foreknowledge
Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts
Issue Two
April 2012

www.foreknowledge.info
ISSN 2225-5613

C...
Contents

Editor:
Dalene Duvenage

From the editor 3
Collaboration in intelligence analysis 4
Collaborative intelligence s...
From the editor
Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa
The reception of the 1st edition for Foreknowledge was phe...
need2share

Collaboration in
intelligence
analysis
A new trend that will change the
dynamics of the intelligence industry?...
need2share
Many intelligence organisations are accepting the fact that they might not know all
the answers. Expert opinion...
need2share

collaborative
igence sourcing
intell
& collection
Crowd sourcing: the practice of obtaining needed services, i...
need2share
The

U

crowdmapping story

shahidi which means "testimony" in Swahili,
was a website that was initially develo...
need2share

collaborative
intelligence
analysis
Mark Blair, CEO of Defense Analyst’s Generic Intelligence Requirements Com...
need2share
Collaboration is fundamentally about behaviors and interactions among individuals working toward a common objec...
need2share
collaborative
intelligence
analysis

Collaborative
sensemaking by
external expert teams

The world’s first civi...
need2share
Singapore’s Risk Assessment and
Horizon Scanning Programme
Singapore’s Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) is located...
need2share
Exploring Collective
Intelligence and Forecasting
collaborative
intelligence
analysis

T

he MIT Center for Col...
need2share
Other collaborative analysis projects
The U.S. Government, specifically the Intelligence Advanced
Research Proj...
thinking

Psychology
of
intelligence
analysis
Richards Heuer
There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their ...
pressure for early judgment. This
is a recipe for inaccurate perception.
Intelligence seeks to illuminate
the unknown. Alm...
toolbox

Analyst
Structured Brainstorming
From Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis
by Richards J. Heu...
toolbox
Exploiting divergent viewpoints to
enhance collaboration

Structured brainstorming steps
There are no hard and fas...
toolbox
Intelligence analytics:
intelligence analysis + mathematical analytics
Tony Nolan
Risk, Intelligence and Analytics...
toolbox
Bitácora de análisis o memo analítico
Juan Pablo Somiedo
Madrid, Spain http://elbuhoanaltico.blogspot.com/

El mem...
in the news
News about our profession
GCHQ shortlisted in
National Council for
Work Experience
Awards 2012
GCHQ (ed: excer...
career

The effective analyst
Janet Evans
Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia...
people
Meet Charmian Taylor
Corrections intelligence analyst
Department of Corrections, Wellington, New Zealand

N

ot man...
people
T

ell us about your studies
and the award you received
from the Prime Minister?
During my studies in the Master
of...
events

discuss

share

collaborate

2
il 201
Apr
International Studies
Association
Annual Convention

San Diego

1 - 4 Ap...
J

events

2012
une
International BISA-ISA
conference

ISPM conference
Strategic foresight, strategic agility and future
o...
Contribute to the growing body of
knowledge in the intelligence
discipline by writing for journals
and presenting at the f...
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Colaboración Juan Pablo Somiedo Foreknowledge2

