163143063 cases-in-persons-and-family-relations-assigned-by-atty-bolivar

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Article 2
T AÑADA VS.T UVERA Case Digest
T AÑADA VS.T UVERA
FACT S:
Petitioners seek a writ ofmandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/orcausethe publication in the Official
Gazette ofvarious presidential decrees, letters ofinstructions,
general orders, proclamations, executiveorders, letters of
implementation and administrativeorders.
Respondents,through the Solicitor General would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence ofany showing thatthe petitioner are
personally and directly affected orprejudiced by the alleged non-
publication ofthe presidential issuances in question.
Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity ofthe law where
the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUES:
Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special
provisions as to the date they areto take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensablefor their effectivity?

RULING:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itselfdoesnot provide for its effectivity date, for then
the date ofpublication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not
when the law itselfprovides for the date when it goes into effect.
Article2 does not preclude the requirement ofpublication in the
Official Gazette, even ifthe law itselfprovides for the date ofits
effectivity.
The publication ofall presidential issuances ofa public natureor of
general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees thatprovide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise imposeburdens on the people,such as tax
revenuemeasures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particularpersons or class ofpersons
such as administrativeand executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances ofgeneral
application, which havenot been published,shall haveno forceand
effect.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIAT ION OF SERVICE EXPORT ERS,
INC. petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN D. T ORRES, as Secretary
of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENT O, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINIST RAT ION,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992.]
FACT S: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order
No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to
Hong Kong”. As a result ofthe department order DOLE, through the
POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound
workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized
by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas
employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for
prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit
implementation.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse
of discretion and/orin excess oftheir rule-making authority
in issuing said circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA
circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of publication and
filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register
were not complied with.
HELD: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority
and did not commit grave abuse ofdiscretion.This is because Article

36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement
activities ofall agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation
of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to
issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture ofquasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers
in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the
growing complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and
unenforceable. The reason is the lack ofproper publication and filing
in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations.—The Department ofLabor and other
government agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and
regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agencyshall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book
VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 .)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. —In addition to other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the
rule in cases ofimminent danger to public health, safety and welfare,
the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures
to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 ).
Prohibition granted.

People v.Godoy
250 SCRA 676,732 (1995)G.R.Nos. 115908-09Facts:
Accused-
appellant Danny Godoy was charged in two separate filings before th
eRegional Trial Court, for Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch
47 , with rape andkidnappingwithseriousillegaldetentionof17-year-oldMia
Taha.
Issue:
Whetherornot,iffoundguilty,accused-appellantGodoywillbesubjecttodeath
penaltyimposedbyRepublicActNo.7659
Held:
Y e s , s i n c e Re p u b l i c A c t N o . 7 6 5 9 w h i c h r e i m p o s e d t
h e d e a t h p e n a l t y o n c e r t a i n h e i n o u s c r i m e s t o o k e ff
e c t o n De c e m b e r 3 1 , 1 9 9 3 , t h a t i s , fi ft e e n d a y s a ft e
r i t s public ation in the Dec ember 1 6, 1 993 issues o f the
Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star,Malay a and Phil ippine
Times Jo urnal and no t o n January 1 , 1 994 as is
so metimesmisinterpreted.
GSIS v. Commission on Audit
301 SCRA 731, 736 (1999)
G.R. No. 125982
Facts:
The case beforethe Court is a special civil action of certiorari seeking
to review the decision ofthe Commission on Audit that affirmed the
ruling of Corporate Auditor Mariano C. Gaborne disallowing in audit
the payment of death benefits in the amount of P43,107 .19, to the
heirs of the late Brig. General Arturo T. Asuncion, who died o n
November 16, 1987 , in a helicopter crash, for the reason that a
reserve officer like him of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was
not at that time a compulsory member of the Government Service
Insurance System.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Brig. General Asuncion should receive
payment of death benefits
Held:
Y es, since E. O. No. 7 9 is effective fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette, or on January 7 , 1987 . At that
time, the late General Asuncion was a reserve officer who had

rendered a total often (10) years of continuous active duty service
commission in the AFP. Hence, he was compulsorily covered as a
member of the GSIS on the date he died on November 15, 1987 , in
line of duty in a helicoptercrash. Consequently, his heirs are entitled
to payment of death benefits.
Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs Vega
360 scra 32
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance
in the liquidation ofthe Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC
of Manila Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein
petitioner filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and
benefits.
On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which
was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was
published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the
bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing
the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and
reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation
proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7 169 became
effectiveonly on March 10, 1992or 15 days after its publication in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7 169 became effective on January 2,
1992.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take
effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.
Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement ofpublication, which cannot in any event
be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due
process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws
that are supposed to govern it.

FARINASv T HE EXECUT IVE SECRETARY
FACT S:
A petition was filed seeking the Court
to declareunconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006 or “The Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections Through Fair Election Practices” as it repealed Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the ipso jure resignation
from public office ofone who filed his certificate ofcandidacy,except
for President and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners’ contention that the repeal ofSection 67 is a rider
on the said law, the same embracing more than one subject,
inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it violated
the equal protection clausesince the said law didn’t repeal provision
relating to appointive officials. Appointive officials would still be
considered ipso jure resigned upon filing of their respective
certificates of candidacy.
HELD:
Section 14 is not a rider. The purporteddissimilarity of Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to
the other provisions ofthe contested law, which deal with the lifting
of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, doesn’t
violate the “one subject- one title rule”. The Court has held that an
act having a single general subject, indicated in its title, may contain
anynumber ofprovisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and they may be considered in furtherance of such subject by

providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.
The repeal of Section 67 is not violative of the equal
protection clause. Equal protection is not absolute especially if the
classification is reasonable. There is reasonable classification
between an elective official and an appointive one. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They
are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure ofthe appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials are
prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take part in
any election except to vote.
De Roy vs Court ofAppeals
157 scra 766
The firewall ofa burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed
and destroyed the tailoring shop occupiedby the family ofthe private
respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate theirshop in view ofits proximity to
the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners
were found guilty ofgross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days
period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of
Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.It correctly applied the rule
laid down in Habulayas vs Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends
that the said case should not be applied non-publication in the
Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published
in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.
HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel

as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and
law journals.
ART ICLE 6
Emeterio Cui vs. Arellano University
G.R. No. 1517 2
May 30, 1961
FACTS: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up
preparatory law course in the Arellano University. After Finishing his
preparatory law course plaintiffenrolled in the College ofLaw ofthe
defendant from school year1948-1949. Plaintifffinished his law
studies in the defendant university up to and including the first
semester ofthe fourt year. During all the school years in which
plaintiffwas studying law in defendant law college,Francisco R.
Capistrano, brother ofmother ofplaintiff, was the dean ofcollege of
law and legal counsel ofthe defendant university. Plaintiffenrolled
for last semester ofhis law studies in the defendant university but
failed to pay tuition fees becausehis uncle Dean Francisco R.
Capistrano, having severed his connection with defendantand
having accepted the deanship and chancellorship ofthe collegeoflaw
of the Abad Santos University graduating from the collegeoflaw of
the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he has studying law
in Defendant University was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were retured to
him after the end ofsemester and when his scholarship grants were
awarded to him. The whole amount oftuition fess paid by the
plaintiffto defendant and refunded to him by the latterfrom the first
semester up to and including the first semester ofhis last year in

college oflaw or the fourth year, is in total P1,003.87. After
Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take
the bar examination.To securepermission to take the bar, he needed
the transcriptofhis records in defendant Arellano University.
Plaintiff petitioned the latterto issue to him the needed transcripts.
The defendant refused until afterhe paid back the P1,003.87 which
defendant refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts,plaintiffpaid to defendant the said sum
under protest.
ISSUE: Whether the provision ofthe contractbetween plaintiffand
defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transferto
another school without refunding to the latterthe equivalent ofhis
scholarship in cash, is valid or not.
HELD: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director ofPrivate
Schools provides that “When students are given full or partial
scholarship, it is understood that such scholarshipare merited and
earned. The amount in tuition and otherfees corresponding to These
scholarship should not be subsequently charged to recipient students
when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep
students in a school.
Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principleof
public policy. The defendant uses the scholarship as a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential ofan education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals. The practiceofawarding scholarshipto
attract students and keep them in school is not Good custom nor has
it received somekind ofsocial and practical confirmation except in
some private institution as in Arellano University.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one shall be enteredsentencing the defendant to pay the
plaintiffthe sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from September 1,1954, date ofthe institution ofthis case, as well as
the costs, and dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim. It is so
ordered.
Article8
People vs.Jabinal
GR No. L-30061(February 27,1974)
FACT S:
Jabinal was found guilty ofthe crime ofIllegal Possession ofFirearm
and Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession ofthe revolver and the ammunition described in the
complaint,without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,although he had no
license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agentfrom the
Provincial Governor ofBatangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said
appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess
and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view ofhis
above-mentionedappointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matterofthe
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis ofthe Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs.
Lucero(1958) and not on the basis ofthe latest reversal and
abandonmentin People vs. Mapa (1967).
ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis ofthe
court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction
stand in view ofthe complete reversal ofthe MAcarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
RULING:
Decisions ofthis Court, under Article8 ofthe New Civil Code states
that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part ofthe legal system … .” The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement oflegal maxim
“legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet"— the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent courthas the force oflaw.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agentand Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession ofsaid firearm in spite ofthe
absence ofa license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
Certainly, appellant may notbe punishedfor an act which at the time
it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.
ARTICLE 16
Aznar vs Garcia
7 scra 95
Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule
Edward Christensen was born in New Y ork but he migrated to
California where he resided for a period of9 years. In 1913, he came
to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In
his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel
for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law ofthe domicile. On the other hand,
counsel for Maria, averred that the national law ofthe deceased must
apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under
California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be
applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional
rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in California o n
the matter;the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled
in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside
of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law
of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the
successional rights under Philippine law only
Bellis vs Bellis
20 scra 358
Nationality Principle
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United
States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate
children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died,
he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the
other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived
of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law
were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should
determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not
entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national
law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.

Minciano vs. Brimo
50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition
of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate
left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers ofthe deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on
the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions
of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary disposition.
Held:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his
will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate;
however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with
Article 10 of the Civil Code
CIVIL PERSONALITY
ARTICLE 40
Minciano vs. Brimo
50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924
Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition
of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate
left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers ofthe deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on
the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions
of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of
his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary disposition.
Held:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his
will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate;
however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with
Article 10 of the Civil Code

