La teoría del conocimiento y el Ciclo de Inteligencia

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Should we kill the intelligence cycle?
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ISSN 2225-5613June 2012
Issue Three
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2. 2 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
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Dalene Duvenage
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From the editor 3
Should we kill the intelligence cycle? 4
The UK MoD Core functions of intelligence paradigm
El ciclo de intelligencia y la teoria del conocimiento
Pulling the plug on the intelligence cycle - where is
counterintelligence?
Bob Heibel: pioneer of intelligence analysis 10
education
Analysis software that also cooks? 11
Analyst toolbox 12
Red hat analysis
Applying red hat analysis to radicalised individuals
Make your message compelling!
Intelligence analytics: Text mining
The effective analyst: attitudes 17
Let’s reduce friction in intelligence 18
dissemination
Psychology of intelligence analysis # 3 20
Meet a Financial Intelligence Unit analyst 22
Upcoming conferences 23
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3. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 3
Dalene
Douglas Bernhardt is an
author and visiting lecturer at
various South African
universities and Mercyhurst
University in the US in
Competitive Intelligence.
Tony Nolan is a risk, intelli-
gence and analysis officer in
the Australian government.
Georgia Holmer is acting direc-
tor of the Washington DC based
Forum Foundation for Analytic
Excellence.
Janet Evans is Associate
Investigator, Centre of
Excellence in Policing and
Security, Australia
Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa
When you read this 3rd edition of Foreknowledge, you would be one of thousands of analysts and
managers across all the intelligence domains in 89 countries who have read our previous editions
thus far. Thank you for your enthusiasm and support - we’ve heard from agencies that distrib-
ute it to all units, universities that use the magazine in class exercise, while a Canadian inter
agency group of analysts discusses the articles during their knowledge sharing sessions. In our 3rd edition
we focus on the debate surrounding the intelligence cycle and discuss the different opinions and ask practi-
tioners to join in. We also look at Red Hat Analysis in the Analyst Toolbox and look at distribution and for-
matting of our intelligence reports. We meet Bob Heibel, the former FBI special agent who became a
change agent when he pioneered the first intelligence analysis qualification in the world at Mercyhurst Col-
lege 20 years ago. Is link software the sum total of your knowledge on software? We start with a series fo-
cusing on intelligence software issues in laymen's terms in this issue. Remember to do our survey so that
we can serve your needs better.
Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts:
From the editorFrom the editor
Richards Heuer is a veteran
intelligence scholar and ana-
lyst. He has written numer-
ous books and resides in
Monterey, California, USA.
He gave us permission to summarise his
book, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.
Juan Pablo Somiedo is from
Madrid, Spain where he is a
strategic and competitive
intelligence specialist .

4. 4 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
need2share
Should we kill the
intelligence cycle?
… and why should practitioners care?
"When it came time to
start writing about in-
telligence, a practice I
began in my later years
at the CIA, I realized
that there were serious
problems with the intel-
ligence cycle. It is really
not a very good descrip-
tion of the ways in
which the intelligence
process works."
Arthur Hulnick, 2006
What's wrong with the Intelligence Cycle
Many academia and only a few
practitioners have written and de-
bated about the (in)famous cycle,
most of them agreeing that it
doesn’t really reflect 21st century
reality, and as such can not be seen
as a model of the intelligence proc-
ess or functions in our complex
world. Kris Wheaton of Mercyhurst
University definitely raised the
stakes in the debate last year when
he blogged that we should kill the
intelligence cycle. In this edition we
look at why such “murderous”
terms have crept into the debate.
The debate
Philip Davis and Kristian
Gustafson1 divide the discussants in
the intelligence cycle debate in 2
groups: the conceptualists (those
that see the intelligence cycle as a
conceptual model of intelligence
activities), while the proceduralists
sees it as an attempt to map the
processes in intelligence.
Dalene Duvenage
The first group view the intelli-
gence cycle as a heuristic concept
that describes the interaction be-
tween different activities and does
not fret a lot on whether this is a
true reflection of reality, as it never
was meant to be one.
On the other hand, the procedural-
ists absolutely hates the traditional
cycle that was created in the 1940’s
and have designed variants on the
cycle or created new models based
on systems and cybernetics theo-
ries: nested cycles, cycles-within-
cycles, sensemaking loops, feed-
back loops, crisscrossing diagrams,
web diagrams, models for positive
intelligence, models for counterin-
telligence, models for law enforce-
ment intelligence, models based on
work study practices… the list goes
on..
But is this relevant to practition-
ers?
I know very few of the practition-
ers reading this article really cares
about the intelligence cycle and the
debate on whether it is relevant or
not. Because for you it is irrelevant.
You’re too busy catching criminals,
preventing terrorist attacks or out-
witting your competitors.
Most probably, the last time you
saw and maybe thought about the
intelligence cycle was during your
intelligence training. You might
dismiss the academic debate as eso-
teric navel-gazing, far removed
from your reality.
But, you are dead wrong.
The debate resonates with practi-
tioner’s day-to-day frustrations - it
reflects the dissonance you experi-
ence with what “is supposed to be”
and “what is” - between the out-
dated intelligence functions, struc-
tures and processes and the fast
moving transnational threats and
challenges we have to face and ana-
lyse everyday.
Intelligence, like so many other dis-
ciplines, is in a precarious position:
very little of what we know and
have institutionalised the last 60 -70
years is still relevant today, or will
be tomorrow. Quite a few classic
tradecraft principles and practices
will stay relevant, no matter in
what age, government system or
intelligence domain we operate.
But most of what we do and why

5. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 5
need2share
Few intelligence practitioners are aware or interested in the intensified debate among intelligence
scholars on the intelligence cycle. For them, the cycle and the discussion about its future is irrelevant.
But if practitioners are serious about the intelligence profession, they must be aware and become
involved in the debate and recognise that the debate can improve intelligence practice. In this edition,
we try to bridge this gap between academia and practitioners by highlighting some dimensions of this
important debate.
we do it, are, and will be challenged
by our new realities.
We have to relook, revisit, invent,
innovate - and that is the task of
practitioners and academia alike.
The theoretical “kill the Intelligence
cycle” debate has a practical
grounding, and the outcome of the
debate will in turn have implica-
tions in the practitioner’s reality.
What is the value of the debate?
The debate is important because it
forces us to re-examine what we are
doing and why we are doing it
when we are doing it. Will we ever
find one model that satisfies every-
one’s prescriptions and require-
ments? Definitely not!
But the debate makes us mindful
and self-aware of what could go
wrong in the interaction between
planning, tasking, collection, analy-
sis, and distribution.
It helps us to seek for better strate-
gies and processes to make intelli-
gence more effective.
It helps us to find a common vocab-
ulary and understanding of the
complexities of our cognitive proc-
esses and organizational dynamics.
The debate also strengthens the
growth of the intelligence analysis
discipline and its body of knowl-
edge.
Should we kill the intelligence cy-
cle?
This question is as loaded and mul-
ti-faceted as the question “Should
we have the death penalty?” Maybe
the question here should rather be:
“Can you contribute to the debate
about the intelligence cycle , its use-
fulness and relevancy?”
In this, and following editions, we
will introduce key aspects of the
different viewpoints and models,
hopefully challenging you to inves-
tigate them and maybe come up
with your own model or opinion. ●
1 The Intelligence Cycle is Dead, Long Live the
Intelligence Cycle: Rethinking an Intelligence
Fundamental for a New Intelligence Doctrine. ISA
Conference paper. April 2012.
Will we ever find one model
that satisfies everyone’s
prescriptions and require-
ments? Definitely not!

