This document summarizes three court cases from the Philippines related to political law and sovereign immunity: 1) USA vs. Ruiz - The US was not liable for damages when a Philippine company was not awarded a contract to repair wharves at a US naval base, as the contract related to the sovereign function of national defense, not a commercial activity. 2) Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC - The Department of Agriculture was not protected by sovereign immunity in a case regarding unpaid wages and benefits to security guards at its facilities, as it entered into an employment contract in a non-sovereign capacity. 3) Republic vs. Sandoval - The state was not liable for damages from the deaths

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USA vs. Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The US had a naval base in Subic, Zambales
which was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Phils. and the US. The US made an
invitation for the submission of bids for the repair of
wharves in said base. Private respondent Eligio de Guzman
& Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the private respondent received from
the US 2 telegrams requesting it to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
private respondent complied with the requests. Thereafter,
private respondent received a letter which said that the

2. company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating. The private respondent sued the US and the
members of the Engineering Command of the US Navy.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint may prosper
Held:The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a
State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality
of States. However, the rules of International Law are not
petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them—between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the present case,
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the US and the Phils.,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order. They are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial
or business purposes.

3. Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November
11, 1993
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and
Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements,
guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed
a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential
pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages
against the DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly
and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security
guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the
decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the DA and
the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on
execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

4. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of
the State applies in the case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution
that “the State may not be sued without its consent”
reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the
unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction
of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A
sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the
State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State
may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on
the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim,
or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of
the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must

5. still be made between one which is executed in the
exercise of its sovereign function and another which is
done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to
have descended to the level of an individual and can this
be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it
entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant
security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No.
3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth
Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must
first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling

6. for a genuine land reform program. There was a marchers-
police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12
rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres.
Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola
Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation.
The most significant recommendation of the Commission
was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to
be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an
action for damages against the Republic and the
military/police officers involved in the incident.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held:The Court held that there was no valid waiver of
immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any
way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely
states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and,
therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only
serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any
party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the
recommendation of the Commission does not in any way
bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the
military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for
the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted

7. beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that
the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military
and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities
can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded
their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered
official.
Case Digest: Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II
10 June 1988 G.R. No. L-56930
FACTS:
Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this
conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules
and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining
the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the
Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein
petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two.
Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for
which they have been sued for damages.
RULING:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.
Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments,
discipline, dismissal and other related matters. The same can be said for Moreau.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the
petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government. There should
be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government
sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

8. Loida Shauf & Jacob Shauf v. Court of Appeals, Don Detwiler & Anthony Persi
Postedin Uncategorized byadminon27 Feb2010
G. R. No. 90314 (November 27, 1990)
This case illustrates another violation of Article 11(1)(b). The decision enunciates that
employment should not be denied on the ground of sex, color, or origin. The protection to labor
espoused by the Constitution is used hand-in-hand in upholding non-discrimination.
Facts: The Education Branch of the Third Combat Support Group in the Clark Air Base opened
a position for a guidance counselor. Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an
American who is a member of the U.S. Air Force, applied for the position. As per records, she
possessed all the qualifications for the job at that time.
According to applicable regulations, where there are qualified dependents of military or civilian
personnel, who are locally available, appointments to positions shall be limited to the
dependents.
Instead of hiring Loida, however, one Mr. Isakson was selected for the position. The latter was
not a dependent of a military or civilian personnel. In addition, Mr. Isakson, apparently, lacked
certain qualifications. Loida filed a complaint for damages grounded on the acts of
discrimination committed by the respondents.
Held: The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court awarding damages in favor of Loida.
The Constitution provides that the State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all. This is a carry-over from the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed.
REPUBLIC OFINDONESIAvs. JAMES VINZON
Posted on March 6, 2009 by raquel
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN,
and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON
FACTS:
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of
Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air
conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister
Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly

9. found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards
set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in
a letter dated August 31, 2000. Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the aforesaid
termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that
Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot
be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision that petitioners
have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the
Maintenance Agreement.
RULING:
The SC GRANTED the petition.
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign
State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act
jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. A sovereign State does not
merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic
mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with
private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the
living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of
Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with
respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical
facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official
residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
KHOSROWMINUCHERvs.HON.COURTOF APPEALS and
ARTHUR SCALZO
Posted on March 6, 2009 by raquel
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR
SCALZO, respondents
FACTS:

10. Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo,
Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the
Iranian National Resistance Movement.
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No.
6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation”
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was
said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur
Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages
on the ‘trumped-up’ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
ISSUE:
WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity
conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
RULING:
The SC DENIED the petition.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the
representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the
receiving state. Only “diplomatic agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from
civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat
entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own
ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of
the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the
diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity
is contentious.
Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in
the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts
giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be

11. barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not
accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the
maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot
assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official
would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The
consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns.
The “buy-bust operation” and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has
given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal
witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond
the scope of his official function or duties.
wylie v. rarang 209 SCRA 357 (1992)
WYLIE v. RARANG (28 May 1992)
Petitioners: M.H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams
Respondents: Aurora I. Rarang and the IAC
Nature: Petition for review
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
AT THE NAVAL BASE. In Feb. 1978, M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer and
Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay,
Olongapo City. Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise control guard in the Office of
the Provost Marshal.
THE “POD”. Wylie, in his capacity as asst. admin. officer, supervised the publication of the
Naval Base station’s “Plan of the Day” (POD), which featured important announcements,
necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of its regular
features was the “action line inquiry.”
THE CAUSE OF THIS MESS. On Feb. 3, 1978, the POD published, under the “NAVSTA
Action Line Inquiry,” the ff:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control inspector/ inspectress are (sic) consuming
for their own benefit things they have confiscated from Base Personnel. The observation is even
more aggravated by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes and food stuffs PUBLICLY.
This is not to mention ‘Auring’ who is in herself, a disgrace to her division and to the Office of
the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the

12. Merchandise Control Division is aware of this malpractice?
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other personnel are prohibited from appropriating
confiscated items for their own consumption or use. Two locked containers are installed at the
Main Gate area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM evidence custodian controls access
to these containers. Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their meals at their worksite
due to heavy workload. Complaints regarding merchandise control guards procedure or actions
may be made directly at the Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and necessary action….
Rarang was the “Auring” referred to here, as she was the only one with that name in the Office
of the Provost Marshall, and Wylie’s letter of apology for the “inadvertent” publication was also
conclusive proof of this.
AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES was instituted by Rarang against Wylie, Williams, and the US
Naval Base. She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages, and P50K attorney’s
fees.
RARANG’S ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation
and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language
and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base personnel.
WYLIE, WILLIAMS, THE NAVAL BASE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS, BASED ON
THESE GROUNDS:
1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the US
Navy and are immune from suit;
2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without
its consent; and
3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
MOTION DENIED.
THE TC’S DECISION: the acts of Wylie and Williams weren’t official acts of the US
government in the operation and control of the Base but personal and tortious acts which are
exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country can’t be sued in the court of another
country without its consent. Thus their acts weren’t imputable against the US government but
were done in their individual and personal capacities. They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K
moral and exemplary damages, and P30K attorney’s fees. However, the suit against the US
Naval Base was dismissed.
BOTH PARTIES APPEALED. Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune from suit
since the publication was made in their official capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and that
they did not intentionally and maliciously cause the publication. Rarang appealed as she wasn’t
satisfied with the award.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TC’S DECISION: Rarang was awarded P175K moral damages and

13. P60K exemplary damages.
WYLIE AND WILLIAMS’ ARGUMENT in this Petition for Review: they made the publication
in the performance of their official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie) and
commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy and were, therefore, immune from suit for their
official actions.
ISSUE: WON Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD. Does the grant
of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its
officers from crimes and torts?
HELD: YES and NO respectively.
THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, QUOTING US v. GUINTO: The rule
that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the
1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2…Even without such
affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation … As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state
immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that ‘there can be no legal right
against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends! (Kawanakoa v. Polybank)
There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the
maxim par in parem, non habet imperium . All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case,
‘unduly vex the peace of nations.’ (Da Haber v. Queen of Portugal)
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against
the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded (Garcia v. Chief of Staff). In such a
situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed
without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called ‘the royal prerogative of dishonesty’ because of the
privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-
suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling
tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does
not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the
state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express
consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state
enters into a contract it itself commences litigation…The above rules are subject to qualification.
Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly
enacted statute. (Rep. v. Purisima)… not all contracts entered into by the government will

14. operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and
proprietary acts (US v. Ruiz). As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will
result only where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant. (Lim v.
Brownell)
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF IMMUNITY FROM SUIT, ALSO UNDER US v.
GUINTO: In the case of the US, the customary rule of international law on state immunity is
expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty …
The petitioners also rely heavily on Baer v. Tizon… to support their position that they are not
suable, the US not having waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is emphasized that in Baer,
the Court held:
“The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is
appropriate… insofar as alien armed forces are concerned, the starting point is Raquiza v.
Bradford, a 1945 decision. In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the release of petitioners
confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado cited Coleman v. Tennessee, where it was
explicitly declared: ‘It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly
country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.’ Two years later, in Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess, this
Court relied on Raquiza v. Bradford and cited in support excerpts from the works of the
authoritative writers … Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the
Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provision should control on such
matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on
the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate. More to the point is Syquia v. Almeda Lopez
… It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted correctly considering that the ‘action must be
considered as one against the U.S. Government.’ The opinion of Justice Montemayor continued:
‘It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was
raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government has not given its
consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover,
this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
government’s consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his
country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance
that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.”
The above observations do not confer on the US a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its
agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated
from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of
their official functions. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or
private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that
no such waiver may be implied … In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:
“The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State

15. without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperii... The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates
to the exercise of its sovereign functions.”
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their
official functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this is a matter of evidence. The
charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are
imputable to the US, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are
sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved. If found
liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS. The POD was published under the direction and authority of
the commanding officer. The administrative assistant, among his other duties, is tasked to
prepare and distribute the POD. The NAVSTA Action Line Inquiry is a regular feature of the
POD , which was to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel
should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation . According to Wylie, the action
line naming “Auring” was received about 3 weeks prior to the article’s publication. It was
forwarded to the Provost Marshal for comment, and the response “… included a short note
stating that if the article was published, to remove the name.” This note was forwarded to the
executive officer and to the commanding officer for approval. The approval of the commanding
officer was forwarded to the office of the Administrative Assistant for inclusion in the POD. A
clerk typist in the office of the Administrative Assistant prepared the smooth copy of the POD
and Wylie, the administrative assistant signed the smooth copy of the POD but failed to notice
the reference to “Auring” in the action line inquiry.
As the article implied that Rarang was consuming and appropriating confiscated items, she was
investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, she had been the recipient of
commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties.
PART OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS. Wylie and Williams actively participated in screening the
features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that US officials
in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that
they may not be held liable for the questioned publication.
BUT: TAKE NOTE THAT THEY WERE SUED IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES for
their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article. And our laws and, we presume, those
of the US don’t allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty, and these aren’t
covered by the immunity agreement.

16. CHAVEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN on the law on immunity from suit of public officials is
applicable here: the general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for
acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted
ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith… A mere invocation of the immunity clause
does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. In the case of PCGG v.
Peña, Chief Justice Teehankee added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials
under Section 4(a) of Exec. Order No. I as follows:
…First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission,
The cited section … provides the Commission’s members immunity from suit thus: ‘No civil
action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in
the discharge of the task contemplated by this order.’ No absolute immunity like that sought by
Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is
understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the
unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State’s exercise of
police power was immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task
granted the members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from
suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and nonaccountability nor grant a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds
his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or … ‘maliciously conspir(es) with the
PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently
baseless suit in derogation of the latter’s constitutional rights and liberties’, there can be no
question that a complaint for damages does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike.
ARGUMENT: that Williams as commanding officer is far removed in the chain of command
from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for
everything which goes wrong on the base.
WHILE THIS IS TRUE AS A GEN. RULE, FOR THIS CASE NO. The records show that the
offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. Art.
2176 prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person’s act or omission constituting
fault or negligence. “Fault” or “negligence” in this Article covers not only acts “not punishable
by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent. ”
Moreover, Art. 2219(7) provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander
or any other form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to
receive from the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition
to punitive or exemplary damages .
ULTRA VIRES ACT CAN’T BE PART OF OFFICIAL DUTY. Indeed the imputation of theft
contained in the POD is a defamation against Rarang’s character and reputation. Wylie himself
admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name