Geluz vs CA
Facts:Nita Villanueva had 3 abortions done by the same doctor,
Geluz. Husband Oscar Lazo sued Geluz on the 3rd abortion (2 mo.),
seeking damages. CA sustained claim ofLazo for P3,000.
Issue: Whether or not the husband can claimdamages from the
abortionist.
Held: No, he cannot. Award for death ofa person does not cover
unborn fetus because it is still not vested with legal personality.
According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case,
the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak ofbecauseit was
aborted in utero. The child shouldbe born beforethe parents can
seek any recovery for damages.
Action for pecuniary damages on accountofpersonal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for
such damages that can be instituted on behalfofthe unbord child for
the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. Moral
damages cannot also be recovered becausethe wife willingly sought
the abortion, and the husband did not furtherinvestigateon the
causes ofthe abortion.
People VSFelie
Facts: Herein accused Fernando Felipewas convicted by the lower
court ofthe crime ofrape committed by him against his niece-in-law
Ruth Pancho. As a result ofthe incidentthe victim got pregnant, who
was then 25 years old.
When the accused appealed his case, oneofhis defenses was the fact
that the victim’s child was born on March 13, 1972and that the
victim could not havebeen raped on July 9, 1971 because thereare
only 247 days between these dates. Accused claimed thatthenormal
period ofgestation is 280 days and the Civil Code considers 300 days
as the length ofuterine developmentofa child.
Issue: Whether or not the victim’s childis considered a normal
child.
Held: Y es, the victim’s child was normal. As aptly contended by
theSolicitor General in his brief, "a child born 8 months and seven
days after conception is considerednormal. ...;that in certain
instances the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length ofthe
uterinedevelopment ofa child, but by providing that a premature
child is one which has an intra-uterine life ofless than seven
months (Art. 41, Civil Code) the Code impliedly recognizes that a
child which had an intra-uterinelife of8 months, as in the case at
bar, is a normal child."

ARTICLE 43
JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO
Facts:
Feb. 6, 1945:battleofliberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., 7 0, wife Angela Joaquin, 67 , daughters Pilar (32-33),
Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25),son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and
his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German
Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese startedshooting
hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave building.
His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, his son’s wife and
neighbor Francisco Lopez . As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on
the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German
Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela
Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco soughtrefuge in an air raid shelter
where they hid for three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way
to St.Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela
were hit and killed.
Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while
Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother.
Issue:
Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr.
Held:
Reversed.Art. 43 civil code:Whenevera doubt arises as to which was
the first to die ofthe two or morepersons who would inherit one from
the other, the person who alleges prior death ofeither must provethe
allegation;in the absenceofproof the presumption shall be that they
died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the
other shall take place.
In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be
arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The presumption that
AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence.
Gauged by the doctrine ofpreponderance ofevidence by which civil
cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of
survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4)
inferential.
Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are
called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the
Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at
the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one
to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a
hierarchy of survivorship.

FAMILY CODE
ARTICLES 1-7
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598,March 7, 1997
FACT S:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and
accounting against their AuntLeoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for
partition and accounting oftheir grandparents’ estate at the Court of
First Instance ofCebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia
and Gaudioso appealed to the Court ofAppeals but the latter
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Basilio Balogbog and GenovevaArnibal died intestate in 1951 and
1961 respectively. They have three children,Leoncia,Gaudioso and
Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and
Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the
one-third share in the estateoftheir grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not awarethat their brother
has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the
validity ofthe marriagebetween their brother Gavino and Catalina
despite how Gaudioso himselfadmitted during a police investigation
proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the
son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts ofRamoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of
their parent’s marriage, they presentedPriscilo Trazo, 81 years old
then mayor ofAsturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who

both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and
wife and that they have threechildren. Catalina herselftestified that
she was handed a “receipt” presumably the marriage certificate by Fr.
Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimedthat her brother Gavino died
single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate
from the local Civil Registrar ofAsturias to the effect that the office
did not have a record ofthe names ofGavino and Catalina which was
prepared by Assistant Municipal TreasurerJuan Maranga who
testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriageofGavino and
Catalina should have been proven in accordancewith Arts.53 and 54
of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time
of the alleged marriagewas celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that “marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of
1889 should be proven only by a certified copy ofthe memorandum
in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereofhave not been kept or
have been lost,or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which
case any otherproof, such as that ofthe continuous possession by
parents ofthe status ofhusband and wife, may be considered,
provided that the registration ofthe birth oftheir children as their
legitimate children is also submitted in evidence”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions ofthe trial court and Court of
Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalina’s marriageas valid and
thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso onethird oftheir grandparents’
estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 ofthe Civil Code of889
of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor
General ofthe Philippines shortly after the extension ofthat code of
this country. Therefore,Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since
this case was brought in the lower courtin 1968, the existence ofthe
marriage must be determined in accordance with the presentCivil
Code, which repealed the provisions ofthe formerCivil Code, except
as they related to vestedrights, and the rulesofevidence. Underthe
Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husbandand wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriagecontract is considered primary evidenceof
marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not
take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case
evidence consisting ofthe testimonies ofwitnesses was held
competent to provethe marriage ofGavino and Catalina in 1929, that
they havethreechildren, one ofwhom, Petronilo,died at the age of
six and that they are recognizedby Gavino’s family and by the public
as the legitimate children ofGavino.

Republic vs. CourtofAppeals
The case:
The facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar,
City Court judge ofPasay City. The marriage was celebrated without
the knowledge ofCastro’s parents. The marriage contract states that
marriage license no. 3196182was issued in the name ofthe
contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The
couple did not immediately livetogether as husband and wife. Thus,
it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant
that the couple decided to live together. Their cohabitation only
lasted for four months and then the couple parted ways.The baby
was adopted by Castro’s brother,with the consent ofCardenas. Itwas
then discovered that therewas no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration oftheir marriageas confirmed by a
certification from the Civil RegisterofPasig, Metro Manila. Her
husband was duly served with notice ofthe proceedings and a copy of
the petition but he choseto ignoreit, thus, he was properly declared
in default. The trial court denied her petition on the groundthat the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuanceof
a marriage license prior to the celebration ofthe marriageofthe
contracting parties. The appellatecourt reversed the decision ofthe
trial court. PetitionerRepublic ofthe Philippines now assailed the
decision ofthe appellate court and posits that the certification ofthe
local civil registrarofdue search and inability to find a record or
entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the
parties is not adequateto prove its non-issuance.
The Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish thatno marriage
license was issued by the Civil Registrar ofPasig prior to the
celebration ofthe marriage orprivate respondent to Edwin
Cardenas?
Held:
The subject marriageis one ofthose commonly known as a “secret
marriage”, ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriagecelebrated
without the knowledgeofthe relatives and/orfriends ofthe
contracting parties. At the timethe marriage was solemnized on June
24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code
which provides that no marriage shall be solemnizedwithout a
marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one ofthe
essential requisites ofa valid marriage, absence ofa license would
render the marriage void ab initio.
The certification ofdue search and inability to find issued by the civil
registrar ofPasig enjoys probativevalue,he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record ofall data relative to the issuanceofa
marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance ofsuspicion
and pursuant to section 29, rule 132ofthe rules ofcourt, a certificate
of due search and inability to find sufficiently provedthat his office
did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
There was absolutely no evidenceon record to show that there was
collusion between privaterespondent and her husband Cardenas. It
is noteworthy to mention that the finding ofthe appellate court that
the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack
of marriage license does not discount that fact that indeed, a
spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil
registrar ofPasig, may have been presented by Cardenasto the
solemnizing officer.
This court holds thatunder the circumstances ofthe case, the
documentary and testimonial evidencepresented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence ofthe subject
marriage license. The petition is Denied there being no showing of
any reversibleerror committed by respondentappellatecourt.

