Animals And Sociology

© 2008 The Author
Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Sociology Compass 2/6 (2008): 1954–1971, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00163.x
Animals and Sociology
Leslie Irvine*
University of Colorado
Abstract
This paper outlines some of the major theoretical contributions of the specialty
field known as ‘animals and society’. It examines three areas of focus within the
field. One of these areas finds connections between our exploitation of animals
and other forms of domination and oppression. Consequently, this body of
research provides insight into how we might challenge and overcome inequality,
more generally. A second area examines animal abuse and questions entrenched
assumptions about the link between cruelty to animals and violence directed
toward humans. This research also reveals that animals are often victims and
pawns in domestic violence. A third area uses human–animal interaction to
challenge dominant sociological views of the self. By doing so, this work expands
our knowledge of what it means to live in a social world. Overall, the scholarly
work within the field of animals and society suggests that the inclusion of animals
in sociological research can expand and clarify existing theories and concepts.
This paper examines the sociological specialty known as ‘animals and
society’. Although this is how the specialty is recognized within sociology,
not everyone who works in the field agrees on what to call it. Some
would argue that the term ‘animals and society’ suggests that the two exist
independently. After all, human beings belong to the animal kingdom, too
(although we often conveniently forget this). Moreover, non-human animals
are so tightly woven into the fabric of society that it is difficult to imagine
life without them. For example, over 70 percent of American households
include dogs and cats, and birds, and nearly half consider these animals
family members (AVMA 2007). Animal products play a tremendous role
in our economy, in the form of meat, eggs, dairy products, leather, wool,
silk, cosmetics, soap, toiletries, and medications. We live surrounded animal
products, in drywall, linoleum, paint, and adhesive for wallpaper and
carpet. Our language contains numerous animal influences. We can describe
someone as ‘pig-headed’, ‘gentle as a lamb’, or ‘strong as an ox’ (see
Bryant 1979; Smith-Harris 2004). We might ‘bark up the wrong tree’ or
act as a ‘lame duck’. Throughout history, animals have assisted people in
many ways. They have plowed our fields, transported us, and helped us
wage war. Currently, they help people see and hear, alert them to

© 2008 The Author Sociology Compass 2/6 (2008): 1954–1971, 10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00163.x
Animals and Sociology 1955
impending seizures, and even detect the subtle presence of undiagnosed
cancer. Finally, animals figure heavily in social problems, from illegal activities
such as dog fighting (Kalof and Taylor 2007), to natural disasters such as
Hurricane Katrina (Irvine 2004a, 2006a,b, 2007a,b, forthcoming), to
concern over endangered species and conflicts with wildlife (Herda-Rapp
and Goedeke 2005). In light of these and other examples of the roles
animals play in society, the name ‘animals and society’ can seem both
ambiguous and redundant. In addition, some would point out that the
name also helps to maintain the human/animal distinction that much
of the work in the area challenges. Consequently, some scholars prefer
‘ethnozoology’ because it ‘avoids the ambiguity of the term animal’
(Arluke 2003, 42). Others use the terms ‘human-animal studies’ or
‘anthrozoology’. Nevertheless, because sociology recognizes the area as
‘animals and society’, I will use that term here.
In this paper, I examine several major contributions of this specialty
area. I organize the discussion theoretically, rather than listing all the
topics that scholars have explored (see Arluke 2002b). Thus, I do not
provide an exhaustive review of the literature, but instead discuss how
selected work in the field advances theories and concepts that are at the
very heart of sociology. Although this strategy reveals how the field has
contributed to sociology, more generally, it has the disadvantage of omitting
some important work in areas outside those represented here.
After first discussing how animals might have a place in the discipline,
and why they should have one, I offer examples of how including them
has enriched sociological knowledge in three specific areas. I first consider
work that examines our uses of animals as a type of oppression within a
dominating, capitalist system. This work argues that our treatment of other
species should be considered along with racism and sexism as one of
numerous, interlinked oppressions. Next, I consider the body of research
on the connection between cruelty to animals and violent behavior
toward people. This work reveals that the connection is not as clear or
direct as many have supposed. Finally, I examine the symbolic interactionist
work on relationships between people and animals. This research opens
up possibilities for understanding the creation of the self apart from
spoken language.