6. 6 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
In practical terms, the core func-
tions communicated back and
forth and across the ‘cycle’ rather
than steps in a sequence, the rela-
tionships between the various
principal intelligence activities
were best visualised as a network
of dialogues and sometimes short-
circuits across the whole intelli-
gence framework. Any two, three
or even all four functions could be
‘wired together’ in different, often
spontaneous ways.
The final visual representation of
the core functions paradigm pre-
sented in the final doctrine docu-
ment was essentially that the
enhanced core functions topology
that is, with the ‘latent’, traditional
intelligence cycle marked out sep-
arately and the newer core func-
tions topology inscribed within
the cycle. The only notable altera-
tion to the network topology was
superimposition of the Jack Re-
port’s continuous review process
At the recent International Studies
Association conference in San Di-
ego, Prof Philip Davies of the
Brunel University’s Centre for In-
telligence and Security Studies de-
scribed the process of developing
a new Joint military doctrine for
the UK MOD in 2010 and 2011, in
which the debate surrounding the
intelligence cycle led the task team
to propose a new heuristic or con-
ceptual representation of the intel-
ligence functions and not
processes.
He stressed the point that no dia-
gram can effectively depict the in-
telligence processes, but that it is
possible to attempt to draw a func-
tional model.
Their task team agreed that the
core functions paradigm was more
than a cycle, and that the tradi-
tional intelligence cycle could be
subsumed by it.
Therefore, the next question was
how to most usefully represent the
‘logical inter-relationships’ be-
tween direction, collection,
processing and dissemination. It
was concluded that what was re-
quired was an alternative topology,
and that the most useful topologi-
cal representation was as an all-
channel network.
While the intelligence cycle out-
wardly appears a simple process,
in reality it is a complex set of ac-
tivities. It is a continuous process
comprising many cycles operating
at different levels and speeds. Al-
though the 4 individual tasks are
discrete, as information flows and
is processed and disseminated as
intelligence, the tasks overlap and
coincide so that they are often con-
ducted concurrently, rather than
sequentially.
The UK Ministry of Defence’s
“Core functions of intelligence paradigm”
From the conceptual school of thought by scholars
over the horizontal and vertical
cross-connections in the centre of
the diagram. It is a logical and
methodical process intended to
get the best available intelligence
to the commander, but it should
not be seen as prescriptive.
It will always be imperfect, but
decision-making has risks and the
imperfect nature of the intelli-
gence product must be factored in.
Davies concluded that the new
model satisfied the ‘old guard’ in-
telligence cycle advocates while
also meeting the concerns of ‘radi-
cal’ critics by making the differ-
ence between principle (concepts)
and practice (process) explicit, and
providing for separate articulation
of procedural specifics at a differ-
ent (and more appropriate) doctri-
nal level. ●
Become an ISA member to access
Davies and Gustafson’s paper.
need2share

7. 7 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
need2share
En la actualidad el ciclo
de inteligencia pensado
por “Sher”, como le
llamaban sus colegas
más cercanos, está siendo puesto en
duda. Algunos analistas dudan de
su utilidad en un mundo que ha ev-
olucionado hacia notas y caracterís-
ticas muy diferentes de las que
pudo ver aquél profesor. Cierta-
mente desde el punto de vista de
Kent, el ciclo de inteligencia es, a
priori, un enfoque convencional de
resolución de problemas, es decir,
opera desde la pregunta (problema)
hacia la respuesta (solución). El flu-
jo que establece es lineal y resoluble
y esto no se corresponde con los
procesos cognitivos que ocurren en
el razonamiento humano ni con una
visión compleja de la realidad que,
desde luego, es no lineal y no resol-
uble. En el intento de linealizar
problemas no lineales a través del
ciclo de inteligencia están muchas
de las carencias que plantea la disci-
plina.
Muchas veces, es el analista quien
debe buscar el problema para, en un
momento posterior, encontrar la
solución. Los decisores no siempre
saben cuáles son los problemas re-
ales a los que se tienen que enfren-
tar. Como Donald Rumsfeld, afirmó
en una entrevista: “We don´t know
what we don´t know”. De esta for-
ma, frecuentemente son los analis-
tas de inteligencia quienes tienen
que asesorar a los decisores sobre
dónde deberían centrar su atención.
Henry Kissinger decía que
desconocía qué productos de la in-
teligencia necesitaba, pero que los
reconocía cuando los veía en la me-
sa de su despacho.
En la película clásica “El hombre
invisible” de James Whale, basada
en la novela de H.G. Wells, el pro-
tagonista descubre un método para
volverse invisible (que lo convierte
en asesino). Al final, la policía lo
descubre por las pisadas que deja
sobre la nieve. Esta analogía puede
servirnos para intentar explicar
parte del trabajo de un analista. A
falta de contar con otra cosa, el
analista se ve obligado a buscar las
“huellas en la nieve”. Así se dedica a
buscar las llamadas “weak signals”
o señales débiles, que se definen co-
mo “a development about which on-
ly partial information is available at
the moment when response must be
launched, if it is to be completed be-
fore the development impacts on the
firm”. Es decir, las señales débiles
son elementos que pueden incitar,
en el analista atento y sensible a el-
las, una sensación de que algo im-
portante pudiera estar iniciándose o
pudiera ocurrir en un futuro.
La idea es que la identificación de
las señales débiles permiten a una
organización la detección de una
amenaza u oportunidad incipiente y,
por tanto, reaccionar con mayor rap-
idez y eficacia. Posteriormente, algu-
nas de esas “weak signals” se
convierten en indicadores que pasan
a ser monotorizados para su posteri-
or seguimiento. Un ejemplo aplicado
El Ciclo de Inteligencia y la Teoría Del Conocimiento
Juan Pablo Somiedo
al mundo de la inteligencia contra-
terrorista es el movimiento de los
terroristas de una célula a otra. Nor-
malmente se interpretan esos mov-
imientos como “weak signals” o
señales débiles que pueden indicar
la preparación de un próximo aten-
tado terrorista.
El problema es que la experiencia
nos demuestra que si queremos ser
efectivos no basta con adoptar una
actitud pasiva de seguimiento de las
mismas variables todo el tiempo.
Cada cierto tiempo debemos formu-
lar hipótesis de trabajo que nos con-
duzcan a establecer nuevas variables
de cuyo seguimiento podemos
obtener nuevas señales débiles útiles
para la organización. Y esto obliga al
analista a un continuo trabajo de ac-
tualización.
Conviene aclarar que lo que se pone
en duda no es la arquitectura del cic-
lo de inteligencia, que puede ser más
o menos viable como marco estruc-
tural, sino su rigidez a la hora de lid-
iar con determinados problemas. En
esta línea estoy de acuerdo con Rob-
ert M. Clark cuando afirma que “el
ciclo de inteligencia puede describir
la estructura y la función de in-
teligencia pero no describe el
proceso de inteligencia en sí mis-
mo.” ●

