SANKEY THESIS 28MAY2014

THE COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Student Name: SSgt James P. Sankey, U.S. Air Force
Joint Special Operations Master of Arts Class of 2014
Thesis Title: Policy Recommendations for Commercially Operated Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles in the United States
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies

DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT
THE VIEWS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. REFERENCES TO
THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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ABSTRACT
Most of what the general public knows about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is
related to the use of these vehicles overseas by the United States military in the Global War on
Terror. The effectiveness, morality, and legality of UAVs (specifically the weaponized versions)
are matters of continuing controversy. This paper does not address UAVs that are being operated
outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Rather, it focuses on the role of UAVs within
the United States and the possible negative consequences from their use domestically before
proper Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidelines have been put in place. There is today
a lack of regulation addressing the capability and potential misuse of small, commercially
operated UAVs operating anonymously and autonomously within the National Airspace
(NAS).This would include those owned and operated by individuals or groups intending to
commit terrorist acts. Without FAA regulation of small UAV operations in the NAS, malicious
individuals or groups could achieve the capability to quickly exploit weaknesses in the system
and create havoc on a national scale. Before laws are written and passed, the FAA must
designate an aerial law enforcement entity to identify UAV violations and ensure that all
forthcoming rules and regulations are complied with.

Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................................1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 1
Policy Options......................................................................................................................... 2
Preferred Policy Option .......................................................................................................... 2
Research Design...................................................................................................................... 3
Method of Analysis................................................................................................................. 4
Discussion and Analysis of Cases......................................................................................... 10
CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................................12
DESCRIPTION OF POLICY PROBLEM............................................................................................ 12
Why Non-Regulation is a Problem....................................................................................... 20
Who the UAV Policy Would Affect..................................................................................... 26
CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................................30
DISCUSSION OF POLICY OPTIONS ............................................................................................... 30
UAV Equipment ................................................................................................................... 33
UAV Operators ..................................................................................................................... 36

UAV Enforcement ................................................................................................................ 37
Current Policy and Law ........................................................................................................ 40
Policy Option ........................................................................................................................ 46
CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................................................47
EVALUATION OF POLICY OPTIONS ............................................................................................. 47
Enforcement Options ............................................................................................................ 48
Insurance............................................................................................................................... 49
Serial Number and Tracking................................................................................................. 51
No-Fly Areas......................................................................................................................... 52
Advancement in Anti-Jamming and Hacking....................................................................... 53
CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................................54
POLICY RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 54
Resulting Problems and continuing ambiguities................................................................... 55
Summary............................................................................................................................... 56
WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................................57

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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The lack of regulation for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) flying in US airspace
constitutes a major problem that affects US civil aviation and, potentially, US national security.
As early as 2002, it was reported that some 43 cases had been uncovered in which the use of
remote control delivery systems was "either threatened, developed, or actually utilized" by
terrorist groups (Gips 2002). This problem has created significant debate within the American
government and business community over UAVs operating in US national airspace (NAS), with
a special focus on the ability of UAVs to operate both anonymously and autonomously. Scholars
have addressed privacy issues such as the potential for both government and private UAVs to
violate 4th
Amendment rights – particularly the danger that, at least on the government side, they
could facilitate warrantless searches. However, little has been said about the threat UAVs could
pose if they were to be used by malicious state or non-state actors wishing to do harm to the
United States and its citizens. UAVs guided by Global Positioning System (GPS) technology can
be preprogramed, leaving humans completely out of the command-and-control loop after launch.
Those with preprogramed flight profiles – complete with aerial waypoints, airspeed, altitude, and
landing coordinates – are of interest to companies such as Amazon and Domino’s Pizza who
could potentially benefit from cheaper costs in delivering goods to the customer. Once airborne,
however, this type of UAV could potentially pose a danger to US citizens and installations. This
potential danger needs to be addressed through a transparent policy process designed to prevent
misuse and achieve best outcomes for business, government, and the nation generally. This paper
will seek to elucidate the policy framework necessary for the creation of the regulatory
guidelines that will govern the use of UAVs in American air space.

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Policy Options
For commercial UAVs in the NAS, the following areas should be focused upon when
considering policy options and requirements for safe operation: UAV equipment, UAV
operators, and UAV policy enforcement.
The UAV equipment section will explore different types of equipment that could aid in
the identification and tracking of the UAV itself.
The UAV operators section will lay out requirements for the licensing of a commercial
(and possibly individually operated) UAV. These requirements should be mandatory before the
hiring of pilots or actual UAV operations occur.
UAV enforcement is a new concept for policymakers in the United States. While the
skies over major US cities have been meticulously monitored for suspicious aircraft activity
since 9/11, there is nothing in place to detect and track UAVs, due largely to their small
signature and radar cross section (Baker 2013) Additionally, this paper will investigate ways to
cease the operation of or remove a UAV from the sky safely without putting individuals on the
ground at risk.
Preferred Policy Option
Policies must be created and implemented to establish the necessary regulatory
framework to govern the use of UAVs in American air space. Regulations should include proper
registration and the insuring of all commercially employed UAVs, combined with licensing of all
commercial UAV operators. Additionally, an air monitoring agency should be established with
proper jurisdiction to strictly enforce these regulations once they have become law. The FAA is

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expected to come forward with the guidelines governing the commercial use of UAVs in
domestic airspace by late 2015 (FAA 2007). What will probably remain lacking is the aerial
enforcement piece, as it has not appeared in any of the FAA roadmaps or proposals to date (US
Department of Transportation 2013).Without the capability to enforce the regulations passed by
Washington, these regulations will remain only words on paper. The FAA must work in tandem
with the Department of Homeland Security to initiate discussions on how the skies will be
patrolled, how rule breakers will be identified and dealt with, and whether and to what extent
violators should be prosecuted. The key, again, is enforcement.
Research Design
Scholarly journals, law reviews, defense intelligence reports, and previous theses have
been examined while investigating appropriate resources to guide the writing of this paper with
the goal of addressing the issues surrounding commercial UAVs operating in the United States.
The terrorist UAV threat and the extent to which that threat is increasing has gone largely
unaddressed. In order to counter this potential threat, I have discovered several existing aviation
policies as well as tools (both existing and in development) that could be adapted to regulate
UAV use. Chapter three considers these options and explores them at length.
The FAA has increasingly handed out cease and desist warnings and even fined some
companies and organizations that have tried to employ UAVs for other than strictly personal use
on the grounds that any public or private use must be vetted through the Agency (Goglia 2014).
My research revealed several Department of Transportation (DOT) and FAA documents
pertaining to general aviation, but almost nothing concerning civilian/commercial UAVs. It was,
however, fascinating to discover how some existing regulations are being interpreted. For

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example, Peter Sachs, an attorney in Connecticut, has gone so far as to state that the FAA has
been claiming an authority over domestic UAV operations which it does not in fact possess. His
claims will be evaluated in chapter four to determine their validity.
Additionally, chapter four will look at ways in which persons and companies can be held
accountable for the UAV operations they conduct. Some UAV companies are even leaning
forward in the quest to achieve safe operations and are developing innovative ways to assist the
FAA, as well as other global aviation regulators (including the International Civil Aviation
Organization, or ICAO). Chapter four will also look at counter-UAV options and attempt to look
for ways to enforce the rules once these have been handed down by the FAA.
Method of Analysis
Qualitative Historical Analysis
The primary analytical method employed in this paper will follow the logic of a qualitative
review and evaluation of primary and secondary documents and select cases that inform the
recent evolution of UAV operation in the United States as they interface with a mature and yet
evolving FAA regulatory mechanism for the control of American air space.
The problem being addressed is the fact that UAV technology is moving faster than anyone
initially anticipated it would, and there now exists the possibility (indeed, likelihood) that UAVs
will soon be flying through the skies of the United States. Congress has ordered that this problem
be solved through legislation by the end of 2015, and agencies like the FAA have been
scrambling to organize and get passed policies that will ensure both aerial and ground safety.
This problem includes initially unforeseen obstacles that must be addressed before an effective

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policy can be implemented. Not only are they concerned with flight safety of UAVs, but also that
of other aircraft sharing the NAS with UAVs, not to mention people are on the ground. The case
study below will cover establishing workable regulations to integrate UAVs into the NAS.
Three years ago, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Cory Mendenhall wrote a thesis on a topic
similar to this one. At that time, he was attending the National Defense University’s Joint Forces
Staff Collage at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in Norfolk, VA. Although he dealt with
UAV integration into the NAS, his thesis was primarily concerned with the integration of United
States Department of Defense (DOD) UAVs. In his report, he concluded that UAVs must be held
to the same and possibly higher standards than manned aircraft, in order to ensure that people
and property (both in the air and on the ground) are not placed at risk (Mendenhall 2011). The
problems he identified were, first, lack of data available to successfully establish a target level of
safety (TLS) for UAVs operating in the NAS. Second, the lack of reliability demonstrated by
UAVs as compared to manned aircraft. Third, he pointed out that a requirement for DOD UAVs
to meet FAA airworthiness standards for civilian aircraft was lacking.
In attempting to elucidate a solution to the TLS problem, Mendenhall pointed out that the
only flight data available were from the wars being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the
experience gained in these two conflicts provided a starting point for what would be required to
satisfy both FAA order 8040.41
of June, 1998, and the Acquisition Management System (AMS)2
.
This FAA order and the AMS rules require FAA-wide implementation of safety risk
1
8040.4 has been updated with 8040.4A and establishes the Safety Risk Management (SRM) policy for the FAA. It
also establishes common terms and processes used to analyze, assess, and accept safety risk. The policy is designed
to prescribe common SRM language and communication standards to be applied throughout the FAA (FAA 2012).
2
“The Acquisition Management System (AMS) establishes policy and guidance for all aspects of lifecycle
acquisition management for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It defines how the FAA manages its
resources - money / people / assets - to fulfill its mission” (FAA 2014).