What makes ‘animals and society’ sociology?
The existence of this specialty area might seem contradictory, for we
commonly equate sociology with the study of people, not animals. However,
non-human animals contribute so much to what we call ‘society’ that
their exclusion from sociology amounts to a glaring omission. Over the
past two decades, some sociologists have acknowledged that the inclusion of
animals can sharpen and expand sociological insights. Many departments
now offer courses on ‘Animals and Society’. In 2002, the American
Sociological Association recognized the Animals and Society Section. Its
establishment occurred over the objections of some high-profile sociologists

1956 Animals and Sociology
(e.g., Perrow 2000; see Nibert 2003a). Some still point to ‘fundamental’
differences between humans and non-human animals and assert human
superiority, ignoring some current and important empirical evidence.
In recent decades, research has blurred or even erased many of the lines
we have used to justify the human/animal distinction. For example,
Aristotle claimed that only humans laugh, but it turns out that chimpanzees,
bonobos, and orangutans do so, too (Foerderreuther and Zimmerman
2003; Provine 1996). Researchers have also found that rats make sounds
that ‘have more than a passing resemblance to primitive human laughter’
(Panksepp and Burgdorf 2003, 533). For some time, we distinguished
ourselves from other animals by calling humans ‘the tool users’. Then,
Jane Goodall (1990) observed the chimpanzee David Greybeard not only
using a tool but making one (see also Van Schaik et al. 1999). When her
mentor, Louis Leakey, learned of the discovery, he sent her a telegram that
famously read, ‘Now we must redefine tool, redefine man, or accept
chimpanzees as human.’ Since then, other researchers have found that
numerous other animals, including crows, elephants, and dolphins, make
and use tools.
In sociology, the distinction between humans and other animals is most
often justified by ‘culture’, which animals allegedly lack. However, even
this argument has some cracks in it. Janet and Steven Alger (2003b)
reviewed 30 major introductory sociology textbooks to investigate the
portrayal of animals and how well the texts integrated newer research on
animals. They found that most of the texts ignored ‘the new knowledge
of animal behavior accumulated over the past twenty years’ (83–84). One
of the best examples comes from the coverage of culture.
All of the textbooks we reviewed had a chapter or section devoted to human
culture and all of the authors defined human culture in essentially the same
way. Culture is a ‘design or blueprint for living,’ a ‘way of life,’ or a ‘social
heritage.’ Culture is learned, it is shared, and it is passed on to the next
generation. The elements of culture offered by these authors were also very
similar and included beliefs, values, norms, symbols, language, customs, tech-
nology, knowledge and material objects. And, the tremendous diversity of
cultures among different human groupings constituted the evidence that culture
is a human creation, and not biologically determined. When these same
authors turned their attention to the question of animals and culture, however,
several problems immediately became apparent. (72)
One of the problems the Algers found involved poor scholarship. Most of
the texts made claims about animals’ lack of culture without citing any
references, indicating that ‘many authors believed their views on animal
culture were so well established that no source was necessary or that
comments about animals were not of sufficient importance to warrant
serious research’ (72). Thus, authors ignored solid findings that numerous
species of animals are indeed capable of developing culture. For example,
material culture exists among numerous other species, including cats

(Alger and Alger 2003a; Thomas 1994), chimpanzees (Dawkins 1998; Goodall
1986; Whiten et al. 1999), parrots (Pepperberg 1991), and dogs (Thomas 1993,
2000). Moreover, culture originated long before our hominid ancestors
split off the evolutionary path from chimpanzees (Van Schaik et al. 2003).
Another problem concerned disparagement and denial of animals’
capacities. Even when textbook authors acknowledged that animals did
have some form of culture, they went to great lengths to elevate human
expressions. For example, one text explains that ‘humans are not unique
just because they make and use tools. However, the tools that humans make
are unequaled in complexity. Think of the difference between using a
twig to catch termites and making an automobile’ ([Andersen and Taylor
2002, 63] Alger and Alger 2003b, 75). In this way, in many texts, the cultural
‘ante was raised such that it was necessary to have high culture to be considered
as having a culture worthy of the name’ (Alger and Alger 2003b, 75).
