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RULE 73 REGALADO, J.: G.R. No. 97906 May 21, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG
Petitioner seeks to set aside the judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals 1
in affirmance of the decision of the court a quo 2
granting the petition filed by herein private respondent Maximo Wong for the change of
his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. w hich washis name prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.
The facts are undisputed. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he w as but
tw o and a half years old and then know n as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, w as then nine years old, they w ere, with the consent
of their naturalparents 3
and by order of the court in Special Case No. 593 4
issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, w as an insurance agent w hile Concepcion Ty Wong w as a high
schoolteacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen yearsof marriage. The couples show ered their adopted
children w ith parental love and reared them as their ow n children.
Upon reaching the age of tw enty-tw o, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It w as averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry w hen in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he w ants to erase any implication w hatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter w as resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional
requirements having been fully complied w ith, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. w as granted. 5
On
appeal to respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the Solicitor General, the decision of the court below w as
affirmed in full, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petitionfor change of name are valid,
sufficientand proper to warrant the grantingof said petition.
The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends w ere unsubstantiated and
cannot justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass
ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother w ho is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further,
the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, w hich requires an
adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and w ould identify him w ith his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed
his relationship w ith his adoptive parents. 6
In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that is, upon adoption he used the surname of the adopter. How ever, being
already emancipated, he can now decide w hat is best for and by himself. It is at this time that he realized that the Chinese name he carries causes
him undue ridicule and embarrassment and affects his businessand social life. In fact, his adoptive mother, being aw are of his predicament, gave
her consent to the petition for change of name, albeit making it clear that the same shall in no w ay affect the legal adoption, and even underw ent
the rigors of trial to substantiate her sw orn statement. If his adoptive mother does not take offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or
insecurity about his desire to change his name, private respondent avers that there can be no possible prejudice on her, much less the State. 7
We feelthat w e should preface our review of this case with a clear comprehension of the legal significance of a person's name. For all practical and
legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by w hich he is know n and called in the community in w hich be lives and is best know n. It is
defined as the w ord or combination of w ordsby w hich a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation w hich
he bears for the convenience of the w orld at large addressing him, of in speaking of or dealing w ith him. 8 Names are used merely as one method

2. of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently
been held that, w hen identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial. 9
The names of individuals usually have tw o parts: the given name or proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is
that w hich is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or family name is that w hich identifies
the family to w hich he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the
surname to w hich the child is entitled is fixed by law . 10
A name is said to have the follow ing characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused w ith others. (2) It is
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be w ithout a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the star t, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. 11
Title XIII, Book I of the Civil Code, in Articles 364 to 380, provides the substantive rules w hich regulate the use of surnames. Considering the
subject and personalities involved in this present review , particular attention must be called to Article 365 w hich mandates that "(a)n adopted child
shall bear the surname of the adopter," in correlation w ith Article 341 on the effects of adoption, among w hich is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to
use the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an adopted child is maintained in Article 39(3), Title II of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherw ise know n as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. More recently, Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, or the
Family Code, echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter. 12
Clearly, from the very wordingsof the law , it
may be inferred that this use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right.
Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can change his name or surname w ithout judicial authority." The application for change of name
thereunder involves a specialproceeding governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and one w hich involves
substantialchanges, w ith the declared objective of such judicialproceedings being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of personalname is simply to have, w hereverpossible, a record of the change, and in keeping w ith the object of the statute,
court to w hich application is made should normally make its decree recording such change of name. 13
A change of name is a specialproceeding to establish the status of a person involving his relation w ith others, that is, his legal position in, or w ith
regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem 14
and, as such, strict compliance w ith all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on
publication, is essentialin order to vest the court w ith jurisdiction thereover. 15
For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the true or
official name recorded in the civil register. 16
To digress a little for purposes of clarification, the change of name contemplated under Article 376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule 103
must not be confused w ith and cannot be effected through the summary proceeding proposed in Article 412 of the some Code, as procedurally
regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules, w hich refers only to correction of clerical errors, such as those w hich are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake in copying or w riting, or some harmless or innocuous change, 17
and not
those w hich w ill involve substantial changes. 18
Turning now to the case at bar, w e are guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
reasons adduced and the consequences that w ill likely follow ; 19
it is a privilege w hich may be granted only upon a show ing of a proper or
reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor. 20
We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that private respondent's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his
present surname is unsubstantiated.
The testimony of private respondent in the low er court bears out the existence of valid cause in his bid for change of name:
ATTY. DUMAMBA:
Q Now , after adoption, w hen you went to school, what did you use as your surname?
A "Wong," sir.
Q Now , after you adopted the surname "Wong?" in your studies, w hat did you observe?
A I observed that "Wong" as a surname embarrassed me to my friends and w hen I go w ith Chinese friends I cannot talk Chinese. I am
living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one can believe that I am Muslim. I have a little business of Furniture but I have little
(sic) customer because no one believes me that I am Muslim.
Q You w ant to informthis Honorable Court that this family name you are using w hich is "Wong" embarrassed you from (sic) your friends
and relatives and also cause(d) damage to your business?
A Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DUMAMBA:
Q Now , considering that according to you, you are embarrassed because of the family name you are using, your friends shy aw ay from
you and it is a handicap in your business, w hat is your desire for the Court to do in order to help you?
A Change my family name.
Q From "Wong" to w hat do you w ant your surname changed?
A "Alcala, Jr.", sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q What is your purpose in changing your family name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr.?
A I feel embarrassed to my friends and also to my relatives and as I said I have a little business of furniture and only a few customers
buying for the fact that they don't believe I am Muslim.
Cross.
ATTY. SERO:
With the permission of the Honorable Court.
Q Your father's name is Maximo Alcala, Sr., is he still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q And w hat does your father sayto this proposed changed (sic) of your name, your family name to your real family name given to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q They have no objection to it?
