire process.
In this work, we equipped AFL, a popular fuzzer, with DIAR and examined two critical Linux libraries -- Libxml's xmllint, a tool for parsing xml documents, and Binutil's readelf, an essential debugging and security analysis command-line tool used to display detailed information about ELF (Executable and Linkable Format). Our preliminary results show that AFL+DIAR does not only discover new paths more quickly but also achieves higher coverage overall. This work thus showcases how starting with lean and optimized seeds can lead to faster, more comprehensive fuzzing campaigns -- and DIAR helps you find such seeds.
- These are slides of the talk given at IEEE International Conference on Software Testing Verification and Validation Workshop, ICSTW 2022.
In the rapidly evolving landscape of technologies, XML continues to play a vital role in structuring, storing, and transporting data across diverse systems. The recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) present new methodologies for enhancing XML development workflows, introducing efficiency, automation, and intelligent capabilities. This presentation will outline the scope and perspective of utilizing AI in XML development. The potential benefits and the possible pitfalls will be highlighted, providing a balanced view of the subject.
We will explore the capabilities of AI in understanding XML markup languages and autonomously creating structured XML content. Additionally, we will examine the capacity of AI to enrich plain text with appropriate XML markup. Practical examples and methodological guidelines will be provided to elucidate how AI can be effectively prompted to interpret and generate accurate XML markup.
Further emphasis will be placed on the role of AI in developing XSLT, or schemas such as XSD and Schematron. We will address the techniques and strategies adopted to create prompts for generating code, explaining code, or refactoring the code, and the results achieved.
The discussion will extend to how AI can be used to transform XML content. In particular, the focus will be on the use of AI XPath extension functions in XSLT, Schematron, Schematron Quick Fixes, or for XML content refactoring.
The presentation aims to deliver a comprehensive overview of AI usage in XML development, providing attendees with the necessary knowledge to make informed decisions. Whether you’re at the early stages of adopting AI or considering integrating it in advanced XML development, this presentation will cover all levels of expertise.
By highlighting the potential advantages and challenges of integrating AI with XML development tools and languages, the presentation seeks to inspire thoughtful conversation around the future of XML development. We’ll not only delve into the technical aspects of AI-powered XML development but also discuss practical implications and possible future directions.
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 5. In this session, we will cover CI/CD with devops.
Topics covered:
CI/CD with in UiPath
End-to-end overview of CI/CD pipeline with Azure devops
Speaker:
Lyndsey Byblow, Test Suite Sales Engineer @ UiPath, Inc.
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdfPaige Cruz
Monitoring and observability aren’t traditionally found in software curriculums and many of us cobble this knowledge together from whatever vendor or ecosystem we were first introduced to and whatever is a part of your current company’s observability stack.
While the dev and ops silo continues to crumble….many organizations still relegate monitoring & observability as the purview of ops, infra and SRE teams. This is a mistake - achieving a highly observable system requires collaboration up and down the stack.
I, a former op, would like to extend an invitation to all application developers to join the observability party will share these foundational concepts to build on:
Unlock the Future of Search with MongoDB Atlas_ Vector Search Unleashed.pdfMalak Abu Hammad
Discover how MongoDB Atlas and vector search technology can revolutionize your application's search capabilities. This comprehensive presentation covers:
* What is Vector Search?
* Importance and benefits of vector search
* Practical use cases across various industries
* Step-by-step implementation guide
* Live demos with code snippets
* Enhancing LLM capabilities with vector search
* Best practices and optimization strategies
Perfect for developers, AI enthusiasts, and tech leaders. Learn how to leverage MongoDB Atlas to deliver highly relevant, context-aware search results, transforming your data retrieval process. Stay ahead in tech innovation and maximize the potential of your applications.
#MongoDB #VectorSearch #AI #SemanticSearch #TechInnovation #DataScience #LLM #MachineLearning #SearchTechnology
HCL Notes and Domino License Cost Reduction in the World of DLAUpanagenda
Webinar Recording: https://www.panagenda.com/webinars/hcl-notes-and-domino-license-cost-reduction-in-the-world-of-dlau/
The introduction of DLAU and the CCB & CCX licensing model caused quite a stir in the HCL community. As a Notes and Domino customer, you may have faced challenges with unexpected user counts and license costs. You probably have questions on how this new licensing approach works and how to benefit from it. Most importantly, you likely have budget constraints and want to save money where possible. Don’t worry, we can help with all of this!
We’ll show you how to fix common misconfigurations that cause higher-than-expected user counts, and how to identify accounts which you can deactivate to save money. There are also frequent patterns that can cause unnecessary cost, like using a person document instead of a mail-in for shared mailboxes. We’ll provide examples and solutions for those as well. And naturally we’ll explain the new licensing model.
Join HCL Ambassador Marc Thomas in this webinar with a special guest appearance from Franz Walder. It will give you the tools and know-how to stay on top of what is going on with Domino licensing. You will be able lower your cost through an optimized configuration and keep it low going forward.
These topics will be covered
- Reducing license cost by finding and fixing misconfigurations and superfluous accounts
- How do CCB and CCX licenses really work?
- Understanding the DLAU tool and how to best utilize it
- Tips for common problem areas, like team mailboxes, functional/test users, etc
- Practical examples and best practices to implement right away
Sudheer Mechineni, Head of Application Frameworks, Standard Chartered Bank
Discover how Standard Chartered Bank harnessed the power of Neo4j to transform complex data access challenges into a dynamic, scalable graph database solution. This keynote will cover their journey from initial adoption to deploying a fully automated, enterprise-grade causal cluster, highlighting key strategies for modelling organisational changes and ensuring robust disaster recovery. Learn how these innovations have not only enhanced Standard Chartered Bank’s data infrastructure but also positioned them as pioneers in the banking sector’s adoption of graph technology.
Full-RAG: A modern architecture for hyper-personalizationZilliz
Mike Del Balso, CEO & Co-Founder at Tecton, presents "Full RAG," a novel approach to AI recommendation systems, aiming to push beyond the limitations of traditional models through a deep integration of contextual insights and real-time data, leveraging the Retrieval-Augmented Generation architecture. This talk will outline Full RAG's potential to significantly enhance personalization, address engineering challenges such as data management and model training, and introduce data enrichment with reranking as a key solution. Attendees will gain crucial insights into the importance of hyperpersonalization in AI, the capabilities of Full RAG for advanced personalization, and strategies for managing complex data integrations for deploying cutting-edge AI solutions.
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 6. In this session, we will cover Test Automation with generative AI and Open AI.
UiPath Test Automation with generative AI and Open AI webinar offers an in-depth exploration of leveraging cutting-edge technologies for test automation within the UiPath platform. Attendees will delve into the integration of generative AI, a test automation solution, with Open AI advanced natural language processing capabilities.
Throughout the session, participants will discover how this synergy empowers testers to automate repetitive tasks, enhance testing accuracy, and expedite the software testing life cycle. Topics covered include the seamless integration process, practical use cases, and the benefits of harnessing AI-driven automation for UiPath testing initiatives. By attending this webinar, testers, and automation professionals can gain valuable insights into harnessing the power of AI to optimize their test automation workflows within the UiPath ecosystem, ultimately driving efficiency and quality in software development processes.
What will you get from this session?
1. Insights into integrating generative AI.
2. Understanding how this integration enhances test automation within the UiPath platform
3. Practical demonstrations
4. Exploration of real-world use cases illustrating the benefits of AI-driven test automation for UiPath
Topics covered:
What is generative AI
Test Automation with generative AI and Open AI.
UiPath integration with generative AI
Speaker:
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
Let's Integrate MuleSoft RPA, COMPOSER, APM with AWS IDP along with Slackshyamraj55
Discover the seamless integration of RPA (Robotic Process Automation), COMPOSER, and APM with AWS IDP enhanced with Slack notifications. Explore how these technologies converge to streamline workflows, optimize performance, and ensure secure access, all while leveraging the power of AWS IDP and real-time communication via Slack notifications.
Threats to mobile devices are more prevalent and increasing in scope and complexity. Users of mobile devices desire to take full advantage of the features
available on those devices, but many of the features provide convenience and capability but sacrifice security. This best practices guide outlines steps the users can take to better protect personal devices and information.