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management in a “formalized, disciplined, and documented manner for all high-consequence
decisions” (FAA 2012).
The reliability issue was highlighted by the fact that, as least historically, UAVs have had a
mishap rate twice as high as their manned counterparts (Mendenhall 2011, 32). Mishaps included
the tendency to lose navigational links and fly off course. This problem was further highlighted
on August 2, 2010, when a small, windowless helicopter (the MQ-8B Fire Scout) operated by the
U.S. Navy flew within 40 miles of Washington D.C.’s restricted airspace before its operators
could stop it (CIKR Monthly Open Source Cyber Digest 2010). On the other hand, six years
before Mendenhall wrote his thesis, the 311th Performance Enhancement Directorate at Brooks
AFB released a study3
that defended the UAV and put much more blame on human factors as
opposed to the aircraft itself (Tvaryanas, Thompson and Constable 2005). However, in order to
see full UAV integration into the NAS, mishap numbers must decline to a point where they at
least match the reliability numbers for manned aircraft (Mendenhall 2011).
The final obstacle to be overcome is air worthiness. DOD has the authority to certify and
release its aircraft on the basis of DOD handbook MIL-HDBK-516B4
, Airworthiness
Certification Criteria. The handbook
…establishes the airworthiness certification criteria to be used in the
determination of airworthiness of all manned and unmanned, fixed and rotary
wing air vehicle systems. It is a foundational document to be used by the system
program manager, chief/lead systems engineer, and contractors to define their air
system’s airworthiness certification basis” (FAA 2004).
3
“A comprehensive 10-year review of human factors in Department of Defense (DOD) UAV mishaps was
conducted using DOD’s new Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). HFACS is a model of
accident causation based on the premise latent failures at the levels of organizational influences, unsafe supervision,
and unsafe preconditions predispose to active failures (e.g., UAV operator error).” (Tvaryanas, Thompson and
Constable 2005).
4
This 2004 document is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies of the Department of Defense.

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DOD’s airworthiness process comprises three separate levels based on safety of flight (SOF)
risks:
Level I – Certifies to standards equivalent to manned systems with catastrophic failure
rates no worse than one loss per 100,000 flight hours.
Level II – Authorizes standards less stringent for unmanned aircraft with catastrophic
failure rates no worse than one per 10,000 flight hours.
Level III – Minimizes catastrophic failed rates to less than 1,000 flight hours (Ibid).
Mendenhall points out that there are two gaps revealed within the certification process. The
first gap is that UAVs cannot fully comply with manned aircraft rules and standards. Safety of
Flight (SOF) measures currently account only for loss of aircrew and are not directed at
governing actual UAV flight. Furthermore, SOF risks pertaining to personnel, damage to
equipment, property, and the environment must be considered when establishing certification
standards (Ibid).
Narrative
This section contains a specific scenario concerning a plausible domestic UAV threat, and
provides an example of how this problem could be dealt with. For starters, anyone is free to
purchase a UAV. As with manned aircraft, UAVs can be separated into two types: fixed-wing
(FW) and rotary wing (RW), also known as vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL). Model
airplanes will typically fall into the FW category, with a few exceptions.5
Most RW/VTOL
5
Arcturus UAV recently introduced a new vertical takeoff and landing system they call
JUMP™. Jump can be fitted to FW UAVs and consist of booms fitted with vertical lift motors
and rotors mounted to each wing to provide vertical lift for takeoff and landing. Vertical lift
motors are shut off for winged flight and rotors are feathered longitudinally for minimum drag.
Seamless transition to winged flight is achieved by the Piccolo autopilot using Latitude

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UAVs seen today are either classified as helicopters, quadcoptors, or octocopters (the amount of
rotors will determine the naming convention). The intended use and payload requirement will
determine which UAV is best suited for a particular task. For example, a FW UAV would not be
ideal for overhead imagery of a property or farm field. On the other hand, if airspeed was a
requirement, it may prove to be the better option, as opposed to a RW platform. Once someone
decides on the type of UAV to purchase, they have many options available that allow them to
acquire one. He or she can shop at a nearby hobby shop or toy store, or order one online from an
out-of-state or overseas vendor. FW model airplanes typically use a propeller-type engine
mounted either to the front or back of the body that generates forward thrust. UAVs currently
range in price from a few hundred US dollars up to a few thousand dollars, depending on several
factors that include: materials, equipment, sensors, size, and payload capacity. Some kits contain
several pieces or parts, requiring the operator to follow a detailed set of instructions and
assemble them (rather like Lego); others come ready to fly right out of the box. There are also
homemade UAVs which are normally built by professionals and require the assembling of
several independent parts. Choosing to go this route requires a deeper understanding of UAV
flight operations (similar to Information Technology experts building a desktop computer from
the ground up).
Once a UAV is ready for flight, the operator with either preprogram waypoints (using a
laptop and GPS coordinates into the navigation profile), or, alternatively, learn how to manually
control it. GPS control can be as easy as entering waypoints into available computer software
Engineering’s Hybrid-Quadrotor technology. All flight control is fully autonomous (Arcturus-
UAV 2011).

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such as ArduPilot, APM 2.6, and Pixhawk (DIY Drones 2014). The software interface may allow
the user to manually type in coordinates or merely tap areas on a map which tell the UAV where
to navigate. Software has recently been developed to prevent UAVs from interfering with airport
traffic; this will be explained in more detail in chapter four.
Most UAVs operate on an unencrypted frequency. As such, they are susceptible to hacking.
Chapter four will cover this in detail, but essentially, the “drone interceptor” flies near the UAV
and electronically forces it to disconnect its signal to the operator. It then broadcasts its own Wi-
Fi signal, which the UAV recognizes and connects to. With the UAV now no longer connected
to the operator, the drone interceptor has hijacked it with its own signal, and the UAV will
operate in whatever way the drone interceptor tells it to.
In this case study, consider the scenario of a UAV hijacked by a by a terrorist. This
technology removes the need for terrorists to purchase any of their own UAVs and bypass
national security organizations from monitoring and tracking shipments from supplier to
customer. The terrorists could repeat the hijacking process several times until they acquire a
fleet. The terrorist who hijacked the UAV is now able to use it in any of the malicious ways to be
described in chapter three: delivering contraband, weapons, explosives, or conducting aerial
surveillance of a potential target). This type of threat is real and has already been thought of by
terrorist organizations, as highlighted in this paper. It’s time to start thinking about UAV
countermeasures against potential threats – from the use of UAVs to attack buildings with
explosives, to transporting weapons into prison yards to facilitate escapes.

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Discussion and Analysis of Cases
In the three years since Mendenhall completed his thesis, there has been considerable
discussion about UAVs in the United States. This section looks at how, and in some cases if, the
policy and procedure gaps described in his thesis have been filled. First to be considered is the
TLS for UAVs operating in the NAS. As very few UAVs have been allowed to fly in the NAS,
there is still very little data on this. However, even if there were copious amounts of data
available, it is difficult to say how many crashes should be considered too many (inevitably, of
course, some crashes will occur). It would be necessary to weigh each situation independently
and ask a series of questions:
 What was the UAV doing when it crashed?
 Why was it chosen over a manned asset?
 Could a manned airframe have safely achieved the same results?
 What was the opportunity and financial cost of the damage caused to the airframe? To
others?
 How would the use of a manned asset affect the overall mishap numbers?
As these are only some of the questions that should be asked, it is apparent how
complicated tracking down some of this information will become. Additionally, the information
gaps identified by Mendenhall concerned only US military UAVs, and not those operated by
civilians. The required collection of relevant data (aircraft performance, mishap reports,
mechanical records, etc.) to determine TLS information has yet to be identified, collected, or
accurately presented, and therefore those information gaps still exist.
Mendenhall next looks at UAV reliability and mishap rates. He noted they had a
tendency to lose the navigation link and fly off-course. Many military UAVs have a lost-link
orbit to which they default to in the event they do fly off course. For example, if a UAV
somehow loses contact with its operator, it either finds its preprogrammed orbit via onboard

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GPS, or returns back to home base or original launch location. As far as the mishap rate is
concerned, Dyke Weatherington, who manages UAV programs for the DOD, has said that, “…
the accident trends for the MQ-1 and MQ-9 [military grade UAVs] are the same as the historic
trends of manned aircraft” (Lee, IHS Jane's Defence Weekly 2013). Once again, however, these
numbers only refer to DOD UAVs, and not to the smaller commercial or hobby UAVs
considered in this paper.
This thesis presents a unique scenario that has been little written about, that is, terrorists
hijacking a UAV and using it to cause death and destruction. Currently, the detection and
tracking of airborne UAVs, other than visually, is a daunting task. Even done successfully, there
is no way to apprehend the UAV once it is identified as a potential threat. Air Traffic Control
(ATC) and US military early warning (EW) radars are not capable of seeing an object of this
size. Until the technology to satisfy this requirement is distributed, installed and implemented,
the ability to halt illegal UAV operation simply does not exist.
If the United States continues along the path it is currently following, and does not
address the problems put forth in this paper, the skies will quickly fill with unregulated UAV
operations and untraceable airborne UAVs. Additionally, in the absence of an aerial enforcement
department, the US faces the possibility of losing control over its airspace. This problem can be
solved by taking some of the lessons learned in the US military’s integration of manned and
unmanned aircraft and combining them with current domestic rules and regulations. In this case,
the main difference between military UAVs and domestic private UAVs (other than military
UAVs use of mostly encrypted navigation signals), is that the military and its members adhere to
strict protocols in carrying out their duties. Servicemen and women follow a set of rules,
knowing that any deviations could result in catastrophe.

