Chapter 10 Air Cargo This chapter examines issues related to aircraft operator security along with risks and processes associated with air cargo. An overview and assessment of the vulnerabilities of aviation systems in relation to air cargo is also discussed. Policies, methods, and regulations are examined for managing security within the "air cargo supply train." The "9-11 bill," along with Title 49 CFR Part 1548 Indirect Air Carrier Security legislation, are examined in relation to air cargo security. We will also look at a synopsis of where air cargo security is today and examine concerns regarding future legislation and methods for managing air cargo security. * Introduction Introduction The business and logistics for supporting air cargo is a highly complex system of global infrastructure that is subject to risk from crime and terrorism. Air cargo includes freight and express packages that range in size from small to very large, and in type from car engines, electronic equipment, machine parts, apparel, medical supplies, human remains, to fresh-cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish, and other perishable goods. * Yemen air cargo plot In 2010, an attempt was made to bomb commercial airliners using explosive devices hidden in computer print cartridges shipped as air cargo. This effort in terrorism, commonly referred to as the Yemen air cargo plot, brought to public attention that air cargo is vulnerable as a target for terrorism. The Yemen air cargo plot was the first known terrorist activity using scheduled air cargo service as a mode for implementing an attack. * Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11 Introduction 10.5 million tons of cargo shipped every year 22% of U.S. passenger aircraft hold is cargo Majority of air cargo transported by all-cargo operators Remaining 2 million+ tons carried by passenger aircraft Most shipping customers assume that express or overnight delivery always utilizes cargo air service. However, only a small percent of packages travel by air and an even smaller amount is placed on a passenger-carrying plane as cargo. These small percentages still represent over 10.5 million tons of cargo shipped by air every year within the United States. Of that capacity, over 8 million tons is shipped cargo on international flights to and from the U.S., along with over half a million tons of mail. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that at least 22% of a U.S. passenger airliner's hold is on average, cargo, with the remaining cargo transported by "all-cargo" aircraft. Passenger planes often specialize in carrying "just-in-time" cargo, which consists of perishable items such as seafood and flowers or high-value fragile items like computers, jewelry, and artwork (etc.). The individual size and weight of items carried as air cargo are usually smaller and lighter as compared to cargo carried by rail, vessel, or truck. * Practical Aviation ...

1. Chapter 10
Air Cargo
This chapter examines issues related to aircraft operator
security along with risks and processes associated with air
cargo. An overview and assessment of the vulnerabilities of
aviation systems in relation to air cargo is also discussed.
Policies, methods, and regulations are examined for managing
security within the "air cargo supply train." The "9-11 bill,"
along with Title 49 CFR Part 1548 Indirect Air Carrier Security
legislation, are examined in relation to air cargo security. We
will also look at a synopsis of where air cargo security is today
and examine concerns regarding future legislation and methods
for managing air cargo security.
*
Introduction
Introduction
The business and logistics for supporting air cargo is a highly
complex system of global infrastructure that is subject to risk
from crime and terrorism.
Air cargo includes freight and express packages that range in

2. size from small to very large, and in type from car engines,
electronic equipment, machine parts, apparel, medical suppl ies,
human remains, to fresh-cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh
produce, tropical fish, and other perishable goods.
*
Yemen air cargo plot
In 2010, an attempt was made to bomb commercial airliners
using explosive devices hidden in computer print cartridges
shipped as air cargo.
This effort in terrorism, commonly referred to as the Yemen air
cargo plot, brought to public attention that air cargo is
vulnerable as a target for terrorism. The Yemen air cargo plot
was the first known terrorist activity using scheduled air cargo
service as a mode for implementing an attack.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Introduction
10.5 million tons of cargo shipped every year
22% of U.S. passenger aircraft hold is cargo
Majority of air cargo transported by all-cargo operators

3. Remaining 2 million+ tons carried by passenger aircraft
Most shipping customers assume that express or overnight
delivery always utilizes cargo air service. However, only a
small percent of packages travel by air and an even smaller
amount is placed on a passenger-carrying plane as cargo.
These small percentages still represent over 10.5 million tons of
cargo shipped by air every year within the United States. Of
that capacity, over 8 million tons is shipped cargo on
international flights to and from the U.S., along with over half a
million tons of mail.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated
that at least 22% of a U.S. passenger airliner's hold is on
average, cargo, with the remaining cargo transported by "all-
cargo" aircraft.
Passenger planes often specialize in carrying "just-in-time"
cargo, which consists of perishable items such as seafood and
flowers or high-value fragile items like computers, jewelry, and
artwork (etc.).
The individual size and weight of items carried as air cargo are
usually smaller and lighter as compared to cargo carried by rail,
vessel, or truck.
*

4. Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Introduction
Primary risks:
Hijacking an all-cargo aircraft and using it as WMD
Introducing an explosive to passenger carrying aircraft via air
cargo
Illicit shipment of weapons, explosives or CBRN via air cargo
There are three primary risks associated with terrorism that
apply to the air cargo industry: (a) hijacking an all-cargo
aircraft and using it as a weapon of mass destruction, (b)
introducing an explosive to a passenger carrying aircraft via the
air cargo supply chain, and (c) the illicit shipment of weapons,
explosives, or CBRN agents via air cargo
Since 9/11, two Congressional Acts have attempted to address
the security of air cargo, the Implementing the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (2007) and the
National Intelligence Reform Act (2004).
*
Terrorism and Crime in Air Cargo

5. In 1979, Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber) placed a bomb in the
hold of an American Airlines passenger aircraft. The bomb
failed to detonate and began smoking, which alerted the flight
crew.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Terrorism and Crime in Air Cargo
A system must be in operation to screen, inspect, or otherwise
ensure security of all cargo that is to be transported in all -cargo
aircraft in air transportation and intrastate air transportation as
soon as practicable after the date of enactment of the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act
After 9-11, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of
2001 required the federal government to provide for:
The screening of all passengers and property, including U.S.
mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles,
that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an
air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation
A system must be in operation to screen, inspect, or otherwise
ensure the security of all cargo that is to be transported in all-
cargo aircraft in air transportation and intrastate air
transportation as soon as practicable after the date of enactment
of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued

6. warnings that al-Qaeda might be plotting to fly cargo planes
from overseas into U.S. targets, such as nuclear power plants,
bridges, and dams.
Also in 2003, Charles McKinley hid in a shipping crate and
mailed himself by air on a cargo flight miraculously surviving
the trip, only to be arrested, charged, and serve a year in prison.
Critics of air cargo security underscored that this incident
demonstrated how easily a weapon, bomb, or even a terrorist
could be transported by air cargo.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Terrorism and Crime in Air Cargo
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Terrorism and Crime in Air Cargo
Air Cargo Security Act established FACAOSSP and IACSSP
Security Threat Assessment (STA)

7. USA Patriot Act
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)
In 2006, finalized rulemaking of the Air Cargo Security Act
established FACAOSSP and IACSSP. The Act specifically
required security threat assessments for individuals handling air
cargo, and CHRCs and STAs for individuals working in cargo
operations areas with access to aircraft. Criminal History
Records Check and Security Threat Assessment.
Also, the Act did not require training of crewmembers in the
“All-Cargo Common Strategy” plan as is required in passenger
airline domain.
Unfortunately, major cargo and baggage theft rings have been
uncovered at airports throughout the United States and the
smuggling of contraband, counterfeit and pirated goods has also
been a problem for air cargo security. A large portion of air
cargo crime is committed either by cargo workers or with the
assistance of cargo workers, so increased security of cargo
operations areas and improved background checks of cargo
workers may help reduce crime and terrorism associated with
air cargo.
The USA PATRIOT Act required the U.S. DOJ to establish a
separate category for cargo theft in the Uniform Crime
Reporting System and also refines relevant statues and increases
criminal penalties for cargo theft and stowaways.
The Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) and several
other programs have been created by TSA to meet these
objectives. One focus has been to look at screening cargo at
various points throughout the supply chain, rather than just at
the airport.