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup SlidesZilliz
Prompting language models is hard, while programming language models is easy. In this talk, I will discuss the state-of-the-art framework DSPy for programming foundation models with its powerful optimizers and runtime constraint system.
Maruthi Prithivirajan, Head of ASEAN & IN Solution Architecture, Neo4j
Get an inside look at the latest Neo4j innovations that enable relationship-driven intelligence at scale. Learn more about the newest cloud integrations and product enhancements that make Neo4j an essential choice for developers building apps with interconnected data and generative AI.
1. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
SECURITY
SAFEGUARDING INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
ANNEX 17
TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
SIXTH EDITION — MARCH 1997
This edition incorporates all amendments adopted by the Council prior to
13 November 1996 and supersedes on 1 August 1997 all previous editions
of Annex 17.
For information regarding the applicability of the Standards and
Recommended Practices, see Foreword.
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
2. AMENDMENTS
The issue of amendments is announced regularly in the ICAO Journal and in the
monthly Supplement to the Catalogue of ICAO Publications and Audio-visual
Training Aids, which holders of this publication should consult. The space below is
provided to keep a record of such amendments.
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS AND CORRIGENDA
1/8/97 (ii)
AMENDMENTS CORRIGENDA
No.
Date
applicable
Date
entered
Entered
by No.
Date
of issue
Date
entered
Entered
by
1-9 Incorporated in this Edition
4. ANNEX 17 (v) 1/8/97
FOREWORD
Historical background
The material included in this Annex was developed by the
Council pursuant to the following two resolutions of the
Assembly:
Resolution A17-10: Implementation by States of
Security Specifications and Practices adopted
by this Assembly and further work by ICAO
related to such Specifications and Practices
. . . . . .
THE ASSEMBLY:
. . . . . .
(3) REQUESTS the Council, with the assistance of the other
constituent bodies of the Organization, to develop and incorporate,
as appropriate, the material in the Appendices to this Resolution as
Standards, Recommended Practices and Procedures in existing or
new Annexes or other regulatory documents or guidance material
of the Organization.
Resolution A18-10: Additional Technical Measures
for the Protection of the Security of
International Civil Air Transport
. . . . . .
THE ASSEMBLY:
(1) REQUESTS the Council to ensure, with respect to the technical
aspects of air transportation security, that:
(a) the subject of air transportation security continues to be given
adequate attention by the Secretary General, with a priority
commensurate with the current threat to the security of air
transportation;
. . . . . .
Following the work of the Air Navigation Commission, the
Air Transport Committee and the Committee on Unlawful
Interference, and as a result of the comments received from
Contracting States and interested International Organizations,
to whom draft material had been circulated, Standards and
Recommended Practices on Security were adopted by the
Council on 22 March 1974, pursuant to the provisions of
Article 37 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
and designated as Annex 17 to the Convention with the title
“Standards and Recommended Practices — Security —
Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference”.
Table A shows the origin of subsequent amendments
together with a list of the principal subjects involved and the
dates on which the Annex and the amendments were adopted by
the Council, when they became effective and when they became
applicable.
Introduction
In order that a comprehensive document may be available to
States for implementation of the security measures prescribed
by this Annex, an Attachment hereto reproduces extracts from
other Annexes, Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport
of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284), PANS-RAC and
PANS-OPS bearing on the subject of action to be taken by
States to prevent unlawful interference with civil aviation, or
when such interference has been committed.
Guidance material
The Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against
Acts of Unlawful Interference (Doc 8973) provides detailed
procedures and guidance on aspects of aviation security and is
intended to assist States in the implementation of their
respective national civil aviation security programmes required
by the specifications in the Annexes to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation.
Action by Contracting States
Applicability. The provisions of the Standards and
Recommended Practices in this document are to be applied by
Contracting States.
Notification of differences. The attention of Contracting
States is drawn to the obligation imposed by Article 38 of the
Convention, by which Contracting States are required to notify
the Organization of any differences between their national
regulations and practices and the International Standards
contained in this Annex and any amendments thereto.
Contracting States are invited to keep the Organization
currently informed of any differences which may subsequently
occur, or of the withdrawal of any difference previously
notified. A specific request for notification of differences will
be sent to Contracting States immediately after the adoption of
each Amendment to this Annex.
5. Annex 17 — Security Foreword
1/8/97 (vi)
Contracting States are also invited to extend such
notification to any differences from the Recommended
Practices contained in this Annex, and any amendment thereto,
when the notification of such differences is important for the
safety of air navigation.
Attention of States is also drawn to the provisions of
Annex 15 related to the publication of differences between
their national regulations and practices and the related ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices through the
Aeronautical Information Service, in addition to the obligation
of States under Article 38 of the Convention.
Promulgation of information. Information relating to the
establishment and withdrawal of and changes to facilities,
services and procedures affecting aircraft operations provided
according to the Standards and Recommended Practices
specified in this Annex should be notified and take effect in
accordance with Annex 15.
Use of the text of the Annex in national regulations. The
Council, on 13 April 1948, adopted a resolution inviting the
attention of Contracting States to the desirability of using in
their own national regulations, as far as practicable, the precise
language of those ICAO Standards that are of a regulatory
character and also of indicating departures from the Standards,
including any additional national regulations that were
important for the safety or regularity of air navigation.
Wherever possible, the provisions of this Annex have been
written in such a way as would facilitate incorporation,
without major textual changes, into national legislation.
General information
An Annex is made up of the following component parts, not all
of which, however, are necessarily found in every Annex; they
have the status indicated:
1.— Material comprising the Annex proper:
a) Standards and Recommended Practices adopted by
the Council under the provisions of the Convention.
They are defined as follows:
Standard: Any specification for physical charac-
teristics, configuration, matériel, performance,
personnel or procedure, the uniform application of
which is recognized as necessary for the safety or
regularity of international air navigation and to which
Contracting States will conform in accordance with
the Convention; in the event of impossibility of
compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory
under Article 38 of the Convention.
Recommended Practice: Any specification for
physical characteristics, configuration, matériel,
performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform
application of which is recognized as desirable in the
interests of safety, regularity or efficiency of
international air navigation, and to which Contracting
States will endeavour to conform in accordance with
the Convention.
b) Appendices comprising material grouped separately
for convenience but forming part of the Standards
and Recommended Practices adopted by the Council.
c) Definitions of terms used in the Standards and
Recommended Practices which are not self-
explanatory in that they do not have accepted
dictionary meanings. A definition does not have an
independent status but is an essential part of each
Standard and Recommended Practice in which the
term is used, since a change in the meaning of the
term would affect the specification.
2.— Material approved by the Council for publication in
association with the Standards and Recommended Practices:
a) Forewords comprising historical and explanatory
material based on the action of the Council and
including an explanation of the obligations of States
with regard to the application of the Standards and
Recommended Practices ensuing from the
Convention and the Resolution of Adoption.
b) Introductions comprising explanatory material
introduced at the beginning of parts, chapters or
sections of the Annex to assist in the understanding
of the application of the text.
c) Notes included in the text, where appropriate, to give
factual information or references bearing on the
Standards or Recommended Practices in question,
but not constituting part of the Standards or
Recommended Practices.
d) Attachments comprising material supplementary to
the Standards and Recommended Practices, or
included as a guide to their application.
This Annex has been adopted in five languages — English,
Arabic, French, Russian and Spanish. Each Contracting State
is requested to select one of those texts for the purpose of
national implementation and for other effects provided for in
the Convention, either through direct use or through translation
into its own national language, and to notify the Organization
accordingly.
The following practice has been adhered to in order to
indicate at a glance the status of each statement: Standards
have been printed in light face roman; Recommended Practices
have been printed in light face italics, the status being
indicated by the prefix Recommendation; Notes have been
printed in light face italics, the status being indicated by the
prefix Note.
Any reference to a portion of this document which is
identified by a number includes all subdivisions of that portion.
6. Foreword Annex 17 — Security
(vii) 1/8/97
Table A. Amendments to Annex 17
Amendment Source(s) Subject(s)
Adopted
Effective
Applicable
1st Edition Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolutions A17-10
and A18-10
— 22 March 1974
22 August 1974
27 February 1975
1 Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A21-23
Change in status of paragraphs 3.1.2 and 5.1.2 to a Standard;
compilation and dissemination of information related to an aircraft
being subjected to an act of unlawful interference.