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Terrorist ready to die for their beliefs are not likely to act in a lawful manner when using
a UAV to carry out an attack. Additionally, a law-abiding US citizen flying a UAV could be
following all rules and regulations, but have his UAV hijacked and used for terrorist operations
against his will. Future research must involve the complex task of how to use encrypted
navigation unique to the navigator of each UAV. This research must also include ways to
monitor small aerial devices without relying on ATC or EW radar. And research should begin to
focus on non-lethal tools that an aerial enforcement agency could use to safely land a UAV
found to be in violation of law. This course of action is safer than shooting down the UAV and
would generally avoid damage to persons or objects in the air and on the ground.
CHAPTER 2
Description of Policy Problem
According to a 2013 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the FAA has been
issuing Certificate of Waiver or Authorizations (COAs) since January, 2007. As of 2012, the
total COAs issued numbered 1,428. These are issued for specific timeframes (usually 12 to 24
months), locations, and operations. In 2012 alone, the FAA issued 391 COAs to 121 federal,
state, and local government entities, including law enforcement and academic institutions. Of
note is the fact that the “Insitu”, ScanEagle X200 and AeroVironment’s PUMA are the only two
commercial UAVs that, so far, have been given clearance by the FAA to operate.
ConocoPhillips, Alaska's largest oil producer and the holder of oil leases in the remote Chukchi
Sea off the state's northwest coast, is the first company in the United States to be given this
authority. According to FAA spokesman Les Dorr, “The Arctic is a good place to do that

13
because air traffic is limited” (DeMarban 2013). The flights occurred in September 2013 and
have been going on ever since without incident.
Figure 1: Entities with COAs Approved from January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data (Dillingham 2013)
The same GAO report expects that small UAVs will improve technologically while
decreasing in price (Dillingham 2013). Although Congress has tasked the FAA to lead the effort
for safety, other federal agencies – such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) –
are likely to have a role as well, although at this time it is not exactly clear what their roles will
be.

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Table 1: Key Federal UAV Stakeholders and Their Roles Integrating UAVs into the National Airspace
Source: GAO analysis of FAA data (Dillingham 2013)
The FAA has a mechanism in place to prepare for the safe integration of all aircraft
operating within the NAS, called the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).
According to the FAA website, NextGen is:
A series of inter-linked programs, systems, and policies that implement
advanced technologies and capabilities to dramatically change the way the current
aviation system is operated. NextGen is satellite-based and relies on a network to
share information and digital communications so all users of the system are aware
of other users’ precise locations (FAA 2013).
In other words, as Dillingham puts it, the goal of NextGen is to integrate existing air traffic
control systems; develop new flight procedures, standards, and regulations; and create and
maintain supporting infrastructure in order to create increased situational awareness (Dillingham
2013).
Additionally, the FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) has been tasked
by the Office of Management and Budget to develop, in conjunction with partner agencies, a
strategic interagency UAS/UAV research, development, and demonstration roadmap (FAA 2013,
28). As it now stands, according to the most recent FAA UAV roadmap, NextGen will include
all UAVs (US Department of Transportation 2013). JPDO exists to oversee and coordinate
NextGen research activities within the federal government and aims to use technologies to their

15
fullest potential, both in aircraft and throughout the air traffic control system. Reports on efforts
to speed up the process have been released, although other reports suggest that the process is
falling behind schedule. (W. C. Bennett 2012) The FAA only recently confirmed choices for
United States UAV testing grounds. The testing will be done under the auspices of the following
organizations, colleges, or government departments: The University of Alaska, Drone America
(a Reno, Nevada company), New York State’s Griffiss International Airport, the North Dakota
Department of Commerce (working from North Dakota State University’s Carrington Research
Extension Center located in Carrington), Texas A&M University at Corpus Christi, and Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University (Duquette and Dorr Jr. 2013). These testing sites will
have four objectives: 1) developing plans for integrating UAS into the national airspace; 2)
changing the COA process; 3) integrating UAS at six test ranges; and 4) developing, revising, or
finalizing regulations and policies related to UAS. A December 2013 FAA press release defines
the responsibilities of each location (See Table 3).
Table 2: Chosen UAV Test Site Locations and Justification for Selection
 University of Alaska The University of Alaska proposal contained a
diverse set of test site range locations in seven
climatic zones as well as geographic diversity
with test site range locations in Hawaii and
Oregon. The research plan includes the
development of a set of standards for unmanned
aircraft categories, state monitoring and
navigation. Alaska also plans to work on safety
standards for UAV operations.
 State of Nevada Nevada’s project objectives concentrate on
UAV standards and operations as well as
operator standards and certification
requirements. Research will also include a
concentrated look at how ATC procedures will
evolve with the introduction of UAV into the
civil environment and how these aircraft will be
integrated with NextGen. Nevada’s selection
contributes to geographic and climatic diversity.

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New York’s Griffiss
International Airport
Griffiss International plans to work on
developing test and evaluation as well as
verification and validation processes under FAA
safety oversight. The applicant also plans to
focus its research on sense and avoid
capabilities for UAS and its sites will aid in
researching the complexities of integrating UAS
into the congested, northeast airspace.
North Dakota
Department of Commerce
North Dakota plans to develop UAV
airworthiness essential data and validate high
reliability link technology. This applicant will
also conduct human factors research. North
Dakota’s application was the only one to offer a
test range in the Temperate (continental)
climate zone and included a variety of different
airspace which will benefit multiple users.
Texas A&M University –
Corpus Christi
Texas A&M plans to develop system safety
requirements for UAV vehicles and operations
with a goal of protocols and procedures for
airworthiness testing. The selection of Texas
A&M contributes to geographic and climactic
diversity.
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University (Virginia Tech)
Virginia Tech plans to conduct UAV failure
mode testing and identify and evaluate
operational and technical risks areas. This
proposal includes test site range locations in
both Virginia and New Jersey.
Source: (FAA 2013)

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Picture 1: Selected UAV Test Site Locations
Source: (FAA 2014)
Although the first testing site was expected to launch no later than August of 2014, the FAA
issued a press release on April 21, 2014 announcing that the North Dakota Department of
Commerce team was the first on their testing list to be issued a COA. They were now authorized
to begin testing their Dragonflyer X4ES small UAS at its Northern Plains Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Test Site (FAA 2014).
As mentioned previously, US Army LTC Mendenhall recently completed a master’s
thesis on how the United States plans to integrate military UAVs into the NAS. In his thesis, he
takes the reader through a brief history of the UAV and how it has evolved through the past two
decades. He describes the different classes of UAVs and provides a short description of each. He
also discusses the various elements that make up the NAS, from airports and ATC towers to

18
flight service stations (FSS) and the Air Traffic Control System Command Center. Being able to
determine the differences in FAA airspace classifications (see figure 2) is critical to
understanding the complexity and operational challenges of how the FAA controls various
airspace in terms of proximity to airfields and aircraft altitudes. UAVs primarily operate within
what is known as segregated airspace. Segregated airspace consists of three categories of special
use airspace: restricted, warning, and prohibited areas (FAA 2014).
A restricted area comprises airspace identified by an area above the surface of the earth
within which the flight of aircraft, while not wholly prohibited, is subject to restrictions.
Activities within these areas must be confined due to the nature of ground activities and
operations that the aircraft is either involved with or unaware of. To clarify, restricted areas
denote the existence of unusual and often invisible hazards to aircraft such as the firing of
artillery, aerial gunnery, or guided missile launches.
A warning area is airspace of defined dimensions, extending from three nautical miles
outward from the coast of the US, which contains activity that may be hazardous to
nonparticipating aircraft. The purpose of an area so designated is to warn nonparticipating pilots
of the potential danger.
A prohibited area contains airspace of defined dimensions identified by an area above the
surface of the earth in which the flight of aircraft is forbidden. Such areas are established for
security or other reasons associated with national security. These areas are published in the
Federal Register and are depicted on aeronautical charts (FAA 2014).
Additionally, within the NAS there are four other defined airspace types: controlled,
uncontrolled, special use, and other airspace. Uncontrolled airspace sees less traffic than
controlled airspace and therefore does not require the services of an air traffic control tower. The

19
only other airspace type relevant to this paper is controlled airspace. Controlled airspace is under
the control of the FAA. As such, ATC is essentially responsible for directing air traffic in the
controlled airspace, and carries the burden of preventing aerial collisions. Mendenhall, in his
thesis, broke out the different controlled airspace classifications and showed how each fits into
the NAS. Figure 2 displays the different classes of controlled and uncontrolled airspace within
which air traffic control service is provided.
Figure 2: Visual Chart of the FAA Airspace Classification
Source: (Mendenhall 2011)
In each class of airspace – A, B, C, D, and E – there are specific requirements that must
be adhered to before aircraft are allowed to enter or leave them. Where the volume of air traffic
is relatively low (class G airspace) the area is designated as uncontrolled and therefore does not
require the operator to check in with the FAA or ATC. FAA guidelines that normally only
pertain to DoD UAVs mandate that any UAVs operating at 18,000 feet above ground level

20
(AGL) must abide by the following: 1) the operator must file and submit a flight plan to operate
under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR); 2) he must obtain a clearance from Air Traffic Control
(ATC); 3) he must be equipped with an operational Mode C transponder; 4) he must operate with
navigation or collision avoidance lights; 5) he must maintain communications between the
operator and ATC.
Why Non-Regulation is a Problem
Other countries are facing some of the same issues that the United States is expected to
encounter with respect to non-regulated UAV use. For example, in South Africa in 2013, the
South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), became the first such authority to allow
UAVs as a beer delivery vehicle6
; but is now attempting to crack down on UAVs flying in civil
airspace (AFP RELAXNEWS 2013). According to Poppy Khoza, South Africa’s Director of
Civil Aviation,
…the SACAA has not given any concession or approval to any organization,
individual, institution or government entity to operate [UAVs] within the civil
aviation airspace. Those that are flying any type of unmanned aircraft are doing so
illegally; and as the regulator we cannot condone any form of blatant disregard of
applicable rules” (Commercial Aviation Association of South Africa 2014).
As a result, the SACAA may consider imposing regulations to cover UAVs flying in
civilian airspace. South African law on aviation is found in Section 72 of the Civil Aviation Act,
2009 (Act No. 13 of 2009) and specifically references the control and regulation of civil aviation
safety and security (Gazette 2009). The South African example demonstrates the difficulties that
6
In 2013, concertgoers in South Africa were able to order beer with their smartphones and have it delivered to their
GPS location. The UAV flew approximately 50 feet above the coordinates given before dropping the beverage -
attached to a parachute – to the customer down below (AFP RELAXNEWS 2013).