17. if the article was published, but they were negligent because under their direction they issued the
publication without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of
official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed Rarang, and as a result she suffered
besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so,
since the article was baseless and false. Wylie and Williams alone, in their personal capacities,
are liable for the damages they caused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of
the IAC are AFFIRMED.
US v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
PetitionforCertiorari toAnnul &SetAside RTCCavite Branch 22 Resolution,1993
FACTS:
• RespondentNeliaMontoya,anAmericanCitizen,workedasanID checkerat the US NavyExchange
(NEX) at the US MilitaryAssistance Group(JUSMAG) headquartersinQuezonCity.She’smarriedto
Edgardo Montoya,a Filipino-Americanservicemanemployedbythe USNavy& stationedinSan
Francisco.
• PetitionerMaxine isanAmericanCitizenemployedatthe JUSMAG headquartersasthe activity
exchange manager.
• Jan.22, 1987 – Montoyaboughtsome itemsfromthe retail store Bradfordmanaged,where she had
purchasingprivileges.Aftershopping&while she wasalreadyatthe parkinglot,Mrs. YongKennedy,a
fellowIDcheckerapproachedher&toldher that she neededtosearchherbags uponBradford’s
instruction.MontoyaapproachedBradfordtoprotestthe searchbut she was toldthat itwas to be made
on all JUSMAG employeesonthatday.Mrs. Kennedythenperformedthe searchonherperson,bags&
car infrontof Bradford& othercuriousonlookers.Nothingirregularwasfoundthusshe wasallowedto
leave afterwards.
• Montoyalearnedthatshe was the onlypersonsubjectedtosuchsearchthat day& she wasinformed
by NEXSecurityManager RoynonthatNEX JUSMAG employeesare notsearchedoutside the store
unlessthere isastrong evidence of awrong-doing.Montoyacan’trecall anycircumstance that would
triggersuspicionof awrong-doingonherpart. She isaware of Bradford’spropensitytosuspectFilipinos
for theftand/orshoplifting.
• Montoyafiledaformal protestw/Mr. Roynonbutno actionwas taken.
• MontoyafiledasuitagainstBradfordfor damagesdue to the oppressive &discriminatoryacts
committedbypetitionerinexcessof herauthorityasstore manager.She claimsthatshe has been
exposedtocontempt&ridicule causingherundue embarrassment& indignity.She furtherclaimsthat
the act wasnot motivatedbyanyotherreasonaside fromracial discriminationinourownlandw/cisa
blowto ournational pride & dignity.She seeksformoral damagesof P500k and exemplarydamagesof