  1. 1. foreknowledge Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts Issue Two April 2012 www.foreknowledge.info ISSN 2225-5613 Collaborative intelligence analysis Crowdsourcing & Crowd forecasting Intelligence analytics Structured brainstorming Bitácora de análisis o memo analítico
  2. 2. Contents Editor: Dalene Duvenage From the editor 3 Collaboration in intelligence analysis 4 Collaborative intelligence sourcing and collection 6 Collaborative intelligence analysis 8 Publisher: 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions PO Box 40467 Moreleta Park Exploring collective intelligence and forecasting 12 Pretoria 0044 Other collaborative analysis projects 13 Psychology of intelligence analysis 14 Analyst toolbox South Africa Contributions and advertising enquiries: Structured brainstorming 16 Intelligence analytics 18 Analysis blog or analytic memorandum 19 editor@foreknowledge.info Disclaimer Views expressed in articles are not necessarily those of News about our profession 20 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions cc or of any executive member or director of the endorsing professional organizations unless expressly so stated. The effective analyst 21 Editorial submissions Meet Charmian Taylor 22 Authors contributing articles to Foreknowledge e-mag grant a licence to the publisher and its contractors from time to time to edit and publish the article electronically or by print or any other media. Upcoming conferences 24 Call for papers 26 Endorsed by: By contributing to the e-mag authors grant the publisher and its contractors from time to time an indemnity to the fullest extent permitted by law from all liability arising from their work. All authors are responsible for securing permission to use any copyrighted material, including graphics, quotations, and photographs, within their contributions. The publisher and its contractors from time to time disclaim any and all responsibility for copyright violations and any other form of liability arising from the content of the e-magazine or from any material linked to the e-magazine. Contributing authors will be notified immediately of any discovered copyright violations so that such issues may be dealt with promptly. No responsibility or liability will be accepted by the publisher and its contractors from time to time or any associated persons or entities to advertisers for the publication of advertisements that may be inaccurate or found to be contrary to law. Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Association of Crime and Intelligence Analysts Australian Institute for Professional Intelligence Officers 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions CC (the “Publisher”) is the owner of all rights in terms of copyright related to any works embodied in this E-Magazine or its content, save for the works embodied in the advertisements and the literary works embodied in the contributions. No person may copy, reproduce, make an adaptation of, let, offer for sale or hire, import or export other than for private use, or distribute for purposes of trade the E-Magazine or any part thereof in any manner or form or cause or allow any person to commit any of the aforementioned acts in relation to the E-Magazine or any part thereof; without the express authorisation of the Publisher. The Publisher, Authors and Advertisers reserve their respective rights in and to all works embodied in this E-Magazine. © 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions CC 2011 All rights reserved April 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  3. 3. From the editor Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa The reception of the 1st edition for Foreknowledge was phenomenal! The aim of this e-magazine and the website is to educate and inform intelligence analysts and their managers and support personnel about developments in our growing discipline. In this edition we focus on the emerging trend of collaborative intelligence analysis and how the Lone Ranger analyst can tap into the knowledge of other experts. Recent research has shown that the levels of teamwork have increased in more than 95% of scientific subfields; most probably because the remaining problems are incredibly hard to solve. We experience that in intelligence analysis as well where specialists have to collaborate because many of our answers lie beyond our own individual cognitive grasp. The following few pages will provide you with a framework to understand collaborative intelligence analysis and a snapshot of what intelligence organisations are doing to “exploit the collective intelligence of the masses”. Remember to click on the links to access more information. Enjoy! Dalene Duvenage Our contributors: Richards Heuer is a veteran intelligence scholar and analyst. He has written numerous books and articles and resides in Monterey, California, USA. He gave us permission to summarise his book, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Brett Peppler is AIPIO President, Vice Chair of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), and a member of the adjunct faculties of several universities. Tony Nolan is a risk, intelligence and analysis officer in the Australian government. 3 Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain where he is strategic and competitive intelligence and a specialist in the field of epistemology applied to the analysis of information Janet Evans is Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  4. 4. need2share Collaboration in intelligence analysis A new trend that will change the dynamics of the intelligence industry? Dalene Duvenage W hen one looks at the landscape challenges are not managed effective- of intelligence analysis the last ly. The main obstacle to collaborative In the Knowledge Age, traditional intelligence organisations have been dis- few years, it seems as though the lone intelligence remains tight production analyst in her cubicle is gradually re- schedules and the prevailing secret or- monopoly over their core intelligence placed by teams of analysts to provide ganisational culture. function: forewarning. In fact, the in- either operational or strategic analysis support to intelligence functions. The trend is definitely more evident in the US and Europe where intelligence problems have forced disparate agen- The following few pages take a snapshot of what intelligence organisations are doing to exploit the collective “wisdom of the crowds”.1 enfranchised from holding the telligence “space” has expanded with stakeholders and role-players like NGOs, transnational organisations and companies, private knowledge broker firms, as well as interest and pressure groups representing communities, concepts and ideologies… This “de- cies to collaborate, than here in Africa First we glance over what these terms mocratisation” of intelligence will where most organisations agencies might mean in an intelligence context, have a profound impact on the way in- have not yet matured to that extent. before we look at different examples of Team analysis is more the exception than the rule and many agencies still rely on the expert advice of the individual analyst. This is especially evi- the two main components of collaborative collection or sourcing and Snowden’s Cynefin model and a pre- collaborative analysis. vious model of mine to create this con- Collective intelligence has developed and in other national security agencies in a distinctive discipline with propo- with minimal analytical resources. nents and critics in the last few years privilege of collaborative opportunities and tools like A-space and Intellipedia. The rest of the world is sadly trailing far behind. We are all well aware of the cognitive and bias challenges faced by these lone analysts, in addition to the overwhelming deluge of information. Collaborating with other analysts might lighten some these burdens, but the team effort can also fail if the associated complex dynamics and inherent 3 Dalene Duvenage (2010) tion in intelligence namely collabora- dent in law enforcement intelligence Since 2008, analysts in the US had the telligence is conducted. tinuum. Of course, this framework is not absolute and only attempts to provide a provisional framework. with numerous applications in natural There is limited collaboration in the sciences, psychology, economy, digital knowable domain. Those of you fa- media, software development etc. Our miliar with the puzzle and mysteries focus here will be a very shallow but analogy, would understand that in hopefully engaging perspective on de- this space, the analyst would seek for velopments and possible applications missing puzzle pieces to complete his in the intelligence analysis realm. understanding of an intelligence prob- The graphic on the next page depicts the fluidity of collaboration modes within intelligence analysis. I have used some creative license with Dave lem that many of us are familiar with: election results of a stabile country with few role players, an organised crime syndicate involved in human 1 James Surowiecki (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the smuggling, a patent analysis of a com- Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom petitor or an analysis of a new weap- Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  5. 