Science is a sphere of human activity in which objective knowledge about reality is developed and systematized theoretically. The main functions of science are explanatory and predictive functions. Science is a complex multifaceted integral phenomenon, and the process of development of scientific knowledge is not a unidirectional process, but a nonlinear one, characterized by multidirection. This is a process in which new growth points, diverse opportunities and situations of choice arise. Science studies not only the surrounding reality, but also itself as a part of this reality. There is a whole complex of disciplines studying science, which includes the history and logic of science, psychology of scientific creativity, sociology of knowledge, etc. However, it is the philosophy of science that studies science as an integral phenomenon, exploring the general laws of scientific and cognitive activity, the structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge, its levels and forms, its socio-cultural determination, means and methods of scientific cognition, ways of its justification and mechanisms of knowledge development. The philosophy of science began to take shape in the middle of the twentieth century. As a scientific discipline, the philosophy of science differs from the direction in Western and domestic philosophy, which bears the same name and originated a century earlier.

1. M I W № 4
THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF
MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE
T O L E U K H A N A S Y L B E K
M A S T E R ' S D E G R E E S T U D E N T I N T H E S P E C I A L T Y
" G E O S P A T I A L E N V I R O N M E N T A L M A N A G E M E N T "

2. Science is a sphere of human activity in which objective knowledge about reality is developed
and systematized theoretically. The main functions of science are explanatory and
predictive functions. Science is a complex multifaceted integral phenomenon, and the
process of development of scientific knowledge is not a unidirectional process, but a
nonlinear one, characterized by multidirection. This is a process in which new growth
points, diverse opportunities and situations of choice arise.

3. The subject and basic concepts of modern
philosophy of science
• Science studies not only the surrounding reality, but also itself as a
part of this reality. There is a whole complex of disciplines studying
science, which includes the history and logic of science, psychology
of scientific creativity, sociology of knowledge, etc. However, it is
the philosophy of science that studies science as an integral
phenomenon, exploring the general laws of scientific and cognitive
activity, the structure and dynamics of scientific knowledge, its
levels and forms, its socio-cultural determination, means and
methods of scientific cognition, ways of its justification and
mechanisms of knowledge development.
• The philosophy of science began to take shape in the middle of the
twentieth century. As a scientific discipline, the philosophy of
science differs from the direction in Western and domestic
philosophy, which bears the same name and originated a century
earlier.

4. The subject and basic concepts of modern
philosophy of science
• If the main goal of science is to obtain the truth, then the
main goal of the philosophy of science is to answer the
question of how it is possible to achieve the truth. The
specifics of the problems and tasks facing the philosophy of
science make it a discipline fundamentally different from the
fields of scientific knowledge close to it, such as, for example,
sociology of science (examines the relationship of science as
a social institution with the structure of society, the typology
of the behavior of scientists in various social systems, etc.),
science studies (describes the general laws of the
development and functioning of science), scientometry
(studies the dynamics of information arrays of science) and
others.

5. The subject and basic concepts of modern
philosophy of science
• The central problem of the philosophy of science is the
problems of growth and development of scientific
knowledge. All other problems and issues that are discussed
within this discipline grow out of this and can be divided into
three groups:
• 1) problems going from philosophy to science;
• 2) problems arising within science itself and in need of meta-
reflection;
• 3) problems of interaction between science and philosophy,
taking into account their fundamental differences.

6. Problems of philosophy of science:
The first third of the twentieth century .
1. building a holistic scientific picture of the world;
2. investigation of the relation of determinism and causality;
3. study of dynamic and statistical patterns.
The second third of the twentieth century .
1. empirical justification of science;
2. the complexity of the theoretical load of facts;
3. analysis of verification and falsification procedures;
4. thematic analysis of science.
The last third of the twentieth century .
1. a new, expanded understanding of scientific rationality;
2. aggravation of the competition of various explanatory models of the
development of scientific knowledge;
3. clarification of the concepts of "scientific criteria", "methodological
norms", etc.;
4. analysis of ideological and social problems accompanying the growth
and development of science.