A No, sir.
Q Stated before this Honorable Court, the purpose w hy you w anted to change your name from "Wong" to "Alcala" is so that to av oid
embarrassment because you are a Muslim and your Muslim relatives think that you are Chinese.
A Yes, sir.
Q Not for the purpose to hide anything or w hat not?
A No, sir. 21
The foregoing testimony of private respondent is materially corroborated by the testimony of private respondent's adoptive mother:
Q Now , w hat did you observe to (sic) your son Maximo Wong after you and your husband adopted him?
A When I adopted him and he used the surname "Wong" I observed that some of his relatives, cousins and friends seem to shy aw ay
from him and despise him in school that is w hy I agreed to change his name. 22
We uphold these observations in the decision of respondent appellate court:
The purpose of the law an allow ing of change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a
person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In granting or
denying the petition for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25,
1965; Nacionales vs. Republic,
L-18067, April 29, 1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA 843). In the present case, We believe that the court a quo had exercised its
discretion judiciously w hen it granted the petition.

3. From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee w as prompted
to file the petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings w ith his
relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social and
business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to
erase signs of a former alien nationality w hich only hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of
name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que Liong Sian vs. Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074). Justice dictates
that a person should be allow ed to improve his socialstanding as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest
of the State or other persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). Nothing w hatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such prejudice
or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons w ould result in the change of petitioner's name. 23
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor
but also that he w ill be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 24
Among the grounds for change of name w hich have been held valid
are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to w rite or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change w ill avoid confusion; 25
(d) Having continuously used and been know n since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaw are of her alien parentage; 26
(e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and w ithout prejudicing anybody; 27
and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no show ing that the desired change of name
w as for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name w ould prejudice public interest. 28
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. 29
Summarizing, in special proceedings for
change of name, w hat is involved is not a mere matter of allow ance or disallowanceof the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindfulof the consequent results in the event of its grant and w ith the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it
must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings. 30
The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by w hich relations of paternity and
affiliation are recognized as legally existing betw een persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child
of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to
effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name w hich frequently accompanies adoption being
more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31
The w elfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for
adoption. On this point, there is unanimous agreement. 32
It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer fromthe naturalparents to the adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of
obedience ow ing by the child, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the same manner as if the child had been
born of such adoptive parents in law ful w edlock, subject, how ever, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute imposed. 33
More
specifically under the present state of our law , the Family Code, superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code on the matter, 34
relevantly provides in this w ise w ith regard to the issue involved in this case:
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the follow ing effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights
and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters; (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the change of name w ould run counter to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code and
the ruling in Manuel vs. Republic35
that "one should not be allow ed to use a surname w hich otherwisehe is not permitted to employ under the law ,"
and w ould set a bad example to other persons w ho might also seek a change of their surnames on lame excuses. 36
While w e appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we find the same to be unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to
his old name, private respondent w ould then be using a name w hich he is prohibited by law fromusing. True, the law prescribes the surname that a
person may employ; but the law does not go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects such recourse to the
obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does not prohibit, it permits.
If w e w ere to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion, then there w ill never be any possibility or occasion for any person,
regardless of status, to change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal imperative on the use of surnames in the event
that the petition is granted. Rule 103 of the Rules of Court w ould then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have been the intendment of the law .
A petition for change of name is a remedy allow ed under our law only by w ayof exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use
of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission
granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties w ho may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term
"persons" to signify allnatural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted exc eptionalcircumstances,
petition the court for a change of name, w e do not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an
adopted child. In other w ords, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort, to Rule 103.
We are of the view that the circumstances herein obtaining are w ithin the ambit of the established exceptions and find merit in private respondent's
submission:
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose w hich (State) is to give a person in opportunity to improve his personality and
provide his best interest (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In the instant case, the court a quo found the petition of Maximo Wong
for change of name justifiable after due hearing, thus its factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count heavily and need not be
disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as w ell as to
observe the demeanor of the w itnesseswhile testifying in the case (Baliw ag Transit, Inc. vs. CA, 147 SCRA 82). Moreover, the trial court
could take judicial notice of other existing factors in the community w here herein respondent lives w hich it considers material in its
judicious determination of the case. . . .
Additionally, herein respondent is already of age and as such he can decide w hat is best for him. His experience w ith regards (sic) his
socialand business dealings is personal and it is only him (sic) w ho can attest to the same. Finding his predicament's proper remedy is
solely through legal process, herein respondent accordingly filed a petition pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court w hich was granted
by the Court a quo. 37
Besides, w e have faith in the circumspection of our low er courts and that, in the exercise of their discretion, said courts s hall consider petitions for
change of name only on cogent and meritorious grounds as w ould justify the granting of such applications. We do not expect our trial courts to
cater or give in to the w himor caprice of an applicant, aside fromthe fact that there is alw ays the safeguard and correctiv e interdiction of appellate
review .
It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the use of the name of his parents by nature as cross ingratitude. To go by
the Solicitor General's suggestion that private respondent should have his adoption revoked if he w ants to use the surname of his natural father
w ould be to exact too clear a toll for making use of an appropriate and valid remedy available under the law .
Herein private respondent, before he filed the petition for change of name, asked for his adoptive mother's permission to do so:
Q Now , in filing this petition for change of surname, you had talked w ith your adopted mother?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask permission from her w hether she w ants you to change the surname?
A Yes, sir. 38
True enough, the above testimony of private respondent w as confirmed by his adoptive mother in this manner:
Q How are you related to Maximo Wong?

4. A My adopted son.
Q He is your adopted son, did your son talk to you w hen he filed this petition for change of his surname?
A Yes, he even tried to ask me and I said, alright if you w ant to change.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now , w hen you agreed to the filing of this petition for change of name, did you reduce your consent in w riting?