8. 8 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
Pulling the Plug on the Intelligence Cycle
- where Is Counterintelligence?
Author: B (practitioner & scholar)
In previewing this edition, the April
issue of Foreknowledge posed the
question “Should we kill the intelli-
gence cycle?” From a counterintelli-
gence perspective, we may just as
well switch off the life support.
The cycle, you see, has actually
been terminally ill for some time.
Its priesthood must now account
for a cardinal sin committed in the
roughly sixty years of its existence.
They persisted in trying to convert-
ing us in believing the cycle offers
an explanation of intelligence proc-
ess. The truth is out – it never ex-
plained counterintelligence.
If it does not explain counterintelli-
gence, it does not explain intelli-
gence generally. Attempts to add a
few years of artificial life through
endless qualifications and cosmetic
modifications will not save this pa-
tient. Do we have any choice but to
pull the plug, do the autopsy, and
intensify the quest for alternatives?
This, the first of a three-part series,
briefly examines a two-fold problem
statement. Firstly, what is the intelli-
gence cycle and what is expected
from it? Secondly, how is the cycle
measuring up against this expecta-
tion?
What is expected from the intelli-
gence cycle?
The intelligence cycle is a theoretical
construct within the process model
‘family’. A model should be an ide-
alised, simplified and preferably vi-
sual representation of the range of
activities that is, applied to this con-
text, collectively referred to as the
intelligence process.
The importance of process models
can hardly be over emphasized.
These concepts are indispensable in
structuring our thinking on intelli-
gence. They also condition the way
we execute the business of intelli-
gence. The following quote from the
2005 WMD report, illustrates this
point and summarises what is prob-
ably the predominant thinking in
intelligence services and agencies
internationally: "The process of
tasking, collecting, processing, ana-
lysing, and disseminating intelli-
gence is called the intelligence
cycle. The intelligence cycle drives
the day-to-day activities of the In-
telligence Community".
Beautiful oversimplification
As is clear from the quote, in its
‘purist’ form the traditional intelli-
gence cycle has a beautiful simplici-
ty. It comprises of a circular,
self-repeating process of the five
‘steps’ cited above.
However, from especially the 1990s
onwards, pioneering voices in the
U.S.A. raised the alarm - something
is not quite right. The cycle’s sim-
plicity is an oversimplification. It is
an oversimplification to the degree
that there are disconcerting fissures
between theory (the cycle) and
practice (the actual way in which
intelligence is done).
Cycle does not address counterin-
telligence
Most of these deficiencies have been
well documented and are discussed
in other contributions to this edition
of Foreknowledge. With some excep-
tions – notably Hulnick’s (2007)
must-read “What’s wrong with the
intelligence cycle?” – critiques of
the intelligence cycle underplay a
The Austrian Armed Forces’ Intelligence Cycle
“ Do we have any
choice but to pull the
plug, do the autopsy,
and intensify the quest
for alternatives? ”
need2share

9. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 9
fundamental question, namely:
Where is counterintelligence in the
intelligence cycle?
Intelligence is after all seen as com-
prising of four major ‘elements’ (al-
so referred to as ‘functions’ and
‘disciplines’), namely collection,
analysis, covert action and counter-
intelligence. Of these collection and
analysis feature in the traditional
cycle. Counterintelligence, with
covert action, are conspicuously ab-
sent. If the intelligence cycle does
not explain counterintelligence it
cannot hold as an intelligence proc-
esses model.
CI throughout the cycle?
To officers starting out their careers
– be careful when raising such a
point during training. The standard,
indignant arrogant response might
well be that counterintelligence is
performed throughout the cycle.
You might be told that counterintel-
ligence mirrors the flow of the intel-
ligence cycle.
Really? No example could be found
within consulted Intelligence Stud-
ies' literature of an endeavour that
feasibly demonstrates the conceptu-
al moulding of counterintelligence
dynamics with the traditional intel-
ligence cycle.
Duvenage & Hough (2011) mention
attending numerous elaborate pres-
entations and lectures on how this
‘counterintelligence-throughout-the-
cycle’ concept works. Well, from a
counterintelligence perspective, it
does not work.
Such presentations score high marks
for demonstrating Power Point so-
phistication and graphic illustra-
tions, but fail to convincingly
demonstrate the working of the
nebulous ‘throughout’/mirror con-
cept.
Conceptual quagmires
They are conceptual quagmires en-
deavouring to artificially hammer a
square peg (counterintelligence) in-
to a round/cyclic hole (intelligence
cycle). Omissions, tacit assump-
tions, vague references and elabo-
rate explanations of
counterintelligence fitting in some-
where in an (added) exploitation’
phase, being performed throughout
the intelligence cycle and/or mirror-
ing the intelligence cycle should be
seen for what they are.
They are all symptomatic fruits of
an inability to conceptually inte-
grate the fiddly counterintelligence
discipline with the intelligence
process'.
Should we kill the intelligence cycle? The cycle, you see, has actually
been terminally ill for some time. From a counterintelligence
perspective, we may just as well switch off the life support. Attempts
to add a few years of artificial life through endless qualifications and
cosmetic modifications will not save this patient.
The intelligence
cycle is a beautiful
oversimplification
that has no bearing
on reality
Take the trouble and study the ori-
gin and history of the traditional
intelligence cycle. You will be re-
warded by seeing the intelligence
cycle for what it is and was intend-
ed to be - a model explaining the
positive intelligence process. By the
look of the deficiencies listed in lit-
erature, it is no longer particularly
successful in this either. It does, in
short, not meet that what is expect-
ed from such a model.
In the forthcoming edition of Fore-
knowledge, some ideas will be raised
on alternatives. ●
Article based on Duvenage, BPC & Hough,
M 2011, The conceptual structuring of the intel-
ligence and counterintelligence processes : endur-
ing holy grails or crumbling axioms - quo vadis,
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 33,
no. 1, pp. 29-77. Download here (10MB pdf)
need2share

10. 10 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
Share with us your journey to es-
tablish intelligence analyst educa-
tion in the US.
After retirement from the FBI in
1987, an experienced college profes-
sor friend and I designed a four-
year undergraduate program built
on a Liberal Arts foundation that
could be initiated using existing
courses and thereafter built on with
the intelligence topics. After being
rejected by three different institu-
tions, including my alma mater, I
approached Mercyhurst College
(now Mercyhurst University) a
four-year Liberal Arts Catholic
school in Erie, in late 1991.
My concept was to create an intelli-
gence concentration in Mercyhurst’s
history program that would pro-
duce graduates who were entry-lev-
el qualified as intelligence analysts
for government and the private sec-
tor. The stars were in alignment.
The president of the college, Dr.
William P. Garvey, was a true entre-
preneur willing to take a chance if
the cost was reasonable. After a
short study on market potential, he
gave the go ahead. We partnered
with the history department and by
fall term 1992 had recruited 14 stu-
dents.
Our intelligence studies effort re-
mained in the history department
until 2004, during which time it
grew steadily. Of course, what
changed the perception - acceptance
Bob Heibel
Pioneer of intelligence analysis education
of intelligence studies and the de-
mand for its graduates - were the
events of 9/11.
A U.S. Department of Education
FIPSE grant of $250,000 in 2004 ena-
bled the creation of the Institute for
Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst.
The department consisted of an un-
dergraduate BA in Intelligence
Studies, a Master of Science in Ap-
plied Intelligence (approved in
2004), and a series of graduate cer-
tificate programs tailored for corpo-
rate and government clients. Over
the past 20 years the Mercyhurst
program has grown to approximate-
ly 350 students at the university and
another 100-plus online and in
Washington, D.C. These resultant
skills are recognized by potential
employers and allow us to place 90
percent of graduates in a short peri-
od of time.
Does intelligence analysis educa-
tion have a future?
I have no doubt that the Mercyhurst
intelligence studies model has clear-
ly proven that academia has the po-
tential to provide qualified
entry-level intelligence analysts to
government and the private sector.
As veteran intelligence professional, Bob Heibel realised the need for an education program that could
deliver well-trained analysts to the intelligence community. In 1992, he started the
Research/Intelligence Analyst Program (RI/AP) at the Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania which
has grown into a fully fledged Institute for Intelligence Studies. Twenty years later, the MCIIS’s will
celebrate its 20th anniversary this July with a solid reputation and hundreds of graduates employed in
law enforcement, national security as well as business/competitive intelligence.
What advice would you give to in-
telligence analysts regarding pro-
fessional development
opportunities?
They must find some way to main-
tain and enhance their skills. Ideally
this should be enabled by their em-
ployer through a combination of in-
house and external training, profes-
sional organizations and academic
programs. Academia’s role in this
will eventually include an ultimate
intelligence studies degree and the
development of true intelligence re-
search institutes, which currently do
not exist. ●
This model differs from the historic
intelligence community approach.
Traditionally the IC has sought sub-
ject matter experts with advanced
degrees and after hiring trained
them to be intelligence analysts.
The Mercyhurst model challenges
that by providing a “generalist” as
early as 21 years of age who enters
the job market with proven applied
skills that allow them to immediate-
ly contribute to their employer’s
mission. They can then become sub-
ject-matter experts as appropriate.
There should be room for both ap-
proaches. In my opinion, graduat-
ing students with proven applied
intelligence-related skills are the
key to the success of future academ-
ic programs.
people

11. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 11
Get used to it as this phenomenon
is likely to flare up in the months
ahead with software vendors vying
for new business opportunities -
also in intelligence. Of course you
know software cannot cook, neither
can it analyse. It requires a mindful
human that understands the con-
text of the information and the abil-
ities of the software to visualise
analytical hypotheses.
A new vendor landscape
Now that a consolidation has taken
place in the content management
/document management and Busi-
ness Intelligence space, vendors
will start looking for new growth
areas -including intelligence. Big
Data is currently a hot topic in the
IT world and data warehousing /
business intelligence suppliers have
realized that this includes not only
quantitative or structured but also
unstructured and text based data.
Some vendors have been quick on
the proverbial draw and taken steps
to shore up on this front. It may be
old news, but IBM has purchased
Analysts Notebook (I2), SAP is
partnering with Palantir and SAS
has settled on Memex. This pro-
vides them with opportunities in
non-traditional areas. IBM has in-
teresting plans for integrating I2 in-
to its wider architectural
framework. Similarly, Visual Ana-
lytics has opened up a new vista for
traditional Business Intelligence
and Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) software vendors.
Visual analytics and reasoning
In a sense, this is good news for in-
telligence analysts. Why you ask?
The concept of Visual Analytics
places you as the analyst in a piv-
otal role in the process of making
sense of large data sets.
This is not to say that software ven-
dors necessarily understand the
concept of Visual Analytics, which
is the science of analytical reason-
ing facilitated by highly interactive
graphical interfaces. This implies a
) the capability of supporting hy-
pothesis driven and exploratory
analysis, b) granular drill down ca-
pability and, c) does not take days
to change or code what you want to
see.
With Visual Analytics you have to
wield the analytical Excalibur – not
the software coder or vendor’s pro-
fessional service team slaving in the
back office.
OSINT software
OSINT has also sprouted a myriad
of software vendors vying for a
space at the barbeque. A broad
comparison between Visual Analyt-
ical and OSINT software systems
reveals that they share various
processes such as 1) collection, har-
vesting and retrieval, 2) data aug-
mentation, entity extraction, fusion
3) marshalling and modelling, and
4) visualization in some form of
portal, dashboard or graphical rep-
resentation.
The onus on analysts
When using software applications
of this nature it is important to real-
ize that the efficacy of any tool is
negated unless data is pre-analysed
in some way - more so if it is un-
structured data. This in a sense
places the onus on modern analysts
to have a good understanding of
data structures and working with
.CSV and other files types and ap-
plications like Excel.
I have met too many analysts who
are weak in this area and shy away
from it as far possible. But most
analyst centric software tools re-
quire the analyst to import and ma-
nipulate the data prior to utilizing
analytical functionality. Poor ap-
preciation of specifics and intrica-
cies relating to importing data into
an application will have a profound
effect on the presentation thereof
which can lead to skewed analysis.
Analysts generally want instantane-
ous results when working with soft-
ware applications. In some cases,
this is possible, however, there’s no
such thing as a free barbeque.
If analysts want to exploit the full
capabilities of the new generation
of analytical software tools, they
will need to be trained in data man-
agement, in addition to their usual
analytical skill sets.
Ok…I’m off to that barbeque. Until
the next Foreknowledge! ●
This column provides you with news and
information of the software and technol-
ogy available to help you with your ana-
lytical tasks. This includes topic areas such
as geo-spatial analysis, link-analysis, social
network analysis, intelligence manage-
ment systems, tools available to support
various structured analytical techniques,
crowd sourcing tools, tips and snippets
for the preparation of datasets, and infor-
mation to help you dealing with IT staff in
your organizations and make better deci-
sions when buying software. If there are
specific topics you want us to cover, you
are welcome to forward requests to
tech@foreknowledge.info
Ever walked out of a software sales presentation with the distinct
impression that the offering can barbeque your steak too?
RJG
tech
… intel software that
also cooks?

12. 12 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
toolbox
Red Hat
Analysis
From Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analy-
sis by Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. 2010.
experts to put themselves in
the adversary’s shoes and sim-
ulate how the adversary or
group would respond.
3. Emphasize the need to avoid
mirror imaging. The question
is not “What would you do if
you were in their shoes?” but
“How would this person or
group most likely
think/behave/respond to the
stimulus?”
4. Individual experts can be as-
signed to role-play a specific
counterpart in that group, or
experts can be tasked with en-
suring that all the relevant in-
formation relating to each of
their areas of responsibility is
put on the table.
5. Capture the most likely outcome
by: a) making a list of actions the
person or group is most likely to
take b) describing a conversation
where the target or individual
talks in the first person or c)
drafting a document (set of in-
structions, military orders, poli-
cy paper, or directives) that the
adversary would likely gener-
ate.
6. The best outcomes are those
that most accurately replicate
the actual decision-making
process. ●
When to Use It
Red Hat Analysis works best
when trying to predict the behav-
iour of a specific person who has
the authority to make decisions.
Authoritarian leaders as well as
small, cohesive groups, such as
terrorist cells, are obvious candi-
dates. It is much less effective
when dealing with a leader who
is constrained by a legislature or
influenced by conflicting interest
groups
Value Added
Red Hat Analysis is a technique
that can 1) help anticipate the de-
cision-making of an individual
that is difficult to understand or
observe; 2) help avoid ethnocen-
trism and provide needed cultur-
al context; and 3) encourage
insights into personal motivations
underlying decision-making of an
individual.
Method
1. Gather a group of experts with
in-depth knowledge of the tar-
get country, company or
group, operating environment,
and the senior decisionmaker’s
personality, motives, and style
of thinking.
2. Present the experts with a situ-
ation or a stimulus and ask the
Red Hat Analysis falls under the re-
framing category of structured ana-
lytical techniques. An individual or
group can change their mindset or
mental model of how things normally
work and challenge their own think-
ing about the problem, simply by
changing the questions it asks or
changing the perspective from which
it asks them.
Red Hat Analysis was designed to
help intelligence analysts anticipate
the behaviour of an adversary by
putting oneself “in their shoes” or
putting on “their hat.” To do this ef-
fectively, without mirror imaging,
requires substantial area and cultural
expertise. A person who brings this
type of cultural expertise to a group
or project is known as a red hatter.
Related to this technique are Red
Cell and Red Team analysis in which
a group “plays the enemy” in an ef-
fort to gain strategic insight. A Red
Cell is a unit that plays the adversary
role in testing the effectiveness of
their own government or company’s
tactics or personnel in a military ex-
ercise or war game. A Red Team is
an organizational element comprised
of trained and educated members
that provide an independent capabili-
ty to fully explore alternatives in
plans and operations from the per-
spective of adversaries and others.
A good example of the latter is
Helene Lavoix’s Red Team Analysis
blog
Analyst toolbox

13. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 13
Applying Red Hat Analysis
to understand the
radicalisation of individuals
Georgia Holmer is acting director of the Forum Foundation for Analytic Excellence, whose
mission is to promote the effective use of critical thinking skills and structured analytic
techniques by teaching, certifying, and applying these skills and techniques to a broad
range of enduring and emerging issues. This is a redacted version of a paper she presented
at the 2012 ISA conference on how she applied Red Hat Analysis to understand the
radicalisation of individuals.
There exists some dissonance be-
tween the accepted purpose and
method of this analytic technique.
Although the method tries to pre-
vent mirror imaging, during role
play, one has tap into individual
experiential knowledge and em-
pathy. Its value is therefor rooted
in gazing directly into a mirror -
an effective combination of cogni-
tion and empathy.
Red Hat Analysis could be
viewed as a unique employment
of both critical and creative facul-
ties; a technique that provides in-
sight into both those motivational
factors that are contextually or
culturally determined and the
more universal psychological
drivers that can be discovered
through the process of identifying
or relating to another’s experi-
ence.
Red Hat Analysis is to help un-
derstand individual trajectories of
radicalization and involvement in
terrorist activity. Red Hat Analy-
sis has been used with some fre-
quency in the Intelligence
Community to help predict the
decisions and choices of a terrorist
group or cell leader. However, the
nature of terrorism has changed
substantially over the past decade
with the emergence of loosely af-
filiated networks of self-radical-
ized individuals. These new
models of terrorism lack the tradi-
tional organizational structure
that involves a centralized leader-
ship or more formal group affilia-
tion. Georgia tweaked the
methodology to apply it here as
well.
1. Re-define the target. Expand the
target application of Red Hat
Analysis to reflect modern ter-
rorist activity, and specifically
include those individuals who
are self-radicalized and carry
out attacks independent of
formal group affiliation or di-
rection.
2. Require a specific set of experts.
Gather analysts to participate
in the exercise that include ex-
perts on terrorism, individuals
with significant cultural and
regional experience, specialists
in specific radical ideologies,
and those with knowledge of
the psychological processes of
radicalization.
3. Identify a spectrum of scenarios.
Ask analysts to generate a
range or spectrum of possible
trajectories an individual
might follow, from disengage-
ment and/or de-radicalization
to direct involvement in vio-
lent acts.
4. Require a thorough engagement
in role play. Construct a role
play exercise that involves a
specific trigger or catalyst
could lead to a change in the
status quo. Have each partici-
pant engage in the role play,
taking turns as the target, and
expanding the list of scenarios
or possible trajectories. Con-
sider using the first rule of im-
provisational theater in which
all possibilities are allowed
and affirmed during this crea-
tive and exploratory stage. In-
sist that analysts use the first
person in their expression.
5. Examine all outcomes. Collect
all identified scenarios, collec-
tively consider the likelihood
of each, and select those that
are most deserving of atten-
tion. The goal is to expand an
understanding of the possibili-
ties using a structured tech-
nique. The hope is that a
sufficiently robust number of
outcomes have been generated
to gain a deeper and more
comprehensive understanding
of the phenomenon and avoid
future surprise. ●

14. 14 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
One of the toughest facts
that any Intelligence prac-
titioner must accept is that
a first-class intelligence
deliverable, regardless of
the depth of findings and analysis
that may underpin it, will often
fail to achieve its principle objec-
tive; that is, to provide decision-
makers with product that they
find both compelling and relevant
to their individual and collective
concerns. There are a number of
explanations for this, one of which
is often overlooked; the ‘packag-
ing’ of intelligence.
Typically, when finished intelli-
gence products are distributed to
management consumers they of-
ten amount to dry, colourless epis-
tles of mainly regurgitated facts
and news. They are, in effect, little
more than stirred (not shaken!)
cocktails of open source based in-
formation. It is also apparent that
in many instances the very person-
alities of analysts charged with de-
livering, or presenting product
will fall short of anything that
might be deemed inspiring;
they’re simply not skilled in ‘sell-
ing’, or persuading.
More emphasis on past than fu-
ture
Perhaps more importantly, future-
oriented analysis (e.g. alternative
futures analysis or analysis of
competing hypotheses) that
should spring from company-wide
coordination led by the CI depart-
ment is seldom on offer.
The result is that an analysis of
“what happened”–standard fare in
CI reporting–simply does not reso-
nate with, and is therefore not use-
ful to, corporate decision-makers.
What decision-makers want
What they need are judgments fo-
cusing on what could, or is likely,
to happen, with explanations of
why analysts think so. Managers
also appreciate a strong HUMINT
component in an intelligence deliv-
erable; knowing the thinking and
intentions of target sources is as, if
not more, important than knowing
their organisations’ capabilities.
Otherwise, senior executives in
particular may just as well search
for the insight and ‘enlightenment’
they want from the raft of mind-
numbing analysts’ reports pub-
lished by major investment banks,
from their trusted personal advi-
sors and friends (who usually have
their own agendas), or, for a quick
‘news fix’, from CNN, Bloomberg,
or BBC News.
Think: when was the last time
that the intelligence you delivered
caused your company’s manage-
ment to modify their behaviour,
their strategy, or their plans?
There is considerable scope for im-
provement in the ‘packaging’ of
intelligence products in private
sector organisations. We believe,
for example, that there are impor-
tant lessons that can be learned
from advertising and from story-
telling.
Lessons from advertising
Consider some of the key princi-
ples of advertising:
● the ability to capture the
“buyer’s” attention.
● the ability to sustain their at-
tention.
● the ability to transmit the
message clearly within a very
limited time span.
● the ability to convince the
consumer to accept the mes-
sage of the ad, and the ad
brand (say, for example, the
competitive intelligence func-
tion itself).
Are these the principles which un-
derpin the delivery of your ‘prod-
ucts’?
Lessons from storytelling
Storytelling, too, is a powerful art
form that is often overlooked.
Robert McKee, a highly regarded
screenwriting lecturer, argues that
although “Persuasion is the centre-
piece of business activity … de-
spite the critical importance of
Make your message
compelling!
Douglas Bernhardt
toolbox
Although Douglas wrote this article from a
competitive intelligence perspective , the
problems and principles he addresses are
relevant to all intelligence domains
When was the last time your intelligence report caused the
decision-makers to modify their plans and strategies?

15. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 15
toolbox
persuasion, most executives [and,
we would add, analysts] struggle
to communicate, let alone inspire.”
He believes that listeners can be
engaged “on a whole new level if
[we] toss [our] PowerPoint slides
and learn to tell good stories in-
stead.”
What can a story do? Again ac-
cording to McKee, “Essentially, a
story expresses how and why life
changes.” A good story will incite
interest, excitement and emotions
on the part of the listener in a way
that static graphs, spreadsheets,
tables, and lists of data simply
can’t. When was the last time you
promised yourself a good ‘bedtime
read’ of a Credit Suisse, JP Morgan
Chase, or Goldman Sachs research
report?
Appeal to the soul and not intel-
lect
When trying to persuade, logic
and reason are not enough; they
appeal to the intellect, not the soul.
Consider: why did Mr Bush and
Dr Rice not respond to the PDB of
6th August 2001–less than six
weeks prior to the attacks of 11th
September 2001 on the Pentagon
and New York’s World Trade Cen-
tre–with the urgency that one
might reasonably expect from sen-
ior political leaders? The docu-
ment’s headline alone should have
been sufficient to elicit a strong re-
action– followed by effective
action!–on their part. Remember,
the PDB did judge that Bin Ladin
was “determined to strike”, not
that he might have been thinking
Finished intelligence products distributed to management consumers often amount
to dry, colourless epistles of mainly regurgitated facts and news. They are, in effect,
little more than stirred (not shaken!) cocktails of open source based information.
about it. How often have your
firm’s decision-makers discounted
or ignored intelligence because
they did not regard it as compel-
ling, or possibly because it did not
conform to their personal agendas
or organisational policies?
Using film or video to get your
message across
A good story can also leverage
film or video to considerable ad-
vantage. We show our MBA stu-
dents clips from documentaries
and Hollywood productions to
support specific lessons. Because it
does so within the context of cine-
ma, it becomes an almost irresisti-
ble story and students are left in
no doubt about the intelligence
principles we wanted to bring
home.
Although exploring the many ele-
ments of a good story are well be-
yond the scope of this article, we
do suggest that for a brief over-
view you may wish to start with
Robert McKee’s article “Storytell-
ing That Moves People” in Harvard
Business Review (2003, Vol. 81, No
6).
If a central aim of intelligence is to
support the making of smarter
strategic choices, doesn’t it make
sense to do what is necessary to
ensure that in each and every case
its presentation matches the quali-
ty, and reinforces the urgency, of
the analysis?
Analysts must therefore be compe-
tent in presenting analysis, both
orally and in writing. Ultimately,
sculpting the product is only the
first step; ensuring that it is ‘well
received’ by the consumer is the
second. ●
Douglas can be reached at
douglas.bernhardt@gmail.com
President Barack Obama receives the Presidential Daily Briefing from Robert Cardillo, Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration, in the Oval Office, Jan. 31, 2012.
Part of the briefing was done using an iPad. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