31 March 1976
31 July 1976
30 December 1976
2 Proposals of some
States and Council
action in pursuance of
Assembly Resolution
A22-17
Transfer of specifications appearing in Chapter 9 of Annex 9 —
Facilitation (Seventh Edition) to Annex 17; new provision in Chapter
5 concerning measures to be taken to control transfer and transit
passengers and their cabin baggage; and amplification of the Note to
paragraph 5.2.4 (Annex 17, Chapter 5) on measures and procedures to
prevent unauthorized access to specified areas on an aerodrome.
15 December 1977
15 April 1978
10 August 1978
3 Proposals of some
States and the
Secretariat and Council
action in pursuance of
Assembly Resolution
A22-17
Specifications were added on the review of the level of threat by
States, the development of training programmes, the isolation of
security processed passengers, the inspection of aircraft for concealed
weapons or other dangerous devices and the adoption of measures for
the safety of passengers and crew of unlawfully diverted aircraft. A
number of specifications were amplified and the status of one was
changed to a Standard, related to the segregation and special guarding
of aircraft liable to attack during stopovers.
13 December 1978
13 April 1979
29 November 1979
4
(2nd Edition)
Proposals of some
States and an
international
organization and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A22-17
A specification was added on the transportation of persons in custody,
and two specifications revised to provide for aircraft which were
leased, chartered or interchanged. The status of a specification dealing
with the safety of passengers and crew of an aircraft subjected to an act
of unlawful interference was changed to a Standard; the provisions of
a specification dealing with the prevention of sabotage were amplified
and Chapter 1. — Applicability, deleted.
15 June 1981
15 October 1981
26 November 1981
5 Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
and Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A22-17
The Note to Chapter 1 — Definitions was deleted. A specification
setting out the action required for the transportation of weapons on
board aircraft by law enforcement and other duly authorized persons
was modified. A specification on the carriage of weapons in all other
cases was added and the note to a specification dealing with the
safeguarding of unattended aircraft was clarified.
30 November 1984
14 April 1985
21 November 1985
6
(3rd Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
an Ad Hoc Group of
Experts — Unlawful
Interference and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A22-17
On the instruction of the Council this amendment was undertaken as a
matter of urgency by the Committee on Unlawful Interference with the
assistance of an Ad Hoc Group of Experts on aviation security which
had been appointed on the instruction of the Council. As a
consequence 11 new specifications were introduced into the Annex
and 19 specifications were adopted as Standards.
Special effective and applicable dates for 5.1.4 are shown in the
adjacent column.
The Council recommended that those States that are able to implement
the substance of 5.1.4 do so as soon as it is feasible and practicable
before the applicable date.
19 December 1985
19 March 1986
19 May 1986
19 October 1987
19 December 1987
7. Annex 17 — Security Foreword
1/8/97 (viii)
7
(4th Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security
Panel and Council
action in pursuance of
Assembly Resolution
A26-7
This amendment includes: a) a reorganization of the chapters of the
Annex directed at a rationalization of the sequence of objectives,
obligations and necessary actions relating to organization, preventive
security measures and management of response; b) the introduction of
important new provisions to reflect developments and assist States in
confronting new situations which arose from grave acts of unlawful
interference against civil aviation, since the last revision of Annex 17
in 1985; and c) the amendment or fine tuning of existing provisions
consequential to a) and b) above, as well as to reflect the experience
gained in the implementation of such measures.
22 June 1989
30 October 1989
16 November 1989
8
(5th Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security
Panel (AVSECP) and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A27-7
This amendment includes the introduction of important new
provisions in relation to the comprehensive security screening of
checked baggage, security control over cargo, courier and express
parcels and mail, variations to procedures relating to security
programmes, pre-flight checks of international aircraft, and measures
relating to the incorporation of security consideration into airport
design for the purpose of assisting States in the consistent and uniform
implementation of such measures.
11 September 1992
16 December 1992
1 April 1993
9
(6th Edition)
Proposals of the
Committee on
Unlawful Interference
with the assistance of
the Aviation Security
Panel (AVSECP) and
Council action in
pursuance of Assembly
Resolution A31-4
This amendment includes the introduction of new provisions in
relation to the pre-employment checks and capabilities of persons
engaged in implementing security controls, baggage accountability
and authorization, measures to be applied to catering supplies and
operators’ stores and supplies, tests for programme effectiveness, and
need for notification to the State of known or presumed destination of
aircraft under a seized condition.
12 November 1996
31 March 1997
1 August 1997
Amendment Source(s) Subject(s)
Adopted
Effective
Applicable
8. ANNEX 17 1 1/8/97
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
CHAPTER 1. DEFINITIONS
Air side. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain
and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is
controlled.
Regulated Agent. An agent, freight forwarder or any other
entity who conducts business with an operator and provides
security controls that are accepted or required by the
appropriate authority in respect of cargo, courier and express
parcels or mail.
Note.— The term “Known shipper” has been amended to
“Regulated Agent” to take into account the different security
controls applied to originators of cargo and those entities that
consolidate and forward cargo shipments via an air carrier.
Screening. The application of technical or other means
which are intended to detect weapons, explosives or other
dangerous devices which may be used to commit an act of
unlawful interference.
Security. A combination of measures and human and
material resources intended to safeguard international civil
aviation against acts of unlawful interference.
Security Control. A means by which the introduction of
weapons, explosives or articles likely to be utilized to commit
an act of unlawful interference can be prevented.
Security Programme. Measures adopted to safeguard
international civil aviation against acts of unlawful
interference.
9. 1/8/97 2 ANNEX 17
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL
2.1 Aims and objectives
2.1.1 The aim of aviation security shall be to safeguard
international civil aviation operations against acts of unlawful
interference.
2.1.2 Safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and
the general public shall be the primary objective of each
Contracting State in all matters related to safeguarding against
acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation.
2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall establish an organ-
ization, develop plans and implement procedures, which
together provide a standardized level of security for the
operation of international flights in normal operating conditions
and which are capable of rapid expansion to meet any increased
security threat.
2.2 Security and facilitation
2.2.1 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should
whenever possible arrange for the security measures and
procedures to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay
to the activities of, international civil aviation.
Note.— Guidance material on achieving international civil
aviation security objectives through application of the
Standards and Recommended Practices in the following
chapters is to be found in the Security Manual for Safeguarding
Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference
(Doc 8973).
10. ANNEX 17 3 1/8/97
CHAPTER 3. ORGANIZATION
3.1 National organization
3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish a national
civil aviation security programme.
3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the
objective of their national civil aviation security programme
shall be to safeguard international civil aviation operations
against acts of unlawful interference, through regulations,
practices and procedures which take account of the safety,
regularity and efficiency of flights.
3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall designate an appro-
priate authority within its administration to be responsible for
the development, implementation and maintenance of the
national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall specify to ICAO the
appropriate authority designated under 3.1.3.
3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant
review the level of threat within its territory taking into
account the international situation and adjust relevant elements
of its national civil aviation security programme accordingly.
3.1.6 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate
authority to establish means of co-ordinating activities
between the departments, agencies and other organizations of
the State concerned with or responsible for various aspects of
the national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.7 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate
authority to define and allocate the tasks for implementation of
the national civil aviation security programme as between
agencies of the State, airport administrations, operators and
others concerned.
3.1.8 Each Contracting State shall ensure the
establishment of an airport security programme, adequate to
the needs of international traffic, for each airport serving
international civil aviation.
3.1.9 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should make available to its airport administrations, airlines
operating in its territory and others concerned, a written
version of the appropriate parts of its national civil aviation
security programme.
3.1.10 Each Contracting State shall arrange for an
authority at each airport serving international civil aviation to
be responsible for co-ordinating the implementation of
security measures.
3.1.11 Each Contracting State shall arrange for the
establishment of airport security committees to advise on the
development and co-ordination of security measures and
procedures at each airport serving international civil aviation.
3.1.12 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should ensure that arrangements are made for the
investigation of suspected sabotage devices or other potential
hazards at airports serving international civil aviation and for
their disposal.
3.1.13 Each Contracting State shall ensure that duly
authorized and suitably trained officers are readily available
for deployment at their airports serving international civil
aviation to assist in dealing with suspected, or actual, cases of
unlawful interference with international civil aviation.
3.1.14 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the
appropriate authority arranges for the supporting facilities
required by the security services at each airport serving
international civil aviation.