8. The cargo areas of a commercial airliner are hardened for
structural and safety reasons. Additionally, aircraft cargo areas
have relatively large objects of mass that can buffer an
explosion. Therefore, a bomb of sufficient force is needed to
cause serious damage or destruction. This usually requires a
device that is more easily detected by screening technology.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Terrorism and Crime in Air Cargo
*
The Nature of Air Cargo
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11

9. The Nature of Air Cargo
Direct Shippers
Freight Forwarders
Indirect Air Carrier (IAC)
Commercial service airlines carry passengers along with some
amount of baggage and cargo in the hold of the aircraft, which
is provided by either a “direct shipper,” or a “freight
forwarder.”
A direct shipper is not in the business of shipping goods, but
must ship them as part of their business model.
By contrast freight forwarders are businesses that act as
transportation agents to companies desiring to ship cargo by air.
Freight forwarders make their money by shipping goods for
other companies. Freight forwarders manage the logistics of
picking up, shipping and dropping off packages on behalf of
their customer.
An “indirect air carrier” (IAC) is a freight forwarder that
solicits or receives freight from other companies and
consolidates the cargo into larger shipping units for air
transport. IACs usually provide pickup and delivery of the
freight from the shipper to the recipient (Association, 2005) and
frequently use vehicles, vessels, and rail to move some freight.
Freight forwarders must have an Indirect Air Carrier Standard
Security Program (IACSSP) and are part of the Indirect Air
Carrier Management System (IACMS), which the TSA uses to
approve and validate new and existing IACs.

10. *
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
The Nature of Air Cargo
Airforwarders:
Travel agents for cargo
TSA's air cargo strategic plan:Enhancing the known shipper
programEstablishing a cargo prescreening system that identifies
and inspects high-risk cargoInstituting major air cargo R&D
programsPartnering with airlines and others to implement
additional measures
Freight forwarders are also known as "airforwarders”.
Companies who utilize airforwarders typically have cargo
requiring transportation directly to a customer, or in less time
than a traditional overnight all-cargo operator can provide (such
as fresh seafood or perishable medical supplies, etc.).
Airforwarders must ensure cargo is screened and secure
throughout the supply chain. Airforwarders accept cargo at their
facilities or pick it up from the customer and delivers it to the
air carrier facility.
In 2005, the TSA's air cargo strategic plan included the
following four major components: (1) enhanci ng the known
shipper program, (2) establishing a cargo prescreening system
that identifies and inspects high-risk cargo, (3) instituting major

11. air cargo research and development programs, and (4)
partnering with airlines and others to implement additional
measures such as enhanced background checks on persons with
access to cargo and new procedures for securing aircraft
between flights.
The TSA committed $85 million in research and development to
enhancing air cargo safety. The TSA established the followi ng
allocations: $26 million to evaluating explosive detection
systems and operating test programs at several airports; $21.5
million for research and development to identify how current
technologies can be applied to air cargo; $7.5 million for
research and development to identity existing technology that
can be used to build automated inspection systems for U.S.
mail; and $30 million to develop new technologies for
inspecting cargo for explosives and radiation, chemical, and
biological agents.
The benefit of shipping cargo by air is the ability to move an
item much faster than by land or sea transportation.
*
ReinforcementMajority of air cargo transported by all -cargo
operators
Three primary risks associated with terrorism that apply to the
air cargo industry
ATSA 2001 required the federal government to provide for "the
screening of all passengers and property, including U.S. mail,
cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles
In 2006, finalized rulemaking of the Air Cargo Security Act
established FACAOSSP and IACSSP
Passenger airlines also contract with “freight forwarders,” who
act as transportation agents to companies or other entities
desiring to ship cargo by air.

12. Indirect Air Carrier (IAC) - typically a freight forwarder that
solicits freight from other shipping agents and consolidates that
cargo into larger shipping units for air transport.
Known Shipper Program
Based on the airline knowing shipper through a course of
business and being approved by a particular airline to ship
cargo on that airline
The primary air cargo security program has been the Known
Shipper Program - a by-product of the 1996 Gore Commission
report and a mainstay air cargo security program (called
Registered Agent) internationally.
A “known shipper” was originally based on the airline knowing
the shipper through the course of business and being approved
by a particular airline to ship cargo on that airline.
After the air cargo security changes in 2006, the TSA began
developing the Known Shipper Management System (KSMS).
Through this system, the TSA is taking over the vetting process
including facility inspections and tracking. Known shippers are
then kept in centralized database whereby the TSA can conduct

13. further background and intelligence database checks on each
shipper.
Since 2008, the TSA has processed more than 1.4 million
entities through the KSMS.
*
Government Accountability Office on Air Cargo
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Government Accountability Office on Air Cargo
GAO recommended a strategy called a risk management
approach to air cargo security
Phase 1 - conduct a threat assessment
Phase 2 - vulnerability assessment
Phase 3 - criticality assessment
The GAO recommended a strategy called a risk management
approach to air cargo security.
Phase 1 of this strategy was to conduct a threat assessment
identifying potential threats to air cargo.