Laughter, tool use, and culture are just some of the criteria we have
used to draw the human/animal boundary. However, anthropologists tell
us that human groups did not always feel the need to distinguish themselves
from animals. For example, Barbara Noske (1997a,b) points out that,
among many groups, the ‘nature/culture’ distinction does not exist. She
explains that, ‘in hunter/gatherer societies people tend to have an organic
world view which leads them to place themselves within rather than above
the natural world’ (1997b, 185). Evidence traces the human/animal
distinction to the development of settled agriculture (see Franklin 1999;
Lawrence 1986; Noske 1997a,b; Thomas 1983). Farmers dominate nature
by manipulating water, soil, crops, and the bodies of animals. This change
in the means of production depended on and legitimated ideologies that
defined non-human animals ‘as fundamentally different and ontologically
separate’ from humans (Wolch 1998, 121).
When we began to think of animals as ‘others’, we also made them
inferior. This is the belief known as speciesism. The term was coined in
1970 by psychologist Richard Ryder (see also Ryder and Wood 1970)
and popularized by philosopher Peter Singer in his book, Animal Liberation.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines speciesism as ‘discrimination against
or exploitation of certain animal species by human beings, based on an
assumption of mankind’s superiority’ (see also Dunayer 2004; Ryder
1989). The emergence of speciesism initiated debate about what distin-
guished humans from other animals. Although several views circulated
throughout the ancient world, the ‘rationalist’ belief dominated. By claim-
ing that animals were not rational beings, Western thought placed humans
above all creation. With the rise of modern science, rationality gained the
legitimacy that assured humans of their status. During the 17th century,
René Descartes asserted that only humans possessed reason, which they
expressed through language. Until recently, science (including sociology)
has upheld the Cartesian view, maintaining that because animals cannot
speak, they also cannot think.

During the 19th century, Charles Darwin challenged the idea of a
distinct separation between humans and other animals. However, the later
emphasis on behaviorism reasserted the notion of difference by maintaining
that animals were not conscious beings but simply responded to stimuli.
Then, during the 1970s, the tide changed with the emergence of the field
known as ‘cognitive ethology’. This field studies the mental experiences
of animals, particularly in animals’ everyday lives in natural settings, rather
than in laboratory experiments. Scholars generated numerous studies of
the cognitive and emotional capacities of animals. Examples include Jane
Goodall’s (1990) research on chimpanzees, Irene Pepperberg’s (1991) work
with Alex the African Grey parrot, Francine (Penny) Patterson’s research
with Koko the Gorilla (see Patterson and Linden 1981), and Marc
Bekoff’s studies (e.g., 1977, 1995) of the social lives of domestic dogs and
wild canids (such as wolves and coyotes).
Although the sciences had begun to move away from a rationalist view,
sociology held out. The work of George Herbert Mead, who considered
animals incapable of meaningful social interactions, sums up the sociological
view. Mead wrote, ‘the animal has no mind, no thought, and hence there
is no meaning [in animal behavior] in the significant or self-conscious
sense’ (Strauss 1964, 168). He claimed that any sense of purpose or cognition
we might see in animals is merely foolish projection on our part, which
we would abandon once we really understood animals. As he put it, ‘we,
of course, tend to endow our domestic animals with personality, but as
we get insight into their conditions we see there is no place for this sort
of importation of the social process into the conduct of the individual’
([1934] 1962, 182; see also Irvine 2003b, 2004b). However, it turns out
that as ‘we’ get insight into the ‘conditions’ of animals, many researchers
see evidence of not only thought but also culture, as described above,
emotions (Alger and Alger 2003a; Bekoff 2002; Irvine 2004b; Sanders
1999) and morality (Bekoff 2004).
In 1979, Clifton Bryant wrote a now-classic paper advising sociologists
to integrate animals into their studies. ‘The Zoological Connection’ discussed
how including animals could enhance our understanding of work and
occupations, criminology, and the sociology of the family, just to name a
few areas. Beginning in the 1980s, sociologists began to take up Bryant’s
challenge. In what follows, I examine a selection of these efforts.