7. K. Popper 's concept
• Sir Karl Raimund Popper (German: Karl Raimund Popper;
July 28, 1902 - September 17, 1994) was an Austrian. and
Brit. philosopher and sociologist. One of the most
influential philosophers of science of the XX century; best
known for his works on the philosophy of science, as well
as social and political philosophy. He criticized the classical
concept of the scientific method, and also vigorously
defended the principles of democracy and social criticism,
which he proposed to adhere to in order to make possible
the prosperity of an open society.The founder of the
philosophical concept of critical rationalism. He described
his position as follows: "I may be wrong, and you may be
right; we will make an effort, and we may get closer to the
truth."Introduced the concept of "falsifiability" (Latin falsus
- false) as a necessary condition for the recognition of a
theory or hypothesis as scientific . Representatives of
logical positivism put forward the principle of verification
as a criterion for the demarcation of science and non-
science. K. Popper, recognizing the necessity, but showing
the insufficiency of this principle, proposed as an
additional criterion of demarcation the method of
falsifiability: only that theory is scientific, which can be
fundamentally refuted by experience. The productivity of
the "Popper principle" (falsifiability as a criterion for the
demarcation of scientific and non-scientific knowledge) is
based on the principle of fallibilism (from Latin. fallibilis -
error-prone, fallible), developed by the founder of
pragmatism C.S. Pierce - our knowledge is fundamentally
erroneous.

8. K. Popper 's concept
• In contrast to the principle of verification, K. Popper proposed the principle of falsification
(the fundamental refutability of any statement). The philosopher asserts the organic unity
of the theoretical and empirical levels of the organization of knowledge, as well as the
hypothetical nature and fallibility of any science. The last statement is the content of the
principle of "fallibilism" (English, fallible - error-prone, unreliable). According to this
principle, human cognition cannot be infallible; the trial and error method is a universal
way of developing cognitive activity.
• Considering the problem of "demarcation", the essence of which is the separation of
scientific knowledge from non-scientific, i.e. the differentiation of science and
"metaphysics", K. Popper interpreted the growth of scientific knowledge (where the main
thing is problems and their solution) as a special case of more general processes of social
change. In this sense, any attempts to construct global theories and prophecies (like the
social philosophy of Marxism) reflecting these social changes can only result in a
catastrophe.
• To Popper believes that the history of scientific knowledge is a history of bold
assumptions and their permanent refutations. Whoever says "science" says "progress".
And vice versa.

9. T. Kuhn 's concept
• Thomas Samuel Kuhn (July 18, 1922, Cincinnati, Ohio -
June 17, 1996, Cambridge, Massachusetts) was an
American historian and philosopher of science.He believed
that scientific knowledge develops by leaps and bounds,
through scientific revolutions. Any criterion makes sense
only within the framework of a certain paradigm - a
historically established system of views. The scientific
revolution is a change of explanatory paradigms, which is
carried out "on the initiative" of the scientific
community.The most famous work is considered to be
"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, 1962). The main idea: science should
be perceived not as gradually developing and
accumulating knowledge towards the truth, but as a
phenomenon passing through periodic revolutions -
"paradigm shift" (Eng., paradigm shift).The course of the
scientific revolution, according to T. Kuhn, is determined by
the transition from normal to extraordinary science:
• normal science: every new discovery can be explained from
the standpoint of the prevailing theory;
• extraordinary science as evidence of a crisis in science. It is
characterized by the appearance of anomalies -
unexplained facts. An increase in the number of anomalies
leads to the emergence of alternative theories and, as a
result, to the coexistence of many opposing scientific
schools;
• ascientific revolution and, as a result, the formation of a
new paradigm.

10. T. Kuhn 's concept
• a) pre-paradigm science: an eclectic mix of alternative hypotheses and competing scientific
communities;
• b) normal science (paradigmatic): the dominance of one theory as a model of problem solving and
the theoretical and methodological basis of scientific knowledge. It is characterized by cumulative
accumulation of knowledge, theoretical and experimental improvement of the initial software
installations. The basic concept is a "scientific paradigm", i.e. a disciplinary matrix acting as a set of
knowledge, methods and values unconditionally shared by members of the scientific community; it
defines a range of significant scientific problems and possible ways to solve them, while ignoring
facts and theories that do not agree with the prevailing paradigm. But sooner or later "abnormal"
facts lead to scientific crises;
• c) extraordinary science (extra-paradigm). It is at the last stage that scientific revolutions that resolve
the conflict of competing theories become possible. At the same time, the priority of a particular
scientific theory is ensured not only by its cognitive advantages, but also by a number of extra-
scientific factors (psychological, political, cultural, etc.). Achieving a convention on the choice of an
exemplary theory means the formation of a new paradigm.
• T. Kuhn's concept has had a huge impact on the modern philosophy of science. The historical-
evolutionist approach, anti-cumulativism, the idea of socio-cultural conditionality of scientific
cognition (externalism), the concepts of paradigm and scientific revolution introduced by him greatly
contributed to overcoming the neo-positivist tradition in the philosophy of science and the
formation of postpositivism, sociology and psychology of science.