A Yes, sir, I agreed also so that his business w ill prosper because
he is already Alcila and not Wong because Wong they said is Chinese. 39
As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition (her husband having already passed aw ay), Concepcion Ty Vda. de Wong ex ecuted an affidavit
in Cotabato City on May 27, 1985, w ith these textual declarations:
That I am the same and identical person, w ho is the surviving adapted (sic) parent of Maximo Wong.
That I personally discovered it myself from the time my adapted (sic) son Maximo used the surname of my late husband Wong, his
relatives and childhood friends shy aw ay from him because he is branded as a son of a chinese w hich is different from them w hose
parents are muslim Filipinos;
That I pity my son w ho is often rediculed (sic) by his friends and relatives because of his family name Wong, hence, in order not to
humper (sic) his social and business life in the future, I am voluntarily and of my ow n free w ill w ithout being forced, coerced, or
intimidated give (sic) my consent to his desire to change his desire to change his surname w ithout affecting how ever the legal adoption
granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making him as one of my legal and compulsory heir (sic).
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the above mentioned facts and for all legal intent (sic) and purposes. 40
There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent to first secure has adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the questioned
legal recourse other than the parentalrespect and reverence which is ow ed by and to be expected of a dutifulchild. If private respondent w as such
an ingrate, as the Solicitor General w ould have us believe, he w ould not have bothered to seek his adoptive mother's counsel. In the same breath,
had his adoptive mother regarded him as an ungratefuladoptee, she w ould not have executed the affidavit above quoted, much less testify in his
behalf at the hearing of his petition.
Moreover, w orthyof note is the fact that private respondent's adoptive mother emphasized that she executed the above affidavit "w ithout affecting
the legal adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making him as one of my legal and compulsory heir(s)." This is incontrovertible
proof that she never entertained any misgivings or reservations w ith respect to her consent to his petition. This likew ise dispels any possible
confusion as to private respondent's legal status or adoptive paternity and his successional rights. Concordantly, w e have heretofore held that a
change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flow ing therefrom. It does not alter
one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; w hat is altered is only the name. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J.: May 31, 1969 G.R. No. L-22761
ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH, represented in this suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG
vs.
MARIA SANTOS BUSH
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from two orders ofthe Court of First Instance ofManila in Civil CaseNo. 51639, the fir st dismissing the complaint and
the second denying the motion to reconsider the order ofdismissal.
On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural children and the o nly heirs in the direct
line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born ofthe common-law relationship oftheir father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941;
that said John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception ofthe plaintiffs, were not suffering from any disability to marry each other; that they
lived with their alleged father during his lifetime and were considered and treated by. him as his acknowledge natural childr en; that said John T. Bush,
at the time of his death, left several real and personal properties; that the defendant, by falsely a lleging that she was the legal wife ofthe deceased
was able to secure her appointment as administratrix ofthe estate ofthe deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 ofthe Co urt ofFirst Instance of
Manila; that she submitted to the court for approval a projectofpartition, purporting to show that the deceased left a willwhereby he bequeathed his
estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger; that the defendant then knew that the plai ntiffs were the
acknowledged natural children ofthe deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in J uly,
1962. They prayed that the project of partition be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting ofall the
properties left by the deceased and another project ofpartition adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the
event that the defendant had disposed ofall or part ofthe estate, that she be ordered to pay them the market value thereof; and that the defendant
be ordered to pay for the value ofthe fruits received, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack ofcause ofaction,res judicata and statute of limitations. The plaintiffs opposed and the defendant filed
a reply to the opposition. On January 10, 1963 the lower court denied the motion, “itappearing that the grounds upon which s aid motion is based are
not indubitable.” In time, the defendant filed her answer specifically denying all the material averments ofthe complaint and invoking laches, res
judicata and statute oflimitations as affirmative defenses.
After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereofthe hearing was postponed upon the defendant’s manifestation that
she would file a written motion to dismiss. The motion, when filed, challenged the jurisdiction ofthe court, stating that si nce the action was one to
annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could take cognizance ofthe case, citing Rule 75, Section
1, of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the grou nd relied upon by the
defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.
The procedural question posed by appellants is: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion t o dismiss?
It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack ofcause ofaction, res judicata and statute oflimitat ions, was denied because
those grounds did not appear to the court to be indubitable. The second motion reiterated none of those grounds and raised only the question of
jurisdiction. In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court in effect did so motu proprio, witho ut offering the plaintiffs a
chance to argue the point. In fact the court did not even state in its order why in its opinion the action had prescribed, and why in effect, without any
evidence or new arguments on the question, it reversed its previous ruling that the ground ofprescription was not indubitabl e.

5. In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94, it was held:
Section 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion t o this end be filed. In
the light of this express requirement we do not believe that the court had power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion duly presented.
The fact that the parties filed memoranda upon the court’s indication or order in which they discussed the proposition that t he action was
unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and independently ofthe case for libel did not supply the deficiency. Rule 30 ofthe Rules ofCourt
provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed, and the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, u nder the familiar
maxims, inclusio unius est exclusivo ulterius. The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may dismiss upo n the court’s own motion
an action is, when the ‘plaintifffails to appear at the time ofthe trial or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length oftime or to comply with
the Rules or any order of the court.
The foregoing ruling is applicable in this case, because although a motion to dismiss had been presented defendant the resolu tion ofthe court
granting the same was based upon a ground not alleged in said motion. But assuming that the lower court could properly consider the question of
prescription anew, the samestill did not appear to be indubitable on the face ofthe allegations in the complaint. The defen dant cites Article 137 of
the Civil Code, which provides that an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only during the lifetim e ofthe putative
parents, except in two instances not obtaining in this case, and that the present action was c ommenced afterthe death ofthe putative father ofthe
plaintiffs. The said provision is not of indubitable application, since the plaintiffs do not seek acknowledgment but allege as a matter offact that
they “are the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the directline ofthe late John T. Bush.” Whether or not this allegation is true will,
of course, depend upon the evidence to be presented at the trial.