3.1.15 Each Contracting State shall ensure that
contingency plans are developed and resources made available
to safeguard airports and ground facilities used in international
civil aviation, against acts of unlawful interference.
3.1.16 Each Contracting State shall require the
appropriate authority to ensure the development and
implementation of training programmes to ensure the
effectiveness of its national civil aviation security programme.
3.1.17 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should ensure that persons engaged to implement security
controls are subject to pre-employment checks, are capable of
fulfilling their duties and are adequately trained.
3.1.18 Each Contracting State shall require operators
providing service from that State to implement a security
programme appropriate to meet the requirements of the
national civil aviation security programme of that State.
3.1.19 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should promote whenever possible research and development
of new security equipment which will better satisfy
international civil aviation security objectives.
11. Annex 17 — Security Chapter 3
1/8/97 4
3.2 International co-operation
3.2.1 Each Contracting State shall co-operate with other
States in order to adapt their respective national civil aviation
security programmes as necessary.
3.2.1.1 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should make available to other States on request a written
version of the appropriate parts of its national civil aviation
security programme.
3.2.1.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should include in its bilateral agreements on air transport a
clause related to aviation security.
3.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that requests
from other States for special security measures in respect of a
specific flight or specified flights by operators of such other
States, as far as may be practicable, are met.
3.2.3 Contracting States shall, as necessary, co-operate
with each other in the development and exchange of
information concerning training programmes.
3.2.4 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should co-operate with other States in the field of research and
development of new security equipment which will better
satisfy international civil aviation security objectives.
12. ANNEX 17 5 1/8/97
CHAPTER 4. PREVENTIVE SECURITY MEASURES
4.1 General objectives of the measures
4.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
prevent weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices
which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference,
the carriage or bearing of which is not authorized, from being
introduced, by any means whatsoever, on board an aircraft
engaged in international civil aviation.
Note.— In applying this Standard, special attention must be
paid to the threat posed by explosive devices concealed in, or
using electric, electronic or battery-operated items carried as
hand baggage and/or in checked baggage. Guidance on this
matter is to be found in the Security Manual for Safeguarding
Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference
(Doc 8973).
4.1.2 Recommendation.— Contracting States should
ensure that the carriage of weapons on board aircraft, by law
enforcement officers and other authorized persons, acting in
the performance of their duties, requires special authorization
in accordance with the laws of the States involved.
4.1.2.1 Recommendation.— Contracting States should
ensure that the carriage of weapons in other cases is allowed
only when an authorized and duly qualified person has
determined that they are not loaded, if applicable, and then
only if stowed in a place inaccessible to any person during
flight time.
4.1.2.2 Recommendation.— Contracting States should
ensure that the pilot-in-command is notified as to the number
of armed persons and their seat location.
4.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that pre-flight
checks of originating aircraft assigned to international flights
include measures to discover suspicious objects or anomalies
that could conceal weapons, explosives or any other dangerous
devices.
4.1.4 Each Contracting State shall establish procedures,
which include notification to the operator, for inspecting
aircraft, when a well-founded suspicion exists that the aircraft
may be the object of an act of unlawful interference, for
concealed weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices.
4.1.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
safeguard aircraft when a well-founded suspicion exists that
the aircraft may be attacked while on the ground and to
provide as much prior notification as possible of the arrival of
such aircraft to airport authorities.
4.1.6 Each Contracting State shall arrange for surveys to
identify security needs, arrange for inspections of the
implementation of security controls, and arrange tests of
security controls to assess their effectiveness.
4.2 Measures relating to passengers
and their cabin baggage
4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that adequate
measures are taken to control transfer and transit passengers
and their cabin baggage to prevent unauthorized articles from
being taken on board aircraft engaged in international civil
aviation operations.
4.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that there is no
possibility of mixing or contact between passengers subjected
to security control and other persons not subjected to such
control after the security screening points at airports serving
international civil aviation have been passed; if mixing or
contact does take place, the passengers concerned and their
cabin baggage shall be re-screened before boarding an aircraft.
4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
ensure that the aircraft operator and the pilot-in-command are
informed when passengers are obliged to travel because they
have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings,
in order that appropriate security measures can be taken.
4.2.4 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should require operators providing service from that State, to
include in their security programmes, measures and
procedures to ensure safety on board their aircraft when
passengers are to be carried who are obliged to travel because
they have been the subject of judicial or administrative
proceedings.
4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall require measures to be
taken in respect of flights under an increased threat to ensure
that disembarking passengers do not leave items on board the
aircraft at transit stops on its airports.
4.3 Measures relating to checked baggage,
cargo and other goods
4.3.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
ensure that operators when providing service from that State
do not transport the baggage of passengers who are not on
board the aircraft unless the baggage separated from
passengers is subjected to other security control measures.
13. Annex 17 — Security Chapter 4
1/8/97 6
4.3.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should establish measures to ensure that operators when
providing a service from that State transport only baggage
which is authorized for carriage.
4.3.3 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should establish measures to ensure that checked baggage is
subjected to screening before being placed on board aircraft.
4.3.4 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
ensure that consignments checked-in as baggage by couriers
for carriage on passenger flights are subjected to specific
security controls in addition to those provided in 4.3.1.
4.3.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
ensure that baggage intended for carriage on passenger flights
and originating from places other than airport check-in
counters is protected from the point it is checked in until it is
placed on board an aircraft.
4.3.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure the
implementation of measures at airports serving international
civil aviation to protect cargo, baggage, mail, stores and
operators’ supplies being moved within an airport and
intended for carriage on an aircraft to safeguard such aircraft
against an act of unlawful interference.
4.3.7 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should establish measures to ensure that catering supplies and
operators’ stores and supplies intended for carriage on
passenger flights are subjected to security controls.
4.3.8 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
ensure that cargo, courier and express parcels and mail
intended for carriage on passenger flights are subjected to
appropriate security controls.
4.3.9 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
ensure that operators do not accept consignments of cargo,
courier and express parcels or mail for carriage on passenger
flights unless the security of such consignments is accounted for
by a regulated agent or such consignments are subjected to other
security controls to meet the requirements of 4.3.8.
4.3.10 Each Contracting State shall require the
establishment of secure storage areas at airports serving
international civil aviation, where mishandled baggage may be
held until forwarded, claimed or disposed of in accordance
with local laws.
4.3.11 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should take the necessary measures to ensure that unidentified
baggage is placed in a protected and isolated area until such
time as it is ascertained that it does not contain any explosives
or other dangerous device.
4.4 Measures relating to access control
4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish procedures
and identification systems to prevent unauthorized access by
persons or vehicles to:
a) the air side of an airport serving international civil aviation;
and
b) other areas important to the security of the airport.
4.4.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to
ensure adequate supervision over the movement of persons to
and from the aircraft and to prevent unauthorized access to
aircraft.
4.5 Measures relating to airport design
Each Contracting State shall ensure that the architectural and
infrastructure-related requirements necessary for the optimum
implementation of international civil aviation security
measures, are integrated into the design and construction of
new facilities and alterations to existing facilities at airports.
14. ANNEX 17 7 1/8/97
CHAPTER 5. MANAGEMENT OF RESPONSE TO ACTS
OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
5.1 Operational aspects of an act
of unlawful interference
5.1.1 Each Contracting State shall take adequate measures
for the safety of passengers and crew of an aircraft which is
subjected to an act of unlawful interference until their journey
can be continued.
5.1.2 Each Contracting State responsible for providing air
traffic services for an aircraft which is the subject of an act of
unlawful interference shall collect all pertinent information on
the flight of that aircraft and transmit that information to all
other States responsible for the Air Traffic Services units
concerned, including those at the airport of known or presumed
destination, so that timely and appropriate safeguarding action
may be taken en route and at the aircraft’s known, likely or
possible destination.
5.1.3 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should ensure that information received as a consequence of
action taken in accordance with 5.1.2 is distributed locally to
the Air Traffic Services units concerned, the appropriate
airport administrations, the operator and others concerned as
soon as practicable.
5.1.4 Each Contracting State shall provide such assistance
to an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure, including
the provision of navigation aids, air traffic services and
permission to land as may be necessitated by the
circumstances.