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997
PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.
Facts;
Respondent a Justice ofthe Court ofAppeals was charged with
Bigamy by complainant and is being recommendedfor suspension
from practice oflaw.
Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz married
each other pending the court's decision on the former's marriage.
However, their relationshipwas shortlivedas right after the
marriage, the complainantleft their would-be-honeymoon placeafter
some unbearable utterances madeby the respondent.Several
months after, the complainant learned that respondent a
subsequently marrieda certain Lydia Geraldez, thus,the basis ofthis
complaint.
Issue;
WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspendedfrom his practice
of law.
Ruling;
Citing Rule 1.01 ofthe Code ofProfessional Responsibility,the
Supreme Court found the respondent engaging in an unlawful,
dishonest, immoral ordeceiful conductand recommends
SUSPENSION with the specific WARNINGthat a more severe
penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same ora similar
offense hereafter.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
FACT S:
The following are the complainants:Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1),
Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and
Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio
Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy,
clerk ofcourt II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged thatPalaypayon solemnized marriages even
without the requisite ofa marriage license. Hence, the following
couples wereable to get married just by paying the marriagefees to
respondent Baroy:Alano P. Abellano &Nelly Edralin;Francisco
Selpo & Julieta Carrido;Eddie Terrobias &Maria Gacer;Renato
Gamay & Maricris Belga;Arsenio Sabater &Margarita Nacario;

Sammy Bocaya &Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage
contracts ofthe following couples did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition,Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
and did not indicate the date ofsolemnization reasoning out that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage licenseto be submitted by the
parties which happens usually several days after the marriage
ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriagebetween Abellano &Edralin falls
under Article 34 ofthe Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage
license requirement. According to him, he gave strictinstructions to
complainantSambo to furnish the couplecopy ofthe marriage
contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter
failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license
and executing their marriage contract, a copy ofwhich was then filed
with the civil registrar. The other fivemarriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts
and the date and place ofmarriage are not included. It was alleged
that copies ofthese marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainantSambo. The alleged marriage ofSelpo &Carrido,
Terrobias &Gacer, Gamay &Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnizethem in the absence
of a marriage license and that the marriage ofBocaya &Bismonte
was celebrated even without the requisitelicense due to the
insistence ofthe parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests
which he again did not sign the marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization ofmarriage was charged against the
respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by JudgePalaypayon
were valid.

HELD:
Bocaya &Besmonte’s marriagewas solemnized without a marriage
license along with the othercouples. The testimonies ofBocay and
Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was
really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized theirmarriage. Bocaya
declaredthat they wereadvisedby judgeto return after 1 0 days after
the solemnization and bring with them their marriagelicense. They
already started living together as husband and wife even without the
formal requisite. With respectto the photographs, judgeexplained
that it was a simulated solemnization ofmarriage and not a real one.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start ofthe
wedding ceremony up to the signing ofthe marriage certificates in
front ofhim. The court held that it is hard to believethat it was
simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized
marriage between Abellano &Edralin and claimed it was under
Article34 ofthe Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed
with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint
affidavit that they havebeen living togetheras husband and wife for
almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage
contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. Ifhe
and Edralin had been living togetherfor 6 years already before they
got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must
have been less than 13 years old when they started living together
which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is
his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who
might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the
marriage license requirement.
Article4 ofthe Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence
of any ofthe essential or formal requisites shall renderthe marriage

void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not
affect the validity ofthe marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively
liable.
Arañes vs. Judge Occiano
A.M. No. MT J-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with
Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for
solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her late groom
(Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license, among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s
death, to inherit the “vast properties” left by Orobia was not
recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed
against respondent for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations, which caused her so much hardships,
embarrassmentand sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of
the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which
required the respondent to comment on the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the
ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the
petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the
requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage.
However, due to the earnest pleas ofthe parties, the influx ofvisitors,
and the delivery ofthe provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the
solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage
license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the
respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never
did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner
suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s guilty ofsolemnizing a marriage
without a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Ruling: Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisitemarriage license. In People vs. Lara,
the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which preceded the
issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent
issuance ofsuch licensecannot renderor even add an iota of validity
to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to conduct
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage ofthe petitioner. Judges, who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court's jurisdiction, thereis a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite,which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
NAVARRO VS. DOMAGT OY 259 SCRA 129
FACT S: Navarro is the Municipal Mayor ofDapa, Surigao del Norte.
He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed
by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which,
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27 , 1994,
respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed thathe merely relied
on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadan’s
wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to
have been sworn to beforeanotherjudge. Second, it is alleged that he
performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo
and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court’s jurisdiction on
October 27 , 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the
marriage outside ofhis jurisdiction upon the request of the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction.