14. Phase 2 was a vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses
that may be exploited, and
Phase 3 was a criticality assessment that prioritizes security
assets and functions and identifies what systems, methods, or
procedures are vital to securing air cargo.
The GAO made a series of recommendations to enhance cargo
security, which included the following:
Use radio frequency electronic “seals” to secure cargo—this
technology transmits an alarm if the container has been
compromised,
Develop or use a variety of systems capable of detecting
weapons of mass destruction, including x-rays, radiation, trace
and vapor detection systems, and greater use of canines,
Use pressure chambers to detect and detonate on the ground any
explosive device with a barometric trigger,
Develop blast-hardened containers to store cargo within the
aircraft,
Use access control biometric technology to ensure only
authorized persons are able to handle cargo,
Use GPS tracking systems to track cargo throughout the
transport,
Use closed-circuit television to monitor the loading of cargo
into the aircraft.
*

15. Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Government Accountability Office on Air Cargo
In 2005, the GAO (2005b) published another report in response
to U.S. Congressional inquiries about the progress and status of
air cargo security.
In 2005, the GAO (2005b) published another report in response
to U.S. Congressional inquiries about the progress and status of
air cargo security. The report focused on GAO’s investigations
of three areas:
To what extent has the TSA implemented a risk-based
management approach to air cargo security;
What actions has the TSA taken to ensure the security of air
cargo and what may limit their effectiveness;
What are the TSA’s plans for enhancing air cargo security, and
what financial, operational, and other challenges do the TSA
and industry stakeholders face in implementing these plans?
The GAO also prepares confidential reports for Congress where
actions and other security sensitive information (SSI) data are
highlighted.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Government Accountability Office on Air Cargo

16. TSA established an automated Performance and Results
Information System(PARIS) to compile the results of cargo
inspections and the actions taken when violations are identified.
The largest number of violations was due to failing to adhere to
the indirect air carrier security program
The second largest number of violations was issued for not
properly documenting air cargo procedures.
Failing to properly inspect cargo had the lowest number of
citations.
The TSA is currently developing a system to compare
information on air cargo shipments and the PARIS databases
against certain targeting criteria to assign a risk level.
All of the GAO reports and actions by the TSA and the aviation
industry may be rendered irrelevant if the U.S. Congress passes
legislation requiring that all cargo must be inspected using an
explosion detection system (EDS) or equivalent process.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Government Accountability Office on Air Cargo
Aviation Security Advisory Committee: Air Cargo
The committee focused on three broad based security areas:
Shipper acceptance procedures

17. IAC security
Security of the all-cargo aircraft
In 2003, the ASAC Working Group, which included
organizations such as the:
Cargo Airline Association,
Airforwarders Association,
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE),
FBI,
National Air Transport Association, the Air Transport
Association,
National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association, and
U.S. Postal Service,
studied concerns related to air cargo security.
The ASAC Working Group recommended security enhancements
to address various risks associated with air cargo. The result
was 40 separate recommendations that would eventually form
the basis of the TSA’s air cargo security rulemaking.
The committee focused on three broad based security areas:
Shipper acceptance procedures,
IAC security, and
Security of the all-cargo aircraft.

18. The committee recommended that:
The Known Shipper Program be strengthened,
Government databases be coordinated to provide more and
better information on threats,
Research and development focus on the development of
technology to better screen cargo, and
Freight from unknown shippers be screened.
In regard to IAC security, the committee recommended that:
IACs implement a validation program that requires the IAC to
be accredited,
Security measures address en route security (to the airport), and
Some form of security screening for employees of IACs be
instituted with necessary security training.
As related to the protection of all-cargo aircraft, the committee
recommended:
Better airport perimeter access controls,
The identification and credentialing of employees with access to
cargo ramps,
Screening of individuals with access to aircraft and cargo
ramps,
Secure unattended aircraft,
The search all-cargo aircraft,
Better incident response procedures and
Security training for all-cargo personnel.
In November 2004, the TSA issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking regarding security regulations for air cargo.
In 2005, the TSA hired more than 300 air cargo security
inspectors (ACSIs).
In August of 2006, the TSA published the air cargo regulations
in the Federal Register, thereby making them official
regulations for the air cargo industry.