16. 16 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
analytics
Intelligence
Tony Nolan
Text mining
For this edition’s column, I
would like to talk about how
the intelligence process can be
used for both research and also
sending out a message. Analytics
is not just about numbers alone.
Text mining is the analytical proc-
ess of understanding words, lan-
guage, information and
knowledge. While the majority of
Intelligence work is about the
words and language, very little
analysis is conducted on text, as
the equivalent of numbers, where
you can look for patterns. The rest
of this article is written on the as-
sumption that you have legal au-
thority and permission to conduct
the following activities.
Text mining applies linguistic
rules and statistical methods to
automatically analyse electronic
text and helps you discover in-
sights that are often buried in
large amounts of unstructured
text data – such as email, social
media content, blogs and other
online media sources. Text min-
ing, when combined with meta-
data (extra information about the
dataset provided from outside of
the dataset), gives a powerful
view of the person’s language,
their intent, knowledge about the
topic, and their intended message.
I bet you thought there is no room
for human understanding in text
mining, but there is. The Intelli-
gence Officer is still needed to
make sense of the high frequency
words and concepts derived by
nearest neighbour groupings to
track the information behaviour of
the targets.
You can text mine emails, text
files, word documents, pdf’s, and
even webpages. There are com-
puter programs like web spiders,
web scrapers, etc, where you can
put in the desired words your’e
interested in text mining, and they
go off and use the search engines
to locate those relevant webpages,
and then save them in a corpus
ready for text mining. There is also
free text mining software such as
R available.
Basically any one can use open
source software for free, to locate a
piece of text, or convert a pdf file
to text, or download a webpage,
and then process them into a dic-
tionary, examine frequency
counts, and look at the correlation
between words, and have concept
maps, link charts and word
clouds. All you need is an internet
connection, a Linux emulator, and
the R console software. I will re-
visit R software in future articles.
Now for a real world example.
The NSW Police Force in Australia
has developed a project called
Eyewatch. Basically, project Eye-
watch is about communicating
with the people of NSW using Fa-
cebook to gather Intelligence, and
also to provide information back
to the general population, but
more specifically the local popu-
lation of each Local Area Com-
mand.
This type of project lends itself to
text mining. Once the text is cap-
tured from both the Facebook
posts and virtual neighbourhood
watch meetings, then many dif-
ferent pieces of analysis are avail-
able. For instance once the data is
loaded, you can compare sets of
posts from different times, loca-
tions, sexes, communities, etc and
examine if there are any highest
frequency words, as well as outli-
er words, specific to each commu-
nity.
You can also examine the lan-
guage and the syntax between the
datasets. Finally it also becomes
possible to geocode the locations
mentioned, and integrate it into
your crime or marketing analysis.
Of course you can also produce
word clouds and link charts
based on word frequency and
nearest neighbour. ●
Risk,IntelligenceandAnalyticsOfficer,AustralianGovernment
toolbox

17. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 17
The effective analyst
Part 3: Attitude
Janet Evans
Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia
In this issue I will
continue to talk
about the findings
of the effective an-
alyst study focus-
ing on attitudinal
factors that indi-
cate an effective analyst and since
this issue is focused on the intelli-
gence cycle I will also describe how
the findings from our study tie into
the intelligence cycle.
First and foremost: A do-er
While attitudinal factors have been
considered in previous research the
importance of attitude has been un-
derestimated. The want or desire to
be in intelligence has not been rec-
ognised previously and factors like
being a do-er, being intelligent, mo-
tivated, independent and being a
decision maker in their own right is
largely ignored. In our study attitu-
dinal factors incorporated com-
ments that describe the analysts
disposition to intelligence work and
analysis. The most frequently
sighted attitudinal factor is what we
called the do-er. A do-er is some-
one who is energetic, willing,
proactive, achievement oriented
and accomplishes a lot.
Second: passion for intelligence
Another important factor that de-
scribes an effective analyst is a per-
son who has a passion for
intelligence and has chosen to be
there. Many who participated in
our study reported that having staff
that are in intelligence positions for
the ‘wrong’ reasons has a negative
impact on their peers and analysts
described being demoralised by
those that showed no interest in in-
telligence work.
Decision-makers felt that analysts
in intelligence for the ‘wrong’ rea-
sons tainted the whole of intelli-
gence analysis with a poor work
ethic. The examples included peo-
ple placed in Analysis because they
could not cope in other areas.
In this 3rd article in a series of four articles, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and
Mark Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective.
career
Attitude is a little
thing that makes a big
difference.
Winston Churchill
The intelligence cycle and the ef-
fective analyst study
The ‘intelligence cycle’ has four dis-
tinct areas and in our study, only
two of those (analysis and dissemi-
nation) were raised by the partici-
pants as relating to analyst
effectiveness. Interestingly, they do
not deem skills in data
collection/collation or direct in-
volvement in the direction phase of
the intelligence cycle necessary for
the analyst’s effectiveness.
Rather, it seems as though analysts
view the amount of time spent on
collecting and collating data as
“dead time” which does not con-
tribute to their effectiveness. Many
of the analysts interviewed sees col-
lection as the responsibility for oth-
ers in the unit, rather than
themselves.
The absence of the analyst from the
direction phase of the intelligence
cycle may be negligible in opera-
tional and tactical analysis because
the analyst works within the intelli-
gence unit or the operational team
and has regular contact with man-
agement.
However, the absence of the analyst
from the direction phase of the in-
telligence cycle when considering
strategic intelligence would be very
problematic. In strategic analysis
the analyst also manages strategic
product and would need to negoti-
ate the terms of reference for the
analysis directly with the client
who in most cases would not be
their line manager. The role of the
analyst in the direction phase of the
intelligence cycle needs further con-
sideration. ● ​

