Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences

Sarah Allen
Sarah AllenInnovation Catalyst
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Perimeter Security
Motte and Bailey Castles
www.primaryhomeworkhelp.co.uk/castles/motteandbailey.htm
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
+ “ActionScript”
+ RTMP (two way audio-video)
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 2001-2019
1172
2001-2019 CVE reports
1172 Flash Player
1999 Internet Explorer
2033 Chrome
2442 Firefox
2001-2019 CVE reports
1172 Flash Player
1999 Internet Explorer
2033 Chrome
2442 Firefox
number is not significant indicator
Flash Player CVEs
Memory Safety CVEs
337 memory corruption
262 use after free
116 buffer overflow
35 integer overflow
17 out-of-bounds read
9 heap.overflow
8 null pointer dereference
5 double free
4 bounds checking
3 out of bounds memory read
3 improper memory access
2 out-of-bounds write
1 invalid pointer dereference
Memory Safety CVEs
337 memory corruption
262 use after free
116 buffer overflow
35 integer overflow
17 out-of-bounds read
9 heap.overflow
8 null pointer dereference
5 double free
4 bounds checking
3 out of bounds memory read
3 improper memory access
2 out-of-bounds write
1 invalid pointer dereference
“allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary code via a crafted font”
“allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary
code via crafted streaming media”
“allows remote attackers
to execute arbitrary code
via a crafted SWF file”
long a = (long)b;
Unexpected Context
...spoof the address bar and possibly conduct
phishing attacks by re-opening the window to a
malicious Shockwave Flash application, then
changing the window location back to a trusted
URL while the Flash application is still loading
Microsoft Excel allows user-assisted
attackers to execute arbitrary javascript
and redirect users to arbitrary sites via an
Excel spreadsheet with an embedded
Shockwave Flash Player ActiveX Object,
which is automatically executed when
the user opens the spreadsheet.
...allows remote attackers
to cause victims to
unknowingly click on a link
or dialog via access
control dialogs disguised
as normal graphical
elements, as
demonstrated by hijacking
the camera or microphone
Unexpected Context ⇒ Parsing / Validation
not properly validate
malformed header overflow
type confusion
object confusion
does not verify a member element's size
wide characters
untrusted input
xml script
interpret jar: URLs
CRLF injection
modify HTTP headers
https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/issues/7728
Recent vulnerabilities in URL parsing...
https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/189258/
Recent vulnerabilities in URL parsing...
Your implementation is your API.
Your implementation is your API.
(not your docs)
The dark ages
Web is for content
Physical networks
Perimeter security
HTTPS is expensive
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
https://ehrintelligence.com/news/will-specializing-ehr-interfaces-solve-the-ehr-usability-problem
https://blog.se.com/building-management/2014/10/27/
can-physical-environment-big-data-make-big-difference-hospital/
https://blog.se.com/building-management/2017/09/27/four-digital-hospital-trends-leverage-iot/
The dark ages
Web is for content
Physical networks
Perimeter security
HTTPS is expensive
The modern era
PII + finance + real-world
Bot armies
Supply chain attacks
Cloud native
Ubiquitous crypto
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences
Humans make errors.
The world is changing.
Fundamentals are the same.
Vulnerabilities
create
opportunity.
https://www.cio.com/article/2600345/11-steps-attackers-took-to-crack-target.html
https://www.cio.com/article/2600345/11-steps-attackers-took-to-crack-target.html
1. Install malware that steals credentials
2. Exploit a web application vulnerability
3. Steal access token from domain admins
4. Run code to find computers on the network
5.SQL database ⇒ 70M PII
6.PoS, custom malware ⇒ 40M credit cards
7. Create network share for stolen data
8. Exfiltrate data via FTP ⇒ success
8 vulnerabilities
https://www.cio.com/article/2600345/11-steps-attackers-took-to-crack-target.html
The initial penetration point is not the story, because
eventually you have to assume you're going to get breached...
You cannot assume otherwise. You have to be prepared and
have an incident response plan for what to do when you are
breached. The real problem arises when malware is able to
enable an attacker to penetrate deeper into the network."
— Tal Be'ery, Aorato Lead Researcher
https://www.cio.com/article/2600345/11-steps-attackers-took-to-crack-target.html
Plot to steal cryptocurrency foiled by npm security
Popular pattern
1. publish a “useful”
package
2. waiting until in use
by the target,
3. update to include
malicious code..
It now seems clear that the bug was created
intentionally to target Komodo’s version of Agama
wallet. A hacker spent several months making
useful contributions...before inserting the bug.
Eventually, the hacker added malicious code to an
update of a module that Komodo’s Agama was
already using.
— komodoplatform.com/update-agama-vulnerability
https://blog.npmjs.org/post/185397814280/plot-to-steal-cryptocurrency-foiled-by-the-npm
What’s new today?
Scale
Everything is connected
Real-world targets
Lessons learned
Secure is a verb, not an adjective.
Anything that can happen, will.
Don’t create new parser or new crypto,
unless you need to. Invent new things!
Lessons learned (practical tips)
Tools for testing, monitoring.
Memory safe languages / features
Contribute to open source dependencies
Checklists are an anti-pattern.
github.com/cncf/sig-security
before-you-ship.18f.gov/security
bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org
@ultrasaurus
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Internet security: a landscape of unintended consequences