5.1.5 Each Contracting State shall take measures, as it may
find practicable, to ensure that an aircraft subjected to an act of
unlawful seizure which has landed in its territory is detained on
the ground unless its departure is necessitated by the overriding
duty to protect human life, recognizing the importance of
consultations, wherever practicable, between the State where
that aircraft has landed and the State of the operator of the
aircraft, and notification by the State where the aircraft has
landed to the States of assumed or stated destination.
5.2 Reports
5.2.1 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should exchange information with other States as considered
appropriate, at the same time supplying such information to
ICAO, related to plans, designs, equipment, methods and
procedures for safeguarding international civil aviation
against acts of unlawful interference.
5.2.2 A Contracting State in which an aircraft subjected to
an act of unlawful interference has landed shall notify by the
most expeditious means the State of Registry of the aircraft
and the State of the operator of the landing and shall similarly
transmit by the most expeditious means all other relevant
information to:
a) the two above-mentioned States;
b) each State whose citizens suffered fatalities or injuries;
c) each State whose citizens were detained as hostages;
d) each Contracting State whose citizens are known to be on
board the aircraft; and
e) the International Civil Aviation Organization.
5.2.3 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of
unlawful interference shall require its appropriate authority to
re-evaluate security measures and procedures in respect of
international flights which have been the subject of unlawful
interference and take action necessary to remedy weaknesses
so as to prevent recurrence.
5.2.4 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of
unlawful interference shall provide ICAO with all pertinent
information concerning the security aspects of the act of
unlawful interference as soon as practicable after the act is
resolved.
5.2.5 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State
should adopt measures to ensure that persons acting in an
official capacity do not divulge confidential information
concerning an act of unlawful interference if such information
is likely to jeopardize the safety of international civil aviation.
15. ANNEX 17 9 1/8/97
ATTACHMENT TO ANNEX 17
CHAPTER 3. GENERAL RULES
. . . . . .
3.7 Unlawful interference
An aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference
shall endeavour to notify the appropriate ATS unit of this fact,
any significant circumstances associated therewith and any
deviation from the current flight plan necessitated by the
circumstances, in order to enable the ATS unit to give priority
to the aircraft and to minimize conflict with other aircraft.
Note 1.— Responsibility of ATS units in situations of
unlawful interference is contained in Annex 11.
Note 2.— Guidance material for use when unlawful
interference occurs and the aircraft is unable to notify an ATS
unit of this fact is contained in Attachment B to this Annex.
Note 3.— Action to be taken by SSR equipped aircraft
which are being subjected to unlawful interference is
contained in Annex 11, the PANS-RAC (Doc 4444) and the
PANS-OPS (Doc 8168).
. . . . . .
ATTACHMENT B. UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
1. General
The following procedures are intended as guidance for use by
aircraft when unlawful interference occurs and the aircraft is
unable to notify an ATS unit of this fact.
2. Procedures
2.1 Unless considerations aboard the aircraft dictate
otherwise, the pilot-in-command should attempt to continue
flying on the assigned track and at the assigned cruising level
at least until able to notify an ATS unit or within radar
coverage.
2.2 When an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful
interference must depart from its assigned track or its assigned
cruising level without being able to make radiotelephony
contact with ATS, the pilot-in-command should, whenever
possible:
a) attempt to broadcast warnings on the VHF emergency
frequency and other appropriate frequencies, unless
considerations aboard the aircraft dictate otherwise.
Other equipment such as on-board transponders, data
links, etc., should also be used when it is advantageous
to do so and circumstances permit; and
b) proceed in accordance with applicable special
procedures for in-flight contingencies, where such
procedures have been established and promulgated in
Doc 7030 — Regional Supplementary Procedures; or
c) if no applicable regional procedures have been
established, proceed at a level which differs from the
cruising levels normally used for IFR flight in the area
by 300 m (1 000 ft) if above FL 290 or by 150 m
(500 ft) if below FL 290.
Note.— Action to be taken by an aircraft which is
intercepted while being subject to an act of unlawful
interference is prescribed in 3.8 of this Annex.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 2 — RULES OF THE AIR
16. Annex 17 — Security Attachment
1/8/97 10
CHAPTER 13. SECURITY*
13.1 Security of the flight crew compartment
In all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew
compartment door, this door shall be capable of being locked.
It shall be lockable from within the compartment only.
13.2 Aeroplane search procedure checklist
An operator shall ensure that there is on board a checklist of
the procedures to be followed in searching for a bomb in case
of suspected sabotage. The checklist shall be supported by
guidance on the course of action to be taken should a bomb or
suspicious object be found and information on the least-risk
bomb location specific to the aeroplane.
13.3 Training programmes
13.3.1 An operator shall establish and maintain a training
programme which enables crew members to act in the most
appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of
unlawful interference.
13.3.2 An operator shall also establish and maintain a
training programme to acquaint appropriate employees with
preventive measures and techniques in relation to passengers,
baggage, cargo, mail, equipment, stores and supplies intended
for carriage on an aeroplane so that they contribute to the
prevention of acts of sabotage or other forms of unlawful
interference.
13.4 Reporting acts of unlawful interference
Following an act of unlawful interference the pilot-in-
command shall submit, without delay, a report of such an act
to the designated local authority.
13.5 Miscellaneous
13.5.1 Recommendation.— Specialized means of
attenuating and directing the blast should be provided for use
at the least-risk bomb location.
13.5.2 Recommendation.— Where an operator accepts
the carriage of weapons removed from passengers, the
aeroplane should have provision for stowing such weapons in
a place so that they are inaccessible to any person during
flight time.
* In the context of this Chapter, the word “security” is used in the
sense of prevention of illicit acts against civil aviation.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 6 — OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT
PART I — INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT — AEROPLANES
17. Attachment Annex 17 — Security
11 1/8/97
CHAPTER 1. DEFINITIONS AND
APPLICABILITY
A. Definitions
. . . . . .
Security equipment. Devices of a specialized nature for use,
individually or as part of a system, in the prevention or
detection of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation
and its facilities.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 2. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
OF AIRCRAFT
A. General
. . . . . .
2.2 Contracting States shall make provision whereby
procedures for the clearance of aircraft, including those
normally applied for aviation security purposes, as well as
those appropriate for narcotics control, will be applied and
carried out in such a manner as to retain the advantage of
speed inherent in air transport.
Note 1.— With respect to application of aviation security
measures, attention is drawn to Annex 17 and to the ICAO
Security Manual.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 3. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
OF PERSONS AND THEIR BAGGAGE
A. General
. . . . . .
3.2 Contracting States shall make provision whereby the
procedures for clearance of persons travelling by air, including
those normally applied for aviation security purposes, as well
as those appropriate for narcotics control, will be applied and
carried out in such a manner as to retain the advantage of
speed inherent in air transport.
Note 1.— With respect to application of aviation security
measures, attention is drawn to Annex 17 and to the ICAO
Security Manual.
Note 2.— With respect to application of appropriate
narcotics control measures, attention is drawn to the relevant
ICAO publication (currently in preparation).
. . . . . .
C. Departure Requirements and Procedures
. . . . . .
3.29 Recommended Practice.— Contracting States
should, in conformity with their respective regulations,
endeavour to reduce the documentation required to be
produced by passengers departing from their territories to a
valid passport or other acceptable form of identity document.
Note.— It is not the intent of the above provision to
discourage Contracting States, who wish to be more liberal,
from accepting official documents of identity such as expired
passports, national registrations cards, seafarers’ identity
documents, alien resident permits, crew member certificates,
etc. in lieu of a valid passport.
3.30 Recommended Practice.— Contracting States
should not require the presentation of baggage of passengers
departing from their territory except for aviation security
measures, or in special circumstances.
Note.— This provision is not intended to prevent the
application of appropriate narcotics control measures.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 4. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE
OF CARGO AND OTHER ARTICLES
A. General
. . . . . .
4.2 Contracting States shall make provisions whereby
procedures for the clearance of goods carried by air and for
the interchange of air cargo with surface transport, including
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 9 — FACILITATION
18. Annex 17 — Security Attachment
1/8/97 12
those normally applied for aviation security purposes as well
as those appropriate for narcotics control, will be applied and
carried out in such a manner as to retain the advantage of
speed inherent in air transport and to avoid delay.
Note 1.— With respect to application of aviation security
measures, attention is drawn to Annex 17 and to the ICAO
Security Manual.
