Paper Title: Information Behaviors in the Intelligence Community

1. Running head: INFORMATION BEHAVIORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1
Information Behaviors in the Intelligence Community
Laura Levy
Kent State University

2. INFORMATION BEHAVIORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 2
Information behaviors are unique to an individual and the information that the user is seeking.
One of the issues impacting information behaviors in today’s digital environment is that there is too much
information from too many sources. This overabundance of information causes information overload,
which can result in lower quality of work produced or a lack of focus by the information user. Too much
information can be overwhelming to anyone, but in certain situations information overload can have more
serious repercussions.
The Intelligence Community (IC) is one such group of information users that routinely
experiences information overload. Too much information can compromise the efficiency of the
information user in identifying threats and producing reports in a timely and accurate manner.
Intelligence analysts need a solution to process the vast amounts of information that they are exposed to
each workday. Through a study of the literature related to the IC and the user information behaviors
found in the LIS field, a solution to handling information overload may be found in incorporating LIS
information behavior strategies into the Intelligence Cycle.
User Group Definition
The user group that this paper will focus on is the all-source intelligence analysts that work within
the United States intelligence community. According to the RAND Corporation (a nonprofit, nonpartisan
research organization), “the intelligence community comprises the many agencies and organizations
responsible for intelligence gathering, analysis, and other activities that affect foreign policy and national
security” (“Intelligence Community”, n.d.). Further, in the United States the IC can be subdivided on the
federal, state, and local level, all ideally sharing information amongst agencies.
The federal IC is comprised of 17 different agencies, divided into three separate groups that fall
under the supervision of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and works in
cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency. The armed forces IC is comprised of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office,
and the National Security Agency under the Services group. The various departments of the federal
government also have agencies concerned with Intelligence Analysis. These departments are the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the Department of Treasury, the Department of State, the Department of Energy,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Intelligence Community,
2015). These agencies all employ intelligence analysts in some capacity.
The federal IC works with the state and local governments through fusion centers located
throughout the United States. According to Gerardi (2013), “Congress has defined fusion centers as
collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal government agencies that combines
resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect,
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity” (Gerardi, p. 4). Fusions
centers emerged because of the attacks of 9/11 to prevent future acts of terrorism. The fusion centers are
intended to increase the federal intelligence capabilities related to domestic terrorism using local, state,
and tribal law enforcement (Gerardi, p. 1). Fusion centers are intended to compliment the Federal
agencies by providing additional intelligence information, but unfortunately the intent doesn’t match the
results.

3. INFORMATION BEHAVIORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 3
Real-Life Context of Users
While fusion centers and the Federal IC have the best intentions of creating a cohesive
intelligence network, they are failing due to information overload and lack of cohesion between the levels
of government and agencies. Inconsistent training also slows the process of analyzing important
intelligence information in the time that it is usually needed. While fusion centers are relatively new to
the intelligence field, the other agencies have existed for decades, which also leads to a disconnect
between governmental levels.
Information overload is one of the reasons why intelligence analysis is difficult to complete
effectively, and it occurs at all levels of the government. On the local and state level too much data
overloads the analysts, and coupled with other issues such as inadequate training, the ability to analyze
and act on information is significantly affected (Brueggemann, p. V). Information comes from a variety
of sources today, including social media, websites and traditional clandestine operations. The issue of
information overload negatively impacting the IC is not just located at the state and local level, it can be
found at the federal level as well. For example, the FBI frequently collects too much information and
can’t effectively decide what information is important in a timely manner (Brueggemann, p.6).
A 2012 Congressional investigation revealed findings that fusions centers provided subpar
intelligence, which wasn’t produced in a timely manner, and it was suggested that the work the fusion
centers performed was redundant. Most of the fusion centers lacked the proper training to provide
adequate intelligence, and those that did were unable to clearly communicate and share that information
to the federal agencies (Devine, p.6).
Theories, Models, and Approaches
All the problems mentioned in this report can be traced back to the way that the IC analysts
interact with information and their resulting behaviors. The information overload that is experienced can
be very stressful and lead to errors. The lack of accessibility to other IC agencies intelligence reports can
lead to analyst frustration and incomplete analysis. Information behavior theories found in the LIS field
of study could help improve the current situation that analysts find themselves in daily.
Intelligence analysts are often faced with overwhelming amounts of information and that causes
several negative outcomes in relation to the analyst and the analysis of a threat. Young (2013) explains
that the Intelligence Community is getting overrun with information and causes the analyst to lose sight
of what is important, which may result in important information being ignored (Young, p. 24).
“Psychologist Lucy Jo Palladino writes that information overload leads to added stress, indecisiveness,
and less effective analysis of decisions” (Young, p. 24). Case’s Principle of Least Effort (PLE) Theory
explains how the information overload that is present during analysis causes a reduction in accuracy of
analysis. PLE says that an information seeker, like an analyst, will minimize the effort required to obtain
information, even if the result is of lower quality or quantity (Case, p. 291). During Wolfberg’s research
study, he found that analysts that experienced information overload and confusion about the information
being studied would be engaging in survival learning. The analysts would then reduce their analysis of
material and rely on their prior knowledge, this being the analysts least effort available to use in
producing an intelligence product (Wolfberg, p. 12). In research of intelligence processes, it seems that
analysts tend to engage in descriptive analysis of information that is collected, more of the here and now
instead of the future predictions. Davitch attributes this to Daniel Kahneman’s “substitution heuristic” in
which a person will simplify a difficult task by evaluating an easier, related one (Davitch, p. 19). This is
very similar to how Case related the pleasure principle to PLE in information seeking, an analyst will