5. need2share Many intelligence organisations are accepting the fact that they might not know all the answers. Expert opinions of external scholars, think tanks, consultants and the general public are increasingly sought to assist in making sense of the threats and opportunities of the new world. This collaboration will impact on the way intelligence organisations collect, analyse and communicate their insights to decision-makers. Continuum of analysis collaboration in intelligence organisations Complex domain Unknown domain ● Teams of expert analysts applying structured techniques ● Crowd sourcing & network of external experts to make sense of strategic mysteries Knowable domain ● Individual expert analyst using intuitive and other basic techniques ● Traditional intelligence problems with clearly discernable cause and effect elements or with little room for alternatives ● Mainly operational and tactical analysis ● Complicated strategic intelligence problems with no clear-cut cause and effect elements, and which morph continuously ● Analysts focus more on variables that change intelligence problem’s essence and dynamics ● Chaotic, unexpected problems with unknown agents and variables (“black swans”) ● Flows and patterns not discernable, only in retrospect ● No stable solutions, outcome is never predictable or explainable ● Emergent solutions Limited In-house teams Broad collaboration Dalene Duvenage, 2012 ons system. He intuitively knows pattern, but there is just never enough In the unknown domain, intelligence where to get the intel and what it time or pieces to confirm whether you problems are chaotic and unexpected means and might use some basic ana- hypothesis is correct or not, so you while the intelligence community ac- lytical tools like social network analy- have to reach out and share puzzle knowledges that it does not have suf- sis and, timeline analysis to build a pieces and collaborate to get a grasp of ficient analytical capacity to deal with narrative. He rarely collaborates with what is happening. Intelligence issues it. These problems, like the possible other analysts and his intelligence like the ongoing unrest in Syria, the economic implosion of China, are real products are usually of an operational growing threat of instability on the mysteries and in-house analyst teams’ or tactical nature. border between the US and Mexico or expertise and are not sufficient to In the complex domain the intelli- an upcoming tightly contested elec- make sense of the myriad interrelated gence problems gets a bit more diffi- tion in a neighbouring country re- variables. External experts, sometimes cult to understand as there are usually quires multi-faceted analysis. A team even the general public are ap- a myriad of role players, interests and of analysts then collaboratively try to proached to assist in either the factors impacting across functional make sense of the essence and dynam- sourcing/collection of relevant infor- desks and intelligence priorities with ics of the intelligence problem. They mation and/or the analysis and inter- strategic implications for various gov- apply various structured analytical pretation of disparate flows of ernment departments. Again, taking tools to make sure they have ad- information. Usually, collaborative the puzzle analogy, analysts receive dressed and argued as many as possi- software is used to gather the views puzzle pieces that just won’t fit any ble assumptions, hypotheses, from across a country or even interna- familiar pattern, most of the time no scenarios and possible decision impli- tionally, which is then either moderat- two pieces will even be from the same cations. Minority viewpoints are also ed by in-house experts or self puzzle. With careful consideration, taken into account as the team realise regulated like a wiki. The next pages you start picking up semblances of a they might still not have the full pic- give you a glimpse of collaboration in ture. intelligence organisations . April 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  6. 6. need2share collaborative igence sourcing intell & collection Crowd sourcing: the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people and especially from the online community rather than from traditional employees or suppliers (Merriam Webster) M ark Blair, CEO of Defense Analyst’s Generic Intelligence Requirements Company (DAGIR Co.) shares his viewpoints on collaborative intelligence sourcing and collection, or crowd sourcing: “The crowd represents giant, often untapped, populations of passive and active collectors. This is, of course, a known quantity… from Tip Lines to Milk Cartons to ‘How’s my driving?’ bumper stickers, companies and agencies have harnessed the collection prowess of the crowd for decades. The crowd is a powerful collection of independent, au- tonomous operators that, once activated, produce extremely powerful bodies of information in an extremely short time frame. For example, in early 2009 the St Paul police released a database of church burglaries and asked the public for help. We built a crowdsourcing web page with a geospatial analysis system and an array of analytic tools. Although the effort was terminated for reasons that were never made public, contributors from 11 different countries lent their labor and expertise to solve the problem and produced findings that provided valuable insight.” Today there are unprecedented technologies and tools that push crowd collection far beyond its simple beginnings that incorporates dynamic GIS maps, databases, cell phone geo-tagged image capturing and feature recognition. Crowd sourcing is about the many contributing a little, not a few contributing a lot. It is low cost, rather speedy, and has a wide breadth of opinions, expertise, and dissent (which is good). A properly managed crowd is a formidable analytic machine that asks for little and gives great dividends” Spain’s security strategy - everyone’s responsibility In its new security strategy released in June 2011, the Spanish government envisages three fora that will incorporate external input to its national security strategy: Social Forum which, as an advisory body, will bring together representatives of the Public Administrations, field experts, academics, researchers, universities, specialized institutions, business firms and social organisations to carry out joint analyses on security matters. 3 Integrated External Response Unit (URIE) for the deployment of Spanish civilian experts in national and multinational missions abroad, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, emergencies or humanitarian aid. It will increase Spanish civilian capabilities and a civilian-military approach, making Spain a more effective and committed international actor. Economic Intelligence System (SIE), in collaboration with the private sector, for collecting and analysing economic, financial and business information relevant to security, detecting and preventing acts against our interests, and supporting the action of the State and better decision-making in this area. April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  7. 7. need2share The U crowdmapping story shahidi which means "testimony" in Swahili, was a website that was initially developed to map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-election fallout at the beginning of 2008 for Kenyans to report and map incidents of violence that they saw via SMS, email or the web. It has grown to a system that facilitates early warning systems and helps in data visualization for response and recovery. The Ushahidi platform has been used to monitor elections in India, Mexico, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It has been deployed in the DR Congo to track unrest, Zambia to monitor medicine stockouts and the Philippines to track the mobile phone companies. It has also been crucial in rescue operations in Haiti. Screen shot of the Syrian Spring Crowd map Crowdmap is the fastest, simplest installation of the A key component of Ushahidi is the ability to use mo- Ushahidi platform. Within minutes you'll be up bile phones as a primary means of both sending crisis and running with your own installation, mapping incidents and receiving updates. The Internet can be reports events and visualizing information. difficult to access or completely unavailable in some parts of the world, so the platform was created with the mobile phone as a foundational element. Read more about Ushahidi here and here. Listen to a podcast on Ushahidi crowdsourcing here.. Read about crowdsourcing here and here. The US’ Homeland Security National Dialogue Project Six years after its creation, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) undertook the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), which will inform the design and implementation of actions to ensure the safety of the United States and its citizens. The QHSR includes recommendations addressing the long-term strategy and priorities of the nation for homeland security and guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the department. Rather than set policy internally and implement it in a top-down fashion, DHS undertook the April 2012 • Foreknowledge QHSR in a new and innovative way by engaging tens of thousands of stakeholders and soliciting their ideas and comments at the outset of the process. cialized knowledge into the review. It also provided the opportunity to strengthen trust and create buy-in for later policy implementation. Through a series of three weeklong, web-based discussions, stakeholders reviewed materials developed by DHS study groups, submitted and discussed their own ideas and priorities, and rated or “tagged” others’ feedback to surface the most relevant ideas and important themes deserving further consideration. Many forms of media were used to reach potential participants. These included e-mails to thousands of professionals, invitations delivered at conferences or meetings, links and buttons placed on web pages of DHS and component sites, references in articles and homeland security journals, and “Dear Colleague” letters passed among congressional offices as well as Twitter, Facebook, GovLoop, and Ning. This National Dialogue on the QHSR had important benefits. By engaging stakeholders at all levels, DHS was able to incorporate ground-level expertise and spe- See reports here and here. 2
  8. 8. need2share collaborative intelligence analysis Mark Blair, CEO of Defense Analyst’s Generic Intelligence Requirements Company (DAGIR Co.) shares his view on collaborative intelligence analysis: “The key to organizing and synthesizing collaborative analytic efforts is to provide a simple and intuitive interface allowing individuals to make small contributions with little effort. We don’t advise trying to re-invent the wheel here. For instance, the Delphi Method is well suited for many analytic tasks and we often incorporate such methods in our systems. Some analytic endeavors require more complex, specialized apparatuses or low-cost solutions. It is important to remember that collaborative analysis is about the crowd, not the analysis. The crowd will take care of the analysis, if you give them the right tools and dynamic navigation to peruse the contributions of others. A new contributor must quickly and easily find his/her place in the larger effort. At the high-level, facilitators/solicitors need an easy way solicit the right help to meet their needs. CrowdSourcing systems must address all of these issues. Crowds have other benefits as well. Crowds can fight cognitive 3 biases, plan accordingly. For instance, the ability for contributors to remain anonymous can combat Group Think (Mind Guarding, Bandwagon Effect, etc.), and the overemphasis of the opinions of “experts” or individuals in an authoritative position (Halo Effect). Other dangers such as Confirmation Bias, Availability Heuristic, and Anchoring Effect are diluted as they are less likely to express a uniform influence over a larger group (crowd) of contributors. When organizing a collaborative effort it is important to give the crowd an array of tools. If you give them only a hammer “every problem is a nail.” Providing evidence-driven or data-driven tools can ensure that the crowd develops an empirical foundation for analytic conclusions. A program (ACH2.0) based on Richard Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses produced by the Palo Alto Research Center can be downloaded for free here. Tools such as this and even simple databases encourage the development empirical foundations (e.g. statistical models, regression analysis, etc.) and bolster confidence. From our experience, another surprising quality of the crowd, is that if you give them tools, they will use them. “ Collaborative intelligence analysis competition in UK In December 2010, the UK Ministry of Defence’s Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE) launched a Collaborative Multi-Source Intelligence competition for proposals that show novel approaches to collaborative fusion and analysis using multiple and different sources of intelligence. One of the specific challenges is Collaborative analysis models, tools and services. The aim is to develop the understanding of team sense-making concepts and processes, together with applications and services which offer support to those processes. More information on the competition here. Current status of the project is unknown. April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  9. 