Note 2.— With respect to application of appropriate
narcotics control measures, attention is drawn to the relevant
ICAO publication (currently in preparation).
. . . . . .
C. Clearance of Export Cargo
. . . . . .
4.11 Contracting States shall make arrangements
consistent with aviation security, as well as those appropriate
for narcotics control, which permit operators to select and load
cargo, including unaccompanied baggage, and stores on
outbound aircraft up to the time of departure.
. . . . . .
4.13 Except for reasons of aviation security Contracting
States shall not normally require physical examination of
cargo, including unaccompanied baggage, to be exported by
air.
Note.— This provision is not intended to prevent authorities
from examining goods exported under certain conditions, e.g.
under bond, licence or drawback, nor is it intended to preclude
other essential examinations including any appropriate
narcotics control measures.
. . . . . .
4.15 Contracting States shall permit cargo, including
unaccompanied baggage which is to be exported by air, to be
presented for clearance purposes at any approved customs
office. Transfer from the first office to the air customs office of
the airport where the cargo, including unaccompanied
baggage, is to be laden on the aircraft, shall be effected in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the laws and
regulations of the State concerned. Such procedure shall be as
simple as possible, making due allowance for aviation security
requirements, and any appropriate narcotics control measures.
. . . . . .
G. Aircraft Equipment, Stores and Parts
. . . . . .
4.44 Recommended Practice.— Ground equipment and
security equipment imported into the territory of a
Contracting State by an airline of another Contracting State
for use within the limits of an international airport in
connexion with the establishment or maintenance of an
international service operated by that airline should be
admitted free of customs duties and, as far as possible, other
taxes and charges, subject to compliance with the regulations
of the Contracting State concerned. Such regulations should
not unreasonably interfere with the necessary use by the
airline concerned of such ground equipment and security
equipment.
Note.— It is the intent of this provision that items such as
the following should be admissible under the above provision,
and it is not desired to discourage a Contracting State from
allowing once-admitted items to be used by another foreign
airline or at a location other than an international airport:
. . . . . .
e) Security equipment:
— weapon-detecting devices;
— explosives-detecting devices;
— intrusion-detecting devices.
f) Component parts for incorporation into security
equipment.
. . . . . .
4.47 Contracting States shall establish procedures for
airlines and/or operators of other Contracting States allowing
the prompt entry into or departure from their territories of
aircraft equipment, spare parts, ground, training and security
equipment, whether or not they are free of customs duties and
other taxes and charges, under the provisions of this Annex or
any other arrangements. Contracting States shall grant prompt
clearance for the importation and exportation of such goods
upon completion of simplified documentary procedures by the
airlines or operators concerned. These arrangements shall not
extend to goods intended for general sale, food, beverages and
tobacco.
. . . . . .
4.49 Contracting States shall allow the loan of aircraft
equipment and spare parts and security equipment and spare
parts between airlines, when these are used in connexion with
the establishment or maintenance of scheduled international
air services, without payment of customs duties or other
taxes or charges subject only to control measures which may
provide that repayment of the loan is normally to be
accomplished by means of the return of articles that are
19. Attachment Annex 17 — Security
13 1/8/97
qualitatively and technically similar and of the same origin,
and in any event that no profit-making transaction is
involved.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 6. INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS —
FACILITIES AND SERVICES FOR TRAFFIC
A. General
6.1 Contracting States shall take all necessary steps to
secure the co-operation of operators and airport
administrations in ensuring that satisfactory facilities and
services are provided for rapid handling and clearance of
passengers, crew, baggage, cargo and mail at their international
airports. Such facilities and services shall be flexible and
capable of expansion to meet anticipated growth in traffic
volume, or increased security measures during higher threat
situations, while permitting appropriate narcotics control
measures.
Note 1.— With respect to the application of aviation
security measures, attention is drawn to the relevant
specification in Annex 17, Chapter 2 [2.2.1].
Note 2.— With respect to application of appropriate
narcotics control measures, attention is drawn to the relevant
ICAO publication (currently in preparation).
. . . . . .
B. Airport Traffic Flow Arrangements
. . . . . .
III. Outbound Passengers, Crew and Baggage
. . . . . .
6.21 Recommended Practice.— In order to facilitate
aircraft departure, Contracting States, in examining
passengers as a security measure, or for purposes of
narcotics control as appropriate, should, to the extent
feasible, utilize specialized equipment in conducting such
examinations so as to reduce materially the number of
persons to be searched by other means.
Note 1.— The use of radiological techniques for screening
passengers should be avoided.
Note 2.— Privacy should be assured when a thorough
physical search is to be carried out. If special rooms are not
available, portable screens may be used for this purpose.
6.22 Recommended Practice.— In order to facilitate
aircraft departure, Contracting States, in examining baggage
of passengers departing from their territory as a security
measure, or for narcotics control purposes as appropriate,
should, to the extent feasible, utilize specialized equipment in
conducting such examinations so as to reduce materially the
amount of baggage to be searched by other means.
. . . . . .
V. Transit and Transfer of
Passengers and Crew
. . . . . .
6.33 Recommended Practice.— Contracting States
should ensure that physical facilities at airports are provided,
where the volume and nature of the traffic so require, whereby
crew and passengers in direct transit on the same aircraft, or
transferring to other flights, may remain temporarily without
being subject to inspection formalities, except for aviation
security measures, or in special circumstances.
Note.— This provision is not intended to prevent the
application of appropriate narcotics control measures.
. . . . . .
VII. Cargo and Mail Handling and
Clearance Facilities
. . . . . .
6.44 Recommended Practice.— Adequate space should
be available in cargo terminals for storage and handling of air
cargo, including building up and breaking down of pallet and
container loads, located next to the customs area and easily
accessible to authorized persons and vehicles from both the
apron and the landside road. Such arrangements should take
into account aviation security and appropriate narcotics
control measures.
. . . . . .
6.46 Recommended Practice.— Cargo terminals should
be equipped with storage facilities as appropriate for special
cargo (e.g. valuable goods, perishable shipments, human
remains, radioactive and other dangerous goods, as well as
live animals). Those areas of cargo terminals in which cargo
and mail are stored overnight or for extended periods prior to
shipment by air should be protected against access by
unauthorized persons.
20. Annex 17 — Security Attachment
1/8/97 14
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 8. OTHER FACILITATION
PROVISIONS
A. Bonds and Exemption from
Requisition or Seizure
. . . . . .
8.2 Recommended Practice.— The aircraft, ground
equipment, security equipment, spare parts and technical
supplies of an airline located in a Contracting State (other
than the Contracting State in which such airline is established)
for use in the operation of an international air service serving
such Contracting State, should be exempt from the laws of such
Contracting State authorizing the requisition or seizure of
aircraft, equipment, parts or supplies for public use, without
prejudice to the right of seizure for breaches of the laws of the
Contracting State concerned.
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL
. . . . . .
2.1 SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR (SSR)
. . . . . .
2.1.4 Mode A reply codes (information pulses)
. . . . . .
2.1.4.2.1 Code 7700 to provide recognition of an aircraft in an emergency.
. . . . . .
2.1.4.2.3 Code 7500 to provide recognition of an aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference.
2.1.4.3 Appropriate provisions shall be made in ground decoding equipment to ensure immediate recognition of Mode A codes
7500, 7600 and 7700.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 10 — AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
VOLUME IV (SURVEILLANCE RADAR AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS)
21. Attachment Annex 17 — Security
15 1/8/97
CHAPTER 2. GENERAL
. . . . . .
2.22 Service to aircraft in the event
of an emergency
2.22.1 An aircraft known or believed to be in a state of
emergency, including being subjected to unlawful inter-
ference, shall be given maximum consideration, assistance and
priority over other aircraft as may be necessitated by the
circumstances.
Note.— To indicate that it is in a state of emergency, an
aircraft equipped with an SSR transponder might operate the
equipment as follows:
a) on Mode A, Code 7700; or
b) on Mode A, Code 7500, to indicate specifically that it is
being subjected to unlawful interference.
2.22.2 When an occurrence of unlawful interference with
an aircraft takes place or is suspected, ATS units shall attend
promptly to requests by the aircraft. Information pertinent to
the safe conduct of the flight shall continue to be transmitted
and necessary action shall be taken to expedite the conduct of
all phases of the flight, specially the safe landing of the
aircraft.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 5. ALERTING SERVICE
5.1 Application
5.1.1 Alerting service shall be provided:
. . . . . .
c) to any aircraft known or believed to be the subject of
unlawful interference.