Theorizing oppression: speciesism and domination
Many sociologists currently understand that race, class, and gender work
as interlocking systems of oppression. As David Nibert explains,
Sociologists now accept the idea that the oppression of various devalued groups
in human societies is not independent and unrelated; rather, the arrangements
that lead to various forms of oppression are intricately woven together in such

a way that the exploitation of one group frequently augments and compounds
the mistreatment of others. (2003b, 6).
Some scholars have extended this by arguing that there is a link between
our treatment of animals and our treatment of human groups also considered
‘others’ (Adams 1990; Adams and Donovan 1995; Grauerholz 2007; Kalof and
Fitzgerald 2003; Kalof et al. 2004; Nibert 2002, 2003b; Patterson 2002;
Regan 1982; Singer 1990; Spiegel 1996; Torres 2007). They argue that species
should be included as a form of oppression, too. The work in this area
emphasizes that speciesism should not be understood as simply a form of
prejudice against animals, such as preferring to save one’s child rather than an
animal if the choice came to that. Instead, like racism and sexism, speciesism
is deeply rooted in the structure of society, particularly in the economic
practices around our use of animals as food. Just as we cannot end racism or
sexism by simply stopping our individual prejudices, confronting speciesism
will require more than just individual efforts. It requires challenging the
institutionalized speciesism woven into all aspects of society. In what follows,
I examine what two scholars, David Nibert and Bob Torres, propose.
Nibert takes up the task through a historical-materialist perspective.
He revises a three-pronged theory that was developed to explain ethnic
stratification and examines the linkages among speciesism and other forms
of oppression (see Noel 1968). In brief, the interactive forces that produce
ethnic stratification include (1) competition between or economic exploitation
of one group by another; (2) unequal power held by one group over
another; and (3) ideological justification that drives and reinforces the first
two forces. As Nibert points out, we can easily see all three forces at work
in the case of animals. First, we readily exploit them by consuming their
bodies, from their eggs, milk, and flesh, to their skin and fur. We profit
tremendously from the ‘livestock industry’. We compete with them for
the use of land, air, and water. We use them in scientific experiments. We
exploit them for our amusement in bullfights, dogfights, cockfights, rodeos,
races, and circuses. We use them for companionship and amusement.
Second, we hold unequal power over animals, whether in the direct form
of weapons, chains, or cages, or the less direct form of considering them
as property. We even hold this power over dogs and cats, who become
beloved family members – as long as they abide by our rules (see Hickrod
and Schmitt 1982). The dog who disregards the rules of the human
household can be scolded, struck, neglected, and abandoned (see Green-
ebaum 2006–07; Irvine 2003a). Millions of dogs and cats die each year in
animal shelters simply because they have no homes. They quickly go from
‘best friend’ to unwanted, illustrating not so much their shifting behavior
as our power over them (see Veevers 1985). Third, ideology makes it
appear that our domination of animals is natural and even beneficial. We
take human supremacy for granted. We seldom question or challenge our
position at the top of the hierarchy. Moreover, as Nibert points out, we

seldom even see the means by which we oppress human and animal
others. Oppression is often ‘naturalized’, or made to seem part of the
‘normal and innate part of worldly existence’ (2003b, 18). For example,
we use animals to serve our purposes, and then we disparage them for
what they have become. We believe that certain animals exist to ‘become’
steak or lamb chops. We force horses to work for us, and then we use the
term ‘workhorse’ to suggest that endless labor is the horse’s natural choice.
We use rats for experiments and put them in mazes, and then we describe
pointless activity as a ‘rat race’. Although many of us have fought to
overcome the vestiges of racism and sexism in our language and our
thinking, we seldom see the speciesism that remains.