9. need2share Collaboration is fundamentally about behaviors and interactions among individuals working toward a common objective enabled by IT tools and appropriate organizational policies and underlying cultural norms. The correct nexus for collaboration is the human interface with other minds, not the human interface with IT. Robust social networks serve as an essential underpinning of collaboration and ensure that communities can come together to put more eyes on the target, promote analytic excellence, and facilitate informed decisionmaking. Achieving a robust collaborative environment requires sustained leadership commitment on the part of senior leaders in every intelligence community and military organization. Randoph Pherson and Joan McIntyre 2009 Collaborative sensemaking in internal teams Travels with Shiloh Imagine an intelligence shop where the analysts are afforded some control over their time like Google time. It could be something pretty modest, like 10% or 20% of their total work time. Analysts can then ‘pitch’ projects to their peers and ask for their assistance in order to benefit from their expertise (‘Can you take four hours to do a statistical analysis of IED detonations from 2007-2009?’) or can ask for time (‘I’d like to ask for 20 hours to complete project X.’) In the latter case, analysts would donate the time to someone whose project they endorsed and agree to ‘cover’ for them (with consideration for office needs). Randy Pherson proposes that analytical units should have Transformation Cells which will drive the establishing of a collaborative culture and mechanisms that are most appropriate to their work environment and in interpreting the rules of the road. Such help must have a human face to be effective. The success or failure of efforts to promote cultural change usually depends on how effectively the transforming vision is articulated to lower level managers and the workforce at large. This is best accomplished by forming a small group of interpreters and facilitators who can function as a “help desk” for managers and officers by providing tailored guidance on how to implement collaborative practices within their work environment in the most effective and efficient manner possible. Such Transformation Cells can provide the human infrastructure needed to interpret the leader’s vision (his or her Command Intent) and help officers apply it effectively in their workspace. April 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  10. 10. need2share collaborative intelligence analysis Collaborative sensemaking by external expert teams The world’s first civil society intelligence agency Open Briefing is the world’s first civil society intelligence agency; an accessible platform for insight and analysis on key defence, security and foreign policy issues. They provide open source intelligence assessments and independent security briefings, so that a better informed civil society can properly engage with peace and security debates and influence positive policy developments in these areas. Open Briefing incorporates social media into everything it does. They use new communication technologies to complement traditional dissemination strategies and allow users to access content how they want, when they want. They rely on the good will and hard work of a small group of associate analysts to support the different intelligence desks. This is a voluntary, remote work role, which can be easily fitted around your other commitments. It is only open to those with excellent research and analytical skills and demonstrable knowledge and considerable experience in one or more of our issue or regional desk areas. Associate analysts have an informal relationship with Open Briefing, in that they are affiliated to but independent of the organisation. They assess intelligence items, complete source reliability assessments and file material and analysis on the organisation’s website. They also provide commentary on items filed on the website and create and publish dossiers. They help develop social networks by commenting on Open Briefing’s Facebook page, suggesting sources to add to the desk Twitter lists, suggesting videos to add to the desk YouTube playlists, commenting on LinkedIn and other professional networks using your Open Briefing affiliation, and suggesting items to add to the digital library. They also conduct peer review and help improve Open Briefing’s publications. The analysts are at this stage not paid but are included in Open Briefing’s “list of experts” for media enquiries. See their website here Collaboration challenges Waiting to speak Domination Fear of speaking Misunderstanding Inattention Lack of focus Inadequate criteria Premature decision Missing information Distractions Digressions Missing stakeholders Groupthink Poor grasp of problem, Ignored alternatives Lack of consensus Poor planning Hidden agenda Conflict Inadequate resources Poorly defined goals Robert O Briggs 2009 3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  11. 11. need2share Singapore’s Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Programme Singapore’s Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) is located within the National Security Coordination Secretariat under the Prime Minister’s Office. HSC serves as the operational nerve centre of the Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme. HSC investigates and recommends, through horizon scanning, case studies or other initiatives, key emerging issues as well as risks or uncertainties across various domains that would have a significant impact on Singapore. The RAHS system provides end-to-end capabilities to collect and classify data, analyse and understand relationships, and anticipate as well as discover emerging issues that could have a strategic impact on Singapore. It combines tools, methods and networks for effective scanning and analysis. RAHS has provided an opportunity to adopt a whole-ofgovernment approach to strategic anticipation. It hinges on a collaborative approach linking ministries and agencies across government. It has the potential to connect silos and challenge mindsets, develop an instinct to share, and encourage a collective analysis of possible futures. The RAHS programme was also designed with strategic networking in mind. To this end, the RAHS programme has been utilized by and contained the contributions of analysts from the academia and beyond Singapore. The key objective of such an integrative approach is to bring partner agencies together to work collaboratively on issues of interest and towards a unique solution to the problems at hand. However, collaboration with the private sector has proven to be a big challenge and HSC is still trying to find the right collaboration model. Checklist for successful collaboration (Tamra Hall & Kerry Buckley, Mitre Corporation) 1 Define collaboration goals and schedule & get buy-in 2 Define collaboration processes and workflow 3 Establishing trusting working relationships 4 Define rules of engagement, data ownership and attribution 5 Ensure mutual benefit 6 Obtain management support 7 Align reward structures with collaboration goals 8 Develop comprehensive training programs 9 Ensure critical mass usage Wikistrat is the world’s first Massively Multiplayer Online Consultancy (MMOC). It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a patent pending crowd-sourcing methodology to provide insights unavailable anywhere else. This online network offers a uniquely powerful and unprecedented strategic consulting service: the internet’s only central intelligence exchange for strategic analysis and forecasting, delivered, for the first time, on a real-time, interactive platform. Their network of hundreds of experts follow our scenario-driven crowd-sourced policy planning methodology to generate unique intelligence products.See their website here April 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  12. 12. need2share Exploring Collective Intelligence and Forecasting collaborative intelligence analysis T he MIT Center for Collective Intelligence is exploring a very interesting research question; "How can people and computers be connected so that – collectively - they act more intelligently than any individuals, groups, or computers have ever done before?" The research is based on the phenomenon observed in natural and human systems where a group tends to make better decisions than its individual members. Elsewhere researchers already have operationalised the phenomenon of collective intelligence by developing prediction markets in which participants buy and sell predictions about uncertain future events and are paid only if their predictions are correct. Prediction markets have been found to be surprisingly accurate in a wide range of situations (including forecasting product sales and US Presidential elections). Collective forecasting methods such as prediction markets are used for decision support by a range of leading organisations. Decision support is a process of assessing a range of likely futures, and selecting the action leading to the best expected outcome. Forecasting, especially the quality of forecasts is critical for decision support. Collective forecasting methods utilize all available data, insight and human intuition by collecting clear, probabilistic forecasts of well defined events, pooling the collective forecasts of analysis in a structured, disciplined manner. Australian Institute for Professional Intelligence Officers 3 Brett Peppler, FAIPIO President, Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers Leveraging collective intelligence and forecasting offers tangible benefits for intelligence practice especially when applied to the challenge of predictive intelligence. All good intelligence should be forward-looking because the future is where the consumer’s next decisions will be made. More broadly, collective