18. P100k.
• May 13, 1987 – Summons&complaintwere servedonBradfordbutinsteadof filingananswer,she
alongwithUSA governmentfiledamotiontodismissongroundsthat:(1) thisis a suitagainstUS w/cis
a foreignsovereignimmunefromsuitw/oitsconsentand(2) Bradfordis immune fromsuitforacts
done inthe performance of herofficial functionsunderPhil-USMilitaryAssistanceAgreementof 1947 &
MilitaryBasesAgreementof 1947. Theyclaimthat US hasrights,power& authorityw/inthe bases,
necessaryforthe establishment,use &operation&defense thereof.Itwillalsouse facilities&areas
w/inbases& will have effective commandoverthe facilities,USpersonnel,employees,equipment&
material.Theyfurtherclaimthatcheckingof purchasesatNEX isa routine procedure observedatbase
retail outletstoprotect& safeguardmerchandise,cash&equipmentpursuanttopar.2 & 4(b) of
NAVRESALEACTSUBICINST.5500.1.
• July6, 1987 – Montoya filedamotionforpreliminaryattachmentclaimingthatBradford wasabout to
leave the country& wasremoving& disposingherpropertiesw/intenttodefraudhercreditors.Motion
grantedby RTC.
• July14, 1987 – Montoya opposedBradford’smotiontodismiss.She claimsthat:(1) searchwasoutside
NEX JUSMAG store thus it’simproper,unlawful&highly-discriminatoryandbeyondBradford’s
authority;(2) due to excessinauthorityandsince herliabilityispersonal,Bradfordcan’trelyon
sovereignimmunity;(3) Bradford’sactwas committedoutside the militarybase thus underthe
jurisdictionof Philippine courts;(4) the Courtcan inquire intothe factual circumstancesof case to
determine WON Bradfordactedw/inoroutside herauthority.
• RTC grantedMontoya’smotionforthe issuance of a writ of preliminaryattachmentandlateron
issuedwritof attachmentopposedbyBradford.Montoyaallowedtopresentevidence &Bradford
declaredindefaultforfailure tofileananswer.RTCruledinfavorof Montoya claimingthatsearchwas
unreasonable,reckless,oppressive &againstMontoya’slibertyguaranteedbyConsti.She wasawarded
P300k for moral damages,P100k for exemplarydamages&P50k for actual expenses.Bradfordfileda
PetitionforRestrainingOrder.SCgrantedTROenjoiningRTCfromenforcingdecision.
• Montoyaclaimsthat Bradfordwas actingas a civilianemployeethusnotperforminggovernmental
functions.Evenif she were performinggovernmental acts,she wouldstill notbe coveredbythe
immunitysince she wasactingoutside the scope of herauthority.She claimsthatcriminal actsof a
publicofficer/employeeare hisprivate acts& he alone isliable forsuchacts. She believesthatthiscase
isunderRP courts’ jurisdictionbecause actwasdone outside the territorial control of the US Military
Bases,itdoesnot fall underoffenseswhereUShas beengivenrighttoexerciseitsjurisdictionand
Bradforddoesnot possessdiplomaticimmunity.She furtherclaimsthatRPcourtscan inquire intothe
factual circumstances& determineWON Bradfordisimmune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case isunderthe RTC’s jurisdiction - YES
Interventionof athirdparty is discretionaryuponthe Court.USdidnot obtainleave of court(something
like askingforCourt’spermission) tointerveneinthe presentcase.Technically, itshouldnotbe allowed

19. to intervene butsince RTCentertaineditsmotiontodismiss,itisdeemedtohave allowedUSto
intervene.Byvoluntarilyappearing,USmustbe deemedtohave subjecteditselftoRTC’sjurisdiction.
2. WON RTC committeda grave abuse of discretionindenyingBradford’smotiontodismiss. - NO
Petitionersfailedtospecifyanygroundsforamotionto dismissenumeratedinSec.1,Rule 16, Rulesof
Court.Thus, itactuallylackscause of action.A cause of actionisnecessarysothat Court wouldbe able
to rendera validjudgmentinaccordance withthe prayerinthe complaint.A motiontodismissw/cfails
to state a cause of action hypotheticallyadmitsthe truthof the allegationsinthe complaint.RTCshould
have deferredthe resolutioninsteadof denyingitforlackof merit.But thisisimmaterial atthistime
since petitionershave alreadybroughtthispetitiontothe SC.
3. WON case at bar isa suitagainstthe State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunityisexpressedinArt.XVI,Sec.3 of the 1987 Constitution.Thisimmunityalso
appliestocomplaintsfiledagainstofficialsof the state foracts allegedlyperformedbythemindischarge
of theirdutiessince itwillrequirethe state toperformanaffirmative actsuchas appropriationof
amountto pay damages.Thiswill be regardedasa case againstthe state evenif ithas notbe formally
impleaded.Butthisisnotall encompassing.It’sadifferentmatterwhere the publicofficial ismade to
account inhiscapacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurioustorightsof plaintiff.State authorizes
onlylegal actsby itsofficers.Actionagainstofficialsbyone whose rightshave beenviolatedbysuchacts
isnot a suitagainst the State w/inthe rule of immunityof the State fromsuit.The doctrine of state
immunitycannotbe usedasan instrumentforperpetratinganinjustice.Itwill notapply&maynot be
invokedwhere the publicofficial isbeingsuedinhisprivate &personal capacityasan ordinarycitizen.
Thisusually ariseswhere the publicofficial actsw/oauthorityorinexcessof the powersvestedinhim.A
publicofficial isliable if he actedw/malice &inbad faithor beyondthe scope of hisauthorityor
jurisdiction.(Shauf vs.CA) Also,USA vs.Guintodeclared thatUSA isnot conferredwithblanket
immunityforall actsdone by itor itsagentsinthe Philippinesmerelybecause theyhave actedasagents
of the US in the discharge of theirofficial functions.Inthiscase,Bradfordwassuedinher
private/personal capacityforactsdone beyondthe scope & place of herofficial function,thus,itfalls
w/inthe exceptiontothe doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradfordenjoysdiplomaticimmunity. - NO
Firstof all,she isnot amongthose granteddiplomaticimmunityunderArt.16(b) of the 1953 Military
Assistance Agreementcreatingthe JUSMAG.Second,evendiplomaticagentswhoenjoyimmunityare
liable if theyperformactsoutside theirofficial functions(Art.31,ViennaConventiononDiplomatic
Relations).
HELD: Petitiondenied.TROlifted.