HELD: Domagtoy’s defense is not tenable and he did display gross
ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s presumptive death.
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former
wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the
part ofDomagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the
request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoy’s jurisdiction was
only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More
importantly, the elementary principleunderlying this provision is the
authority ofthe solemnizing judge. Under Article3, one ofthe formal
requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.”
Under Article7, marriagemay be solemnized by,among others, “any
incumbent memberofthe judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”
Article8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alteror qualify the authority of
the solemnizing officeras provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Silverio v. Republic
GR No. 174689
October 22, 2007
Facts: Rommel Silverio filed a petition for the change of his gender
and first name in his birth certificate to facilitate his marriage with
his fiancé. A yearbefore, Silverio has underwent sex re-assignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. In his petition, he wants to change his
first name from “Rommel” to “Mely.”
Issue: Should the court allow the change of name?
Held: No. The SC said that considering that there is no law
recognizing sex re-assignment, the determination ofa person’s sex at
the time of birth, ifnot attended by error, is immutable. It held that
“while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that

reason. There is no special law in the country governing sex
reassignment and its effect. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.”
The Court said that the change in gender sought by petitioner “will
have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences,”
i.e., substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage
and family relations and substantially affect the public policy in
relation to women in laws such as the provisions of the Labor Code
on employment ofwomen, certain felonies under the Revised Penal
Code, etc.
REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN
FACT S: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that
Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further
her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate
evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which certificateis issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department
of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and
female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that
the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or
gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court.

HELD: The contention ofthe Office of the Solicitor General that the
petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil
registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein
is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private
respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition,
the order to publish on December16,2003 and all pleadings, orders
or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the
Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the
provisions ofRules 103 and 108 ofthe Rules of Court. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case
should be dealt with utmost care in view ofthe delicate facts present
in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to
elaborate the term “intersexuality” which is the condition or let us
say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY
applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species
whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the
foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the
compassionate calls for recognition ofthe various degrees ofintersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is
not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine
courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence
presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence
points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a
female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically
or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age ofmajority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to
fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this

gender ofthe human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choiceofwhat courses ofaction to take along the path of
his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence
that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence
to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members ofsociety who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
ARTICLE 26
Quita vs Court ofAppeals
December 22, 1998
Fact ofthe Case:
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both
Filipinos, were married inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got
divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried
another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the
respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.
On April 16, 1972,when Arturo died, the trial court was set
to declared as to whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court
invoking Tenchavez vsEscano caseheld thatthe divorce acquired by
the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private
respondentstressed that the citizenship ofpetitioner was relevant in
the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who
obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they
are valid according to their national law. The petitioner
herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954.

Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the
time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a
Filipino citizen.
The Trial court disregardedthe respondent’s statement. The
net hereditary estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and
Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children
moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial
reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception ofAlexis, entitled to one-halfofthe estate to the exclusion
of Ruperto Padlan, and the otherhalfto Fe Quita.Privaterespondent
was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared
voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court
of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of
the Rules of Court.
Issue:
(1)
Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo voidab initio.
(2)
Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as
surviving spouse ofArturo.
Held:
No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The
citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to
this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already an alien at
the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountry’s
national law.
Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She
cannot be the
primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of
Arturo.

Garcia vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987 .
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the
Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly
dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein
petitioner, inCabanatuan City. In their application for marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since
October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia,
their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former
marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims
that he told petitioner ofhis prior marriage in 1993, beforethey were
married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was
dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and
hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The
trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the
ground ofthe divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in
the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace
Garcia.
Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequentmarriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce
obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in thePhilippines,
provided it is consistent with theirrespective laws. Therefore, before
our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. In this case, the divorce decree between the
respondent and
Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family
court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and compliance with
the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be
demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s
failure to objectproperly because he objected to the fact that it was
not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to
its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even
after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to
produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his
status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.

Republic vs Orbecido III
Article 26 of the Family Code – Divorce
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-
an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that
his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She,
Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove
Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the
trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par 2 ofArticle
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic through the Office
of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the
FC.
HELD: In view ofthe foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroadby the alien spousecapacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship ofthe parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorceis obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
“divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s
naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.

Wolfgang Roehr vs. Maria Carmen Rodriguez & Hon.Judge
Guevarra-Salonga; GR 142820
Facts:Roehr, German Citizen, and Rodriguez,Filipino, were married
in Germany. The same was subsequently ratified in Negros
Occidental. They had 2 children. Rodriguez filed a petition for decree
of nullity ofmarriageat the RTC-Makati. Roehr, however, obtained a
decree of divorce from the CFI of Hamburg, Germany. Roehr thus
fied a motion to dismiss the petition for declation of nullity of
marriage on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
same as a divorce decree had already been promulgated. Judge
Guevarra-Salonga recognized the divorce decree, however, ordered
that its court shall determine still the issue regarding the custody of
the 2 children and the settlement ofproperty relations ofthe parties.
Issue:WON the RTC/Phil. Courts has/havejurisdiction to pass upon
matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad.
Held: Y es.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g.on custody, care and support of the children, must still
be determined by ourcourts.23 Beforeour courts can give the effectof
res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was
given the opportunity to challengethe judgmentofthe German court
so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights ofpetitionerto haveparental custody oftheir two
children.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody
of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for
hearing to determine the issue ofparental custody,care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.
With regard to the property relations, given the factual admission by
the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be
accounted for,respondent judgehas no basis to assert jurisdiction in
this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.