forecasting offers an organising principle for intelligence practice, which may help to break down barriers to collaboration across enterprise boundaries. During 2012, the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO) is partnering with Presciient to offer a Collective Forecasting Competition to expose intelligence practitioners and other interested observers to these emerging forecasting methods. The Competition also allows AIPIO to make a substantive contribution to the intelligence body of knowledge. The Competition was launched in Canberra, Australia on the 16 February 2012, and the Competition website is now live at http://aipio.system-ii.com. The purpose of the Competition is to introduce participants to a number of simple, powerful collective forecasting methods, including probabilistic forecasting, forecast accuracy measurement, pooled (collective) forecasting and conditional forecasts. These are cutting edge methods being used by a range of organisations and agencies around the world. The Competition gives participants an opportunity to be exposed to, and trained in these powerful modern methods. The Competition allows participants to predict the outcomes of a range of events of interest to intelligence professionals across all domains of intelligence practice. The selected events include regional and global events relating to weapons proliferation, conflict, the movement of people and goods, and statistics such as arrest numbers, boat arrivals and numbers of casualties. Events will include both unconditional (simple predictions) and conditional (dependent on policy/action) events. Participants are able to submit suggested events to add to the mix, by email to AIPIOcfc@presciient.com, or create your own events by using the “new” button on the interface. The Competition works on three event expiries; in April, July and October 2012 allowing participants to focus predictions on event outcomes at one, three and six months from the Competition’s launch date. Predicted event outcomes will be assessed against actual outcomes, with competition participants ranked by a range of accuracy measures, and compared with pooled forecasts. Presiciient is making available its online collective forecasting platform – System II – for AIPIO to run the forecasting competition. The System II platform also provides a systematic measure of prediction accuracy: of the pool of predictors, and of any individual predictors within the Competition. All interested folk may participate, so please register to create a Competition account to make predictions. A “How To” manual may be found at the top of the main page of the Competition website, and additional supporting documents explaining collective forecasting and the competition ‘rules’ will shortly be available on the AIPIO website (www.aipio.asn.au). In related activity, AIPIO will be running a master class on Collective Forecasting with System II during the annual AIPIO conference – Intelligence 2012 – to be held at the Swissotel Sydney during 24-26 July 2012. A review of the Collective Forecasting Competition will be presented at the annual Forum, which will be held in Perth on 30 November 2012. April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  13. 13. need2share Other collaborative analysis projects The U.S. Government, specifically the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), is funding the work of several projects that explore new methods to combine predictions from a wide range of volunteer contributors to provide more accurate forecasts of global event with the expectation that it will improve the accuracy of intelligence analysis. Informed investigates various aspects of individual and group predictions to gain fresh insights into the factors that Resources influence people’s predictions about key world events and trends. In addition, it looks at ways to leverage and inte- Collaboration White paper: Collaboration grate this information to develop more accurate overall in the National Security Arena: Myths predictions. and Reality - What Science and Experi- Daggre by George Mason University aims to learn more ence Can Contribute to its Success here about the cognitive and social dynamics involved in accu- Collaborative Intelligence: Using Teams rate intelligence forecasting. If you agree to participate, you to Solve Hard Problems Lessons from and will be asked to browse and modify forecasts of local and for Intelligence Professionals J. Richard world events through a password-protected website SPADE by The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, with Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign aims to enhance the accuracy, precision, and timeliness of forecasts for a broad range of events. The predictions you provide will be combined and weight- Hackman, 2010 here A Wiki Is Like A Room…And Other Lessons Learned From 15 Wiki-based, Open Source, Intelligence Analysis Projects, Kristan Wheaton here ed with thousands of others in a unique way that outper- Groupthink: The brainstorming myth by forms simple aggregation techniques. Jonah Lehrer here Forecasting ACE is a joint venture by private research A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic company and seven different universities. The universities Techniques for Improving Intelligence are: The University of Maryland, The University of Michi- Analysis here gan, Ohio State University, Fordham University, Wake Forest University, Wichita State University and the University of California-Irvine. The company is Applied Research Associates. April 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  14. 14. thinking Psychology of intelligence analysis Richards Heuer There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge. This is an excerpt of chapter 2 on Perception. You can also download the entire book here. A nalysts have a set of assumptions and expectations about the motivations of people and the processes of government in foreign countries. Events consistent with these expectations are perceived and processed easily, while events that contradict prevailing expectations tend to be ignored or distorted in perception. Of course, this distortion is a subconscious or pre-conscious process. This tendency of people to perceive what they expect to perceive is more important than any tendency to perceive what they want to perceive. Expectations have many diverse sources, including past experience, professional training, and cultural and organizational norms. All these influences predispose analysts to pay particular attention to certain kinds of information and to organize and inter3 pret this information in certain ways. Perception is also influenced by the context in which it occurs. Patterns of expectations tell analysts, subconsciously, what to look for, what is important, and how to interpret what is seen. These patterns form a mind-set that predisposes analysts to think in certain ways. A mind-set is akin to a screen or lens through which one perceives the world. There is a tendency to think of a mind-set as something bad, to be avoided. Actually, mind-sets are neither good nor bad; they are unavoidable. People have no conceivable way of coping with the volume of stimuli that impinge upon their senses, or with the volume and complexity of the data they have to analyze, without some kind of simplifying preconceptions about what to expect, what is important, and what is related to what. Analysts do not achieve objective analysis by avoiding preconceptions; that would be ignorance or self-delusion. Objectivity is achieved by making basic assumptions and reasoning as explicit as possible so that they can be challenged by others and analysts can, themselves, examine their validity. Comprehending the nature of perception has significant implications for understanding the nature and limitations of intelligence analysis. The circumstances under which accurate perception is most difficult are exactly the circumstances under which intelligence analysis is generally conducted--dealing with highly ambiguous situations on the basis of information that is processed incrementally under April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  15. 15. pressure for early judgment. This is a recipe for inaccurate perception. Intelligence seeks to illuminate the unknown. Almost by definition, intelligence analysis deals with highly ambiguous situations. As previously noted, the greater the ambiguity of the stimuli, the greater the impact of expectations and pre-existing images on the perception of that stimuli. Thus, despite maximum striving for objectivity, the intelligence analyst's own preconceptions are likely to exert a greater impact on the analytical product than in other fields where an analyst is working with less ambiguous and less discordant information. Moreover, the intelligence analyst is among the first to look at new problems at an early stage when the evidence is very fuzzy indeed. The analyst then follows a problem as additional increments of evidence are received and the picture gradually clarifies. An analyst who starts observing a potential problem situation at an early and unclear stage is at a disadvantage as compared with others, such as policymakers, whose first exposure may come at a later stage when more and better information is available. The receipt of information in small increments over time also facilitates assimilation of this information into the analyst's existing views. No one item of information may be sufficient to prompt the analyst to change a previous view. The cumulative message inherent in many pieces of information may be significant but is attenuated when this information is not examined as a whole. chologists call premature closure. Customer demand for interpretive analysis is greatest within two or three days after an event occurs. The system requires the intelligence analyst to come up with an almost instant diagnosis before sufficient hard information, and the broader background information that may be needed to gain perspective, become available to make possible a well-grounded judgment. This diagnosis can only be based upon the analyst's preconceptions concerning how and why events normally transpire in a given society. Comprehending the nature of perception has significant implications for understanding the nature and limitations of intelligence analysis As time passes and more information is received, a fresh look at all the evidence might suggest a different explanation. Yet, the perception experiments indicate that an early judgment adversely affects the formation of future perceptions. Once an observer thinks he or she knows what is happening, this perception tends to resist change. New data received incrementally can be fit easily into an analyst's previous image. This perceptual thinking bias is reinforced by organizational pressures favoring consistent interpretation; once the analyst is committed in writing, both the analyst and the organization have a vested interest in maintaining the original assessment. That intelligence analysts perform as well as they do is testimony to their generally sound judgment, training, and dedication in performing a dauntingly difficult task. The problems outlined here have implications for the management as well as the conduct of analysis. A prudent management system should: ● Encourage products that clearly delineate their assumptions and chains of inference and that specify the degree and source of uncertainty involved in the conclusions. ● Support analyses that periodically re-examine key problems from the ground up in order to avoid the pitfalls of the incremental approach. ● Emphasize procedures that expose and elaborate alternative points of view. ● Educate consumers about the limitations as well as the capabilities of intelligence analysis; define a set of realistic expectations as a standard against which to judge analytical performance. # The intelligence analyst operates in an environment that exerts strong pressures for what psyApril 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  16. 