Here are some potential advantages and disadvantages of installing anti-terrorist technology on transportation assets: Advantages: - It can help deter terrorist attacks by making transportation targets harder to attack successfully. Hardening assets with technology makes them less vulnerable and vulnerable targets may be less appealing to terrorists. - It can help protect lives. If an attack does occur, protective technology has the potential to minimize loss of life by containing or limiting the damage from an attack. Disadvantages: - It involves significant costs for research, development, purchase, and installation of new security systems. Taxpayer or customer dollars must fund these expenses. The costs may outweigh the risks for some systems or assets. - New systems may have

1. Chapter Eight: Countermeasures

2. New technologies and new procedures for
executing effective countermeasures are
diverse. Some are very cost effective and
some are purely for psychological effect.
The utility of a particular measure should
be subject to appropriate risk assessment
criteria.

3. Remote Controlled Aircraft

4. The government acknowledged immediately after 9/11 that the government
would indeed consider all kinds of technology, including methods to enable
air traffic controllers to take over control of distressed aircraft and to be able
to land aircraft by remote control. Pilots, accurately pointing out a potential
vulnerability, have expressed concern over potential terrorist ability to gain
access to the controllers on the ground. This idea proposes to create a system
that takes control of the aircraft away from its pilot remotely. The security
measures to keep airplane-based hackers out would also keep the pilot from
regaining control of his aircraft. This opens up an avenue for attack that does
not currently exist. If someone could turn several jets into cruise missiles
simultaneously and remotely, there would be a lot of money in finding a way
to exploit it. The idea of a panic button is more realistic. Remote control
would be a good thing if the pilot took a deliberate action to permanently
(until replacement of components was completed) relinquish control of the
aircraft.

5. Arming Cargo Pilots

6. Cargo pilots will now also be permitted to carry
weapons under new legislation that closes a
loophole in the Homeland Security Act. Cargo
airlines generally oppose the idea of their pilots
being armed. Steve Alterman, president of the
Cargo Airline Association, said the 13 all-cargo
airlines that comprise his group do not want
their pilots to be allowed to participate in the
armed pilots program. "We believe that
programs for securing the aircraft and
screening each and every person attempting to
board the aircraft provide the best means of
defense against hijackers," Alterman said

7. Container Hardening

8. As early as 1993, Congress asked the FAA to study and
report on different types of technology designed to
protect aircraft against certain explosives. Even prior
to that, the aircraft hardening program had been
started in 1991. The overall purpose of the project
was to create systems, that would protect commercial
aircraft from catastrophic structural damage or critical
system failure due to in-flight explosions. Secondary
objectives are to investigate vulnerability from some
spurious electromagnetic or high-energy signal
interfering with aircraft electronic systems and to
assess the threat presented by manually operated
highly mobile, surface-to-air missiles.

9. The program is designed to determine and identify:
(1) the minimum amount of explosives that will result
in aircraft loss; (2) the methods and techniques that
can be applied to the current and future fleets of
commercial aircraft to increase the level of
vulnerability to explosive effects; and (3) the threat to
aircraft from electromagnetic (EM), projected energy,
and surface-to-air missiles and practical
countermeasures. One estimate from the Air
Transport Association projects that such containers
would cost airlines $5 billion a year. Additionally, the
containers are only available for wide-body aircraft,
which includes only 25% of the aircraft in service.

10. Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening Systems
(CAPPS II)/Secure Flight

11. in 1998, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
implemented the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System (CAPPS) to enable air carriers to separate passengers
into two categories: those who require additional security
scrutiny (“selectees”) and those who do not. CAPPS used
information from the passenger’s itinerary to search for certain
behavioral characteristics determined by the FAA (and now by
the Transportation Security Administration) to indicate a higher
security risk. A passenger’s selectee status was transmitted to
the check-in counter, where a code is printed on the boarding
pass of any passenger determined to require additional
screening. At the screening checkpoint, passengers who are
selectees were subject to additional security measures. CAPPS
II was the follow on system.