21
can arise when there is a regulatory vacuum concerning UAVs. This should serve as a reminder
to the United States of the importance of developing policies for aerial safety, particularly with
respect to UAVs.
Unregistered airborne objects that are not being tracked are unsafe. An object flying
freely and without any identifying features, while other UAVs or MAVs are sharing the same
airspace, is inherently dangerous. Combine this with the possibility of malicious state or non-
state actors obtaining access to UAVs, and the risk increases. A UAV could be used as a weapon
delivery platform, or the UAV itself could be weaponized. In a paper he wrote while attending
the Air War College at Maxwell AFB in Alabama, Lt Col Michael Dickey explored the
possibility of using UAVs as a weapon delivery platform for biological warfare (Dickey 2000).
In his paper, Dickey stated that, assuming favorable weather conditions, “a properly sized
aerosol dispersal system, an aircraft, cruise missile, or UAV could deliver BW weapons and
cause mass casualties in densely populated areas” (Dickey 2000, 12). He provides specific
examples involving anthrax, and describes how the agent could be dispersed over a large area to
cause multiple casualties. He further cites a 1993 Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, which stated
100kg of an agent like anthrax, if sprayed over a 300 square kilometer area, could possibly cause
up to 3 million deaths, given a targeted population density of 3,000 to 10,000 people per square
kilometer (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1993).
Dickey goes on to write that, “Presuming a nation wanted to inflict major damage upon
the United States or U.S. forces and escape a retaliatory attack, they would need to find a way to
deliver the attack without leaving [any] evidence of from whence it came” (Dickey 2000, 24). He
considers UAVs ideal for this situation. He argues they could be launched from boats or

22
merchant ships lying just off the coast of the United States, and fly below radar to a preselected
target. A UAV could either be navigated manually onto a target, or a preprogramed flight route
with GPS coordinates could be followed. The worst case scenario would involve a tactic which
uses a swarm, or multiple UAVs, to attack a target autonomously. Peter Singer is the director of
the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy
program at the Brookings Institute. Singer published an article in 2009 about robots and military
doctrine in which he also referred to swarming (Singer 2009). He discusses swarming as a part of
military conflict and combat as far back as the time of the Parthians (the Parthian Empire existed
from about 200 BCE to 200 CE) and other armies of massed horsemen:
They would spread out over vast areas until they found the foe, and then encircle them,
usually wiping them out by firing huge numbers of arrows into the foe’s huddled army.
Similarly, the Germans organized their U-boats into “wolfpacks” during the Battle of the
Atlantic in World War II. Each submarine would individually scour the ocean for convoys of
merchant ships to attack. Once one U-boat found the convoy, all the others would converge
on the site, first pecking away at the defenses (Singer 2009). In fact, according to a RAND
study of historic battles dating back to Alexander the Great, whichever side engaged in
swarming tactics normally (61% of the time) won the battle (Ibid).
Dr. Timothy Chung, is an assistant professor of systems engineering and Director of
Research and Education for the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and
Research (CRUSER) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. During his time
at NPS, he has worked on “defensive swarming” techniques which involve launching hundreds
of UAVs at one time in order to disrupt enemy systems. He has concluded that swarms could
potentially confuse an enemy radar defense system by overwhelming it with targets. With the
defender’s radar operators busy trying to figure out what was happening, each attacking UAV
would potentially be free to fly to and engage preprogrammed targets. The defenders’ radars may

23
even lack the capability to see such small objects flying that low to the ground and at slow
speeds.
George Jagels is an editor for Tactical Defense Media, and has written several articles on
military affairs, homeland security, and border protection. On September 26, 2013 he published
an article titled Securing the Skies: How Will the U.S. Military Fend Off Unmanned Systems? In
this article he points out three difficulties in pursuing the swarming option (Jagels 2013):
1. Logistics and Manning – In order to deploy and recover such a quantity of UAVs, new
logistic support and manpower requirements would be needed.
2. Command and Control – interfacing to a single UAV are currently not scalable to larger
swarms; new methods for interacting with multiple agents would be necessary.
3. Networking – While normal architecture requires that all assets communicate directly
with base stations, this would be inefficient for large swarms; new intra-swarm
networking would be necessary to allow updates to be sent back to headquarters (Jagels
2013).
Despite these difficulties, Iran provided a real world example of how swarming can be
extremely effective at confusing radar and defense systems. In 2013 the Whitehead Journal of
Diplomacy and International Relations published a report about a 2012 event in which Iranian
UAVs harassed the ground-based air defenses of the US Army and its regional allies through the
employment of swarms of UAVs. According to the report, Iran deployed a swarm of UAVs,
which by flying low and slow, largely evaded radar coverage7
. (Gormley 2013).
A Hungarian research team demonstrated swarm technology using a group of 10
quadcopters. The quadcopters were able to communicate with each other and perform tasks
autonomously. The Hungarians claim this is the first truly “autonomous drone flock” using
7
“The aircraft, which appear to be of Chinese design or origin, are typically launched to exploit the operating
pattern of U.S. radars. They can fly beneath or around the limited coverage area of radars currently deployed in
neighboring states, and their flight characteristics make them difficult to classify. On at least one occasion, they
were mistaken for birds because of their slow speed and small radar cross section.” (Thompson 2012).

24
quadcopters. A similar demonstration was carried out in 2011 by researcher Dario Floreano at
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, but he used FW flyers (United Nations
University 2014). A simple Google search of “drone”, “swarm”, and “cooperate” provides an
excellent visual that can be seen on YouTube:
“https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQzuL60V9ng” (Vallejo 2012) or TED.com
(http://www.ted.com/talks/vijay_kumar_robots_that_fly_and_cooperate) (TED 2012).
Most UAVs are capable of being jammed or “spoofed,” thus altering UAV performance and
making the UAV do what the operator running the interference wants it to do, rather than what
its original operator intended. Counterfeiting a false GPS signal and thus overpowering the
legitimate satellite GPS signal will cause a UAV’s instruments to misinterpret the vehicle’s
location – this has already proved to be an effective method of altering UAV flight as described
below. (McCarthy 2012)
Marc Goodman is the founder of the Future Crimes Institute, an advisor on global security
issues at Singularity University, and is their chairman for Policy, Law and Ethics. He claims that
all drones are vulnerable to hacking (Goodman 2013). “In a world where all things connected to
the Internet are hackable, so too are drones” (Goodman, Criminals and Terrorists Can Fly Drones
Too 2013).
In 2012, his claim received confirmation in an experiment carried out by Professor Todd
Humphreys and his students at the University of Texas in Austin. Humphreys and his team
demonstrated, at the US government’s request, how to hack into a DHS drone using GPS
spoofing (Cockrell School of Engineering 2012).
During a DHS test of one of their small UAV helicopters, conducted at White Sands Missile
Range, NM, researchers spoofed a UAV into believing that it was at an altitude different from

25
the actual one, causing it to dive toward earth. The demonstration was stopped just before the
UAV crashed, allowing it to successfully recover, but proved a point nonetheless. According to
the DHS researchers, this was an intermediate-level spoofing attack. They added that a more
sophisticated attack would be considerably more difficult and expensive to carry out. They
recommended that spoof-resistant navigation systems be required on UAVs exceeding 18 pounds
(Dillingham 2013).
GPS jamming is a very real threat to UAVs (Dillingham 2013).When the GPS signal being
transmitted is interrupted, and if the system was operating solely on that form of navigation, the
UAV could lose its ability to determine location, altitude, and the direction in which it was
traveling. The only UAVs currently fitted with redundant or multiple UAV navigation controls
are in use by DOD and DHS. According to Humphreys, when it comes to UAV hacking, "It is
not within the capability of the average person on the street, or even the average anonymous
hacker…” (McCarthy 2012). However, he went on to say that “. . . the emerging tools of
software-defined radio and the availability of GPS signal simulators are putting [spoofing] within
reach of ordinary malefactors" (Ibid).
Many commercial companies are eager to begin using UAVs, something the US Congress
has said they will be allowed to do by 2015 (FAA 2007). UAVs would then almost inevitably
become a common feature in US airspace. This could prove to be problematic if observers are
unable to positively identify what a UAV is doing, who it is working for, where it is going, and
when its job will be completed. Malicious actors could take advantage of this ambiguity and use
it to their advantage.