16. toolbox Analyst Structured Brainstorming From Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis by Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. 2010. Rules ● Be specific about the purpose and the topic of the brainstorming session. ● New ideas are always encouraged, so never criticize an idea during the divergent (creative) phase of the process no matter how weird or unconventional or improbable it might sound. Instead, try to figure out how the idea might be applied to the task at hand. When to Use It ● Allocate enough time to do the brainstorming correctly. Brainstorming in some form is one of the most widely used analytic techniques. It is often used at the beginning of a project to identify a list of relevant variables, driving forces, a full range of hypotheses, key players or stakeholders, available evidence or sources of information, potential solutions to a problem, potential outcomes or scenarios, or, for law enforcement, potential suspects or avenues of investigation. ● To avoid groupthink and stimulate divergent thinking, include one or more “outsiders” in the group – that is, astute thinkers who do not share the same body of knowledge or perspective as the other group members but do have some familiarity with the topic. Value Added ● Summarize and distribute the key findings at the end of the session. A wiki let the discussion evolve further. The stimulus for creativity comes from multiple analysts bouncing ideas off each other. A brainstorming session usually exposes an analyst to a greater range of ideas and perspectives than the analyst could generate on his or her own, and this typically results in a better analytic product. 3 ● Write it down! Track the discussion on a whiteboard, easel, or with sticky notes. ● Participants should be encouraged to express every idea that pops into their heads. Even ideas that are outside the realm of the possible may stimulate other ideas that are more feasible. The underlying assumption of brainstorming is that if people are scared of saying the wrong thing, they’ll end up saying nothing at all. … there is a problem with brainstorming. It doesn’t work…Decades of research have consistently shown that brainstorming groups think of far fewer ideas than the same number of people who work alone and later pool their ideas… While the instruction ‘Do not criticize’ is often cited as the important instruction in brainstorming, this appears to be a counterproductive strategy. Our findings show that debate and criticism do not inhibit ideas but, rather, stimulate them relative to every other condition. Osborn thought that imagination is inhibited by the merest hint of criticism, but Nemeth’s work and a number of other studies have demonstrated that it can thrive on conflict…Dissent stimulates new ideas because it encourages us to engage more fully with the work of others and to reassess our viewpoints Jonah Lehrer (2012) April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  17. 17. toolbox Exploiting divergent viewpoints to enhance collaboration Structured brainstorming steps There are no hard and fast rules on exactly how Structured Brainstorming should be done. The following 12-step process was developed for the CIA’s Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis and has worked well for a number of years. The process is divided into two phases, a divergent thinking (creative) phase when ideas are presented, and a convergent thinking phase when these ideas are evaluated. Divergent or creative phase 1. Pass out “Post-It” or “sticky” notes and marker pens to all participants. 2. Pose the problem or topic in terms of a “focal question.” Display this question in one sentence for all to see on a large easel or whiteboard. 3. Ask the group to write down responses to the question with a few key words that will fit on a Post-It. When a response is written down, the participant is asked to read it out loud or to give it to the facilitator who will read it out loud. Marker pens are used so that people can easily see what is written on the Post-It notes later in the exercise. 4. Stick all the Post-Its on a wall in random order as they are called out. Treat all ideas the same. Encourage participants to build on each others’ ideas. 5. Usually there is an initial spurt of ideas followed by some pauses as participants contemplate the question. After five or ten minutes there is often a long pause of a minute or so. This suggests that the group has “emptied the barrel of the obvious” and is now on the verge of coming up with some fresh insights and ideas. Do not talk during this pause even if the silence is uncomfortable. Convergent or evaluative phase 1. Ask all participants as a group to go up to the wall and rearrange the Post-Its into affinity groups (groups that have some common characteristic). Participants are not allowed to talk during this process. Some Post-Its may be moved several times, but they will gradually cluster into logical groupings. Post-Its may be copied in order for one idea to be fit into more than one group. 2. When all Post-Its have been arranged, ask the group to select a word or phrase that best describes each grouping. 3. Look for Post-Its that do not fit neatly into any of the groups. Consider whether such an outlier is (1) useless noise, or (2) the germ of an idea that deserves further attention. 4. Assess what the group has accomplished. Have new ideas or concepts been identified, have key issues emerged, or are there areas that need more work or further brainstorming? 5. To identify the best ideas, the facilitator or group leader should establish up to five criteria for judging the value or importance of the ideas. 6. Set the analytic priorities accordingly, and decide on a work plan for the next steps in the analysis. 6. After two or three of these pauses, conclude this divergent thinking phase of the brainstorming session. April 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  18. 18. toolbox Intelligence analytics: intelligence analysis + mathematical analytics Tony Nolan Risk, Intelligence and Analytics Officer, Australian Government H ello and welcome to my column about Intelligence Analytics. Its focus is the cross over between Intelligence Analysis and Mathematical Analytics, which I call Intelligence Analytics. We have all seen in fictional storylines and TV shows, where the use of data solves crimes, brings down the bad person and saves the day. Of course there is much exaggeration, over simplification, and of course there is always perfect data, and lots of data available. Now, when we deal with the real world, things are never that fast or easy. However, mathematics, data mining and modelling has contributed to solve crimes, reduce risks, and preventing criminal events. When we get down to it, we all use maths every day in our lives, but we don't always think about where we can use maths in our intelligence careers. This is because of a number of reasons: ● we don't think we are maths people, ● maths can't possibly measure what we need, ● there is not enough data, ● maths is something other people do, ● I don't have the skills I need, etc. 3 I'm sure we can think up lots more. But on the other side of the coin: ● maths can help us tell a story, ● maths can help us join pieces together, ● mathematical modelling can uncover patterns, ● maths can help solve a case, and ● maths has helped to save many lives all around the world. Before I continue, I want to get one thing straight. Maths can not do it all, it is not meant to replace you, it is not meant to take away any part of your job. Indeed without the Intelligence Analysts perspective, data mining, analytics, and computer modelling is useless, because it has no context without the Analyst to interpret and incorporate the results into the problem / case at hand. What I intend to do in this column, is point you to resources, share open source tools, and tell you about various methods used in the intelligence process. I hope you will find these columns helpful and informative, making your job easier and helping you to get better results. So you know a little about me, I am an Intelligence Officer who uses mathematical analysts and pat- tern recognition to profile people and environments, as well as uncover factors in events. I failed mathematics at school, and was never good at maths in university. Now, I develop new techniques, help mentor different people, and advise all levels of Australian Government, as well as to the corporate sector. I am a supporter of Analyst First, a movement which puts people before software. However, I could not really end, with out a few suggestions. Did you know that there is software freely available, that will text mine a document, or website, and produce lists of words, draws relational maps of the most used terms, and that is just the beginning. There are tools of analysis which use what is called Random Forrest, to make 500 decision trees, and then tell you just how well the model will predict a future event. There are free online tutorials on how to use maths to improve the intelligence product. Maths and Analytics give the intelligence analyst a scientific platform to support their logic and deductions, combining together to make quality reports. Until next time! April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  19. 