18. 18 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
The April 2012 issue of Scientific
American contains an article by
David Pogue titled Technology's
Friction Problem. In it, he argues
that 'friction' (extra steps or gener-
al hassle between a potential cus-
tomer and something they want)
is an unnecessary drag on all sorts
of transactions from commerce to
voting.
There are at least three problems
when it comes to disseminating
intelligence products: 1) Getting
the right product to the right
person(s), 2) getting it to them at
the right time and 3) getting that
right person to actually read (and
apply) the product.
The problem with distribution
lists
Generally, I've been less than im-
pressed with common delivery
methods for intelligence products
which seem to revolve around
email distribution lists or through
access to otherwise restricted 'por-
tals'. These produce two signifi-
cant problems:
1. The law of good intentions:
You set up a distribution list
for (let's say) WMD informa-
tion. Pretty soon you come
across information that has
nothing to do with WMD but
someone thinks it'd be a good
idea to disseminate. So, they
hijack the list and send it out.
Soon, the list becomes a catch-
all vehicle for sending out eve-
ry piece of informational flot-
sam and jetsam that floats
through the drain.
2. As brilliant as you think your
list or portal is, everyone else
has the same idea. What you
end up with is multiple lists
that recycle the same informa-
tion. That, in turn, interferes
with processing that informa-
tion (collation in some ver-
sions of the intelligence cycle)
and making sure it gets to peo-
ple who actually need it. Per-
haps this is due to an
institutional desire to appear
relevant and “plant the organi-
zational flag” in as many in-
boxes as possible or originates
from a misplaced belief that
more is always better. In any
case, it's rarely helpful.
This is a throwback to when the
limited amount of information
available could be handled by rel-
atively small staffs. Instead of col-
lating information and managing
its flow, we rely on a “more is bet-
ter” philosophy that passes it all
through in bulk.
Today, with the overwhelming
quantity of information available,
we still have not devoted suffi-
cient time or resources to the less
Let’s
reduce
friction in
intelligence
dissemination!
T.W. Shiloh is a pseudonym for a an
intelligence analyst with 20 years
experience in military and law enforce-
ment intelligence analysis.
To fit with our theme for this issue he
addresses the less popular aspects of
the intelligence cycle: collation and
dissemination. A version of this article
appeared in his personal blog,
Travels with Shiloh
T.W. Shiloh
opinion

19. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 19
sexy components of intelligence
analysis.
Friction
There are, however, better ways
to sort through that mountain of
information and get what you
want. But, the problem is friction.
Here's the equation from Pogue's
article which I think can also ap-
ply to intelligence products.
PB+D>C
● P is the probability that the
intelligence product will be
relevant to the customer.
● B is the benefit to the custom-
er from the product if they
receive it and apply it.
● C is friction - the hassle of
having to identify the source
of the information, make
whatever contacts needed to
get access to the document,
the cost in time and resourc-
es to wade through the irrele-
vant stuff that comes your
way during your search, etc.
● D, in the original equation, is
the benefit or the gratifica-
tion the user gets from mak-
ing the transaction. In the
intelligence field, this may
manifest in the satisfaction of
receiving the information in
a timely manner or the in-
creased sense of credibility
gained in knowing that
you've searched all available
sources.
We raise the C quotient to new
heights!
What have we done about reduc-
ing friction? Well, just about eve-
ry agency has its own 'portal' now
and the (maligned) opportunities
to sign up for email distribution
but that moves from boon to bane
when everyone has it. What was
intended to reduce friction is now
a main contributor to it. Lack of
information has turned into a del-
uge of it and old information silos
have simply been replaced by new
ones. All of this raises the C quo-
tient to new heights.
How can we reduce friction?
It's certainly not an easy task and
relies on improvements with both
the intelligence consumer and
generator. On the side of those
generating intelligence products,
we can begin by reducing the
number of outlets one has to go
to for similar information. This
would involve changing the re-
ward structure of agencies so they
act less like news organizations,
always trying to scoop their com-
petitors in order to get more fund-
ing or resources, and emphasize
complementary efforts.
Additionally, we should also
move away from a 'push' system
where producers determine what
customers should get or just re-
lease products without any effort
to match them with customers
who may need them. In ex-
change, we need a system which
allows customers to 'pull' infor-
mation that's relevant to their
needs. With the ability to embed
metadata into information it be-
comes easier for people to identi-
fy, search, retrieve or subscribe to
information that they want.
This may require establishing net-
works of information collators or
'sifters' (similar to reference librar-
ians) who can point consumers in
their direction of interest. Contra-
ry to conventional wisdom, the
information age may require more
people to conduct the collation
function rather than less. Current
efforts to automate that function
have not proven to be adequate.
One final way to reduce friction is
thinking about how products are
delivered. Current thinking con-
tinues to maintain that the aver-
age intelligence consumer can't be
expected to handle anything more
than a few pages of
information...preferably in Power-
Point slide bullets. Yet, whether
talking about terrorism, organized
criminal organizations or emerg-
ing threats, very rarely can context
and critical nuance be conveyed in
such small spaces.
While “audience analysis” is still
considered an exotic concept for
many intelligence shops, its con-
sideration during the production
and dissemination portions of the
intelligence cycle can help over-
come these challenges. Different
types of information will lend
themselves to different formats.
If PowerPoint is insufficient and
lengthy documents make brains
hurt, aren't there other alterna-
tives available for consideration?
There's no reason why analysis
can't be delivered graphically, in
an audio format or using any of a
number of social media tools that
are emerging as the primary
means of communications for mil-
lions of people.
While collation and dissemination
are often regarded at the least ex-
citing aspects of analytical work
they can mean the difference be-
tween a product being useful and
getting lost in the maelstrom of
information that bombards us
everyday. ●
Friction
The hassle of having to
identify the source of the
information, make whatever
contacts needed to get access,
the cost in time and resources
to wade through the
irrelevant stuff etc
opinion

20. 20 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
thinking
Richards Heuer
There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of Intelligence
Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge. This is an excerpt of
chapter 3 on Memory. You can also download the entire book here.
An analyst's memory provides con-
tinuous input into the analytical
process. This input is of two types--
1) additional factual information on
historical background and context,
and 2) schemata the analyst uses to
determine the meaning of newly
acquired information. Information
from memory may force itself on
the analyst's awareness without any
deliberate effort by the analyst to
remember; or, recall of the informa-
tion may require considerable time
and strain. In either case, anything
that influences what information is
remembered or retrieved from
memory also influences intelligence
analysis.
Judgment is the joint product of the
available information and what the
analyst brings to the analysis of this
information.
Substantive knowledge and analyti-
cal experience determine the store
of memories and schemata the ana-
lyst draws upon to generate and
evaluate hypotheses. The key is not
a simple ability to recall facts, but
the ability to recall patterns that re-
late facts to each other and to
broader concepts--and to employ
procedures that facilitate this proc-
ess.
Stretching the Limits of Working
Memory
Limited information is available on
what is commonly thought of as
"working memory"--the collection
of information that an analyst
holds in the forefront of the mind
as he or she does analysis. The gen-
eral concept of working memory
seems clear from personal intro-
spection. In writing this chapter, I
am very conscious of the con-
straints on my ability to keep many
pieces of information in mind while
experimenting with ways to organ-
ize this information and seeking
words to express my thoughts. To
help offset these limits on my
working memory, I have accumu-
lated a large number of written
notes containing ideas and half-
written paragraphs. Only by using
such external memory aids am I
able to cope with the volume and
complexity of the information I
want to use.
A well-known article written over
40 years ago, titled "The Magic
Number Seven--Plus or Minus
Two," contends that seven--plus or
minus two--is the number of things
people can keep in their head all at
once. That limitation on working
memory is the source of many
problems. People have difficulty
grasping a problem in all its com-
plexity. This is why we sometimes
have trouble making up our minds.
For example, we think first about
the arguments in favor, and then
about the arguments against, and
we can't keep all those pros and
cons in our head at the same time
to get an overview of how they bal-
ance off against each other.
The recommended technique for
coping with this limitation of work-
ing memory is called externalizing
Psychology
of
intelligence
analysis

21. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 21
the problem--getting it out of one's
head and down on paper in some
simplified form that shows the main
elements of the problem and how
they relate to each other. Ways of
doing this involve breaking down a
problem into its component parts
and then preparing a simple "mod-
el" that shows how the parts relate
to the whole. When working on a
small part of the problem, the model
keeps one from losing sight of the
whole.
A simple model of an analytical
problem facilitates the assimilation
of new information into long-term
memory; it provides a structure to
which bits and pieces of information
can be related. The model defines
the categories for filing information
in memory and retrieving it on de-
mand. In other words, it serves as a
mnemonic device that provides the
hooks on which to hang information
so that it can be found when need-
ed.
The model is initially an artificial
construct. With usage, however, it
rapidly becomes an integral part of
one's conceptual structure--the set of
schemata used in processing infor-
mation. At this point, remembering
new information occurs by assimila-
tion rather than by mnemonics. This
enhances the ability to recall and
make inferences from a larger vol-
ume of information in a greater vari-
ety of ways than would otherwise
be possible.
Hardening of the Categories
Memory processes tend to work
with generalized categories. If peo-
ple do not have an appropriate cate-
gory for something, they are
unlikely to perceive it, store it in
memory, or be able to retrieve it
from memory later. If categories are
drawn incorrectly, people are likely
to perceive and remember things
inaccurately.
When information about phenome-
na that are different in important
respects nonetheless gets stored in
memory under a single concept, er-
rors of analysis may result.
"Hardening of the categories" is a
common analytical weakness. Fine
distinctions among categories and
tolerance for ambiguity contribute
to more effective analysis.
Things That Influence What Is Re-
membered
Factors that influence how informa-
tion is stored in memory and that
affect future retrievability include:
1) being the first-stored information
on a given topic, 2) the amount of
attention focused on the informa-
tion, 3) the credibility of the infor-
mation, and 4) the importance
attributed to the information at the
moment of storage. By influencing
the content of memory, all of these
factors also influence the outcome
of intelligence analysis.
Memory Rarely Changes Retroac-
tively
Analysts often receive new informa-
tion that should, logically, cause
them to reevaluate the credibility or
significance of previous informa-
tion. Ideally, the earlier information
should then become either more sa-
lient and readily available in memo-
ry, or less so. But it does not work
that way.
Unfortunately, memories are sel-
dom reassessed or reorganized ret-
roactively in response to new
information. For example, informa-
tion that is dismissed as unimpor-
tant or irrelevant because it did not
fit an analyst's expectations does not
become more memorable even if the
analyst changes his or her thinking
to the point where the same infor-
mation, received today, would be
recognized as very significant.
Memory Can Handicap as Well as
Help
Understanding how memory works
provides some insight into the na-
ture of creativity, openness to new
information, and breaking mind-
sets. All involve spinning new links
in the spider web of memory--links
among facts, concepts, and schemata
that previously were not connected
or only weakly connected.
Training courses for intelligence an-
alysts sometimes focus on trying to
open up an analyst's established
mind-set, to get him or her to see
problems from different perspec-
tives in order to give a fairer shake
to alternative explanations. More
often than not, the reaction of expe-
rienced analysts is that they have
devoted 20 years to developing their
present mind-set, that it has served
them well, and that they see no need
to change it. Such analysts view
themselves, often accurately, as
comparable to the chess masters.
There is, however, a crucial differ-
ence between the chess master and
the master intelligence analyst. Al-
though the chess master faces a dif-
ferent opponent in each match, the
environment in which each contest
takes place remains stable and un-
changing: the permissible moves of
the diverse pieces are rigidly deter-
mined, and the rules cannot be
changed without the master's
knowledge. Once the chess master
develops an accurate schema, there
is no need to change it.
The intelligence analyst, however,
must cope with a rapidly changing
world. Schemata that were valid
yesterday may no longer be func-
tional tomorrow.
Learning new schemata often re-
quires the unlearning of existing
ones, and this is exceedingly diffi-
cult. It is always easier to learn a
new habit than to unlearn an old
one. Schemata in long-term memory
that are so essential to effective anal-
ysis are also the principal source of
inertia in recognizing and adapting
to a changing environment. ●
thinking

22. June 2012 • Foreknowledge 22
Meet a Financial
Intelligence Unit Analyst
AR - analyst with an African FIU
What is the role and function
of intelligence analysts in
your agency?
The provision of financial
intelligence for the purpose of
initiating investigations or
supporting investigations to law
enforcement agencies and for
regulatory bodies and other
government agencies for the
purpose of policy fomulation.
What is your specialist area
and what do you do to stay
informed and abreast of new de-
velopments?
My area of specialty is in the area
of Anti Money Laundering /Com-
batting the Financing of Terrorism
(AML/CFT)
I stay informed about my field
through conferences, seminars,
workshops relevant to my field
and subscribing to professional
bodies such: ACAMS, CFE, IACA
and the IALEIA, etc.
Who are your clients and
what types of intelligence
products do you provide to them?
Our clients are the relevant stake-
holders in the AML/CFT regime,
which comprise of the Law en-
forcement agencies, the regulatory
agencies, the policy makers in gov-
ernment etc. The product dissemi-
nated to the above relevant
agencies is financial intelligence
which could be operational, tactical
or strategic in nature.
What are your greatest chal-
lenges you face as an intel-
ligence analyst and how do you
overcome them?
● Inaccessibility to other law en-
forcement agencies databases
● Lack of cooperation on the
part of some law enforcement
agencies in information shar-
ing
● Untimely response to request
made to reporting entities
● Poor quality of data from re-
porting entities.
Overcoming these issues is done
through the constant engagement
of these agencies by providing
them with spontaneous Intelli-
gence products that borders on
their operations. This helps is
building trust and confidence and
in turn creates room for joint oper-
ations. For the reporting entities,
education on the ills of money
laundering, fraud and terror fi-
nancing has gone a long way in
improving relations, so does the
provision of immunity to report-
ing persons within institutions.
What can intelligence ana-
lysts do to promote our
profession?
By networking and forming a for-
midable group or association
where ideas, experiences, chal-
lenges and other issues could be
shared. ●
Intelligence research and
analysis services on
Africa’s political, economic
and criminal threats
***
Due diligence and
background reports on
Persons and Companies of
Interest throughout Africa
***
Setting up of intelligence
units
***
Intelligence information
management and systems
***
Intelligence training
curriculum development
***
Customised OSINT reports
www.4knowledge.co.za
Over the past years, specialized governmental agencies, “financial intelligence units” or “FIUs have been
created as jurisdictions develop systems to deal with the problem of money laundering and other financial
crimes. Many FIUs have analysis units that determine money laundering trends and patterns for use by law
enforcement, provide feedback to the reporting institutions and do proactive targeting. Analysts have bank-
ing, intelligence and law enforcement experience.
people

23. 23 June 2012 • Foreknowledge
June 2012 International BISA-ISA
conference
20-22 June 2012 : Edinburgh, Scotland
British International Studies Association and the
International Studies Association Joint
For conference information click here
July 2012
24th - 26th July 2012
Sydney, Australia
For more information: Click here
Intelligence 2012: Anticipating Risk &
Influencing Action
The Australian Institute of
Professional Intelligence Officers
(AIPIO) Annual conference
collaborate
share
discuss
events
Brunel University seminar
8 June 2012: London, UK
Intelligence analysis learning from journalism
For conference information click here
Brunel University
seminar
13 July 2012: London, UK
Intelligence analysis learning from
other disciplines
For conference information click
here
International
terrorism and
organised crime
conference
6-10 August 2012
Anaheim, CA
Information here
Innovation in border
control workshop
21 - 22 August 2012
Odense, Denmark
Information here
OSINT & web miningsymposium
21 - 22 August 2012
Odense, Denmark
Information here
OSINT & security
informatics
symposium
27 & 28 August 2012
Istanbul, Turkey
Information here
Geospatial Defence
& intelligence Asia
11-14 September 2012
Thailand
Information here
September 2012
ACFEA Globalintelligence forum21 - 22 September 2012Brussels, BelgiumInformation here
Intelligence in the
knowledge society
219 October 2012
Bucharest, Romania
Information here
Need to know
conference
16-17 October 2012
Odense, Denmark
Information here
October 2012
August 2012