The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground posed in her motion to dismiss, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court
formerly in force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which says:
SECTION 1. Where estate ofdeceased persons settled. –Ifthe decedent is an inhabitant ofthe Philippines at the timeofhis death, whe ther a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters ofadministration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court ofFirst Insta nce in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and ifhe is an inhabitant ofa foreign country, the Court ofFirst Instance ofany province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place ofresidence ofthe decedent, or ofthe location ofhis estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want ofjurisdiction appears on the record.
It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes ofthe special proceeding for the settlement ofthe estate ofa deceased person,
“so far as it depends on the place of residence ofthe decedent, or ofthe location ofhis estate. ” The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of
Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rul e specifies that “the court
first taking cognizance ofthe settlement ofthe estate ofa decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion ofall other courts.”
In the final analysis this actionis not necessarily one to annul the partition already madeand approved by the probate cour t, and to reopen the estate
proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs ofthe portion oftheir alleged inheritance ofwhich, th rough fraud,
they have been deprived. Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, this Court believes that the plaintiffs’ cause
should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits. WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case rema nded for further
proceedings. Costs against the defendant-appellee in this instance.
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
Rosa Cayerano Cuenco vs. CA, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cunco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguerra, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco reyes, and Teresita cuenco Gonzalez
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts
FACTS: SenatorMariano JesusCuencodiedinManila.He wassurvivedbyhiswidow andtwominor sons, residing in
Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first
marriage,filedaPetitionforLetters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the
senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petitionstill pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for
the probate of the lastwill andtestament,where she wasnamedexecutrix.Rosaalsofiledanoppositionandmotion
to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have
acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdesfiledanoppositionandmotiontodismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper
venue,consideringthatCFICebualreadyacquiredexclusivejurisdictionoverthe case.The oppositionandmotion to
dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs: Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assumingexclusive jurisdictionoverthe probate proceedingsinpursuance toCFICebu's order expressly consenting
in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
HELD: The Supreme CourtfoundthatCA erredin law inissuingthe writof prohibitionagainst the Quezon City court
fromproceedingwiththe testate proceedingsandannullingandsetting aside all its orders and actions, particularly
itsadmissiontoprobate of the last will andtestamentof the deceasedandappointingpetitioner-widowasexecutrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction

6. Under Rule 73, the court firsttakingcognizance of the settlementof the estate of adecent,shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts.
The residence of the decentorthe locationof hisestate isnot an elementof jurisdictionoverthe subjectmatter but
merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice.
The court withwhomthe petitionisfirstfiledmustalsofirsttake cognizance of the settlementof the estate inorder
to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The
definitionsof acivil actionanda special proceeding,respectively,inthe Rulesillustrate thisdifference.A civil action,
in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong"34 necessarilyhasdefiniteadverseparties,whoare eitherthe plaintiffordefendant.35 On the other hand, a
special proceeding,"bywhichaparty seekstoestablishastatus,right,ora particularfact,"36 has one definiteparty,
who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the
case at bar, itbearsemphasisthatthe estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special
proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the
estate,37 pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39
~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~
A CIVILACTION isone by whicha party suesanotherforthe enforcementorprotection of a right, or the prevention
or redressof a wrong.(See.3[a], Rule 1, 1997 Rulesof Civil Procedure),whileaSPECIALPROCEEDING is a remedy by
whicha party seekstoestablishastatus,a rightor a particularfact.(Sec.3[C].Rule 1,1997 Rulesof Civil Procedure.)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: G.R. No. L-7635 July 25, 1955
TASIANA ONGSINGCO, Guardian of Francisco de Borja vs. HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, as Judge of the CFI of Rizal and JOSE
DE BORJA, administrator of the estate of the late Josefa Tangco,
Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the w ife and judicial guardian of one Francisco de Borja w ho w as declared incompetent by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Special Proceedings No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco w hose estate is being settled in
Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of Francisco de Borja, w ho, on June 29, 1953, w as
appointed administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.
Francisco de Borja, according to petitioner, is the ow ner of tw o parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, w hich he acquired by
inheritance fromhis late father Marcelo de Borja and as such form part of his separate properties. On October 27, 1953, Francisco de Borja w as
declared incompetent by the court as aforesaid, and petitioner, his second w ife, wasappointed his guardian. As such guardian, petitioner took over
fromher husband the possession of said tw o parcels of land and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon for the benefit of her
w ard.
On January 16, 1954, respondent Jose de Borja, as administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco, filed a motion in the estate proceedings of the
latter praying that petitioner be restrained fromthreshing the palay on the lands until the ow nership thereof has been definitely determined either by
the court or by agreement of the parties. Petitioner opposed the motion challenging the jurisdiction of the court and contending that if its purpose is
to pass on the question of ow nership, such can only be threshed out elsew here and not by the probate court.
Because it became obvious to petitioner that respondent administrator w ould insist in his motion w hose main aim is to prevent petitioner and her
laborers fromthreshing the crop standing on the lands and, on the other hand, the several attempts made to agree on the identity of the lands had
failed, petitioner filed an action on January 21, 1954 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to restrain respondent administrator from
interferring w ith the harvesting and threshing of the crop on the claim that the lands w ere the exclusive property of her w ard Francisco de Borja
(Civil Case No. 1350). On the same date, the court granted the preliminary injunction prayed for upon the filing by petitioner of a bond of P5,000.
On January 25, 1954, respondent Jose de Borja filed an urgent petition in the same case asking the court to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction and to dissolve the preliminary injunction that w as issued. This petition w as denied.