12. All of these systems rely on a Passenger Name Record.
When a passenger books a plane ticket, certain
identifying information is collected. This information
is used to check against some data store (i.e., a TSA
No-Fly list, the FBI ten most wanted fugitive list, etc.)
and assign a terrorism "risk score" to that person.
CAPPS II was cancelled by the TSA in the summer of
2004. Shortly thereafter, the TSA announced a
successor program, called Secure Flight that would
work much the same as CAPPS II. TSA hoped to test
Secure Flight in August 2005 using two airlines. In
February of 2006 Secure Flight was cancelled for being
potentially insecure

13. Shoulder-Fired Missiles

17. Individual planes could be equipped with defense
mechanisms against missile attacks. Many military
aircraft and some commercial planes such as El Al, the
Israeli airline, have the capacity to use flares and
advanced technology to divert incoming missiles.
Although current options for such defense are
inordinately expensive given the level of the threat,
submitting a request for such technology to the open
market could yield less costly and more accessible
defense options. The technology for such a defense
already exists and effective diversion mechanisms for
commercial planes need not be as robust as those for
military aircraft (possibly costing as little as $200 per
plane). A priority for such defense efforts should be
high-threat, high-density airports.

18. Advanced technology to divert
incoming missiles

19. After 9/11, the U.S. Department of Transportation chartered an
industry team to make recommendations to improve aircraft
security. One of those recommendations was to reinforce cockpit
doors in order to deny access from intruders. Modifications have
been completed on the door of all U.S. airliners and the doors on
international carriers that serve the U.S. The Rapid Response
Team has concluded that:
Some appropriate flight deck barrier device must be approved
and installed in the entire U.S. fleet and future design of flight
deck doors must meet newly determined requirements.
Procedural changes must be made at all airlines regarding
identification and access of all personnel to the flight deck.

20. Airline industry, unions, and FAA should redesign security
training with possible implementation of defensive capabilities
to address newly identified threats, incorporate changes into the
annual curriculum, and provide security training to all crew
members.
Each airline, in cooperation with the FAA or other government
entities, must develop a delivery system to provide government
security advisories to crew members in a timely manner.
A task force should determine the necessary modifications to
assure continuous transmission of a transponder signal.
All airlines, pilots, and the FAA should jointly identify procedures
in pilot training that could be adapted in an attempted hijacking.

22. Anti-sniper Measures

24. Wiretapping

25. It is simply important to remember that:
It is very easy for a terrorist to access transportation facility phone wires
Even an amateur can easily bug or tap a phone line
An eavesdropper does not have to get close to the target to tap the line
Managers have a serious false sense of security about the phone and
related wiring
Telephone lines are extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping
It's very difficult to find a bug or wiretap on a phone line
Detection requires an expert knowledge of telephones and electronics
Communication is critical to all modes of transportation and some serious
thought needs to be addressed towards the terrorists potential ability to tap
into this huge source of information from unprotected systems.

26. Global Positioning Threats

27. The U.S. Department of Transportation has for years
been investigating hackers intent on knocking out or
distorting positioning data from the Global Positioning
System. The Volpe National Transportation Center
made an intensive study into the threats to systems
that receive GPS signals from the Defense
Department’s 28-satellite constellation. The first
portion of the study was completed in July 1999. They
documented the threats from interference to GPS
systems for railroad, maritime, aviation, and
intelligent transportation system users. The second
part of the study concentrated on how to protect the
systems.

28. Ballistics

29. There is no such thing as bullet proof. A
ballistic or bullet resistant material is
designed to resist penetration from
specific types, calibers, and velocities of
ballistic threats. Variations of personal
protection clothing can be purchased
which suit the needs of law enforcement,
the military, explosion disposal teams,
and heads of security, as well as
vulnerable transportation officials

32. The Federal Air Marshal Program currently has its training
facility and airline security research facility located at the
Williams J. Hughes Airport and now falls under the purview of
the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA: 49 CFR
Chapter XII Part 1544.223). Using a wall full of computer
generated maps, the TSA tracks the flight path of each flight
with an air marshal on board and supporting documents
indicate the travel schedule of each marshal. They currently
employ 45,000 people and are financed with a $4 billion
supplemental spending bill from Congress. The agents receive
special training and regularly travel on U.S. air carriers on high-
risk routes. Additionally, as federal agents, they are permitted
to make arrests without a warrant when certain felony offenses
against the United States can be reasonably shown to have
been or are being committed. The Federal Air Marshal Program
is administered by the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).

33. Federal Air
Marshals

34. Describe the advantages and disadvantages
of installing anti-terrorist technology on
transportation assets.