. . . . . .
5.2 Notification of rescue
co-ordination centres
5.2.1 Without prejudice to any other circumstances that
may render such notification advisable, air traffic services
units shall, except as prescribed in 5.5.1, notify rescue co-
ordination centres immediately an aircraft is considered to be
in a state of emergency in accordance with the following:
. . . . . .
b) Alert phase when:
. . . . . .
except when evidence exists that would allay
apprehension as to the safety of the aircraft and its
occupants, or when
4) an aircraft is known or believed to be the subject of
unlawful interference.
. . . . . .
5.5 Information to the operator
5.5.1 When an area control or a flight information centre
decides that an aircraft is in the uncertainty or the alert phase,
it shall, when practicable, advise the operator prior to notifying
the rescue co-ordination centre.
Note.— If an aircraft is in the distress phase, the rescue co-
ordination centre has to be notified immediately in accordance
with 5.2.1.
5.5.2 All information notified to the rescue co-ordination
centre by an area control or flight information centre shall,
whenever practicable, also be communicated, without delay, to
the operator.
5.6 Information to aircraft operating in
the vicinity of an aircraft in
a state of emergency
5.6.1 When it has been established by an air traffic
services unit that an aircraft is in a state of emergency, other
aircraft known to be in the vicinity of the aircraft involved
shall, except as provided in 5.6.2, be informed of the nature of
the emergency as soon as practicable.
5.6.2 When an air traffic services unit knows or believes
that an aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference, no
reference shall be made in ATS air-ground communications to
the nature of the emergency unless it has first been referred to
in communications from the aircraft involved and it is certain
that such reference will not aggravate the situation.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 11 — AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES
22. Annex 17 — Security Attachment
1/8/97 16
CHAPTER 5. INVESTIGATION
. . . . . .
ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE
INVESTIGATION
. . . . . .
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE CONDUCTING
THE INVESTIGATION
. . . . . .
Informing aviation security authorities
5.11 If, in the course of an investigation it becomes
known, or it is suspected, that an act of unlawful interference
was involved, the investigator-in-charge shall immediately
initiate action to ensure that the aviation security authorities of
the State(s) concerned are so informed.
CHAPTER 3. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
. . . . . .
3.13 Isolated aircraft parking position
3.13.1 An isolated aircraft parking position shall be
designated or the aerodrome control tower shall be advised of
an area or areas suitable for the parking of an aircraft which is
known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference,
or which for other reasons needs isolation from normal
aerodrome activities.
3.13.2 Recommendation.— The isolated aircraft parking
position should be located at the maximum distance
practicable and in any case never less than 100 m from other
parking positions, buildings or public areas, etc. Care should
be taken to ensure that the position is not located over
underground utilities such as gas and aviation fuel and, to the
extent feasible, electrical or communication cables.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 5. VISUAL AIDS FOR NAVIGATION
. . . . . .
5.3 Lights
. . . . . .
5.3.20 Apron floodlighting
(see also 5.3.15.1 and 5.3.16.1)
Application
5.3.20.1 Recommendation.— Apron floodlighting should
be provided on an apron, and on a designated isolated aircraft
parking position, intended to be used at night.
Note 1.— The designation of an isolated aircraft parking
position is specified in 3.13.
Note 2.— Guidance on apron floodlighting is given in the
Aerodrome Design Manual, Part 4.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 13 — AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 14 — AERODROMES,
VOLUME I — AERODROME DESIGN AND OPERATIONS
23. Attachment Annex 17 — Security
17 1/8/97
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 8. EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATIONS
8.1 Secondary power supply
General
Application
8.1.1 Recommendation.— A secondary power supply
should be provided, capable of supplying the power
requirements of at least the aerodrome facilities listed below:
. . . . . .
e) essential security lighting, if provided in accordance
with 8.5;
. . . . . .
8.4 Fencing
Application
. . . . . .
8.4.2 Recommendation.— A fence or other suitable
barrier should be provided on an aerodrome to deter the
inadvertent or premeditated access of an unauthorized person
onto a non-public area of the aerodrome.
Note 1.— This is intended to include the barring of sewers,
ducts, tunnels, etc., where necessary to prevent access.
Note 2.— Special measures may be required to prevent the
access of an unauthorized person to runways or taxiways
which overpass public roads.
8.4.3 Recommendation.— Suitable means of protection
should be provided to deter the inadvertent or premeditated
access of unauthorized persons into ground installations and
facilities essential for the safety of civil aviation located off the
aerodrome.
Location
8.4.4 Recommendation.— The fence or barrier should
be located so as to separate the movement area and other
facilities or zones on the aerodrome vital to the safe operation
of aircraft from areas open to public access.
8.4.5 Recommendation.— When greater security is
thought necessary, a cleared area should be provided on both
sides of the fence or barrier to facilitate the work of patrols
and to make trespassing more difficult. Consideration should
be given to the provision of a perimeter road inside the
aerodrome fencing for the use of both maintenance personnel
and security patrols.
8.5 Security lighting
Recommendation.— At an aerodrome where it is deemed
desirable for security reasons, a fence or other barrier
provided for the protection of international civil aviation and
its facilities should be illuminated at a minimum essential
level. Consideration should be given to locating lights so that
the ground area on both sides of the fence or barrier,
particularly at access points, is illuminated.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 9. EMERGENCY AND OTHER SERVICES
9.1 Aerodrome emergency planning
General
Introductory Note.— Aerodrome emergency planning is the
process of preparing an aerodrome to cope with an emergency
occurring at the aerodrome or in its vicinity. The objective of
aerodrome emergency planning is to minimize the effects of an
emergency, particularly in respect of saving lives and
maintaining aircraft operations. The aerodrome emergency
plan sets forth the procedures for co-ordinating the response of
different aerodrome agencies (or services) and of those
agencies in the surrounding community that could be of
assistance in responding to the emergency. Guidance material
to assist the appropriate authority in establishing aerodrome
emergency planning is given in the Airport Services Manual,
Part 7.
9.1.1 An aerodrome emergency plan shall be established
at an aerodrome, commensurate with the aircraft operations
and other activities conducted at the aerodrome.
9.1.2 The aerodrome emergency plan shall provide for the
co-ordination of the actions to be taken in an emergency
occurring at an aerodrome or in its vicinity.
Note.— Examples of emergencies are: aircraft emerg-
encies, sabotage including bomb threats, unlawfully seized
aircraft, dangerous goods occurrences, building fires and
natural disasters.
24. Annex 17 — Security Attachment
1/8/97 18
9.1.3 The plan shall co-ordinate the response or
participation of all existing agencies which, in the opinion of
the appropriate authority, could be of assistance in responding
to an emergency.
Note.— Examples of agencies are:
— on the aerodrome: air traffic control unit, rescue and fire
fighting services, aerodrome administration, medical
and ambulance services, aircraft operators, security
services, and police;
— off the aerodrome: fire departments, police, medical and
ambulance services, hospitals, military, and harbour
patrol or coast guard.
9.1.4 Recommendation.— The plan should provide for
co-operation and co-ordination with the rescue co-ordination
centre, as necessary.
9.1.5 Recommendation.— The aerodrome emergency
plan document should include at least the following:
a) types of emergencies planned for;
b) agencies involved in the plan;
c) responsibility and role of each agency, the emergency
operations centre and the command post, for each type
of emergency;
d) information on names and telephone numbers of offices
or people to be contacted in the case of a particular
emergency; and
e) a grid map of the aerodrome and its immediate vicinity.
Emergency operations centre and command post
9.1.6 Recommendation.— A fixed emergency operations
centre and a mobile command post should be available for use
during an emergency.
9.1.7 Recommendation.— The emergency operations
centre should be a part of the aerodrome facilities and should
be responsible for the over-all co-ordination and general
direction of the response to an emergency.
9.1.8 Recommendation.— The command post should be
a facility capable of being moved rapidly to the site of an
emergency, when required, and should undertake the local co-
ordination of those agencies responding to the emergency.
9.1.9 Recommendation.— A person should be assigned
to assume control of the emergency operations centre and,
when appropriate, another person the command post.