26
Who the UAV Policy Would Affect
There are three widely accepted types of UAV operators. Model airplane enthusiasts are
considered amateurs or hobbyists by the FAA, and are permitted to fly UAVs for entertainment,
sport, and recreation. Strictly speaking, civil UAV operators are those with industry or academic
ties who wish to pursue UAV research and development, testing, and operator training, or
undertake market research surveys in accordance with 14 CFR Part 21.191. (FAA 2014). A
public UAV operator is by definition governmental in nature (i.e., federal, state, or other local
agency). There remains, however, a third possible class of UAV operator: state or non-state
actors seeking to use UAVs as weapons both in the United States and around the world. It should
be noted that whatever category a UAV operator falls into, his vehicle, once airborne, could
potentially present a dangerous threat. Outside of the military, no countermeasures exist or are in
place to stop, shut down, or remove a threatening UAV from the sky. In the US, largely due to
the dedication and countless man-hours worked by intelligence and law enforcement, plans to
use UAVs maliciously have been identified and stopped before they could be carried out as
explained later in this chapter (Clayton 2011, FBI 2011, Gips 2002).
According to John Villasenor, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for
Technology and Innovation, "There's been so much awareness of the way drones are changing
warfare that it's inevitable that terrorist groups are also keenly aware of drones' potential"
(Clayton 2011). Philip Finnegan, Teal Group's director of corporate analysis, has provided
strategic and market analysis for clients in commercial aerospace and defense, and has stated:
Inevitably this technology is going to spread and the US can't really stop that . . .
non-state actors will try to get control of it. There are threats, not just that someone would
get a drone on their own, but that they might take control of others' drones (Clayton
2011)

27
Dennis Gormley, a senior lecturer on international security and intelligence studies at the
University of Pittsburgh, has stated that "There's a growing realization that UAVs are spreading
globally, and that certain state and non-state actors might want to use them against us” (Ibid.).
Gormley then mentions an FBI sting operation8
in which plans to use UAVs as weapons were
located and stopped before any crime was committed.
In his book Target USA: The Inside Story of the New Terrorist War, Louis Mizell, a
former US intelligence officer and private security expert, uncovered 43 cases involving 14
terrorist groups in which remotely controlled delivery systems were "either threatened,
developed, or actually utilized" (Mizell 1998). In response to critics who downplay the threat of
UAVs being used as weapons, Mizell provided some examples of UAVs capable of carrying a
hefty payload. A Mississippi company, for example, markets Bergen remote-controlled (RC)
Helicopters over the internet. These small five-foot RC helicopters cost $4,000 each and capable
of carrying a 44-lb payload for 30 minutes without refueling. Mizell also mentions a Yamaha
Motor Company UAV helicopter advertising a 20-kg payload.
These types of UAVs are proliferated around the world and readily available to anybody
with the means to buy them. In 2001Yamaha sold well over 1,000 units of this model to
Japanese companies for crop-dusting purposes (Sato 2003). Of note, the relatively small payload
size does not provide assurance that such vehicles will not be used in terrorism. Mizell says that
heavy payloads are not always necessary and that terrorists could employ many UAVs with
8
“The FBI alleges that Rezwan Ferdaus, an Al Qaeda sympathizer, planned to buy, for $3,000, a 68-inch long,
1/10th-scale McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II. The plane, he allegedly told informants, could carry 10 to 12
pounds of plastic explosives at up to 160 miles per hour. It could come equipped with a GPS system to automatically
guide the plane, he allegedly said. He also planned to buy two F-86s, one of which he already possessed at the time
of his arrest, which have similar capabilities” (Clayton 2011).

28
small payloads dispersed over a larger distance to create an effect similar to one UAV carrying a
large payload covering a short distance (Mizell 1998).
Singer claims that terrorist groups have been obtaining or procuring UAVs for the
purpose of evaluating platform attack options and experimentation (P. Singer 2009). His claim
was supported in 2008 when two advanced US made UAVs were discovered in an Iraqi cache by
US soldiers. At four pounds, able to fly close to one hour up to 1000 feet at a cruise speed of
roughly 60 knots before requiring a refueling, the RQ-l IB Raven is the smallest operational
UAV used by the US military (US Army 2010). This trend has also been seen in other parts of
the world. In 2005 an Institute for Defense Analyses report mentioned that nine remotely
controlled, unmanned aircraft were discovered in Columbia when one of that country’s military
units overran a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)9
rebel camp
(Terroristgroups.org 2013). Although merely having this technology stashed somewhere does not
guarantee that it will become weaponized, or is even capable of effective operation, the potential
still exists for it to become a true threat. This was seen in 2002 when model planes were
purchased in Europe and sent to Palestinian shopkeepers, ostensibly for recreational purposes10
.
In a turn of events, the planes wound up being converted into miniature aerial bombers with
explosive payloads (Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT
2005).This report, together with a handful of others listed by the Center for Arms Control,
9
The FARC is classified as a terrorist organization by the governments of Colombia, the United States, Canada,
Chile, New Zealand, and the European Union (Terroristgroups.org 2013).
10
“In December 2002, Palestinian toy importers in Jerusalem and Ramallah were told to order hundreds of model
airplanes for distribution to Palestinian children in hospitals. Subsidies from European Union member-governments
could legitimately be allocated to this humanitarian purpose. The model airplanes were purchased in Europe and
shipped openly to Palestinian shopkeepers. The model planes were sent to Palestinian workshops for conversion into
miniature air bombers with explosive payloads. Tanzim militiamen from Arafat's Fatah, sent out to open areas near
Jericho to test the new weapons, discovered they could fly to a distance of 1 kilometer and an altitude of 300
meters” (Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT 2005).

29
Energy, and Environment Studies at MIPT, indicate that terrorists and other groups are aware of
and are exploring the use of this technology (Ibid). Historically, new technologies have at times
been deliberately converted from peaceful to deadly purposes. For example, cell phones and
other two-way communication devices have been used to detonate explosives along roadsides in
Iraq and Afghanistan; when the US military found ways to counter this tactic by jamming
frequencies, garage door IR safety triggers and outdoor lighting motion detectors began to be
used as backup triggers (Caldwell 2011, 2).With respect to UAV technology in US domestic
airspace, policies must be identified, implemented, and enforced to prevent conversion to deadly
use.
Legitimate, non-threatening hobbyist and recreational UAV operators in the USA are
found in parks and other open areas where they enjoy the freedom of flying their UAVs
unimpeded. Currently, operators of small UAVs are not required to comply with most of the
rules and regulations to which their manned-aircraft counterparts are held. In many cases manned
aircraft rules simply don’t apply. There are, for example, no cockpit doors to be locked or
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) transponders to turn on. At the present time no pilot’s
license is required. In fact, current FAA UAV guidelines require only that operators maintain
flight profiles below 400 feet, operate during daylight hours, avoid airports and/or densely
populated areas (FAA 1981).
Currently, civilian UAV operators are not required to register or identify their UAVs. Nor
are they required to disclose UAV launch locations or what they intend to use them for (FAA
1981). This may not constitute a problem when UAVs are operated away from populated, but
once an operator begins to fly his vehicle over a busy city, highway, or school playground, the
potential for harm arises. Needless to say, worst case scenarios resulting from failure to deal with

30
these issues can end in damage, injuries, or even loss of life. A set of regulations should be
developed and implemented to ensure that civilian UAV operations are safe, law-abiding, and
immune from terrorist exploitation.
CHAPTER 3
Discussion of Policy Options
Peter Singer, author of Wired for War, believes that the USA is currently ahead of other
powers in the area of robotics, but that its advantage will not last much longer (P. W. Singer
2009). The US has led the world in developing and producing UAVs, and currently has an
advantage in autonomous (or GPS) guidance technology. Singer makes a comparison with the
tank: although the British and French invented it, it was the Germans who perfected its use.
Regarding UAVs, the terrorist group Hezbollah found ways to use them to successfully engage
and attack their Israeli enemies. Israel, too, found UAVs useful as early as the 1980s. In 1982 the
Israelis used UAVs to gather radar data in the Beqaa Valley by having UAVs swarm over the
border to attract Syrian radar and missiles. When Syrian air defense radars were left on, their
location was highlighted and subsequently attacked by follow-on strike aircraft (Singer 2013).
Another example of this type of technological adaptation occurred during Operation Iraqi
Freedom (2003). Though in a slightly different context, militants were able to link up certain
websites to IEDs which people could log onto and then personally detonate them (Ibid).
Marc Goodman agrees with Singer and believes that rapidly advancing technology is
opening up an entirely new era of potential UAV crime (Goodman 2013). Advanced technology
(such as UAVs) was once restricted to elite military forces for logistical reasons and, most

31
importantly, because of the high research and development costs. Today many of the benefits
offered by UAV technology can be reaped at low cost; what once cost millions is now available
for thousands of dollars or even less. As a result criminals and terrorists can adopt and reap gains
from now relatively cheap and accessible modern technology. For example, in Mexico criminals
have found a way to build and create their own secure cell towers and networks. “We have to
both understand and appreciate the fact that criminals and terrorists are often early adopters of
technology, and the latest global trends in robotics have not been lost on them.” (Goodman
2013). Goodman talks about arming UAVs with weapons ranging from paintball guns to .45
caliber handguns. While these adaptations would undoubtedly be rather inaccurate, their
psychological effect might be enough to consider the mere launching of the mission a success, at
least from the point of view of the attackers. A UAV needn’t expend any rounds to elicit a major
public response. Merely being in close proximity to a hovering UAV with a mounted weapon
could be terrorizing enough by itself. Arming an aircraft with an explosive device and
programming it to crash into an office building (or a crowd of people) is by definition a lethal
weapon. In fact, this type of attack has - on more than one occasion - been attempted by
terrorists. In 2011, the FBI thwarted a plan by al Qaeda operatives to attack the US Capitol and
Pentagon with UAVs (FBI 2011). In 2009, Tamil Tiger rebels packed two light weight aircraft
with explosives and flew them towards Colombo in Sri Lanka. In this case, the aircraft were
successfully shot down by military forces before they were able to execute a kamikaze-style
attack on the capital (Economist 2014).
With technologically advanced UAVs coming to the United States, the potential for their
malicious use is causing increasing concern. UAV countermeasures are being developed by
private companies, academic organizations, and the US military (Lee, Annual ‘Black Dart’