19. toolbox Bitácora de análisis o memo analítico Juan Pablo Somiedo Madrid, Spain http://elbuhoanaltico.blogspot.com/ El memo analítico es un instrumento de apoyo al análisis muy importante. Goza de mala fama entre los analistas, porque además de suponer un trabajo extra (con el consiguiente tiempo invertido), puede hacer las veces de pequeño "chivato" de si trabajamos duro o nos dedicamos a otras cosas. Los memos analíticos se elaboran con fines de triangulación entre analistas o investigadores, para que otras personas puedan ver lo que hicimos y cómo lo hicimos. El analista refleja en este documento los pasos que ha seguido para realizar sus análisis así como el por qué ha escogido determinadas técnicas en lugar de otras. La bitácora analítica refleja lo que “transpiramos” al analizar la in- formación y nos apoya al establecer la credibilidad del método de análisis. Además facilita el hecho de que si, por cualquier motivo, abandonamos ese análisis, otro analista pueda continuar donde nosotros lo dejamos. Para la elaboración del memo analítico se sugiere seguir las siguientes indicaciones: ● Registrar la fecha de anotación ● Incluir cualquier referencia o fuente importante. Por ejemplo, si consultamos a un colega, anotar quién es él, su puesto y su comentario. Señalar material de apoyo localizado (fotografías, videos, etc). ● Marcar los memos con encabezados que sinteticen la idea, categoría o concepto analizado. ● No restringir el contenido de los memos o anotaciones, permitirnos el libre flujo de ideas. Por ejemplo, incluir anotaciones o comentarios sobre los problemas durante el proceso. ● Usar diagramas y esquemas para explicar ideas, hipótesis y conceptos ● Cuando uno piense que una categoría o concepto haya sido lo suficientemente definido, crear un memo adicional y etiquetarlo con la palabra “saturación”. ● Registrar las reflexiones que ayuden a pasar de un nivel descriptivo a otro interpretativo. ● Guardar una copia de todos los memos. Analysis Blog or Analytic Memorandum Translated by Anina Bester, Pretoria, South Africa The analytic memorandum is a very important aid instrument in analysis. However, it is not popular amongst analysts because, in addition to signify additional work (with the consequent time spend), it may sometimes serve as an “indicator” that we are working hard or that we are working on something else. The analytic memorandum is drafted with the aim of triangulation between analysts or investigators so that other people can see what we do and how this was done. In this document the analyst reflects on the steps he has taken to do his analysis, as well as on the reasons why he has selected certain techniques as opposed to others. The analysis blog therefore reflects that which we “perspire” while analyzing information and assists us to April 2012 • Foreknowledge establish the credibility of the analysis method used. It furthermore facilitates the possibility that, should we abandon the analysis for whatever reason, another analyst could continue with the process where we left. In drafting an analytic memorandum, it is suggested that the following process be followed: ● Register the date of drafting. ● Include all references or important sources. For example, if a colleague was consulted, note his name, position and his comment. Indicate available support material (photographs, videos, etc). ● Mark the memorandum with subtitles which summarizes the idea, category or analyzed concept. ● Do not limit the content of the memorandum or notes in order to allow for a free flowing of ideas. For example, include notes and comments on different problems during the process. ● Use diagrams and sketches to explain ideas, hypotheses and concepts. ● When you think a category or concept has been sufficiently defined, create an additional memorandum and label it with the word “saturated”. ● Register the thought processes which assisted you to move from a descriptive to an interpretative level. ● Keep a copy of all the memorandums. 2
  20. 20. in the news News about our profession GCHQ shortlisted in National Council for Work Experience Awards 2012 GCHQ (ed: excerpted) The GCHQ Student Sponsorship Scheme (SSS) has been shortlisted for an award by the National Council for Work Experience (NCWE). The GCHQ SSS scheme (formerly called the Sponsored Undergraduate Technologist Scheme) was established in 2005. The aim is to attract and retain technologists to GCHQ with a real technical interest and focus. They are recruited onto the scheme from University for one or two summer placements or an industrial year placement. During their time in GCHQ they are given the opportunity to work in technical areas across the department and do project work that benefits both the organisation and the student’s personal and academic development. The GCHQ SSS scheme has seen over 200 students pass through, a substantial number of which are now working as permanent employees in the Department. ACH software used by French biotechnology students Jan 2012: Twenty-six students in the Advanced Master in Biotechnology Management (link) at Grenoble Ecole de Management (GEM) are becoming beta-testers of an intelligence analysis software developed by CIA veterans – 3 a first in Europe. Arsia AmirAslani, Professor and Director of the Advanced Master in Biotechnology Management at GEM, said: “We are training students who already have a strong scientific background, bringing them strategic management, technology and innovation skills. It is essential for us to expose our students to the most advanced analytical techniques and more particularly cutting-edge software for them to immediately add value to their companies, upon graduation.” During the 24-hour of bachelor level courses and the 16-hour of graduate level courses, the student will be trained to protect sensitive data and company know-how to gain and maintain competitive advantages. From the year 2012, 20 French universities including Paris-Dauphine and the University Jean Monnet in Saint-Etienne, will pioneer these CI courses it should be spread in all the French educational programs in 2013." News release by University CIA to software vendors: A revolution is coming Reuters 21 Feb 2012 (ed: excerpted) Business Intelligence compulsory subject for all French students in 2013 Sudyrama 9 Jan 2012 From 2013 the French Government announced that business intelligence will become a compulsory subject in the educational curriculum of all French students. Olivier Buquen, the French government representative in charge of Business/economic Intelligence stated that this project is designed to train future employees and business leaders by raising awareness on the concept of intelligence. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency told software vendors on Tuesday that it plans to revolutionize the way it does business with them as part of a race to keep up with the blazing pace of technology advances. Rather than stick with traditional all-you-can-eat deals known as "enterprise licensing agreements," the CIA wants to buy software services on a "metered," pay-asyou-go basis, Ira "Gus" Hunt, the agency's top technology officer, told an industry conference. Reginald Brothers, deputy assistant secretary of defense for research, told the conference that existing software tools for data analysis, management and interaction lagged the vast amounts of information that drones and other high-tech U.S. military sensors were vacuuming up. "The big data problem is the analysis of it," he said. Existing tools "do not aid users ... in the mission timelines." April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  21. 21. career The effective analyst Janet Evans Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia In this 2nd article in a series of four articles, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and Mark Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective. I n the last issue I described how three themes emerged in the process of understanding what constitutes an effective analyst. In this issue I am going to explore in some detail the first theme as an indicator of an effective analyst, the Analytical product. I find it difficult to reflect on the effectiveness an analyst without wanting to ask what they produce. I am not alone because of the thirty subject matter experts who contributed to the study all wanted to know about products. Responses were categorised into product development and the skills required to disseminate the product. Here the focus is developing the analytical product. Four main arguments emerge when assessing analysts’ effectiveness in relation to developing products. The first is the analyst as a competent thinker. It creates a picture of an effective analyst as a person who is capable of lateral thinking, creative thought and “thinking outside the box”. The second conceptualises the analyst as a problem-solver who provides inferences and recommendations for action movApril 2012 • Foreknowledge ing the role from that of technician to decision makers associate, as described in the first article of this series. In summary the decision making aspect of the role includes mental processes resulting in the nomination of several justified alternatives for action and Mark Lowenthal (2009) describes intelligence as existing solely to support policy makers and that the analyst contribution should be to support decision makers. The third is that life experience counts for a lot in assessing analyst’s effectiveness. This study clearly identified the analyst needing a diverse range of experiences that they can draw on for their analysis. These experiences included but were not limited to being well travelled, extensive work experience and being exposed to many situations or experience within policing, being trusted and respected by peers and superiors or experience in the criminal investigations department. Everyone in the study describe a need to have something to draw on to be effective. The last is the need for training, mentioned by some but not emphasised. What this tells me is when I am looking to recruit an analyst I need to make sure they can think well, “thinking outside the box” and they use their life experience to inform their thinking. When I reflect on the recruitment processes I have used I am not sure a one hour written test adequately captures how well someone thinks particularly if I am trying to capture outside the box thinking. Equally knowing someone has collected many life experiences may not translate into something meaningful in a single interview. The question I leave you with is: do your current recruitment practices really test what you think, and research suggests will make an effective analyst? I am not sure mine have! What is also apparent is how important thinking was rated in comparison to training. Training was mentioned but thinking was emphasised. This poses some what of a dilemma because changing someone’s ability to think laterally or creatively is a much bigger challenge for organisations than training an analyst in a technique or software but if thinking is an underlying element of effectiveness we need to recruit it or develop it. Again I pose a question. How do we measure thinking skills and how do we develop them? • 2