On January 29, 1954, respondent court issued an order the dispositive part of w hich reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the guardian Tasiana Ongsingco is hereby ordered not to meddle in the threshing of the
palay harvested in the lands declared under Tax Declaration No. 540 (Annexes A and A-1). The administrator and the guardian are ordered to
find fromamong the properties of the incapacitated Francisco de Borja in Tabuanting, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, the tw o parcels of land having
an approximate area as those tw o lots adjudicated in his favor by the Commissioners on Partition, and once found, let the parties agree on the
matter, so as to avoid any future controversy, and to notify this Court of their agreement. IT IS SO ORDERED.
On February 10, 1954, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration calling attention to the fact that both the guardian and the administrator had
already attempted to arrive at an agreement as to the identity of the lots w hich are claimed to be the exclusive property of Francisco de Borja, but
they failed to do so, and because of such inability and the immediate need of harvesting and threshing the crop standing thereon, petitioner filed an
action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija precisely to determine once and for all the title to, and ow nership of, said lands and to issue a
preliminary injunction restraining respondent Jose de Borja from interferring w ith the w ork of petitioner; but, in view of respondent Borja's
opposition, respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration.
The present petition poses the follow ing issues: (1) considering that the dispute betw een petitioner and respondent administr ator involves the
ow nership of tw o parcels of land now the subject of an action in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, has respondent court jurisdiction to
determine said dispute in the estate proceedings of the late Josefa Tangco?; and (2) having the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued a w rit
of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent administrator frominterferring with the threshing of the crop standing on said lands, can respondent

7. court, after having been apprised of said order, issue an order the effect of w hich is to nullify and render ineffective said w rit of preliminary
injunction?.
There is no dispute that the tw o parcels of land in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija are claimed by petitioner as part of the separate property of Francis co
de Borja so much so that she took possession thereof when she assumed her commission as guardian on October 27, 1953. That she succeeded
in taking actualpossession of said lands is show n by the fact that w hen she commenced the threshing of the crop standing thereon, respondent
Jose de Borja filed a petition in the estate proceedings of Josefa Tangco to restrain her from threshing said crop. Then a dispute arose as to the
ow nership of said parcels of land. On one hand, petitioner claims that they belong exclusively to her w ard having inherited them from his late father
Marcelo de Borja, w hile, on the other, respondent administrator contends that they are not the land adjudicated to the incompetent by the
commissioners on partition. The parties had made several attempts to arrive at an agreement as to the identity of the disputed lands, but they
failed, and because there w as a pressing need of immediately threshing the crop standing thereon, petitioner filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija to determine once and for all the title and ow nership of said lands. In the same case, the court issued a preliminary
injunction restraining respondent administrator from interferring w ith the administration of said properties. But such action notw ithstanding,
respondent court issued the orders in question w hich not only go into the issue of ow nership but render ineffective the w rit of injunction issued by
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Can respondent court do so?
It is a w ell-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions that, "the question of ow nership of property is one
w hich should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this w hether or not the property is alleged to belong to the
estate" (Franco vs. O'Brien, 13 Phil., 359). In another case, it w as held that "The general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be
passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings" (Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil., 561, 562; See also Cordova Vda. de Mañalac vs.Ocampo, 73 Phil.,
661, 662), or stating the rule more elaborately, "When questions arise as to the ow nership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First
Instance, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, w hich must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a court of first instance . . .." (Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil., 61.)
The dispute betw een petitioner and respondent administrator involving, as it does, the ow nership of tw o parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ecija, and this question having been squarely raised in an action pending in the court of first instance of said province, w hich w as instituted
by petitioner against respondent administrator precisely because of the dispute that had arisen betw een them over said property, it is the sense of
this Tribunal that respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the said question in its capacity as probate court. On the face of such
issue w hich necessarily involves the ownership of the properties, we considerof no consequence the claim that w hat respondent court merely did
w as to lookinto the identity of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ow nership and being interw oven one can
hardly draw the line of demarcation that w ould separate one from the other.
As regards the question w hether the order of respondent court restraining petitioner from threshing the palay crop standing on the lands has been
properly issued on the face of the w rit of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, the answ eris not difficult to find:
the court should not have issued the order, for "It is settled by an overwhelming w eight of authority that no court has pow er to interfere by injunction
w ith the judgments or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal pow er to grant the relief sought by injunction. . . . The
various branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and to allow them to interfere w ith each other's judgments
or decrees by injunctions w ould obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice." (Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44
Phil., 182; Seealso Philippine National Bank vs. Javellana, 92 Phil., 525; Montesa vs. Manila Cordage Company, 92 Phil., 25.)
Wherefore, petition is granted w ithout costs. The orders of respondent court dated January 29, 1954 and February 18, 1954 are hereby set aside.
GR No. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE vs. CFI of Negros Or., CFI of Manila, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE
Short summary: allegednatural childof the deceasedfiledpetitionfor settlement of INTESTATE estate of Don Juan
Uriarte y Goite in Negros Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as special administrator, but PNB failed to
qualified.MTDfiledbynephewof DonJuan,allegingthatwhile he wasinSpain,the deceased made a will AND that
petitioner had doubtful interest (proceeding for his recognition as a natural child not yet done). Pending this, the
nephewsinstitutedapetitionforprobate of the will of DonJuaninManila.Allegednatural sonopposed,contending
that Negroscourtsalreadyhadexclusive jurisdictionof the case.ButNegroscourtdismissedthe special proceeding,
and the Manilacourt proceededtoprobate the will.Petitionercontestedit.Courtheld that since the decedent was
a non-resident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues for the proceedings. But since probate
proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if the venue was
improper,petitionerconsideredtohave waivedthe defectbylaches.Lastly,the courtheldthatif everrecognizedas
the natural child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene in the probate proceedings, or to have it opened if
already finished.
