This thesis aims to analyze and discuss the historiography of archaeology. It specifically focuses on: 1) Presenting key concepts from the history and philosophy of science relevant to writing disciplinary history. 2) Analyzing different forms of history written about archaeology and how it is used to legitimize the field. 3) Exemplifying the issues through analysis of three classic histories of archaeology. The thesis argues that historical accounts of archaeology take different forms and purposes, and it is important to consider the theoretical and methodological issues involved in writing disciplinary history. It analyzes works by Glyn Daniel, Ole Klindt-Jensen, and Bruce Trigger, finding tendencies towards internalism and Wh

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English summary
”Black on black; a guidebook for the blind… ”
Andy Partridge 1998
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS THESIS is to contribute to the understanding of a central
part of our archaeological practice – the ubiquitous historical accounts of our own
scientific work. More specifically, the purposes of the thesis can be summarised as
follows:
• To present and discuss a set of key concepts related to the historiography of science,
especially those relevant to disciplinary history. The concepts are mainly drawn
from the field of science studies.
• To analyse different forms in which the history of archaeology is practised, discuss
varying arguments for its utility, and to show how some central historiographical
problems have been debated in this field. Concepts such as Whig history, internal-
ism, externalism and the legitimisation of interests are focused.
• To exemplify and illustrate the problems discussed through an analysis of three
classic histories of archaeology.
The first point is dealt with mainly in the second chapter of the thesis. The point of
departure here is the deplorable fact that a great deal of history of archaeology is being
written without taking theoretical and methodological issues into consideration. Histori-
cal accounts of archaeology are largely being produced as if there were no problems
related to this kind of study. Hence a main purpose is to present a set of central concepts
drawn from the historiography of science, where such problems have long been debated.
First of all, a general distinction is made between the history of science and disciplinary
history. The former kind of history is produced by professional historians of science; the
second is both produced by and primarily addressed to members of the author’s own
discipline. Disciplinary history frequently serves to legitimate the interests of the
scientific community in which it is conducted. Some examples of this are offered.
A discussion of some central concepts in historical studies of science follows. Two
classic concepts related to accounts of the development of scientific knowledge −
internalism and externalism − are focused. Internalism is defined as the practice of ex-
plaining scientific results by reference to the internal logic of the discipline itself, while
externalism is defined as explanations of the speed and direction of the development of
a science in terms of various external factors, such as social conditions and religious
beliefs. The crucial point made here is that these two forms of explanation are not
fundamentally antagonistic. This is because the externalist approach does not really take
the content of scientific results into account. Hence the two concepts are complementary
rather than competing ways of explaining scientific growth.

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From the 1980s onwards the concept of contextualism has been widely used in the
historiography of science. Contextualism may be understood as a way of breaking up
the established dichotomy between internalism and externalism by considering a larger
number of factors in each sphere.
An even more radical way of dealing with the problem of internal and external
explanations is to be found in the constructivist approach. Constructivism is defined
here as the practice, codified by a principle set out by David Bloor in 1976, of
explaining the formation of knowledge without engaging in the assessment of its truth
or validity. The symmetry principle, according to which analysts should maintain a
neutral stance towards the knowledge claims investigated, is pivotal in the argument of
the present thesis. It is emphasised that this principle does not imply that analysts must
not form their own opinion of the wellfoundedness of a scientific finding, only that such
opinions should not serve as the basis of historical explanations. That is the difference
between methodological and philosophical relativism. Obviously, this also means that
the internalism-externalism issue is a red herring. The reason for this is that there is no
need to retain the epistemological barriers between “science” and “non-science” once
“truth” is no longer in focus.
Another fundamental question discussed in the same chapter concerns the
possibility of assessing knowledge claims made by historical actors without tingeing
them with the colours of modern science. A classic concept in this connection is that of
Whig history, a term coined by the British historian Herbert Butterfield in 1931. Whig
history is defined as the tendency to look for ideas in the past that can be translated, re-
produced in the present and evaluated in terms of the present, or in terms of what came
later. In its most extreme form, Whig reasoning produces a kind of circular, self-
explanatory history, in which ideas, theories and concepts from our own time are used
to explain the past, which, in turn, is used to account for the present shape of things. For
a long time, historians of science have considered Whig history an unmitigated evil.
Over the last two or three decades, however, a subtler view of the problem has emerged.
The most common argument today is that we need some kind of foothold in contemp-
orary science to be able to communicate findings to an audience in the present, but that
this does not justify a one-dimensional, backward projection.
Chapter two ends with a discussion of whether there is a difference between writing
history as history and writing history as a part of “doing science”. Here some of the
arguments of the philosopher Thomas Nickles are presented. Nickles contends that
Whig re-interpretations of previous work in the light of one’s own work may be
invaluable, in that this helps one to relate the work of others to one’s own problems.
Accordingly, he insists that it is hard to see how scientists could do good research
without being Whiggish. In this sense, the Whig approach is a fundamental part of
scientific work, a practice whose primary goal is to solve problems in the present.
Concerning the history of science, on the other hand, history written from the outside,
Nickles is more forbearing. He accepts the use of Whig reasoning in this context too,
but within strict limits only. Contemporary scientific findings, he suggests, may be used
as temporary keys to understanding past science, but they should not be used to evaluate
knowledge claims made by historical actors.
The distinction drawn by Nickles is significant for the position argued later in the
thesis.