SAN LUIS V. SAN LUISFebruary 6,2007
(UnderPropertyRegimesofUnionsWithoutMarriage)
Twoconsolidatedcases:
EdgarSanLuisv.FelicidadSanLuis,RodolfoSanLuisv.FelicidadSanLuisBackground:The
caseinvolvesthesettlementoftheestateofFelicisimoSanLuis.During hislifetimeFelicisimo
contractedthreemarriages.Fromthefirstmarriagecontractedin1942hehadsixchildren,
twoofwhomarethepetitionersinthiscase.Hisfirstwifediedin1963andhissecondmarriage
toanAmericancitizenendedinthewifegettingadivorcein1971.In1974Felicismomarried
Felicidad,therespondentinthiscase,intheUSA.Theyhadnochildrenbutlivedtogetherfor18
yearsuntilFelicismodiedin1992.AfterFelicisimo¶sdeath,Felicidadsoughtthedissolutionof
theirconjugalpartnershipassetsandfiledapetitionforlettersofadministration.Thechildrenof
FelicisimofromhisfirstmarriageopposedthisonthegroundsthatFelicidadisonlyamistress,
thesecondmarriagetotheAmericanwifesubsisting.The petitionersclaimedthatArticle26,
Paragraph2oftheFamilyCodecannotbegivenretroactiveeffecttovalidatethebigamous
marriagebecauseitwouldimpairthevestedrightsofFelicisimo¶slegitimatechildren(Article
256oftheFamilyCode).Issue/Held/Ratio:
DoestherespondentFelicidadhavelegalcapacitytofilethepetitionforlettersof
administration?
YES.Even if the Court does not apply Article 26, Par. 2 ofthe Family
Code, there is sufficientjurisprudentialbasisinthecaseof
VanDorn v.Romillo,Jr.
[oonalangkungdiniyomaalalaito,guys]whereitwasheldthataFilipino spouseshouldno
longerbeconsideredmarriedifthealienspousevalidlyobtainsadivorceoutsideofthe
Philippines. [RememberthatinVanDorntheCourtappliedthenationalityprincipleinArticle
15oftheCivilCode]Indeed,incaseslikeQuita v.DandanandRepublicv.OrbecidoIII[again,
kungdiniyomaalala,oonalang,haha]itwaspointedoutthatPar.2,Article26oftheFamily
CodetracesitsoriginstotherulinginVanDorn.
However,
sinceFelicidadfailedtopresentthenecessaryevidencetoprovethedivorcedecree(recallGarcia
v.Recio:copyofthelaw,finaldecreeofabsolutedivorce)aswellashermarriagesolemnizedin
California, thecaseisremandedtothetrialcourtforfurtherreceptionofevidence.
Ev
enassumingthatFelicisimowasnotcapacitatedtomarryFelicidad
,Felicidadstillhaslegalpersonalitytofilethepetitionforlettersofadministration,asshemaybe
consideredtheco-ownerofthepropertiesthatwereacquiredthroughtheirjointeffortsduring
theircohabitation.Sec.2,Rule79provides(inpart)thatapetitionforlettersofadministration
mustbefiledbyan
interested person.
FelicidadqualifiesasaninterestedpersonwithdirectinterestintheestateofFelicisimoby
virtueoftheir18-yearcohabitation.Ifsheprovesthevalidityofthedivorcebutfailstoproveher
marriage,shemaybeconsideredaco-ownerunderArticle144oftheCivilCode.Ifshefailsto
provethevalidityofboththedivorceandthemarriage,Article148oftheFamilyCodewould
apply.Article148statesthatcoupleswhoareincapacitatedtomarrybutstilllivetogetheras
husbandandwifehaveco-ownershipoverpropertiesacquiredduringtheircohabitationin
proportiontotheirrespectivecontributions.*Note:Thereisanotherissueraisedhere,butI
don¶tthinkMa¶amwillcareaboutit.Felicidadfiledthepetitionforlettersofadministrationin
Makati.PetitionersclaimeditshouldhavebeenfiledinLaguna,wherethedeceasedwas
governor,interpreting³residence´as³domicile.´TheSCdidnotupholdthis,interpreting
³resides´inSec.1,Rule73oftheRulesofCourttomean³actualorphysicalhabitationof
aperson,notlegalresidenceordomicile

ARTICLE 34
BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ (Voidable Marriage)
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on
May 21, 1966. They had four children.However, on March 22, 1993,
David contracted anothermarriage with LuzvimindaPayao before
Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time,
Payao was also marriedto Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued
an affidavit stating that they wereboth married however due to
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer
communicated with them. They have lived together as husband &
wife for 7 years. Judgeagreed to solemnizethe marriage. Herminia
filed charges ofgross ignorance ofthe law against Sanchez.
ISSUE: WON David Manzano’s marriage with Payao is valid?
HELD: NO. Sanchez fined P20,000.00
RATIO:
1. FC Art. 34:legal ratification ofmarital cohabitation exempts a
couple from obtaining a marriage license but the ffrequisites must be
present:
a. lived together as husband &wife for at least five years
b. no legal impediment to marry each other
c. fact of absence oflegal impediment must be present at time of
marriage
d. affidavit stating that they’ve been living together for at least 5
years &without legal impediments
e. solemnizing officer should execute sworn statement that he
ascertained qualifications ofcontracting parties.
2. None of requisites werepresent.They declared that they were
separated but judgestill solemnizedmarriage. Mere separation and
free & voluntary cohabitation with anotherperson do not dissolvethe
marriage tie. Cohabitation for at least five years exempts them from
the marriage license but it does not free them oftheir legal
impediment to contract a subsequentmarriage.
3. Marriage was void &bigamous. Judge displayed gross ignorance
of the law.