19. *
Summary of TSA rulemaking
The overall changes with the 2006 TSA regulations have
accomplished the following:
Called for the requirement of security programs for all -cargo
operators using aircraft more than 100,309.3 pounds in mean
gross takeoff weight.
Strengthened security programs for cargo operators using
aircraft of more than12,500 pounds.
Extended screening requirements to all-cargo operators.
However, the definition of “screening” is still to be determined.
Required airports to extend their security identification display
areas (SIDAs) into the cargo operations areas.
Redefined the indirect air carrier definition to include all -cargo
carriers.
Strengthened foreign air carrier cargo requirements to equal
U.S. domestic aircraft operator requirements.
Strengthened the Known Shipper Program, including the TSA
takeover of the Known Shipper Program vetting process. The
TSA will also maintain the known shipper database in addition

20. to the random screening of a percentage of known shipper cargo
agents.
Implemented methods to identify and screen high-risk cargo.
Required security threat assessments on individuals who have
unescorted access to air cargo.
Screened passengers on cargo flights.
Established all-cargo and IAC Standard Security Programs
(IACSSP), requiring all IACs to have a TSA-approved security
plan in place before operating as an IAC and shipping cargo via
air.
Accepted cargo only from an entity with a similar security
program
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Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Summary of TSA rulemaking
Air Cargo Watch
ACSI
The TSA also implemented several other air cargo initiatives,
including:
“Air Cargo Watch” - a program whereby individuals within the
air cargo supply chain can identify and report suspicious
activity or cargo.
The increased use of canine explosive detection teams and surge
programs using air cargo security inspectors (ACSIs)

21. Since the implementation of the TSA regulations, the
“inspection process” generally consisted of air carrier personnel
conducting visual and manual inspections of air cargo. Visual
inspections consist of:
Looking for signs of unauthorized tampering, including scratch
marks on screws,
Tampering with packaging tape,
Unusual odors, and
Other signs.
If X-ray equipment is not available or the item is too large or
too sensitive to be cleared by an x-ray, a manual inspection can
be performed provided it is conducted with the shipper present.
In 2006, the U.S. Congress was still focused on the issue of air
cargo security and passed legislation calling for the 100%
screening of all air cargo within the next three years. TSA
quickly stated that screening (i.e., physical inspection) could be
waived if the cargo came from a “certified facility”—a facility
that meets certain security standards.
*
ReinforcementThe GAO report determined that numerous
government and industry studies have identified vulnerabilities
in the air cargo system.
GAO recommended a strategy called a risk management
approach to air cargo security.
In 2005, the GAO (2005b) published another report in response
to U.S. Congressional inquiries about the progress and status of
air cargo security.
The ASAC Working Group recommended security enhancements
to address various risks associated with air cargo.

22. Legislation continues to be introduced that may substantially
alter the air cargo security requirements.
TSA implemented Air Cargo Watch. Also increased use of
canine explosive detection teams and surge programs using air
cargo security inspectors (ACSIs)
Unknown Shippers and Mail
Shortly after 9-11, all cargo shipments from unknown shippers
were temporarily suspended and subsequently reinstated for a
period of time. As of this writing, unknown shippers are only
allowed to ship on all-cargo carriers, provided the cargo is not
interlined to a passenger carrier. Only known shipper cargo can
be interlined from all-cargo airlines to a passenger carrier.
Items that weigh more than 16 ounces are required to be
physically inspected before being placed into the U.S. mail
system. Specific period of time? Designated period of time?
Not clear.
Airline personnel look for signs of tampering.
Human organs, human blood, emergency lifesaving drugs, and

23. human remains are exempt from the inspection process.
Cargo inspected also includes unaccompanied baggage carried
by the airlines to reunite with its owner.
Some cargo is accompanied by a passenger on the same flight.
This is known as an “accompanied commercial courier
consignment.”
U.S. mail, diplomatic pouches, and air carrier company mail are
exempt from screening.
*
Title 49 CFR Part 1548 Indirect Air Carrier Security
Entities engaging in commercial carriage of cargo on passenger
air carriers must adhere to Title 49 CFR Part 1548 Indirect Air
Carrier Security.
TSA compliance inspectors must be allowed access to security
areas including the indirect air carrier’s facilities on an airfield.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11