Communication system
9.1.10 Recommendation.— Adequate communication
systems linking the command post and the emergency
operations centre with each other and with the participating
agencies should be provided in accordance with the plan and
consistent with the particular requirements of the aerodrome.
Aerodrome emergency exercise
9.1.11 The plan shall contain procedures for periodic
testing of the adequacy of the plan and for reviewing the
results in order to improve its effectiveness.
Note.— The plan includes all participating agencies and
associated equipment.
9.1.12 The plan shall be tested by conducting:
a) a full-scale aerodrome emergency exercise at intervals
not exceeding two years; and
b) partial emergency exercises in the intervening year to
ensure that any deficiencies found during the full-scale
aerodrome emergency exercise have been corrected; and
reviewed thereafter, or after an actual emergency, so as to
correct any deficiency found during such exercises or actual
emergency.
Note.— The purpose of a full-scale exercise is to ensure the
adequacy of the plan to cope with different types of
emergencies. The purpose of a partial exercise is to ensure the
adequacy of the response to individual participating agencies
and components of the plan, such as the communications
system.
25. Attachment Annex 17 — Security
19 1/8/97
CHAPTER 2. APPLICABILITY
. . . . . .
2.2 Dangerous Goods Technical Instructions
2.2.1 Each Contracting State shall take the necessary
measures to achieve compliance with the detailed provisions
contained in the Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport
of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284), approved, issued and
amended in accordance with the procedure established by the
ICAO Council.
2.2.2 Recommendation.— Each Contracting State should
inform ICAO of difficulties encountered in the application of
the Technical Instructions and of any amendments which it
would be desirable to make to them.
. . . . . .
CHAPTER 10. ESTABLISHMENT OF
TRAINING PROGRAMMES
Dangerous goods training programmes shall be established
and updated as provided for in the Technical Instructions.
PART 6 — TRAINING
Chapter 1
TRAINING
. . . . . .
1.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF
TRAINING PROGRAMMES
1.1.1 Initial and recurrent dangerous goods training
programmes must be established and maintained by or on
behalf of:
. . . . . .
g) agencies engaged in the security screening of passengers
and their baggage.
EXTRACTS FROM ANNEX 18 — THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF
DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR
EXTRACTS FROM DOC 9284 — TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS BY AIR
26. Annex 17 — Security Attachment
1/8/97 20
PART III. AREA CONTROL SERVICE
SEPARATION OF AIRCRAFT IN THE
PROVISION OF AREA CONTROL SERVICE
1. General provisions for the separation
of controlled traffic
. . . . . .
1.3 Larger separations than the specified minima should
be applied whenever wake turbulence or exceptional
circumstances such as unlawful interference call for extra
precautions. This should be done with due regard to all
relevant factors so as to avoid impeding the flow of air traffic
by the application of excessive separations.
Note 1.— Unlawful interference with an aircraft constitutes
a case of exceptional circumstances which might require the
application of separations larger than the specified minima,
between the aircraft being subjected to unlawful interference
and other aircraft.
. . . . . .
EMERGENCY AND
COMMUNICATION FAILURE
16. Emergency procedures
16.1 General
16.1.1 The various circumstances surrounding each
emergency situation preclude the establishment of exact
detailed procedures to be followed. The procedures outlined
herein are intended as a general guide to air traffic services
personnel. Air traffic control units shall maintain full and
complete co-ordination, and personnel shall use their best
judgement in handling emergency situations.
Note.— To indicate that it is in a state of emergency, an
aircraft equipped with an SSR transponder might operate the
equipment as follows:
a) on Mode A, Code 7700; or
b) on Mode A, Code 7500, to indicate specifically that it is
being subjected to unlawful interference.
16.2 Priority
16.2.1 An aircraft known or believed to be in a state of
emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference,
shall be given priority over other aircraft.
16.3 Unlawful interference
16.3.1 Air traffic services personnel shall be prepared to
recognize any indication of the occurrence of unlawful
interference with an aircraft.
16.3.2 Whenever unlawful interference with an aircraft is
suspected, and where automatic distinct display of SSR Mode
A Code 7500 and Code 7700 is not provided, the radar
controller shall attempt to verify his suspicion by setting the
SSR decoder to Mode A Code 7500 and thereafter to
Code 7700.
Note.— An aircraft equipped with an SSR transponder is
expected to operate the transponder on Mode A Code 7500 to
indicate specifically that it is the subject of unlawful
interference. The aircraft may operate the transponder on
Mode A Code 7700, to indicate that it is threatened by grave
and imminent danger, and requires immediate assistance.
16.3.3 Whenever unlawful interference with an aircraft is
known or suspected, ATS units shall promptly attend to
requests by or to anticipated needs of the aircraft, including
requests for relevant information relating to air navigation
facilities, procedures and services along the route of flight and
at any aerodrome of intended landing, and shall take such
action as is necessary to expedite the conduct of all phases of
the flight.
16.3.3.1 ATS units shall also:
a) transmit, and continue to transmit, information pertinent to
the safe conduct of the flight, without expecting a reply
from the aircraft;
b) monitor and plot the progress of the flight with the means
available, and co-ordinate transfer of control with adjacent
ATS units without requiring transmissions or other
responses from the aircraft, unless communication with the
aircraft remains normal;
EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES —
RULES OF THE AIR AND AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES (DOC 4444)
27. Attachment Annex 17 — Security
21 1/8/97
c) inform and continue to keep informed, appropriate ATS
units, including those in adjacent flight information regions,
which may be concerned with the progress of the flight;
Note.— In applying this provision, account must be
taken of all the factors which may affect the progress of the
flight, including fuel endurance and the possibility of
sudden changes in route and destination. The objective is to
provide, as far in advance as is practicable in the
circumstances, each ATS unit with appropriate information
as to the expected or possible penetration of the aircraft
into its area of responsibility.
d) notify:
iii) the operator or his designated representative;
iii) the appropriate rescue co-ordination centre in
accordance with appropriate alerting procedures;
iii) the designated security authority;
Note.— It is assumed that the designated security
authority and/or the operator will in turn notify other
parties concerned in accordance with pre-established
procedures.
e) relay appropriate messages, relating to the circumstances
associated with the unlawful interference, between the
aircraft and designated authorities.
. . . . . .
PART V. AERODROME CONTROL SERVICE
. . . . . .
CONTROL OF AERODROME TRAFFIC
. . . . . .
10. Control of taxiing aircraft
. . . . . .
Note.— See Figure V-4.
10.4 An aircraft known or believed to be the subject of
unlawful interference or which for other reasons needs
isolation from normal aerodrome activities shall be cleared to
the designated isolated parking position. Where such an
isolated parking position has not been designated, or if the
designated position is not available, the aircraft shall be
cleared to a position within the area or areas selected by prior
agreement with the aerodrome authority. The taxi clearance
shall specify the taxi route to be followed to the parking
position. This route shall be selected with a view to
minimizing any security risks to the public, other aircraft and
installations at the aerodrome.
Note.— See Annex 14, Volume I, Chapter 3.
28. Annex 17 — Security Attachment
1/8/97 22
PART VIII. — SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE RADAR (SSR)
TRANSPONDER OPERATING PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 1. OPERATION OF TRANSPONDERS
. . . . . .
1.4 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
1.4.1 The pilot of an aircraft encountering a state of
emergency shall set the transponder to Mode A Code 7700
except when previously directed by ATC to operate the
transponder on a specified code. In the latter case the pilot
shall maintain the specified code unless otherwise advised by
ATC.
1.4.2 Notwithstanding the procedures at 1.4.1, a pilot may
select Mode A Code 7700 whenever there is a specific reason
to believe that this would be the best course of action.
. . . . . .
1.6 UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
WITH AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT
1.6.1 Should an aircraft in flight be subjected to unlawful
interference, the pilot-in-command shall endeavour to set the
transponder to Mode A Code 7500 to give indication of the
situation unless circumstances warrant the use of Code 7700.
1.6.2 A pilot, having selected Mode A Code 7500 and
subsequently requested to confirm this code by ATC in
accordance with 1.1.5 shall, according to circumstances, either
confirm this or not reply at all.
Note.— The absence of a reply from the pilot will be taken
by ATC as an indication that the use of Code 7500 is not due
to an inadvertent false code selection.
— END —
EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES —
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (DOC 8168), VOLUME I — FLIGHT PROCEDURES