Niñal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26, 1974. Out oftheir marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito
resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and
8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.
Issue: What nature ofcohabitation is contemplated under Article76
of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the
counting ofthe 5-yearperiod in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license.
Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period oflegal union had it not been for the absence ofthe marriage.
This 5-yearperiod should be the years immediately before the day of
the marriage and it should be a period ofcohabitation characterized
by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases
of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot
be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for
at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito’s
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being
one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

ARTICLE 35
SERMONIA, vs. CA G.R. No. 109454June 14, 1994
FACT S:
On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with
bigamy before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 197 5 while his prior
marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his
criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion
to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to
reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed
decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of
merit.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the
second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the
Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of
public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The
offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive
notice of the subsequent marriage as of 197 5; hence, prescription
commencedto run on the day the marriage contract was registered.
For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should
have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive
period does not begin from the commission ofthe crimebut from the
time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has
already prescribed.
HELD:
No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of
constructivenotice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that
penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from
registration thereofwould amount to almost absolving the offenders
thereoffor liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from
the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is
still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate
spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a
married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which
circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered
quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only
from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agency.

Santos vs. Ca
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
FACT S:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September
20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not
communicatewith Leouel and did not return to the country.In 1991,
Leoul filed with the RTC ofNegros Oriental, a complaint for voiding
the marriage under Article36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUE:
Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years constitute
psychological incapacity?
RULING:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her
husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute
psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b)
JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
dischargedby the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Art. 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“PSY CHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED

CHING MIN T SOI VSCA
266 SCRA 324
FACT S:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were
married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Gina’s
expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having
sexual intercourse with each other,the defendant just went to bed,
slept on one side thereof, then turnedhis back and went to sleep. No
sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and
fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the
same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no
attempt ofsexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to
declare the annulment ofthe marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.Gina alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a
closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found
to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when erect).Defendant admitted that
no sexual contact was ever made and according to him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided
him and wheneverhe caressed her private parts she always removed
his hands.
ISSUE:
Is the refusal ofprivate respondent to have sexual communion with
petitionera psychological incapacity ?[i]
HELD:
If a spouse, although physically capablebut simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant,Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal ofa spouse to havesexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign ofpsychological
incapacity.
Evidently, one ofthe essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is “To procreatechildren based on the universal principle that
procreation ofchildren through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.” Constant non-fulfillment ofthis obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness ofthe marriage. In the case at bar,
the senseless and protracted refusal ofone ofthe parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obligedto
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the “spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act ofa partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have caredless.”This is so because an
ungiven selfis an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself.
In the natural order,it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation
in the mystery ofcreation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation offamily relations.

Republic vs. CA and Molina, 268 SCRA 198G.R. no. 108763, 13
February 1997
F a c t s : O n 1 4 A p r i l 1 9 8 5 , p l a i n t i f f
R o r i d e l M o l i n a m a r r i e d
d e f e n d a n t R e y n a l d o M o l i n a w h i c h
u n i o n b o r e a s o n . A f t e r a y e a r
o f m a r r i a g e , R e y n a l d o s h o w e d
s i g n s o f i m m a t u r i t y a n d i r r e s p o n
s i b i l i t y a s a h u s b a n d a n d f a t h e r a s h e
p r e f e r r e d t o s p en d m o re t i m e w i t h h i s fr i end s,
d e p e nded o n h i s p a ren tsfo r s u p po rt, a n d w a s n e v er
h o n e st w i t h Ro ri del i n r e g a rd t o th eir fi n a nc e s
r e s u lti ng i n fr e q uent q u arrel s b e tw een t h e m.The RTC-
L a Tr i n i da d, Be n g u et g r an ted Ro r i del’ s p e t iti o n
fo r d e c lara tio n o f n u l l ity o f h e r m a r ri age w h i c h w a s
a ffi r m ed b y the CA
.I s s u e : W h e t h e r o r n o t i r r e c o n c i l a
b l e d i f f e r e n c e s a n d c o n f l i c t i n g perso
nalities constitutepsychological incapacity.
R u l i n g : N o . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e d t h a t
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s an d c o n flic ti ng
p e r so n al iti es d o n o t c o ns tit ute
p s y c h o lo gic a li nc apac i ty. I t l a i d d o w n t h e fo l lo wi ng
g u i d el in es i n a p p ly i ngA rti c le 3 6 o f t h e fa m i ly Co d e:
( a ) p l a i n t iff h a s t h e b u rd en o f p r o o f; ( b 0 r o o t c a us e
m u s t b e m e d ic al ly/c li nic a lly i d en tifi ed,a lle ged i n t h e
c o m pla in t; s u ffic i ently p r o ven b y e x pert s, a n d c learly
e x p lai ned i n t h e d e c is io n; ( c ) i n c a pac ity m u st e x is t
a t t h e t i m e o f m a r ri age ; ( d ) i t m u s t b e i n c urabl e; ( e )
i t s g r a v ity di sabl es e s s enti al m a ri tal o bl ig ati o ns; ( f) a s
e n u m era ted i n A r t i c l e s 6 8 - 7 1 , 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 a n d
2 2 5 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e ; ( g ) I n t erpr etati o n
o f t h e n a t io n al A ppel la te Ma t ri mo ni al Tr i bun alofthe
catholic Church should be given great respect; and (h)P r o sec uti o n
a n d So l i c i to r Ge n e ral m u s t a p p ear a s c o un sel for the
state.Judgment reversed and set aside.

