This document provides discussion questions and resources for an OSINT forum. It includes two student responses analyzing different aspects of open source intelligence and the intelligence cycle. Student #1 discusses how the intelligence cycle applies to OSINT collection and analysis. They also note potential downsides like reliability issues from sources producing propaganda, misinformation or disinformation. Student #2 summarizes key downsides of open source information, including the large volume of data to sort through and issues of reliability given sources can be unreliable, biased or used for deception.

1. OSINT Forum – Week 5
For this forum, you are to answer
one or more
of the questions listed below. The original post must be a
minimum of
250
words. Additionally, you must post two peer responses on a
classmate’s original post. Responses should be a minimum of
200
words each and include direct questions.
Questions:
- How have the authors detailed the value of open sources.
Discuss one or more values. Provide real-time examples to your
discussion.
- Explain the importance of open source information and the
intelligence cycle.
- Why should intelligence personnel who have access to
classified information should not produce unclassified products
on the same subjects?
- What are the downsides of open source information?
- Identify sources one can go to collect open source
information. Provide details for each source identified.
Reading & Resources:
Collecting Open Source Intelligence via Tailored Information
Delivery Systems
Producing Intelligence from Open Sources
NATO OSINT Handbook
(pages 1-35)
The Downside of Open Source Intelligence

2. Student Response #1 – Nicholas
The Intelligence cycle is what drives collection from every
intelligence discipline. And that is especially true with OSINT.
First there must be requirements to drive the intelligence cycle.
With the requirements in place, the analysts will have an idea of
what they are going to collect on, when the requirements are
known they will be further scrutinized by the planning and
direction phase which is led by the National Security Branch
(Intelligence nd, np). Once the analyst is aware of the
requirements and the planning/direction has taken place, they
can now collect raw information through open source. Once the
analyst gathers the information, they process and exploit it into
a usable form. Once the information has been sorted and placed
in a workable form, the analyst will now turn the raw
information into intelligence (Intelligence nd np). Last and not
least, once the information is turned into intelligence it will be
put in the correct format to fit their customer’s needs. This is
why the intelligence cycle is very important for open source
information and the analysis of this information into
intelligence. The steps above are pulled from the basic
intelligence cycle, while the intelligence cycle that focuses
primarily on OSINT (according to NATO) only uses planning
and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, searching
anonymously on the web, production, and dissemination and
evaluation (Kernan 2012, 15). The steps are all similar, but the
steps NATO points out for OSINT is more specific to OSINT,
rather than every collection effort.
Since a lot of us have spoke about deception techniques and
some of the flaws involved with OSINT, I figured I’d also add
in some opinions/information about the downsides of open
source information. Although OSINT is viewed valuable in most
cases, reliability issues arise from proliferation on individual
cites that produce propaganda, misinformation, or
disinformation (Hulnick 2002, 568). The argument can be made

3. about other INT’s having reliability issues, but the fact remains
that Open Source information can be printed or spoke about by
anyone. With SIGINT, an individual might be targeted for a
reason and the only reliability with SIGINT in this realm is if
the individual is aware of the situation and alters what he/she is
saying. So, what this says is every intelligence discipline will
have downsides, but it’s how the analyst recognizes the
downsides and works around them.
References:
“Intelligence Cycle.” FBI.gov. Accessed 2 November 2014.
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle.
Hulnick, Arthur S. 2002. “The Downside of Open
Source Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counter Intelligence.
Kernan, W.F. November 2001. “NATO Open Source
Intelligence Handbook.”
Student Response #2 – Dwayne
What are the downsides of open source information?
It has been widely noted throughout the last 60 years or
so that open source intelligence (OSINT) aids in providing the
bulk of information used by the intelligence community. Some
regard it as the “bread and butter” of analysis, serving as the
basis from which other intelligence is then sought. While
having been increasingly used, this method of intelligence
collection is not without its drawbacks, as is the case with any
of the “int’s”.
Perhaps the largest challenge is sorting through the
mountains of open source information in search of usable
information to refine into intelligence. Hulnick says that “The
conventional wisdom suggests that the greatest problem is the

4. excess of OSINT now overwhelming the ability of analysts to
sort through it. This pressure, though not new, has been
exacerbated by the proliferation of open source data in recent
years” (Hulnick, 2002, 566). More and more websites are being
developed every year that release or track possibly usable
information. Technology has had to try and keep pace with the
exponential increase in OSINT targets, which is no small
matter.
Another major concern about OSINT is that it is
unreliable. This is not a new concern, nor is it limited to
OSINT. All intelligence sources must be thoroughly vetted for
reliability before they become an asset. This applies to OSINT
sources just the same. Through experience and comparison,
OSINT sources can be screened for reliability, bias and
propaganda by the analysts, particularly the seasoned veterans.
OSINT, historically, has also been proven to be used as
a conduit for deception and disinformation campaigns by US
adversaries – and also the US themselves. Knowing that OSINT
is susceptible to being exploited in that manner, it further
reinforces the idea that the seasoned analysts must be weary and
closely scrutinize subject matter.
Resource:
Hulnick, A. 2002.
The downside of open source intelligence
. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
15:565-579. Retrieved from
https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-global-
studies-
common/Intelligence%20Studies/INTL%20422/Content/Week%
205/The%20Downside%20of%20Open%20Source%20Intelligen
ce_Hulnick.pdf