4. INFORMATION BEHAVIORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 4
change the question to get to an answer more quickly, and therefore receiving pleasure at a completed
product (Case, p. 290).
PLE Theory also explains that humans will return to the same source that they have used in the
past, preferably over trying out new sources of information (Case, p. 289). Brueggemann confirms this in
the Illinois State Police Fusion center, explaining that, “Due to time constraints and the number of Daily
Reports, analysts often focus on just one or two from a source (such as Chicago JTTF, Virginia State
Police, Massachusetts State Police, etc.) that is familiar to them based on a prior experience or success
with it (Brueggemann, p.10). Returning to the same sources is something that happens in excess at the
federal level as well. The rise of social media has opened a new opportunity for intelligence professionals
to access large amounts of data, but the intelligence community resists this new information in favor of
the old, classified sources (Davitch, p.18). The unwillingness to look to OPINT sources is a detriment to
the current global threats that face our nation daily.
In looking at the ways that the analysts cycle through the Intelligence Cycle, certain behaviors
seem to remain consistent across the Intelligence Community. One such behavior is the information
literacy that the analysts possess. The LIS community, specifically reference librarians, spends a large
amount of time facilitating the user and information encounter. The IC doesn’t have this same benefit and
there are consequences due to that. Where the reference librarians excel at educating users of ways to
interact with information, the intelligence community is somewhat lacking. “There are few written
guidelines instructing fusion centers as to what is important information and should be forwarded to the
state fusion center; those decisions are left to individual analysts and supervising officers” (Taylor &
Russell, p. 188). Diving deeper, “in fact, the Congressional Research Service reported that the
intelligence cycle has not been fully adopted by state and local agencies. Instead, agencies struggle with
understanding, developing, and implementing a true representation of the fusion process” (Taylor &
Russell, p. 197). What this means is that the intelligence community lacks a clear method for
streamlining their processes of interacting with information, and users are left to figure out their way
amongst several options.
There is an obvious need for more studies and research into applying LIS information behavior
theories to the IC and how the analysts interpret and interact with information of many kinds. Some of
the methods of dealing with information and how to organize it within databases could help make
significant progress in combating the information overload problem that is prevalent in all IC agencies.
Research Methods and Techniques
The Intelligence Community is very difficult to thoroughly study because of the classified nature
of the information that it collects and analyzes. Most of the research used in this report consisted of
surveys and literature reviews. Those researchers that were able to use analysts often had very small
study groups. One research team designed a user study with 3 analysts with varied experience levels.
That research team had analysts’ complete tasks related to analysis and the team collected data through
the analysts written notes, behavior observations, questionnaires and interviews (Gotz, Zhou, & Wen,
2006). Another research team, met with the obstacle of finding analysts, used students attending
Mercyhurst College. “In order to investigate the intelligence analysis process in-depth, we conducted an
observational study of teams of analysts conducting an in-class intelligence project. During the project
period, we conducted two face-to-face meetings with each team – one in week 7 and the other in week 10.
In the meetings, we interviewed each team as a group and the class instructor… (Kang & Stasko, 2014).

5. INFORMATION BEHAVIORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 5
Brueggemann (2008) worked with the population and helped to create the very artifact that he wished to
survey and decided to use two research assistants to eliminate bias in the results (Brueggemann, p. 48).
The population of Brueggemann’s survey consisted of 34 criminal intelligence analysts employed by the
Illinois State Police, Illinois National Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security (Brueggemann, p. 48). The research assistants
asked the respondents to complete a written survey of 30 closed statements and then seal the results in an
envelope and place the envelope into a box, and the surveys would be collected once all 34 participants
had time to complete the survey (Brueggemann, p. 51).
The Department of Homeland Security also created their own survey of fusion center capabilities,
utilizing a standardized assessment with and scoring methodology. The test was an Online Self-
Assessment Tool that asked multiple choice questions to determine the effectiveness of the fusion centers
according to the employees themselves. Once the survey closed, the DHS employees scoured the results
and compared them with information previously reported and did follow-up phone interviews with fusion
center directors if there were issues with the result matching up (Lincoln & Seegmiller, p. 197).
While this is just a sample of the various ways that the IC was studied, it is obvious that there are
several barriers to completing a thorough survey or research project due to the differences between the
agencies, as well as the classified nature of the material.
Information Sources and Services
The IC uses a variety of sources to obtain information about a subject or target. This type of
intelligence is referred to as all-source intelligence.
One way that all-source intel is shared is through the SIPRNet, which is a classified network that
analysts with secret clearance have access too. The Whitelist is a program on the SIPRNet that contains
classified information, and reports and classified information can be sought about a variety of targets and
subjects (Lincoln & Seegmiller, p. 112). When dealing with international collaboration, the Department
of Defense uses The Department of Defense Intelligence Network (DODIN) in order to make all data
collected available to the intended recipients. This system is secure and allow for many authorized people
to access the classified information in order to perform analyses and make decisions (DOD, p. V-10).
The fusion centers use the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) to connect with federal resources, as
well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation Network (FBINet). The availability of this information is
contained within networks that only certain analysts will have access to based on their clearance levels.
The lack of access for other analysts is one of the issues with reports being doubled, and therefore wasting
valuable analyzing time. High turnover of staff means more access requests and less available analysts to
complete the work needed (Lincoln & Seegmiller, p. 112).
The intelligence cycle is the method that analysts use to gather, analyze, and disseminate
information related to national security issues. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence
cycle is comprised of planning and direction, collection (which is where the LIS theories overlap),
processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and
feedback; and these parts will not always be needed in entirety (DOD, p. I-5). Pirolli and Card’s
Sensemaking model for intelligence analysis further accounts for the nature of a nonlinear process during
the intelligence collection process (Kang & Stasko, p. 135). Dervin’s Sense – Making model for user-
centered information gathering is somewhat similar, in that the “situation-gap-use” needs of the user
parallel the needs of the analyst in IC positions (Morris, p. 22). The information needs of different users
may differ regarding context, but the processes and need to fill information gaps remains the same for
both communities.