32
exercise tests UAV countermeasures 2013). This type of research is very important to the US
because of the increased proliferation and availability of UAV systems. In 2005 the Institute for
Defense Analysis published a report titled Terrorist Use of Improvised or Commercially
Available Precision-Guided UAVs at Stand-Off Ranges: An Approach for Formulating
Mitigation Considerations. This report makes the point that even if a UAV is located while in
flight, it would be difficult to prevent it from continuing on its mission. Shooting it down would
be difficult, absent a robust local missile defense capability or, alternatively, the ability to jam its
guidance system. The IDA report does not discuss the implications of shooting a projectile at a
UAV (i.e., the possible damage that could be caused when one or both objects fell to earth). Nor
does it mention certain technologies already developed to accomplish the very task of engaging
or shooting small projectiles out of the sky. Additionally, GPS jamming would be effective only
if the UAV is GPS guided (McCarthy 2012). To ensure the UAV is prevented from receiving
navigation commands, the frequency sending the commands would also need to be jammed. The
report discusses how Hezbollah’s increasing proficiency in UAV operations has resulted in
several occasions on which they have flown their UAVs over Israel. After one of these overflight
operations (which occurred on November 7, 2004), the Center for Arms Control, Energy and
Environment Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology reported11
that UAVs
had become a very attractive option for terrorists, perhaps even more than the traditional suicide
belt (Mandelbaum and Ralston 2005).
11
Eugene Miasnikov, Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical Aspects, Center for
Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at MIPT, Dolgoprudny, June 2004, 26 pages. Translated into
English - March 2005. PDF file (0.54 Mb)

33
Based on the facts presented thus far in this paper, the following should be addressed
before framing a policy proposal: 1) UAV equipment and how it is constructed and
manufactured before it leaves the factory; 2) UAV operators and how to determine whether or
not they possess the necessary qualifications to operate these vehicles; 3) UAV enforcement,
including who will be in charge of patrolling the sky for UAVs that are operating in violation of
the law.
UAV Equipment
1. UAVs should be required to have serial numbers engraved into critical parts before
leaving the factory (control arms, motors, processors, GPS receivers). This would follow
the same guidelines as other aircraft, automobiles, farm equipment, etc., Serial number
tracking would aid in assessing faulty parts to determine an accident if the operator were
to blame versus a mechanical failure. Additionally, it would assist in crime fighting
during forensics testing as a result of any criminal investigation. Detectives would use
this data to identify the persons or companies who purchased the equipment, as well as
narrow down when the equipment was purchased and where it was delivered.

34
2. All UAVs should be installed with a NextGen
transponders and trackers. These kits are now
available through Sagetech Corporation and use
ADS-B location broadcasts interfaced with iPads
(Unmanned Systems Technology 2014). The kit
includes Sagetech’s new XPG-TR micro transponder,
Clarity ADS-B receiver, and an iPad with zero
interface connections, all of which can be fully
installed and made operational within minutes. The transponders should automatically
activate once the UAV is airborne. This type of product would increase the safety of
UAV operations by allowing ATC, nearby aircraft, and third party personnel to track
UAVs with standard commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment.
3. UAVs should be required to come with a standard sense and avoid (SAA) suite installed
at the factory. As with many other technological innovations, the US military is heading
up this project and expects to complete development on UAV sense-and-avoid systems
by FY 201712
(Malenic 2014). Giving the UAV this self-awareness feature combined
with the ability to maneuver and thus avoid striking another airborne device or ground
12
The DOD has divided its SAA activities into GBSAA and ABSAA (airborne sense-and-avoid). The US Army is
leading the GBSAA effort, while the US Air Force (USAF) is overseeing development of a common ABSAA, with
the US Navy (USN) contributing heavily to the latter. The US Marine Corps (USMC) currently has a DOD-
approved ground-based sense-and-avoid (GBSAA) system operating at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point,
North Carolina, according to the "Report to Congress on the progress of research aimed at integrating unmanned
aircraft into national air space", dated December 2013 and signed by Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall. "A
fully developed common GBSAA capability is scheduled to be in use in fiscal year 2014-2015 [FY 2014-15] when
the army certifies and fields a system at five Gray Eagle operating locations", said the report. According to the
report, development of a common ABSAA is to be completed by mid-FY 2016, and "the navy is committed to
developing an ABSAA for [Triton] by…FY 2017", its scheduled deployment date (Malenic 2014).
Picture 2: Sagetech Corporation
identification transponders

35
object is already underway, and is covered later in this paper. This requirement would
help reduce collisions in the air and on the ground. Those hobbyists who chose to build
their own UAV would be required to include and install this hardware and software prior
to any flight time. As of the date of this paper, no suitable technology had been approved
enabling UAVs to autonomously sense and avoid other airborne obstacles in compliance
with all current FAA regulatory requirements. The US Army has been working on a
ground based system to satisfy this requirement (SRC 2014). Other airborne, automatic
dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) technologies have also been tested by NASA
researchers at the Dryden Flight Research Center, but these technologies have yet to be
approved for public release (Dillingham 2013).
4. UAVs should be required to install software that would prevent them from crashing in the
event of a lost link. Lost links can occur for a variety of reasons. For example, temporary
loss of a satellite downlink for GPS guided UAVs can occur when the line-of-sight
between operator and target is temporarily obstructed by a manmade or geological
feature. Some UAVs are pre-programed with GPS coordinates, while others are given
command and control signals. A situation could arise in which a UAV is no longer able
to receive commands or a usable GPS signal, thus making it impossible for the vehicle to
maneuver to a safe area or altitude, hover, or receive new instructions (Dillingham 2013,
Mendenhall 2011).
5. UAVs should be granted a larger dedicated portion of the radio-frequency spectrum to
ensure that sufficiently secure and continuous communications are available to the UAV
operators. In the GAO report on Dr. Gerald Dillingham’s testimony to Congress dated
February 15, 2013, it was stated that many UAVs are controlled by specific radio

36
frequencies that have traditionally been assigned for this type of work. Additional radio
frequencies have been obtained to enable the increased operation of UAVs, and efforts
are underway to secure an even wider spectrum. The next hurdle, according to
Dillingham, will be obtaining dedicated satellite links to ensure secure and continuous
communications for both large and small UAV operations. Leaving unsecured/
unprotected/undedicated spectrum frequencies increases the chance that a UAV pilot
could lose command and control of the vehicle. This could be unintentional, or caused by
outside interference – by terrorists, for example. (Ibid).
6. UAVs used for commercial purposes should be required to have insurance against bodily
injury and property damage before becoming operational.
UAV Operators
1. UAV operators should be held to similar if not the same standards required of MAV
pilots. For example, they should be required to file a detailed flight plan with the FAA
prior to departure. The form for operators could be almost identical to the one currently
used by MAV pilots (FAA Form 7233-1), and include much of the same information
(FAA 2014). UAV operators would not be allowed to take off until they have received
FAA approval.
2. Other UAV operator responsibilities should include a requirement to enroll in and
graduate from a UAV operator instructional class prior to employment with a commercial
business seeking to conduct UAV operations. The operator would only be considered
capable of safe UAV airborne operations after obtaining a license to operate UAVs in the
NAS.

37
UAV Enforcement
Goodman does not think the FAA can be the sole or final authority on this technology, as
he feels it is already too busy with its current aviation responsibilities and challenges. He points
to a 2012 GAO audit that found that “no federal agency has been statutorily designated with
specific responsibility to regulate privacy matters relating to Unmanned Aerial Systems within
the entire federal government”. If no agency has not be named to deal with a far more publicized
issue like privacy, then it is highly unlikely that one has been designated for enforcement. But,
he says, UAV utilization and testing by law enforcement and academic institutions is occurring
more and more, with states like Texas, Florida, Washington, and Mississippi all authorized by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to fly small UAVs in federal airspace.
One key missing feature is whether or not a means of detection exists. Many current Air
Traffic Control (ATC) and United States military Early Warning (EW) radar receivers cannot
detect an ultralight aircraft crossing from Mexico into the United States along the southern
border (Jagels 2013). Dr. Timothy Chung, Assistant Professor of Systems Engineering and
Director of Research and Education for the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems
Education and Research (CRUSER) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey,
California, has stated that the small UAV threat is related to the these becoming cheaper and
more widely available, and as a result of the expansion of UAV technologies through military,
commercial, and consumer use. Problems now lie in the ability to detect and identify smaller and
slower UAVs flying as lower altitudes (Jagels 2013). Both the US government and the private
sector are well aware of this and have been working to develop radars to solve this problem.