11. I. Lakatos ' concept
• Imre Lakatos (in Hungarian, Lakatos - veng. Lakatos Imre,
real name and surname Avrum Lipschitz; November 9,
1922, Debrecen - February 2, 1974, London) was an English
philosopher of Hungarian origin, one of the
representatives of postpositivism.Author of the theory and
methodology of research programs. Following K. Popper,
he developed the principle of falsification to the degree he
called "refined falsificationism". The theory is aimed at
studying the driving factors of the development of
science.He described science as a competitive struggle of
"research programs" consisting of a "hard core" of
fundamental assumptions a priori accepted in the system,
which cannot be refuted within the program, and a "safety
belt" of ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses ("for this case",
meaning "special"), modified and adapted to the
counterexamples of the program. The evolution of a
specific program occurs due to the modification and
refinement of the "safety belt", the destruction of the "hard
core" theoretically means the cancellation of the program
and its replacement by another, competing one.I. Lakatos
calls the main criterion of the scientific nature of the
program the increase in actual knowledge due to its
predictive power. While the program gives an increase in
knowledge, the work of a scientist within its framework is
"rational".

12. I. Lakatos ' concept
• At the same time, in the structure of the program there is a "solid core" containing the main
metaphysical postulates (the ontological framework of the program), and a dynamic "protective belt"
consisting of theories and auxiliary structures.
• Negative heuristics (rules-prohibitions) forbids directing criticism to statements included in the
"core" of the program, ensuring its stability with respect to multiple anomalies and counterexamples.
Such a strategy - to act contrary to the facts and not pay attention to criticism, turns out to be
especially productive at the initial stages of the formation of the program, when the "protective belt"
has not yet been built. The progress of the program is determined by its ability to anticipate new
facts. If different programs can be compared according to their explanatory capabilities and
predictive potential, then we can talk about the competition of programs. A research program that
explains more anomalies than its rival displaces its competitor. In this case, the latter is eliminated
together with its "core".
• Unlike Kuhn's "scientific paradigms", the concept of "research programs" by I. Lakatos explained the
process of scientific knowledge development exclusively from the point of view of internal
intellectual criteria, without resorting to external social or psychological arguments. This gives it a
pronounced normative character, but makes it deficient (from Lat. deficit – not enough) in relation to
many historical facts.

13. P. Feyerabend 's concept
• Paul Karl Feyerabend (German: Paul Karl Feyerabend;
January 13, 1924 - February 11, 1994) was a scientist,
philosopher, and methodologist of science. Born in Vienna,
Austria; at various times lived in England, USA, New
Zealand, Italy, Switzerland; from 1958 to 1989 - Professor
of Philosophy at Berkeley University, California.He is known
for his anarchist views on the process of scientific
cognition, and claims that there are no universal
methodological rules in science. Based on these ideas, he
created the concept of epistemological anarchism.He
opposed a single, tradition-based, scientific method - any
such method puts some limits on the activities of scientists
and, thus, limits progress. Science would benefit most from
some "dose" of anarchism in scientific theory. P.
Feyerabend's position is considered quite radical in the
philosophical community, since it assumes that philosophy
cannot successfully describe science as a whole, nor can it
develop a method for separating scientific works from
unscientific entities, such as myths. P. Feyerabend believes
that the "general course" of the development of science
developed and recommended by philosophers should be
rejected by scientists if it is necessary for further
progress.Insisting that new theories consistently continue
the old ones gives unreasonable advantages to the old
theories. Here the principle of the sequence of the old and
the new as a criterion for evaluating the scientific nature of
the theory is erroneous.

14. P. Feyerabend 's concept
• The theoretical persistence of the authors of scientific concepts is equally legitimate, i.e. the rejection
of alternatives in cognition, regardless of the criticism of the created scientific theories. Denying
uniform methodological standards and norms of scientific knowledge, P. Feyerabend comes to
methodological pluralism: "Any method can be successful.«
• Based on the fact that the language of scientific observations is theoretically loaded, P. Feyerabend
expresses doubts about the possibility of empirical verification of scientific constructions and insists
on the fundamental incommensurability of scientific theories (for example, general cosmological
pictures of reality) due to the impossibility of comparing them with a common empirical basis.
Knowledge is ideologically loaded and, as a result, the struggle of alternative approaches in science
is largely determined by social guidelines and the ideological position of researchers. In view of this,
each researcher has the right to develop their own concepts, without conforming to any generally
accepted standards and criticism from colleagues.
• Realizing the negative nature of the consequences of scientific and technological progress, P.
Feyerabend demands to rid society of the spiritual dictates of science. Coming into conflict with the
academic philosophy of science, he expands the subject and methodological tools of modern
epistemology, which is characterized by the discussion of methodological issues in a broad socio-
cultural context.

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