Facts: -Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negros
-The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed petition for settlement of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don
Juan before the Negros Occidental court. Note that during that time, the proceedings for compulsory
acknowledgment as the natural son of Don Juan was still pending
-PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate, but PNB failed to qualify
-OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don Juan):
Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated - submitted before Negros court
ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable
-JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced SPECPRO for PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON
JUAN before Manila courts + MTD in Negros Courts
Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before Negros Courts
Vicente had no legal personality to sue
>>>OPPOSED byVICENTE:NegrosCourtsfirsttook cognizance, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same
NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it

8. -VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to intervene + dismissal of petition for probate +
annulment of proceedings - DENIED
-Manila court admitted to probate the last will
WON NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT? NO.
Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time of his death, so the courts in the province s
where he left property may take cognizance of settlement of his estate
-here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros
Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give way to Manila court
special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance
with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate.
BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.
So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the
probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
beenappointed,the latter beingrequiredto render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed.
If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy
VICENTE already waived procedural defect of VENUE IMPROPERLY LAID
-He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court, so he should have filed a MTD in Manila
court earlier: Manila court already
*appointed an administrator
*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier
-court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction
As to interest of Vicente in the case
-two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased
parent:
(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and
(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.
MEDIALDEA, J.: GR No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva
v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ow ners hip and
possession and damages.
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-w ar Filipino novel "Without Seeing the
Daw n," w ho died a bachelor, w ithout descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephew s or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1)
his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half -sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. He w as a posthumous child. His father died barely
ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. w as born. Salustia and her
sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second w ife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School,
brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) w hich she had
inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first w ife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property w as acquired during her
short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City,
w here she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties w ere transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate
in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart
attack on February 26,1977 w ithout having set up the foundation.
Tw o w eeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about w hat to do w ith Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concor dia about
Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from w hom his properties c ame, for the purpose of
helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact w as admitted by her in her
"Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" w hich she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540,
w here she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of
the deceased w ithin the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein],
because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the
estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely know n each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have
been visiting each other's house w hich are not far aw ay for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia w ould take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in
good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).

9. After due publication and hearing of her petition, as w ell as her amended petition, she w as declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. She explained that this w as done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister,
Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) w ith her as sole heir, the disposition of the
properties of the estate to fund the foundation w ould be facilitated. On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC)
declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the
deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" w hich she caused to be registered in
the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too w as an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion w as denied by
the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and tw o
months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia
Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ow nership and damages. On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in
Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its
judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of
those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and w ere in the possession of, the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review w herein she
raised the follow ing legal issues:
1. w hether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia
Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even w hile the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) w ere still pending
in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. w hether Concordia Villanueva w as prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. w hether the decedent's properties w ere subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative w ithin the third degree on his
mother's side from w hom he had inherited them; and
4. w hether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation, and notw ithstanding the fact that conformably w ith said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and
properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, w e find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction
to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. w hile the probate
proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no
orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the
intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not
toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of
the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below :
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears
from the record that despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law , no other heirs c ame out
to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate
of the late Esteban Javellana w ho died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it w as established that the late Esteban Javellana died
single, w ithout any know n issue, and w ithout any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic]
sister of his late mother w ho reared him and w ith w hom he had alw ays been living w ith [sic] during his lifetime.
x x x x x x x x x
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana,
w ho died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up w ith the settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion
to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her
share of the properties of the deceased, w as properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy w hen the court denied her motion,
w as to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. How ever, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than
one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action w as improperly filed for
it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere
w ith probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did w e rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-
26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, w here a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed betw een her
and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to make distribution, has pow er to determine the proportion or parts to w hich each distributed is entitled. ... The pow er to
determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal
distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, w ould be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v.
Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively w ithin the range of the administratrix
proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied w ith, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has
not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his
share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or admini strative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, w hich w ould be tried by another court or Judge
w hich may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long
ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92
Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455

10. In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, w here despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in w hich they claimed that they w ere the children by a previous
marriage of the deceased to a Chinese w oman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants w ere not children of the deceased, that
the properties in question w ere paraphernal properties of his w ife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter w as his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, w e ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera w as the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in w hich it is not as yet, in issue, and, w ill not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.
How ever, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three years, the action for
annulment of the project of partition w as allow ed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proc eedings are still pending,
but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likew ise to proceed
to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207
setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia
Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,
Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, w ere improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he w ithin
the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is notew orthy that
extrinsic fraud w as not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It w as only in her amended complaint of March 6,
1980, that extrinsic fraud w as alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing party w hich prevented a fair submission
of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'w hich prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to
the court, or one w hich operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by w hich such judgment w as
procured so much so that there w as no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his
adversary], a litigant w as induced to w ithdraw his defense or w as prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action
in the case w herein the judgment w as obtained, such that the aggrieved party w as deprived of his day in court through no fault of his
ow n, the equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine
Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, how ever, unw arranted for the follow ing reasons:
1. Concordia w as not unaw are of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she
and Celedonia had agreed that the latter w ould "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate.
Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the low est possible cost and the
least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of
taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by law , and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate betw een her
and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement w as to place the estate in a
foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia w as not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed aw ay by choice. Besides, she knew that the
estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed w ith Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the
deceased had planned to do. The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply w ith the requisites of a petition for relief from
judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follow s:
Where petition w as sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or
irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedw ell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she w as the sole heir of Esteban w ithin the third degree on his mother's side w as not false.