38
More on these radars (their capabilities and where they fall short), will be covered in later
sections.
A UAV detected on radar but not registered as having filed any documentation with the
FAA should be flagged and investigated. If it does not have a working transmitter, did not
coordinate with the FAA prior to launch, and/or is operating inside restricted airspace, it should
be considered malicious until proven otherwise. Once a UAV has been identified as malicious, or
potentially so, the proper authorities would be directed to respond to its location. Ideally, the
authorities would have radar either installed on their vehicle, or they would have access to the
same real-time FAA UAV feed. An unregistered UAV could be removed from the sky using
electronic means, to include hacking the controls (covered below). If the operator were found
guilty of breaking the law (assuming the operator was known or later discovered), a range of
penalties could be imposed, including suspending their operator’s license (as with drivers of
automobiles who fail to obey vehicular laws).
Preventing damage to important buildings, structures, or areas could involve installing
counter-UAV equipment in the vicinity of these high value locations. These areas could include,
but not limited to: airports, government office buildings, power stations, and prisons.
Additionally, there could be several ways in which to counter and engage potentially dangerous
UAVs, either kinetically or non-kinetically. Kinetic engagements might include launching
projectiles at or somehow ‘netting’ the UAV. Non-kinetic means would include jamming,
hacking, or otherwise taking over the UAV’s control systems (Jagels 2013). One concept for
removing UAVs from the sky kinetically has already been tested and is described in press reports
as RAP-CAP: a gun-launched projectile using an infrared proximity sensor to burst out foam and
netting around the UAV. In doing so, a conductive carbon would disable the electronics and

39
communications suite (Grant 2012). More lethal means have also been explored. Several
countries including the USA have access to a type of radar called an AN/MPQ-64A1 Sentinel,
which is able to detect, acquire, classify and – if the situation warrants – direct nearby weapons
systems against more than 50 malicious unmanned aircraft simultaneously (Judson 2012). Other
kinetic options include fast-firing solid-state laser weapons like Boeing’s Laser Avenger, which
successfully shot down a UAV in 2009 (Grant 2012). The US Navy utilized this close-in weapon
system with a modified 32-kilowatt power laser to successfully bring down four UAVs in a 2010
exercise (Ibid). It has even been reported that the US Navy has plans to deploy this system to the
Persian Gulf sometime in 2014 (Jagels 2013). While the methods described above appear
effective, there is an obvious problem in employing them over domestic territory; if UAVs are
engaged and destroyed while airborne, they may damage property, as well as injure or kill people
below when they crash-land.
Over the past few years, big companies such as SRC and Raytheon have developed and
tested various static UAV countermeasure systems, including the Vigilant Falcon (VF) and
Vigilant Eagle (VE). VF is a low-cost, lightweight mobile system comprised of high tech radar
with the means to employ electronic countermeasures. Whereas many large ATC radars have
difficulty locating and identifying small aerial systems – such as ultra-light aircraft and UAVs –
the VF radar has proven capable. VF is designed to counter small UAVs by analyzing their
signatures and kinematics for classification and identification. According to Tom Wilson, Vice
President for Product Accounts at SRC, once a UAV is positively identified, the system is
designed to track and disable its operating system (Jagels 2013).
One way in which the military has tested UAV countermeasures is through an annual,
week-long joint exercise called “Black Dart” (Lee 2013). Black Dart (BD) first started in 2010

40
and has only been held at two different locations – China Lake, CA in 2010, and the rest in Point
Mugu, CA in 2011, 2012 and 2013 The exercise attempts to assess counter-UAV systems across
various military air and missile defense kill chains by using some of the newest technology
available, some of which remains classified. Throughout the exercise, ground operators and
commanders concentrate on detecting, tracking, identifying, and sometimes engaging UAVs.
Current Policy and Law
The research design section of chapter 1 mentioned that there are existing aviation
documents and policy memorandums released by the US Congress, the DOT, and the FAA. The
documents below are the same documents the FAA refers to when they try to enforce laws and
forbids public or civil UAV operations without an approved COA. This section compares how
the documents read, to how an attorney, Peter Sachs, interprets those documents. Sachs studied
public interest law and graduated from the University of Bridgeport (Quinnipiac University
School of Law) in Hamden, Connecticut (Sachs 2013). He is well versed in aviation law and the
shortcomings of current UAV regulation. In addition, he is a licensed helicopter pilot who agrees
completely with the necessity to regulate UAVs in domestic airspace. Sachs has been engaged in
ongoing disputes with the FAA for more than two years now. Forbes Magazine, a well-known
business publication, weighed in on this dispute in early March, 2014, when it published an
article, “Listen Up Drone Operators: FAA Has 7 Myths To Bust” (Goglia 2014). This initial
story appeared to support the FAA’s position on small UAV enforcement authority. It also
appeared that the article was an attempt by the FAA to prevent - or stop - public and private
organizations from using small UAVs without first gaining proper FAA approval (Ibid).
However, this article backfired on the FAA. Sachs commented at the bottom of the article and

41
defended his statements with concrete evidence spelled out by the FAA’s own publications; as
described below. The editors at Forbes Magazine were apparently convinced by Sachs’
arguments, since every follow-up article pertaining to the FAA and UAVs in the weeks since has
supported Sachs’ claims and arguments. Several articles have highlighted the lack of enforceable
UAV guidelines, and even criticized the FAA directly for attempting to insinuate
otherwise13
,14
,15
,16
. Forbes has also provided a link to Sachs’ internet page for reference
purposes.
This section describes current federal statues, regulations, and case law surrounding
general aviation and supports the claim that no laws currently exist to regulate UAV use. Sachs
believes that “The federal government has no authority whatsoever to regulate the operation of
remote-controlled model aircraft [RCMA].” (Sachs 2013). Regulations do not have the force of
law. On his website Sachs discusses current laws and regulations, his interpretation of them, and
his opinion as to whether they actually apply to aviation (the body of law in question includes
federal case law). He further states that if those guidelines do not appear in the aforementioned
body of laws, they self-evidently cannot be law and therefore do not need to be followed (Ibid).
In regard to the United States Code, Subtitle VII, he states:
13
It's Time to Halt The FAA's Arbitrary and Expanding Domestic "Drone" Ban. Sean Lawson. 4/08/2014.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2014/04/08/its-time-to-halt-the-faas-arbitrary-and-expanding-domestic-
drone-ban/ accessed 23 April 2014
14
Drone Wars (Of The Legal Variety). Kashmir Hill. 3/17/2014.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/03/17/drone-wars-of-the-legal-kind/ accessed 23 April 2014
15
Next Moves in the Battle Over Domestic Drones. Sean Lawson. 4/22/2014.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2014/04/22/next-moves-in-the-battle-over-domestic-drones/ accessed 23
April 2014
16
Drones: 1, FAA: 0. Ryan Calo. 3/07/2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancalo/2014/03/07/drones-1-faa-0/
accessed 23 April 2014

42
Federal statutory law is enacted by Congress and found in the United States
Code. The federal statutes that govern aviation are found in Title 49 USC Sec.
44101, et seq., and have the force of law. Current federal aviation statutes find
their roots in the Federal Aviation Act in 1958, as revised. The Act basically
provides the big picture with regard to aviation. Most importantly, it established
the FAA, and granted it power to oversee and regulate matters relating to the
safety and use of American airspace though the promulgation of regulations. As
such, although the US Code addresses aviation law in broad terms, the details of
aviation laws are actually found in the FAA regulations (Sachs 2013).
According to Sachs, this definition only appears to be straightforward and indisputable. In fact,
the statute only mentions “unmanned aircraft” once and only in reference to integration goals
(Sachs 2013). The next statutory area Sachs considers is the Federal Aviation Regulations, about
which he states:
Federal regulations are promulgated by the FAA and found in the Code of
Federal Regulations. The federal regulations that pertain to aviation, (the
“FARs”), are found in 14 CFR 1.1, et seq., and have the force of law. There is
nothing in the FARs that concerns RCMA. The FAA cannot just make
up regulations as it goes along, to enforce activities that it simply wishes to
enforce. There must exist an actual statute or regulation for the FAA to
enforce. The FARs are the only federal regulations that exist pertaining
to aviation, and are the only regulations that are legally
enforceable. You’ll not find any that concern RCMA. You will see regulations
that apply to other craft, such as balloons, rockets and even kites. So the FAA
clearly contemplated flight-capable craft other than airplanes and helicopters
when it adopted the current regulations. If the FAA had intended to regulate
RCMA as well, it would have done so. It didn’t.
Once again, Sachs is pointing out potential gaps in the FAA regulations that were not addressed
when they became law. His last point concerns federal case law, that is, the body of past court
decisions regarding FAA enforcement actions. Cases are heard by a National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) administrative judge, and then may go on appeal to an appellate court.
Recently, NTSB judge Patrick Geraghty dismissed a case against one Raphael Pirker, who had
been fined $10,000 by the FAA for using a UAV to shoot a promotional video over the

43
University of Virginia. Additionally, in this case the judge threw out the federal ban on
commercial drone use saying "There was no enforceable FAA rule" concerning Mr. Pirker's
aircraft. He said that the government's claim that laws had been broken due to the FAA having
authority over anything that moves through the air would include "a paper aircraft, or a toy balsa
wood glider" (Feith 2014).
Another recent event, which occurred in Texas, has the potential to cause significant
controversy. On April 21, 2014 a Texas non-profit search-and-rescue organization, Texas
EquuSearch, announced that it was filing a lawsuit against the FAA for the cease-and-desist
order the latter had issued on March 17, 2014 (NICAS 2014). In its lawsuit, Texas EquuSearch
argues that UAVs used for humanitarian purposes fall outside the current ban on businesses
using them (NICAS 2014).
The next point Sachs shifts focus to is what he calls “non-law” or “non-enforceable law”,
which he states might sound or appear to be law, bur really is not law at all. Many interested
parties, including the FAA, refer to most of the FAA publications considered in this section as
regulations prohibiting commercial use of RCMA. Sachs claims this is far from true, rather, he
believes none of them carries any weight; therefore, “none are legally enforceable” (Sachs 2013).
Another publication commonly referred to is Advisory Circular 91-57, published in 1981, and
titled “Model Aircraft Operating Standards” (FAA 1981). This document clearly states that
adherence is purely voluntary and, again, therefore cannot be enforced. Sachs describes it as
“merely a list of common sense suggestions, and is not legally enforceable.” This became
evident in the Pirker case previously discussed” (Sachs 2013).
In 2007 the FAA issued an updated document intended to clarify its policy concerning
unmanned aircraft operations in the NAS. Sachs claims that although this update does state that