20. World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 243
Facts:
Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary
Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and
Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the instance of
the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr. Verstuyft
notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive
branch of the government.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr.
Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the
suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the
quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and
seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
Ruling:
The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally
advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General,
as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then
the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting
under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse

21. of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the
diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
Case Digest: The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.
G.R. No. 101949 01 December 1994
FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other
lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to
vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was
the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding
selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such
principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as
a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present
case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate
business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission
or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-
proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the
use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain.
It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it
almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

22. G.R. No. L-22734, September 15, 1967 CIR vs. PINEDA
Estate proceedings were had to settle the estate of Atanasio Pineda.
After the estate proceedings were closed, the BIR found out that the income tax liability of the
estate during the pendency of the estate proceedings were not paid.
The Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment holding Manuel B. Pineda, the eldest son of the
deceased, liable for the payment corresponding to his share of the estate.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has appealed to SC and has proposed to hold Manuel B.
Pineda liable for the payment of all the taxes found by the Tax Court to be due from the estate
instead of only for the amount of taxes corresponding to his share in the estate.
ISSUE:
Can the Government require Pineda to pay the full amount of the taxes assessed?
RULING:
Yes.
Pineda is liable for the assessment as an heir and as a holder-transferee of property belonging to
the estate/taxpayer.
As a holder of property belonging to the estate, Pineda is liable for the tax up to the amount of
the property in his possession. The reason is that the Government has a lien on what he received
from the estate as his share in the inheritance for unpaid income taxes for which said estate is
liable.
By virtue of such lien, the Government has the right to subject the property in Pineda's
possession, i.e., the P2,500.00, to satisfy the income tax assessment in the sum of P760.28. After
such payment, Pineda will have a right of contribution from his co-heirs, to achieve an
adjustment of the proper share of each heir in the distributable estate.
The Government has two ways of collecting the tax in question. One, by going after all the heirs
and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance
received. The reason why a case suit is filed against all the heirs for the tax due from the estate is
to achieve thereby two results: first, payment of the tax; and second, adjustment of the shares of
each heir in the distributed estate as lessened by the tax.
Another remedy is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or
transferee to the payment of the tax due. This second remedy is the very avenue the Government
took in this case to collect the tax. The BIR should be given the necessary discretion to avail

23. itself of the most expeditious way to collect the tax because taxes are the lifeblood of
government and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. The adjustment of the
respective shares due to the heirs from the inheritance, as lessened by the tax, is left to await the
suit for contribution by the heir from whom the Government recovered said tax.
Obillos vs. Commission on Internal Revenue
139 SCRA 436
G.R.No. L-68118October29,1985
Aquino, J.
Doctrine:
The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them
have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived. There must be an
unmistakable intention to form a partnership or joint venture.
Facts:
For at least one year after their receipt of two parcels of land from their father, petitioners
resold said lots to the Walled City Securities Corporation and Olga Cruz Canda, for which they
earned a profit of P134,341.88 or P33,584 for each of them. They treated the profit as a capital gain
and paid an income tax on one-half thereof or of P16,792.