Moreover, it w as made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his
father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It w ould have been s elf-defeating and
inconsistent w ith her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia w as her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not
constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters w hich w ould defeat one's ow n claim or defense is not such extr insic fraud
as w ill justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co.
of King City v. Bow man, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79,
Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing her ow n.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased w as subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his
only relative w ithin the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 w hich reads
as follow s:
ART. 891. The ascendant w ho inherits from his descendant any property w hich the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives w ho are w ithin the third degree and w ho belong to the line from w hich said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant w ho inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for w hom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives w ithin the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from w hich the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant w ho received by gratuitous title and died w ithout issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law . (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. w as not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from w hom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, w ho is his relative w ithin the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant w ho inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sis ter. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died w ithout descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, br others,
sisters, nephew s or nieces, w hat should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code w hich provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance w ith the follow ing articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed
to the estate.
The latter shall succeed w ithout distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the w hole blood.

11. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent w ithin the third degree in the collateral line, each,
therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'w ithout distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the
w hole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
How ever, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from w hom the estate came), an agreement w hich she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or
Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" w hich she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make
the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely know n each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they
have been visiting each other's house w hich are not far aw ay for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not w aive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree
to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" w hich Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set
up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as w ell.
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as
Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE.
Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. How ever, comformably w ith
the agreement betw een her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia
Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of w hich both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled
to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation w hich shall administer the same for the
purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and
accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein. SO ORDERED.
http://remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com/2011_10_01_archive.html
Javier69 SCRA 524 (1989)
Beatriz de Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes v. CA, Pilar Ibanez vda. De zuzuarregui, Administratriz, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.,
Enrique de Zuzuarregui and Pacita
Short Facts: Beatriz, (not sure if illegit or legit child) opposes the correction of judgment and the re-opening of the probate
proceedings to correct a alleged typographical error in the sqm of the Antipolo land in question,claiming that there was no
typographical error and the parties intended to share only that area of land.
Decedent: Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.
Pilar Ibanez de Susuarregui: surviving spouse ofdecedent
-administratix of the estate
Illegit children:
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Enrique de Zuzuarregui
Jose de Zuzuarregui
*Beatriz de Zuzuarregui vda. Re reyes: daughterof Antonio Sr. by anothermother
Pacita Javier: niece of administratix
-mother of the three illegit children
Project of partition:
Pilar: 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of the assets (share of conjugal partnership)
Beatriz: 1/16
Antonio,Jr.: 1/16
Enrique: 1/16
Jose: 1/16
Antipolo, Rizal property: mentioned 4x in document
-adjudicated to Pilar (12/15), Antonio Jr. (1/15), Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15)
-Pacita relinquished her right "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property"
-administratix and other three distributees filed a MOTION TO REOPEN SPECIAL PROCEEDIGNS for the purpose of
correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land (correct land area: 803,781.51, not 83,781sqm)
-opposition to motion
TC:
(1) opened for purpose of correcting clerical error in description of land
(2) correct land area to conform with description of land area in TCT
(3) correction be made in the project of partition

12. -CA: Affirm
Pacita's allegation: no clerical area. The area in the project of partition is correct. She would not have relinquished her s hare in the
Antipolo land if she new nothing would remain from the land. It was even repeated 4x in the project of partition
ISSUE: WON there was a clerical error, which is an exemption to correcting or supplying a final judgment already entered?
NONE.
On correction of clerical errors:
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or
negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered.The correction of a clerical error is an
exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had
become final. The court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this purpose,it may resort to the pleadings filed by the
parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.
-TC already found that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the project of partition
-probate proceeding, nature:
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the ENTIRE estate of the deceased is
obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof
undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by
co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.
-It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and complete adjudication and
partition of all properties of the estate,necessarily including the entire area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents,if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial
adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of the remaining
balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the distribution of the
difference of 720,000 square meters?
-if they cannot see eye to eye, why share properties as co-owners?
-weird that the parties came up with 83,781, just omitting the zeroes. So only logical reason is that they just forgot to put zero.
-according to her own computation, she already received her 1/16 share in the estate.There would not be a substantialdifference
in value in their shares...
REGALADO, J.: G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989
BEATRIZ DE ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR IBAÑEZVDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, Administratrix,
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA JAVIER
In this petition for review on certiorari, We are asked to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 19, 1977 in CA-G.R.
No. 53197-R 1
which affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City dated March 26, 1973, issued in Special
Proceedings Q-325, entitled "Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.". 2
Respondent administratrix, Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, is the surviving spouse of Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., while petitioner Beatriz de
Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes and the other heirs of said estate, namely, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique de Zuzuarregui and Jose de Zuzuarregui, are
the illegitimate children of the decedent. The parties herein are the only heirs of the deceased wh ose estate was the subject of said settlement
proceedings. Petitioner was the daughter of the deceased by a mother different from that of his aforesaid three (3) sons, their mother being Pacita Javier
who was the niece of the herein respondent administratrix. 3
According to the project of partition dated June 17, 1958 and approved by the probate court, the respective shares of said he irs in the real estate left by
the deceased are as follows: Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, 12/16 thereof, inclusive of 1/2 of said assets which pertains to her share in the conjugal
partnership; Beatriz, 1/16; Antonio, Jr., 1/16; Enrique, 1/16; and Jose, 1/16. 4
Among the real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 located in
Antipolo, Rizal. In said project of partition, its area is stated as 83,781 square meters, with an assessed value of P6,430.0 0. This statement of said area
was repeated in said document four time, 5
that is, in adjudicating the corresponding portions of said land to Pilar (12/15), Antonio, Jr. (1/15). Enrique
(1/15) and Jose (1/15). 6
The petitioner didnot have a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she relinquished her right thereto "in lieu of her bigger
share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property." 7
On January 29, 1973, the respondent administratrix and the other three distributees filed a motion to reopen Special Proceedings No. Q-325 for the
purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 since,
according to them, the correct land area is 803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781 square meters. 8
The heirs of Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes
filed their opposition to said motion. 9
The court a quo issued the contestedorder, with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, (1) Sp. Proceeding No. Q-325 entitled, The Intestate
Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr. is ordered opened for the purpose of correctinga clerical error in the description of the parcel of land covered
by T.C.T. No. 42643; (2) The area of land coveredby T.C.T. No. 42643 be corrected by cancelling 83,781 sq. meters and changing it to 803,781.51 sq.
meters to conform with the description of land area in T.C.T. No. 42643; (3) That said corrections be made as pages 3, 6, 9, 10, and 12 of the project of
Partition. 10
As already stated, the affirmance of said order by the Court of Appeals eventuated in the elevation of the controversy to Us under the present recourse.