44
remote controlled model aircraft may not be used commercially, it is only an Agency policy
statement, and therefore not legally enforceable (Ibid). Upon further investigation, it spells out
guidance for public use of unmanned aircraft by defining a process for evaluating applications
for Certificate(s) of Waiver or Authorization (COA’s), but not private or civilian RCMA.
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 is law, but once again, Sachs found a
loophole is this document. He states:
. . . specifically Title III, Subtitle B is an Act of Congress and is a law, but it’s one
that is simply a list of directives to the FAA. In and of itself it does not compel
any person (other than those employed by the FAA whose duties include the
promulgation of regulations) to do or not do anything. The Act contains a number
of directives to the FAA to develop regulations concerning the integration of
unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system. By definition, Congress
having directed the FAA to develop regulations means none currently exist.
Moreover, these directives apply to the FAA only, not the general public. They
are not themselves regulations, and are not legally enforceable.
The next publication could cause confusion, as both sides have a compelling argument
regarding the wording. The Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Operational Approval is the
definitive guide to the COA process. Sachs points out the top of the document where it states it
is merely a statement of “National Policy”, and again states that a policy statement is not legally
enforceable. He even goes one step further and highlights paragraph five that reads ít ís “not
meant as a substitute for any regulatory process” (FAA, 2013). However, reading further into
the document, paragraph eight reads:
…the applicability and process to be used in UAS operational approval are
dependent on whether the proposed UAS operation within the territorial airspace
of the United States (the airspace above the contiguous United States, Alaska,
Hawaii, U.S. territories, and U.S. territorial waters) is defined as public or civil
(refer to 14 CFR part 1, § 1.1 and Public Law 110-181, “The National Defense
Authorization Act of 2008”) (FAA, 2013).

45
The US DOT Unmanned Aircraft Systems Comprehensive Plan, published in September,
2013, is described by Sachs as a five year roadmap. The document itself describes itself as a list
of goals and objectives to be revised annually to successfully further the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 plan to integrate UAVs into the NAS. Once again, not law, and
unenforceable.
The final document mentioned by Sachs pertains to the COA mentioned earlier. While
the FAA maintains that COAs are authorizations issued by the Air Traffic Organization to a
public operator for a specific UA activity, Sachs says the following:
Most people think that obtaining a “certificate of waiver or authorization”
(“COA”) is required to fly a drone. That’s what the FAA has been claiming for
years. However, it’s not required at all. In fact, with respect to public aircraft,
(government operated aircraft, such as those operated by police and fire
departments), the FAA is not even permitted to regulate Airworthiness or pilot
qualifications. The FAA can only regulate public aircraft insofar as they interact
with all other aircraft, whether civil and public. In other words, the FAA can only
legally regulate that public aircraft to the extent that they comply with Part 91
regulations17
17
While USC 49 § 44711 states, “[a] person may not— (1) operate a civil aircraft in air
commerce without an airworthiness certificate in effect…” and “(2) serve in any capacity as an
airman with respect to a civil aircraft,” the same is not true for public aircraft. The FAA cannot
require operators of public aircraft to have airworthiness certificates or be operated by certified
airmen. And as absurd as it might sound, a police department helicopter need not be airworthy,
and it may be flown by a non-pilot (Sachs 2013).

46
Policy Option
Ensuring the safety of US airspace and assisting in the protection of US national security
have much in common. Controlling airspace is perhaps the biggest challenge ahead, based on
the introduction of a new technology potentially operating in and crowding the airspace. To
accomplish this task, anyone who wishes to purchase a UAV should be required to complete an
FAA designed beginner’s course on airspace and aerial safety. This course would educate UAV
owners on different types of airspace, areas of operation restricted by UAVs, and UAV basic
care and maintenance. The operator would be required to present a graduation certification
before launching a UAV of any type, for any company, for any reason. Once graduated, the
operator would be entered into a national database to track the UAV they purchased and what
their motivations were for the purchase (recreation, sport, research, commercial employment,
etc). Once signed into law, a person found possessing or operating a UAV without certification
would be considered in violation of the policy and potentially subject to a penalty or fines.
Additionally, all UAVs manufactured in the United States or shipped into the United
States from other countries should be required to meet specific engineering standards. No-fly
zone software, sense and avoid technology, lost-link/return-to-base, and installed location
transmitters – would constitute minimum standards for UAVs. Any person found in possession
of a UAV who is unable to demonstrate these features in full operation could be grounded and
considered in violation of policy, subject to penalty and fines.

47
CHAPTER 4
Evaluation of Policy Options
In trying to evaluate how best to regulate UAV operators, several question arise. First, do we
put an age limit on UAV operators? If so, what should it be? In the US, teenagers begin driving
a motor vehicle as early as age 16 (15 with a learner’s permit). If we put regulations on motor
vehicles for safety reasons, shouldn’t we mirror that policy for UAVs? The next logical step is
for the US government to clearly define limitations and boundaries and turn it into law. If one is
unable to purchase a UAV until after they completed their class, they would be limited to
teaching themselves standards of UAV maintenance via books, user manuals, or online
resources. However, it would seem to make more sense for operators to order and practice their
own UAV during the training course. On the other hand, that could result in people failing to
show up for instruction, thinking perhaps that they would be able to figure out operational
maintenance on their own (through reading, online instruction, etc.) As shown above, variables
and exceptions must be considered in order to strike an acceptable balance of operator age limits,
mandated safety classes, and UAV maintenance standards to ensure equipment stays airworthy.
With manufacturing regulations in place, companies will begin building UAVs with most
of the minimum standard features; although usually these parts are purchased by a manufacturer
from another company who turns out to be the lowest bidder and at the lowest possible cost.
This can possibly result in a lower quality piece of equipment being built. Nonetheless, UAV
manufacturing companies selling their products to US consumers should include standard safety
features (similar to automobiles) if they plan to stay competitive in the markets. If a transmitter
suddenly quit working while the UAV was in flight and an air enforcement officer were to

48
identify that failure before the vehicle were able to land, should that be grounds for a penalty or
fine, or simply a citation followed by a friendly reminder to get that transmitter fixed? As with
traffic violations, law enforcement officers could use discretion in assessing penalties. On the
other hand, some may argue for more objective standards of enforcement.
Enforcement Options
UAV law enforcement technology has already become globalized. Countries such as
South Africa, Kenya, Italy, and Australia have taken steps to integrate UAVs into civilian law
enforcement, though not in the same way as advocated in this paper (Goodman 2013). Law
enforcement entities in these countries use UAVs to hunt down criminals and terrorists, not to
actively monitor or defend against terrorists using UAVs as weapons. This type of domestic use
is outside the scope of this paper, and will not be discussed in detail, as many US citizens believe
US law enforcement’s use of UAVs in tracking US citizens will (and has already) meet with
harsh criticism. While this tactic could also prove useful, the US also needs to concentrate on the
employment of UAVs in an aerial monitoring or patrolling mode. Hacker and entrepreneur Samy
Kamkar may have a feasible suggestion as to how to integrate UAVs into securing the airspace
in a non-kinetic way. In late 2013, he made headlines by introducing the world to his SkyJack
UAV. Essentially, he uses a quadcopter that is equipped to hijack other nearby airborne
quadcopters by autonomously hacking into their navigation control center (UAVs hacking
UAVs). On his website, Kamkar explains the process in detail:
I developed a drone that flies around, seeks the wireless signal of any other drone
in the area, forcefully disconnects the wireless connection of the true owner of the
target drone, then authenticates with the target drone pretending to be its owner,
then feeds commands to it and all other possessed zombie drones navigate at my
will (Kamkar 2013).

49
This tactic could prove a double-edged sword if it were to fall into the wrong hands. For
this reason, it is important for the designated air enforcement agency to begin researching ways
to improve upon technology first, and with government funding, develop countermeasures.
Insurance
According to Poms & Associates Insurance Brokers, Inc., risk modeling for a UAV
terrorist attack has not yet been done. While it proved impossible to locate any risk modeling on
potential terrorist UAV events, there were companies willing to insure UAVs against negligent
operations. However, the coverage offered by the companies, outlined in the paragraph below,
would not be sufficient to cover a mass casualty attack in which many people required medical
care. On the other hand, having this type of insurance may be enough to cover any potential
damages resulting from a UAV malfunction or accidental impact on a more limited scale.
UAV operators have the option of purchasing insurance to cover damages in the event
that something goes wrong with their UAV. There are several types of aviation insurance
available, but this paper will only address UAV types. For instance, the types of UAVs discussed
in this thesis are not capable of transporting people (yet), so there is no need for passenger
liability insurance – which is often sold on a “per-seat” basis with a specified limit for each
passenger. Instead, this paper will focus on public liability insurance (also referred to as third
party liability insurance) This type of insurance is concerned with what might happen if the
airframe collided with houses, cars, crop fields, airport facilities or other aircraft (The Canadian
Owners & Pilots Association 2011). Companies offering to insure UAVs only cover liability,
which includes bodily injury to a person (as well as objects) on the ground (T. Miller 2013). An
online search found an insurance company called Transportrisk.com offering up to $100,000,000

SANKEY THESIS 28MAY2014

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