6. INFORMATION BEHAVIORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 6
Related Issues and Considerations
While the focus of this report is the intelligence community tasked with the protection of our
nation’s national security, there are other intelligence fields that could benefit from some LIS strategies.
The business community also uses competitive intelligence to create economic advantages in their niche.
The amount of information there must certainly be as abundant as the amounts found in the IC in this
report. The business intelligence field is a lonely one as well, as most companies don’t want to
collaborate to share intelligence, and the IC is one that needs to work together to succeed to its full
potential.
Some things to consider about the correlation between LIS and the IC is that the government is
very secretive about its information, while the goal of the LIS field is to connect the information to the
user and the user can be anyone who seeks it.
Applications and Implications within the Information Ecology
The reference librarian is someone that possesses many skills related to information seeking. The
IC should look to the LIS community to learn from their experiences with information management and
incorporating user-centered methods into practice. The problem in the IC isn’t a secret. There is too
much information being provided to analysts, without a cohesive and uniform method of organization and
retrieval of intelligence gathered from multiple sources. The disconnect and disorganization creates an
overload of information that prevents analysts from spending more time on the analysis portion of the
intelligence cycle. Several skills of LIS professionals applied to the IC practice would enable more
efficient management and interaction with information in the information ecology. The two disciplines
would benefit from shared knowledge and skills. Showers (2012), describes the process of making data
available for reuse, open and reusable vocabularies and join data together to increase context (Showers, p.
152). The IC has shown struggles with a data-driven infrastructure in the lack of cohesion across the
various local, state, and federal levels. The systems that the FBI use don’t work with the CIA, and the
Treasury Department can’t access any of those materials in some instances. “The lack of an effective
central authority makes those in other agencies reluctant to work with one another” (Taylor & Russell, p.
195). This lack of cohesion is something that deeply affects the timeliness of analysis.
There is also a need for the IC to look at their structure and cooperation between agencies. If all
the agencies have the goal of protecting the United States from enemies that wish us harm, then there
should be more cooperation between them. There have been improvements within the fusion center and
federal entities, but they could be performing much better than they are currently.
Recommendations
The fusion centers and federal agencies need to work together to ensure that the maximum
amount of analysis is being done, which will positively impact the safety of the citizens of the United
States. One way to do this is to ensure a standard training protocol for training and analysis methods, as
well as a way of storing and tagging the analyses. Lincoln and Seegmiller (2013) recommend that
“federal partners should expand support to fusion centers through guidebooks, technical assistance,
mentoring, and subject matter expertise to help fusion centers define and manage SINs (Standing
Information Needs), and to more effectively and efficiently tag their products (Lincoln & Seegmiller, p.
99). By tagging their products, the fusion centers will help to reduce redundant reports that may not have

7. INFORMATION BEHAVIORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 7
been found during a search because it was mis-tagged. Federal agencies should also allow access to their
training materials, workshops, and increase their interagency reviews (Lincoln & Seegmiller, p.99).
Another method of improving the information behaviors of the IC is to reframe the education that
is occurring in relation to analysis. Instead of analysts continuing to attend trainings and briefings to learn
to use systems or discuss previously known information, the analysts should be taught how to seek
information, to grow information literacy as a skill for the analyst to rely on to scour through information.
Information literacy at its most basic definition is a person’s ability to acquire and process information to
understand (Frerichs & DiRienzo, p. 71).
Since there are multiple problems with the IC regarding information behaviors, there will most
likely be more than one solution that ends up bringing the IC together to combat the actors that intend to
act against the United States. At the very least, the IC needs to decide on a uniform method and system to
store information that can be accessed across the agency lines. It is a sense of cooperation that is needed,
not the divisive one that persists today.
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