1. Dokumen membahas penentuan harga transfer antara divisi penggilingan dan produk pada perusahaan Medoc. 2. Terdapat beberapa alasan penerapan harga transfer antara divisi terkait volume produksi dan penjualan. 3. Manajemen memutuskan untuk mengukur kinerja divisi secara terpisah tanpa menggabungkan untuk pelaporan keuntungan.

1. BAB 6

14. Introduction Based by comparing fairness effects in expected and actual transfer price negotiations requires us to consider how parties negotiate transfer prices. These two settings yield different conclusions regarding the linkage from initial expectations to actual. In the restricted, computerized setting, participants indicate that they expect fairness-based price concessions similar to those documented by Luft and Libby (1997) when the outside market price favors sellers, but these expectations do not materialize in actual negotiations. By contrast, in the unrestricted, face-to-face setting, we find a pronounced fairness effect in both initial expectations and subsequent negotiations.

15. Theory and Hyphotheses Luft (1997) reviews the theoretical framework of models that have begun to incorporate preferences for fairness in bargaining (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1986; Bolton 1991; Rabin 1993), tying this framework to the role of management accounting as the means by which fairness pressures can arise. we hypothesize : H1: The transfer price negotiators expect will fall shorter of the outside market price when the outside price would result in significantly higher profits for Parts than when the outside price would result in equal profits for Parts and Assembly. H2: Parts negotiators (sellers) will expect higher transfer prices than will Assembly negotiators (buyers). H3: The manipulation of fairness through a $70 or $50 outside market price will influence the difference between the negotiated transfer price and the outside market price to a greater extent when negotiations are face to face with unrestricted communication than when negotiations are restricted to computerized bids, asks, and acceptances.

17. Primary Results Expected Transfer Prices (H1 and H2) For transfer price expectations, there are no significant main or interaction effects involving the MEDIUM factor, As predicted in H1, shows that participants' expected prices fall farther below the outside market price in the $70 condition than in the $50 condition and As predicted in H2 shows that sellers (Parts) expected systematically higher prices than did buyers. And there is no significant interactions with the negotiation medium for expected transfer prices in Rounds 1 and 2, even though participants knew ex ante whether they would be negotiating by computer or face-to-face. Actual Transfer Prices (H3) These tests support H3, indicating that different methods of negotiation condition the extent to which the preferences for fairness observable in questionnaire-based transfer price expectations also materialize in actual transfer prices from cash-compensated negotiations.

18. Supplemental Analyses To corroborate that the results reflect differing degrees of what Bazerman et al. (2000) termed "social presence," a post-experimental questionnaire asked participants to report the perceived degree of negotiation conflict on a seven-point Likert scale, so they intentionally combined both the humanization and communication aspects of face-to-face negotiation in order to detect any effect that might exist. And this primary tests analyzed transfer price expectations and outcomes separately. For transfer price expectations, indicating that expected transfer prices are no longer similar across the two negotiation settings. This paper analyze the effect of relative profit information on both price expectations and outcomes and also examine the effect of relative profit information on the dispersion of price expectations

19. Conclusions and Future Directions Our experimental study finds that the answer to this question depends on how parties negotiate transfer prices. When participants negotiate over a computer network restricted to bids, asks, and acceptances, the fairness effect in questionnaire-elicited expected transfer prices does not materialize in actual price negotiations. One implication of our findings is that firms can influence the extent to which an outside market price determines a negotiated internal transfer price by changing the means of negotiation the broader implications of our study for experimental research in accounting.

21. Introduction In this transfer pricing (TP) paper empirically investigate how tax compliance influences responsibility accounting in one multinational enterprise (MNE) that uses a single set of transfer prices. First, the authors find that the MNE eliminated TP negotiation as part of its tax-compliance efforts. The consequent reduction in the sense of autonomy was mainly experienced as psychologically disagreeable and the loss of negotiation power sometimes also led to economically harmful situations. Second, tax compliance led the MNE to install uniform profit margins and mark-ups for all similar stages in the firm’s value chain . This case study aims at contributing to the stream of research documenting and explaining how a company’s MCS is designed and used under environmental pressures, in this case caused by the arm’s length principle

22. Literature Review By look at international tax law to examine the reach of the arm’s length principle. This principle explicitly refers to profit centers, which leads us to review the MCS literature on responsibility accounting in relation to TP. And turn to the analytic TP literature that raises questions related to the trade-offs between tax and MCS TP objectives. Focusing on responsibility accounting choices under the constraint of tax compliant TP, then will study these questions in practice in one particular MNE.

23. Research Method By selected based on the following criteria:  Global presence: The MNE operated Semiconductors units worldwide  A large number of cross-border transactions: TP was particularly relevant in the complex domestic and international transaction environment of Semiconductors.  One set of TP books: Semiconductors implemented one set of TP books  Tax compliance: The MNE felt comfortable with the tax compliance aspects of its TP policy.  Management control: A multidisciplinary workgroup had been involved to ensure compliance of Semiconductor’s TP policy with the tax rules.

24. The Research Site In this section introduce the Semiconductors Product Division of the selected MNE. In the semiconductor industry, the MNE was not among the largest global players in terms of volume, but by offering its customers tailor-made solutions in addition to standard products it had gained an important market position. In order to guarantee tax compliance, Semiconductors had gradually been reorganized along a matrix structure involving different stages and a profound consideration of the MCS objectives of the TP policy. Semiconductors implemented its TP policy along strict monitoring requirements (Cools et al. 2008).

25. Discussion and Conclusion The main goal of our research was to explore how TP tax compliance impacts responsibility accounting choices in an MNE that uses one set of TP books. From a tax point of view, the arm’s length principle requires MNEs to treat the different legal entities as if they were independent, profitmaximizing companies. T he lack of empirical research : 1. U ndertook an in-depth case study in one MNE. A first observation is that negotiation 28 in TP was eliminated, since it could provide signals of TP manipulations towards the tax authorities. 2. T he MNE simplified its tax compliant TP policy to such an extent that it installed u niform profit margins and mark-ups for all similar stages in the firm’s value chain. This paper contributes to the literature in various ways : 1. A dds to the limited empirical tradition in responsibility accounting research . 2. T his paper contributes to the research documenting and explaining how the MCS is designed and used under the constraint of external environmental pressures.

29. 2. Seandainya tidak ada batasan struktur organisasi maka menurut penulis akan semakin membuat kondisi kurang dan semakin tidak kondusif, mengingat kondisi sebelumnya bahwa kebijakan harga transfer ini banyak dikeluhkan oleh divisi produk konsumen, seperti biaya ketidakefisienan produksi yang seharusnya menjadi tanggung jawab divisi penggilingan malah menjadi beban divisi produk konsumen, juga dikenai potongan 75% investasi oleh divisi penggilingan padahal divisi ini tidak mengikutsertakan tambahan perlengkapan baru, tingkat persediaan, dan lain – lain. Dampak lain karena tidak ada batasan ini akan mempengaruhi kinerja kedua divisi dalam perusahaan karena masih ada ketimpangan dan keluhan – keluhan yang terjadi terutama masalah biaya – biaya yang mendasari penentuan harga transfer antar divisi.

30. Terima Kasih