3. The history if archaeology – as history and as archaeology
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The second object of the thesis is dealt with in its third chapter. In this chapter,
attention is directed to a handful of arguments commonly used to justify studies in the
history of archaeology. Various motives for emphasising the importance of the history
of archaeology serve as important rhetorical tools. These motives can be regarded as
typical features of a budding, not too self-confident archaeological sub-discipline, their
functions being to defend the space that historical accounts of the discipline occupies in
archaeology. The arguments discussed include some quite pragmatic ones, from the
view that the history of archaeology can be used to rediscover forgotten methods, as
well as the subtler claim that these studies can help us understand better the different
theoretical schools of today. The central point here is that these motives must be
analysed in order to clarify whether they are primarily historical or archaeological.
The third chapter also includes a discussion of the extent to which different
concepts of historiography, as well as general currents of thought, may be reflected in
discussions on the historiography of archaeology. It is noted that the discussions in this
field in some cases lag far behind developments in neighbouring disciplines. Not until
the late 1970s, for instance, did an externalist trend emerge in the history of
archaeology. A few years later, however – concurrently with developments in neigh-
bouring fields, that is – statements emphasising the need for a contextual history of
archaeology were made. This is described as a product of the post-processual ideas
emerging at the time. In this part of the thesis, the use of concepts such as internalism,
externalism, and Whig historiography in the history of archaeology are also discussed.
A central point in the thesis is that historical accounts of archaeology are diverse.
This means that one needs to discuss the foundations of different types of
archaeological history. For this purpose, work in the area is divided into two separate
genres, “the history of archaeology in the form of archaeology” and “the history of
archaeology in the form of history”. These concepts are descriptive in character.
The concept of history of archaeology in the form of history refers to studies
explicitly intended to contribute to the history of archaeology, such as general surveys
and biographies. A fundamental point argued here is that this kind of work contains
implicit but strong claims to truth in the sense that the genre communicates a picture of
the history of archaeology intended to demonstrate “what really happened”.
The concept of history of archaeology in the form of archaeology refers to texts
which, though not intended as contributions to history, nevertheless contain information
that may be perceived as historically relevant. The genre is exemplified by introductory
historical overviews found in academic texts, as well as by cases in which historical
accounts are used to support new theories and research programmes. Different ways in
which history of this kind is used to legitimate archaeological views are considered.
In the fourth chapter, three representatives of the history of archaeology in the form
of history are analysed. The objects in focus are all classic works of the genre – Glyn
Daniel’s A Hundred and Fifty Years of Archaeology (1975), Ole Klindt-Jensen’s A
History of Scandinavian Archaeology (1975) and Bruce G Trigger’s A History of
Archaeological Thought (1989). After a brief historical survey of the genre, and an
examination of some reviews of the texts discussed, the works are analysed with respect
to the general perspective taken, as well as to how the origin of the field is defined in
them: when is the history of archaeology assumed to begin, and when does it end? It is
quite clear that these authors, like many of their reviewers, find it especially hard to deal

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with the history of contemporary, or more recent, archaeology. A typical argument put
forward is that one has to await the recognition of the true significance of a result before
its origin can be properly evaluated. The symmetry postulate, implying that judgements
of the “correctness” of the claims investigated ought not be part of historical
explanations, is invoked to reject that position. Examples of internalist and Whiggish
tendencies in the books are offered. Chief examples are their treatment of Thomsen’s
work on the Three-Age System, as well as brief accounts in which past archaeologists
are described as having been “far ahead of their time”. In many ways, it is contended,
the descriptions of Thomsen´s work provided in the three works resemble myths, as
defined by Roland Barthes (1970).
A comparison of the ways in which Trigger and Daniel adopt externalist appro-
aches in explaining the birth of scientific archaeology follows. It is pointed out that
Daniel’s externalism is a disciplinary one, focusing on the developments in geology and
biology, while Trigger’s is an instance of scientific externalism, focusing attention on
the Enlightenment and the rise of a wealthy middleclass.
Once again, the fundamental consonance of internalism and externalism is pointed
out.
In the concluding chapter the position taken by Nickles is used to emphasise that
there is no reason why present archaeological findings should not be used as a basis for
evaluating past knowledge claims. There is a normative element in all science making,
and hence in doing archaeology, too. History is one of many resources drawn on when
archaeological claims are made, and various motives for studying the history of
archaeology must be accepted as valid, as their role as rhetorical tools and as historical
illustrations in archaeological practice is important
This, however, is just one side of the matter. Claiming, for instance, that Glyn
Daniel’s A Hundred and Fifty Years of Archaeology, with its strong claims to historical
truth, represents good history, is problematic. Though this type of narration may
function as an integral part of good archaeology that by no means makes it good history.
The crucial point, epitomised by the symmetry principle, is that efforts to determine
what findings and theories of the past coincide with those accepted today work at cross-
purposes with the aim of creating a better understanding of past archaeology as a
knowledge-producing activity. If our aim is to explain how and why knowledge claims
have been accepted or rejected in the past, and what kind of interests they served to
legitimate, then we must suspend judgement on whether or not the claims make sense
from a modern point of view.
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