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1. A Case of Mistaken Identity
Simon Harley
n his 2004 thesis and 2011 book Dr. Robert L. Davison quotes liberally from a paper entitled
‘The Necessity for Co-ordinating Staff Work Afloat’ in the possession of the National
Archives at Kew. He claims, repeatedly, that it was authored by Rear-Admiral Ernest C. T.
Troubridge, Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, and dated 18 October 1911.1
This article will
examine the veracity of his assertion, first by looking at the passages Dr. Davison reproduced.
First quote:
As an Admiralty memorandum put it, ‘[t]he aim of the following notes is to suggest
on broad lines a scheme of organization for naval staff duties afloat. with a view that
no action which can be foreseen in time of peace shall be lost sight of in the outbreak
of war, while relieving the various C. in C.’s [sic] of any anxiety regarding minor
details.’2
Second quote:
Rear-Admiral Ernest Troubridge, though offering a more balanced perspective, was
equally damning: ‘In practice it is understood that the War Council never meets at all.
The plans exist only in the head of the First Sea Lord. and it is doubtful if the details
are worked out to give effect to them.’3
Third quote:
As Ernest Troubridge, the first Chief of Staff, commented:
These establishments are not utilized to the fullest advantage. At present that are
educational establishments where officers go who have nothing better to do, while
they are awaiting an appointment to a ship &c. The more brilliant officers who ought
to gain by a course of study there usually get sea appointments and pass them by.4
Upon referring to the paper in question we discover that the third quote is actually taken from
an entirely different document from ‘The Necessity for Co-ordinating Staff Work Afloat’.5
Untitled, headed ‘Summary’, it is marked ‘A’.6
The emphasis in the quote is underlined in red
pencil in the original, the perquisite of a First Lord of the Admiralty. ‘A’ is in turn followed by
1
Davison, ‘In Defence of Corporate Competence’ [hereafter Davison], 289, 296, 308.
2
Davison, 289.
3
Davison, 296.
4
Davison, 308.
5
The National Archives [hereafter TNA], ADM 1/8377/120. Docket dated 1 May 1914 entitled ‘The Naval War
Staff: 1911 – 1914’, fo. 3-13.
6
Docket ‘The Naval War Staff’, fo. 14-16.
I

2. documents marked ‘B’ (‘The Organisation of a Naval War Staff’)7
and ‘C’ (‘Proposed Draft of
Memorandum on Training of Officers for the War-Staff of the Navy at the War-College’).8
The alarum bells instantly sound at the mention of Troubridge as Chief of Staff in October
1911. At the time he was Naval Secretary to the First Lord, and was not appointed Chief of the
Admiralty War Staff until 8 January 1912. More importantly Winston Churchill, who was
appointed First Lord of the Admiralty with a special remit to establish a naval staff, did not
take office until 24 October.9
Crucially, on referring to the original papers, we see that
Troubridge’s name is not mentioned anywhere on them, nor on the cover of the docket. There
is no evidence to support Dr. Davison’s claim that Troubridge was the author.
As regards the date, it is not difficult to see from where Dr. Davison obtained it. At the top of
the first page of the ‘Staff Work Afloat’ paper is the note, ‘This is the only copy. Please return
when done with. C.L.O. 18 Oct. 1911.’ C.L.O. was Rear-Admiral Sir Charles L. Ottley, the
Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and a former Director of Naval Intelligence,
and a figure clearly known to Dr. Davison.10
If Troubridge was the author, then why would
Ottley have the only copy of this paper? A request to return is flimsy evidence for accurately
dating a paper. Given that the following papers ‘B’ and ‘C’ referred to above clearly date from
1909 on account of introductory notes attached to them (even Davison acknowledges ‘B’ is
from 1909),11
one might be forgiven for supposing that the preceding two papers also date from
then, and, given Ottley’s keenness on the return of the first paper, that he was the author of that
one, if not the others.
Other material, also at Kew, sheds light on the matter. In a letter of 17 October 1911 to
Churchill, about to take office as First Lord, Ottley wrote:
In accordance with your request I send herewith some papers prepared in the winter
of 1908-09 for the use of the (then) First Sea-Lord [sic] (Sir John Fisher) advocating
the immediate formation of a Naval War Staff and certain other measures.
These Papers are 3 in number viz (A) – A summary of the main recommendations; -
prepared rather hastily, the other two papers being rather long.
(B) Is an explanatory document giving the reasons which render the creation of a
Naval War Staff desirable. It was carefully drafted in a form such as – it was hoped –
would enable the First Sea Lord to himself initial & promulgate it, without much
further editing or alteration.
7
Docket ‘The Naval War Staff’, fo. 17-25.
8
Docket ‘The Naval War Staff’, fo. 26-28.
9
See Harley, ‘“It’s a Case of All or None”: “Jacky Fisher’s Advice to Winston Churchill, 1911’, Mariner’s
Mirror, 102:2, 176.
10
Davison, 299. Note that Davison mistakenly describes Ottley as Director of Naval Intelligence at the time in
question, 1909.
11
Davison, 296.

3. (C) Is the similar draft of an Admiralty Circular, requiring all officers desirous of
having their names considered for Staff Appointments – ashore or afloat – to pass
through a course of training at a Naval Staff College.
Ottley then explained that he had updated paper ‘B’ after two years (by coincidence the paper
marked ‘B’ in ADM 1/8377/120 has been annotated in Ottley’s distinctive handwriting), and
then recommended Captain George A. Ballard and Captain Maurice P. A. Hankey, R.M.A., as
sources of information regarding a staff. He went on:
In my opinion it is not only desirable to re-cast the organisation of the Department of
the First Sea Lord and to establish a Staff College for Naval Officers, but it is equally
important to co-ordinate the Staff Work of Commanders in Chief and in the
Dockyards. I have a paper on the subject also, but owing to the pressure of work here
on my small clerical staff, I have not yet been able to have it typed.12
Having read this letter, and the original papers outlined above, who can doubt that the author
of ‘The Necessity for Co-ordinating Staff Work Afloat’, and succeeding three papers was Rear-
Admiral Ottley? Papers ‘A’ to ‘C’ were clearly written in 1908-1909, while the ‘Staff Work
Afloat’ paper clearly pre-dated 18 October 1911, although this shows how swiftly Ottley had
it typed up and delivered to Churchill. In conclusion, we have seen how two papers were
conflated into one, which was misdated and attributed to the wrong author, all with no
supporting evidence. Thanks to thorough knowledge of the source material all four relevant
papers in the docket have now been dated, albeit roughly, and their author correctly identified.
References
Davison, R. L. ‘In Defence of Corporate Competence: The Royal Navy Officer Executive
Corps, 1880-1919’ unpublished PhD thesis (Memorial University of Newfoundland,
2004).
Davison, R., The Challenges of Command: The Royal Navy’s Executive Branch Officers, 1880-
1919 (Abingdon, 2011).
Harley, S., ‘“It’s a Case of All or None”: “Jacky Fisher’s Advice to Winston Churchill, 1911’,
Mariner’s Mirror 102:2 (2016) 174-190.
12
Ottley to Churchill, letter of 17 Oct. 1911. TNA, CAB 1/31, Part I, fo. 27-30.