24. Title 49 CFR Part 1548 Indirect Air Carrier Security
IACs must:
Adopt Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program (IACSSP)
Employee must complete a security threat assessment (STA) or
a criminal history records check (CHRC) before handling such
cargo
Must ensure cargo accepted from an unknown shipper is kept
separate from known shipper cargo
IACSSPs must include measures to prevent the introduction of
explosives or incendiaries
IACs must:
Adopt the Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program
(IACSSP), an SSI document, that provides for the security of
the aircraft against acts of violence (explosives, hijacking, etc.)
from the time the cargo is accepted by the IAC until it is
transferred to an employee other than the IAC.
Ensure that any employee that comes in contact with cargo
designated for shipping on an air carrier with a full all-cargo
security program or a foreign air carrier must complete a
security threat assessment (STA) or a criminal history records
check (CHRC) before handling such cargo.
Must ensure that cargo accepted from an unknown shipper is
kept separate from known shipper cargo.
IACSSPs must include measures to prevent the introduction of
explosives or incendiaries and refuse to transport any item that
has not been subjected to such measures.
*

25. Certified Cargo Screening Program
The Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) provides
critical supply-chain security and extends screening to
manufacturing facilities, consolidation points, distribution
centers, and independent cargo screening facilities (ICSF).
Certified CCSP facilities must successfully apply, participate
and adhere to strict security standards, including physical
access controls, personnel security, and screening of
prospective employees and contractors to TSA standards. A
secure chain of custody must also be established from the
screening facility to the side of the aircraft.
TSA developed CCSP to help industry reach the 100% screening
mandate.
Under CCSP, TSA certifies cargo-screening facilities located
throughout the United States to screen cargo prior to providing
it to airlines for shipment on passenger flights.
ICSFs provide a cost effective avenue for small and medium-
sized freight forwarders to meet regulatory screening
requirements.
CCSP allows businesses to:
Screen cargo where it is packaged
Maintain in-house packaging integrity
Avoid screening log jams at the airport
Build bulk configurations to minimize cost
*

26. Current Air Cargo Security Measures and Issues
Since 9/11, the TSA has implemented numerous measures to
secure two primary forms of air cargo - domestic and inbound.
Domestic cargo is transported from locations within the U.S.
Inbound cargo is brought into the U.S. from an international
origin. As of 2012, the TSA estimated that over 90% of
domestic cargo transported on passenger aircraft was being
screen. However inbound cargo remains a challenge with
significantly lower percentages of cargo confirmed as screened
or secure prior to arriving at U.S. security checkpoints.
*
Implementing Recommendations of the 9-11 Commissions Act
of 2007 added more requirements to air cargo security
In 2007, the passage of Implementing Recommendations of the
9-11 Commission Act of 2007 (“9-11 bill”) added more
requirements to air cargo security.
The TSA worked with Congress for more than six months to
significantly strengthen security in air cargo through the 9-11
bill, which mandates that the TSA screen 50% of air cargo on
passenger carrying aircraft within 18 months and 100% within
three years of the passage of the bill.

27. The Air Cargo Division of the TSA currently regulates over 730
charter aircraft operators and 41 all-cargo aircraft operators.
More than 460 TSA canine teams are now assigned to 25% of
each workday in air cargo related environment.
*
ReinforcementKnown Shipper is based on the airline knowing
the shipper through a course of business and being approved by
a particular airline to ship cargo on that airline.
Anything that exceeds 16 ounces must be visually inspected by
the air carrier and screened by the TSA.
Entities engaging in commercial carriage of cargo on passenger
air carriers must adhere to Title 49 CFR Part 1548 Indirect Air
Carrier Security.
IAC’s must also adopt the IACSSP that provides for the security
of the aircraft against acts of violence.
Several measures are currently in place to prevent explosives
from being placed onboard a commercial airliner via cargo.
Conclusion

28. Securing air cargo and related services is a prime concern for
the aviation security practitioner.
The U.S. Congress and the TSA have worked together to create
legislation designed to help prevent cargo aircraft from being
used as weapons of mass destruction.
The TSA requires air cargo operators to have an air cargo
strategic plan and the air cargo industry has worked on its own
to create many air cargo security initiatives.
Future concerns related to air cargo security include the
potential requirement that all cargo must be inspected using
EDS or similar processes.
Support for 100% cargo screening has been mixed.
Recent legislation is enabling the TSA to mitigate future risks
in air cargo and the TSA is developing a multilayered, high-
technology, and industry-cooperative approach to managing
security risks associated with air cargo.
*