Lucita E. Hernandez vs. CA and Mario Hernandez , 320 SCRA 7 6,
Facts: On 1 January 1981, Lucita Estrella married Mario
Hernandez, and they begot three children. On 10 July
1992, Lucita filed a petition for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. She alleged that
from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform
his obligations to support the family, devoting most of
his time drinking, had affairs with many women, and
cohabiting with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child, and finally abandoning her and the
family. The RTC-Tagaytay City dismissed the petition
which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Mario’s habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity/perversion and family abandonment constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the aforementioned
acts do not by themselves constitute grounds for
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
Mario completely unable to discharge his essential
marital obligations, and not merely due to his youth and
self-conscious feelings of being handsome.
Judgment affirmed.
Marcos vs. Marcos
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000 (3rd Division)
Facts: Plaintiff Brenda Marcos and defendant Wilson Marcos
were married twice on 6 September 1982 and on 8 May
1983. They had five children. Brenda filed a case for
nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity,
alleging that Wilson failed to providematerial support to
the family and had resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment. The RTC declared their marriage null and
void under article 36 of the Family Code. However, the
Court of appeals reversed the said decision.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented in
this case show psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not personal medical or psychological
examination of Wilson by a physician is a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: 1. No. Although the Supreme Court is sufficiently
convinced that Wilson failed to provide material support
and resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to psychological
incapacity.

2. No. the Supreme Court ruled that examination by
physician or psychologist is not a condition sine gua non
for the declaration of psychological incapacity.
PESCA V PESCA 356 SCRA 588 APRIL 17, 2001
FACTS: Submitted for review is the decision ofthe Court ofAppeals,
promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 5237 4, reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City,
Branch 130, which has declaredthe marriage between petitioner and
respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
 March 3, 1975 –Lorna Pesca (petitioner) and Zosimo Pesca
(respondent) were in Bacolod and had 3 children. As a
seaman, he did not often stay with petitioner.
 In 1988 – respondent showed signs of immaturity, cruelty,
was a habitual drinker
 November 19, 1992 –petitioner left with her children due to
his cruel behavior but returned and gave Zosimo a second
chance.
 March 22, 1994 – respondent assaulted petitioner so
petitioner decidedly to leave Zosimo. Petitioner filed for
annulment, invoking psychological incapacity as grounds
 April 25, 1994 –summons were served on respondent but he
failed to file an answer within reglamentary period.
 August 3, 1994 – prosecutor submitted report that no
collusion exists between both parties
 January 11, 1995 – respondent filed an answer denying
psychological incapacity
 November 15,1995 –RTC granted nullity ofmarriagebut CA
reversed the decision on the basis that petitioner has not
sufficiently established the grounds for psychological
incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability
ISSUE: Whether Zosimo Pesca’s actions constitute “psychological
incapacity”
HELD: DENIED. Petitioner failed to establish proof that
respondent showed signs ofmental incapacity that would cause him
to be truly incognitive ofthe basic marital covenant provided in Art.
68 of the Family Code.
The "doctrine ofstare decisis,"ordained in Article 8 ofthe Civil Code,
expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form part ofthe legal system ofthe Philippines. The rule follows

the settled legal maxim that the interpretation placed upon the
written law by a competent court has the force of law. The
interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as
of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court finds itself later overruled,and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith in accordance therewith underthe familiar rule of"lex prospicit,
non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ,"borrowed from Canon law, is
an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the
relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first
time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally providedprocedural guidelines to assist the courts and
the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on
psychological incapacity.Molina has strengthened, not overturned,
Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in
the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the
time of solemnization ofthe contract, so as to warrant a declaration
of nullity ofthe marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
SIAYNGCO V SIAYNGCO 441SCRA 422 OCT OBER27,2004
FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon
City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco
 August 11, 197 3 – Juanita Carating (petitioner) married
Manuel Siayngco (respondent) civil rites and church on June
27 , 197 3. Adopted baby boy
 September 25, 1997 – respondent filed for declaration of
nullity based on Art 36; petitioner was over domineering,
selfish, volatile, nagger and trivial. No respect for his
position as judge. This is rooted in her deep-seated
resentment from lack of love and appreciation from her
parents
 According to petitioner, respondent is lying because he
wants to be with his paramour
 Respondent presented Dr Valentina Garcia (psychiatrist);
from her psychiatric evaluation, both had narcissistic
psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive
traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive
and sensitive) to each other’s needs and feelings
 Based on the psychiatric report of Dr Eduardo Maaba,
petitioner is psychologically capacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations
 January 31, 2001 –RTC denied petition for nullity based on
insufficient evidence
 July 1, 2003 – CA reversed RTC decision based on
psychiatric report ofDr Garcia that both are psychologically
incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v CA
ISSUE: Whether root cause of psychological incapacity was
identified based on Molina guideline #2
HELD: Based on the report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only
essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able

to fulfill, if any, is the obligation offidelity. Sexual infidelity, per se,
however, does not constitute psy chological incapacity within the
contemplation ofthe Family Code.It must be shown that respondent
Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to his
ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.
Respondent failed to prove that his wife’s behavior and actions are
grave psychological maladies that paralyzeher from complying with
the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing
that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose
expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,
reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. Dr. Garcia’s
report does not even mention that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated. PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION WAS
REVERSED
FERRARIS V FERRARIS G.R. NO. 162368 JULY 17, 2006
FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitionerMa. Armida Perez-Ferraris ofthe Resolution dated June 9,
2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and
February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court ofAppeals committed any reversible
error.
 February 20, 2001 – Pasig RTC denied the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the petitioner on
the grounds that epilepsy does not amount to psychological
incapacity and evidenceon record was insufficient to prove
infidelity. Motion for reconsideration was denied on April
20, 2001
 CA affirmed in toto the judgment of RTC; it held that the
evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or
that his "defects"were incurable and already present at the
inception ofthe marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found
that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance
of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the
respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed
to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening
disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him
from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred affirming RTC decision in denying
petition for annulment on the account of insufficient evidence
HELD: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on
this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings ofthe appellate court go beyond the issues of the
case, run contrary to the admissions ofthe parties to the case, or fail

163143063 cases-in-persons-and-family-relations-assigned-by-atty-bolivar

163143063 cases-in-persons-and-family-relations-assigned-by-atty-bolivar

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163143063 cases-in-persons-and-family-relations-assigned-by-atty-bolivar