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be
correctedor supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or
correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. 11
The court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this
purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in the body of t he
decision. 12
However, according to the petitioner,there was no such clerical error. While it is not disputed that the area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42643 is 803,781.15 square meters, the petitioner insists that "the area intended by the heirs of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., in the Project of
Partition as approved by the trial court is the area of 83,781 sq. m. and not 803,781,51 sq. m. 13

13. She claims that she would not have relinquished her share in said parcel of land if the true area was not fraudulently concealed from her at the time the
project of partition was executed. 14
She further contends that the fact that the description of the area as 83,781 square meters was repeated several times
is sufficient evidence to show that such was the area intended in the project of partition. 15
Such contentions are without merit. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb, much less to reverse, the factual finding of the lower court that a
typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the project of partition.
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It
would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undiv ided because the proceeding is
precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.
It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and complete adjudicat ion and partition of all properties of
the estate, necessarily including the entire area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as per ceptively posed by the queries
of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they
did not make any further disposition of the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs hav e in holding in suspense
the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters? 16
Besides, petitioner suggests that she and the male heirs could not see eye to eye because they did not have a common mother. 17
If so, this supposed
antagonism would even be a compelling reason for the parties to insist on the total partition of all the properties in the first instance, rather than for them
to remain as co-owners for a long time. As hereinbefore indicated, the project of partition is dated June 17, 1958, 18
while the motion to re-open the
proceedings was filed only on January 29, 1973.
If We were to indulge petitioner in her stand that the area of 803,781 square meters was typewritten in the document as 83,78 1 square meters, not
because of the typist's error in omittingthe number "0" between the numbers "8" and "3" in the first three digits but because the latter area of only 83,781
square meters was the one intended for distribution, then the irresistible question would be how and why the parties arrived at that particular latter figure.
It will be observed that such a portion would constitute only 10.42336% of the total landarea covered by Transfer Certificat e of Title No. 42643. On top
of this, the assumed area of 83,781 square meters has still to be divided into fifteen (15) parts to arrive at the aliquot portions of 12/15 and 1/15 of the
other heirs in this particular property. Why would the parties deliberately create such an unlikely mathematical situation wh ich would complicate the
actual physical segregation of the area supposed to be distributed?
It is, therefore, a logical and credible explanation that the omission of the zero between the figures "8" and "3" converted "803,781" to "83,781", a
product purely of clerical oversight. Petitioner has not offeredany plausible contrary explanation. Parenthetically, she had the assistance of legal counsel
in the intestate proceedings and in the preparation of the project of partition. 19
Petitioner's lamentations of injustice in the partition are demonstrably unfounded. It will be observed that according to her own computation, 20
she
received her 1/16 share in the estate consisting of 279,803 square meters of land, while her half brothers received on the av erage 154,975.11 square
meters each. Even if the supposed shares of the respondents in the remaining 720.000 square meters in the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42643 were to be added, the share of each brother would be only 202,975. 11 square meters. There would not be a substantial difference in value
since the petitioner received190,000 square meters of land located also in Antipolo, Rizal; while in Balara, Quezon City, she received mo re than her half
brothers, that is, 75,803 square meters as against their individual 74,309.70 square meters. It was only in Pasong Tamo where she received slightly less,
14,000 square meters compared to Enrique's and Jose's 14,115 square meters each, but more than Antonio, Jr.'s 13,621 square m eters.
The ineluctable consequence of the foregoing considerations is that, both in law and equity, the court a quo and the respondent court committed no error
prejudicial to petitioner. WHEREFORE, certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
RULE 74 TUASON, J.: G.R.No. L-273 March 29, 1947
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ vs. ZACARIAS ANDAL, QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINAHERNANDEZ
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They
acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal,
the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal
partition alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According
to her original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid
for Maria Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause was called for trial on March 8, she announced in open court that she was willing to
repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th stating that he had made other
expenses; that on 29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's sisters had intervened; and that
meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of the intervenors, an amount which included Andal's expenses as well as the normal
sale price. The document of repurchase gave as reason for the transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in the event trouble should arise the sellers should return to the
buyer what they had received and pay the latter his expenses.
On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had sold him their respective portions of the inherited land for P860 and
that he had no objection to disposing of those portions in favor of the plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the deed of sale amounting to
P50, but that he was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff offered him besides his expenses.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed. The intervenors alleged that there had been a partition among them and their brother and
sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked, and after partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his portion in the
partition." They charged the plaintiff with bad faith in that "it was upon her request for chance that the sale to the defendant, about to take place last November, was delayed
till January of this year when she finally informed the intervenors that they could sell to the defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could not raise the amount of P860
offered by the defendant."
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the
defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase
the land from him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about to file her action. He stated that after he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale
he showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He was able to do this because he lived near Cresencia and passed by her house on his way home from
Candelaria. He said that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document." When asked whether the land
"described in the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among the co-owners Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez,"
counsel for the plaintiff objected on the ground that the best evidence was the document of partition, and the objection was sustained. The same objection and the same ruling
were made on the same ground when the witness was queried how it was that the land he had bought from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been specified in the deed of
sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did not call any more witnesses but only announced that he had witnesses ready to prove that a parol
partition among the five brother and sisters had been made, mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again objected asserting that "under the
Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered. "Upon this
objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition
was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.