24. One day before the expiration of the five-year prescriptive period, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, Commissioner acting on the theory that the four petitioners had formed an
unregistered partnership or joint venture, required the four petitioners to pay corporate income tax on
the total profit of P134,336 in addition to individual income tax on their shares thereof, a 50% fraud
surcharge and a 42% accumulated interest. Further, the Commissioner considered the share of the
profits of each petitioner in the sum of P33,584 as a " taxable in full (not a mere capital gain of
which is taxable) and required them to pay deficiency income taxes aggregating P56,707.20 including
the 50% fraud surcharge and the accumulated interest.
The petitioners contested the assessments. Two Judges of the Tax Court sustained the same.
Judge Roaquin dissented. Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have indeed formed a partnership or joint venture and thus,
liable for corporate income tax.
Held:
We hold that it is error to consider the petitioners as having formed a partnership under
article 1767 of the Civil Code simply because they allegedly contributed P178,708.12 to buy the two
lots, resold the same and divided the profit among themselves.
To regard the petitioners as having formed a taxable unregistered partnership would result in
oppressive taxation and confirm the dictum that the power to tax involves the power to destroy.
That eventuality should be obviated.
As testified by Jose Obillos, Jr., they had no such intention. They were co-owners pure and
simple. To consider them as partners would obliterate the distinction between a co-ownership and a
partnership. The petitioners were not engaged in any joint venture by reason of that isolated
transaction.
Article 1769(3) of the Civil Code provides that "the sharing of gross returns does not of
itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right
or interest in any property from which the returns are derived". There must be an unmistakable
intention to form a partnership or joint venture.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Tax Court is reversed and set aside. The assessments
are cancelled. No costs.
Commissioner vs. Algue
GRL-28890, 17 February1988First Division,Cruz(J);4concur
Facts: The Philippine SugarEstate DevelopmentCompany(PSEDC)appointedAlgue Inc.asits
agent,authorizingittosell itsland,factories,andoil manufacturingprocess.The Vegetable Oil
InvestmentCorporation(VOICP)purchasedPSEDCproperties.Forthe sale,Alguereceivedacommission
of P125,000 andit was fromthiscommissionthatitpaidGuevara,et.al. organizersof the VOICP,

25. P75,000in promotional fees.In1965, Algue receivedanassessmentfromthe Commissionerof Internal
Revenueinthe amountof P83,183.85 as delinquencyincome tax foryears1958 amd1959. Algue fileda
protestorrequestforreconsiderationwhichwasnotacteduponby the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).Thecounsel forAlgue hadtoacceptthe warrant of distrantand levy.Algue, however,fileda
petitionforreviewwiththe Coourtof Tax Appeals.
.Issue:Whetherthe assessmentwasreasonable.
Held:Taxesare the lifebloodof the governmentandsoshouldbe collectedwithout
unnecessaryhindrance.Everypersonwhoisable topaymustcontribute hisshare inthe runningof the
government.TheGovernment,forhispart,isexpectedtorespondinthe formof tangible andintangible
benefitsintendedtoimprovethe livesof the people andenhance theirmoral andmaterial values.This
symbioticrelationshipisthe rationaleof taxationandshoulddispel the erroneousnotionthatisan
arbitrarymethodof exactionbythose inthe seatof power.Tax collection,however,shouldbe made
inaccordance withlawas anyarbitrarinesswill negatethe veryreasonforgovernmentitself.Forall
theawesome powerof the tax collector,he maystill be stoppedinhistracksif the taxpayer
candemonstrate thatthe lawhas notbeenobserved.Herein,the claimeddeduction(pursuantto
Section30[a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section70 [1] of Revenue Regulation2:as to compensationfor
personalservices) hadbeenlegitimatelybyAlgue Inc.Ithas furtherproventhatthe paymentof fees
wasreasonable andnecessaryinlightof the effortsexertedbythe payeesininducinginvestors(in
VOICP) toinvolve themselvesinanexperimental enterprise orabusinessrequiringmillionsof pesos.
Theassessmentwasnotreasonable
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