  22. 22. people Meet Charmian Taylor Corrections intelligence analyst Department of Corrections, Wellington, New Zealand N ot many countries have intelligence analysts in their corrections department. What is the role and function of intelligence analysts in the NZ Corrections department and what value do you bring to the organisation? Operational Intelligence, the Department’s intelligence function, assists in protecting the public by identifying possible criminal activity by prisoners and working with prison management to prevent or address it. This in turn reduces the number of victims of crime, holds prisoners to account and ensures sentence compliance. Protecting the public is the NZ Corrections Department’s key priority. Operational Intelligence plays an important role in ensuring the safety of staff and prisoners and the good order of the prison environment by detecting criminal activity. Information gathered by analysts working in the Operational Intelligence Unit includes such things as who prisoners are associating with, criminal activity attempts, any tensions between prisoners or groups of prisoners (including gang tensions) and other information likely to shape or influence criminal activities. Intelligence gathered is used to track emerging trends and ‘hotspots’ of criminal behaviour, and advise prison management, so that strategies can be put in place. We believe one of the most effective ways to tackle criminals and organised crime is to have Charmian Taylor was awarded the 2011 Prime Minister’s Prize in Strategic Studies from Victoria University for achieving excellent all-round academic performance 3 advance knowledge of their activities and provide recommendations for action. Our activities also contribute to reducing crime in the community. The team liaises closely with other Government agencies, such as the NZ Police, and provides them with information and evidence to use in their investigations or bring charges against those involved in criminal offending. There are many examples where the monitoring of prisoners’ telephone conversations has led to arrests in the community for family violence, drug offending and fraud, etc. W ho are your clients and what types of intelligence products do you provide to them? We follow the National Intelligence Model, whereby we work closely with decision makers, to both provide intelligence products and advice, as well as receive direction as to intelligence priorities. This involves the integration of tasking and coordination processes within operational decision making. Intelligence products provided to decision makers within Corrections range from simple intelligence reports which detail a crime or disorder problem and suggested responses, to telephone monitoring disclosures, prisoner profiles, and tactical assessments at both a prison and national level. April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  23. 23. people T ell us about your studies and the award you received from the Prime Minister? During my studies in the Master of Strategic Studies course offered by Victoria University I completed papers covering topics such as Strategic Analysis, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Intelligence Analysis and Interpretation, Transnational Crime and Intelligence-Led Enforcement. strategic intelligence as part of the day-to-day culture of Corrections. As Intelligence is still a relatively new function, this may take some time. It’s not impossible though, and I believe there’ll be a shift towards safety and security within prisons becoming intelligence led, much like how NZ Police and Customs operate now. W hat can intelligence analysts do to promote our profession? To complete the research component of the MSS, my dissertation examined how terrorist, extremist and organised crime groups are utilising the internet and web-based technology, and identified points of convergence where intelligence operations can best utilise resources in order to achieve the most effective results. One of the most important ways Graduating in December 2010 with a MSS, I received the Prime Minister’s Prize in Strategic Studies in September 2011. The annual prize is one of three Prizes in public policy, public management and strategic studies, which are awarded to the students who have the best overall performance in the Master of Public Policy, Master of Public Management and Master of Strategic Studies. nised, you can help others to W hat are your greatest challenges you face as an intelligence analyst and how do you overcome them? As an analyst, I face a number of different challenges each day, including information collection, competing priorities and time available to undertake analysis. I wouldn’t say these are challenges are unique to just me though, but most intelligence analysts worldwide. One of the greatest challenges I face would probably be working towards embedding April 2012 • Foreknowledge to promote intelligence is for analysts to always work with honesty, integrity and passion. By building trust with information sources, as well as your decision makers, and writing products that you believe in and are willing to stand up to when scrutiunderstand and believe in the value intelligence can provide. Read more about intelligence analysis in the corrections domain: ● Example of a Criminal Tradecraft report here ● Investigation into contraband entering a prison and related issues (strategic report) here ● Intelligence: the key to gang suppression, Brain Parry here ● Using prison gang intelligence from the Inside-out, Melissa Johnson pages 4-8 here ● State of New Jersey Investigation: Gangland behind bars here (see appendix for typical use of analysis tools) ● The correction connection: intelligence gathering approaches in prisons, Jess Maghan here ● Corrections Intelligence chapter written by Melissa Johnson in Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century: a guide for Intelligence Professionals available from LEIU and IALEIA here 2
  24. 24. events discuss share collaborate 2 il 201 Apr International Studies Association Annual Convention San Diego 1 - 4 April 2012 : Hilton San Diego Bayfront, US The Intelligence Studies Section's contribution to the annual ISA conference is 18 intelligence studies oriented panels, and a number of single papers on other panels that are intelligence (national security and defense) related including: ▪ Intelligence, IT, and the Global Information Age ▪ Beyond the intelligence cycle LEIU & IALEIA Annual Conference ▪ Intelligence transformation in new democracies April 30 – May 4, 2012 Loews Coronado Bay, San Diego, US A wide range of topics and training sessions on law enforcement intelligence related topics For more information: Click here ▪ Explaining and evaluating Intelligence Analysis ▪ Who's Watching? Intelligence and surveillance in the Information Age ▪ Intelligence cooperation and communication ▪ Intelligence and the private sector ▪ Improving intelligence analysis methodologies For conference information click here For programme information, click here May International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) 8th Annual Conference 2012 21- 24 May 2012 : Washington DC, US Intelligence Education: Theory and Practice Call for papers on the following topics: ▪ Research initiatives ▪ History of intelligence analysis ▪ Future trends in the field of intelligence analysis ▪ Nexus between intelligence education and intelligence training ▪ Successes and lessons learned in intelligence education ▪ International perspectives in developing the profession Contact Bascom D. Talley, Events Committee Chair, at dittalley@jhu.edu no later than close of business on February 29, 2012. More info on CFP here, more info on conference here 3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge
  25. 25. J events 2012 une International BISA-ISA conference ISPM conference Strategic foresight, strategic agility and future orientation special interest group 20-22 June 2012 : Edinburgh, Scotland British International Studies Association and the International Studies Association Joint International Conference has the following intelligence related themes: ▪ Risks and Challenges: Information, Intelligence and Procurement in the Military ▪ International Perspectives on the Teaching of Intelligence ▪ Intelligence, Misconduct and Torture ▪ Understanding Intelligence: From National Systems to Abstract 17-20 June 2012 : Barcelona, Spain Not an intelligence conference, but topics has relevance to intelligence business and methodologies ▪ Strategic agility ▪ Environmental scanning and peripheral vision ▪ Strategic foresight ▪ Future orientation For conference information click here For special interest group information, click here For conference information click here July The Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO) Annual conference 2012 Intelligence 2012: Anticipating Risk & Influencing Action 24th - 26th July 2012: Sydney, Australia Intelligence 2012 explores the challenges arising from the growing partnership between intelligence practitioners and their customers. Customer expectations of intelligence officers are growing as intelligence-led approaches are becoming more widely employed in government and the private sector. Two key challenges to be explored at Intelligence 2012 concern: ▪ anticipating risks in the operating environment; and ▪ influencing action by decision-makers. Intelligence 2012 will include case-based perspectives from practitioners, managers and customers, offering practical advice to address these topical professional challenges. You can also attend two master classes in critical thinking and collective intelligence. For more information: Click here April 2012 • Foreknowledge 2
  26. 26. Contribute to the growing body of knowledge in the intelligence discipline by writing for journals and presenting at the following conferences. Send notices of CFP’s to editor@foreknowledge.info Call for Papers Due in April 2012 International Symposium on Foundations of Open Source Intelligence and Security Informatics: August 27 & 28, 2012, Istanbul, Turkey. Proposals: 15 April 2012. Information here Workshop on Innovation in Border Control 2012, August 21-22, 2012, Odense, Denmark. Proposals: 30 April 2012. Information here International Symposium on Open Source Intelligence & Web mining 2012, August 21-22, 2012, Odense, Denmark. Proposals: 30 April 2012. Information here Due in May 2012 Need to Know II: Lessons learned: October 16-17 21-22, 2012, Odense, Denmark. Proposals: May 20, 2012. Information here IALEIA Journal Summer 2012: Manuscripts: May 15, 2012. Information here In the next Foreknowledge: ● Feedback on the ISA conference ● Should we kill the intelligence cycle? ● Learning from other disciplines ● We talk to various thought leaders ● A wiki for the Foreknowledge resources list? ● And many more! 3 April 2012 • Foreknowledge

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