Seen through Nibert’s three-part theory, animals qualify as an oppressed
group. Moreover, Nibert argues that the oppression of animals contributes to
other forms of oppression. For example, just in the raising, or ‘production’,
of animals for food, human beings are exploited, and the consequences
most often fall hardest on those who have little ability to resist the forces
responsible. Studies by the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal
Production (2008) and the Union of Concerned Scientists (Gurian-Sherman
2008) have backed up Nibert’s claims. These studies have documented
how modern farming practices endanger public health and the environment
and degrade rural communities. Although I cannot do justice to the
research here, a few examples will illustrate. Intensive farming practices
degrade the environment through air, water, and soil pollution. People in
low-income and rural communities, where such operations are typically
located, suffer high incidences of respiratory disease and negative health
effects from exposure to pathogens and chemicals. The routine use of
antibiotics to raise animals in close confinement fosters drug resistance
among people, particularly children. Moreover, the use of intensive farming
practices threatens the well-being of rural communities by putting family
farms out of business and lowering property values. Research has also
demonstrated a correlation between the opening of a large slaughter
operation in a community and rates of violent crime (Fitzgerald 2007a).
Most workers in slaughterhouses are immigrants, and they are routinely
exploited in jobs that have extremely high rates of injury and turnover.
In some regions of the world, the clearing of land to raise cattle has
displaced indigenous people and animals. This has also led to soil erosion,
which has changed the local ecology and raised the potential for natural
disasters. Thus, the desire to raise increasing numbers of animals for food
also exploits people by putting their health and their way of life at risk.
In his analysis, Nibert takes critical aim at capitalism as the foundation
of the system of oppression. He does not claim that oppression originated
with capitalism, but instead argues that capitalism continued the existing
‘tradition of exploiting humans and other animals to create wealth and
privilege for the few’ (2003b, 12). He argues that exploitation can end
when we reform the economic and cultural systems that sustain oppression.

Because this is unlikely to happen quickly, if at all, he argues that activists
fighting all types of oppression must recognize its interconnections and
work together to create egalitarian social arrangements. Similarly, Bob
Torres (2007) also indicts capitalism in the existence of an exploitive
system, but emphasizes that the roots of the oppression of animals and
other people go back much further in history. He looks to the processes
of domination and hierarchy, which he calls ‘toxic inheritance from previous
eras’ (2007, 80). Torres asks why activists and scholars who are concerned
with social justice have ignored the oppression of animals. The answer, he
claims, is that most people do not recognize speciesism as a form of
oppression. Like Nibert, he points out that we consider our treatment of
animals normal and beneficial. Because we profit from it, we do not
question it. Torres argues that the social anarchist perspective offers the
tools to understand and overcome hierarchical thinking and other forms
of domination. Like Nibert, he urges those concerned with social justice
to work together to challenge they dynamics of oppression in all its forms.
Instead of saying that one group should focus on ‘animal rights’ and
another on ‘human rights’, Torres and Nibert urge us to focus on the
system that creates and sustains oppression.
Studies in this area offer much to sociology by proposing that we stop
compartmentalizing types of oppression and instead examine how its
dynamics work, more generally. As mentioned, some sociologists already
recognize that oppression is interlinked. Nevertheless, even this work still
conceptualizes the ‘links’ of oppression, such as race, class, and gender, as
discrete processes with unique dynamics. By stepping down a level to
examine the traditions, institutions, and norms that sustain oppression and
make it invisible by denying its reality, work that examines our treatment
of animals offers a promising path for sociology. Unfortunately, there is
still considerable resistance. Some of this occurs because many sociologists,
like many other people, embrace and benefit from speciesism. Some stems
from concerns about equating humans and animals. However, as Marjorie
Spiegel explains in her 1996 book, The Dreaded Comparison, one need not
equate the experiences of people and animals to see the commonalities in
‘the supporting systems of oppression’ (28). Likewise, one need not equate
people with animals to understand that ‘any oppression helps to support
other forms of domination’ (30). It may well be that, while questioning
the cultural prejudices at work in oppression and domination, one comes
to question the boundary between humans and the other creatures who
share our planet. However, as Nibert, Torres, and others emphasize, we
remain unique in our ability to change our actions.
Theorizing power: animals and violence
Whereas the research in the preceding section argues that, on the societal
level, our treatment of animals parallels our treatment of other human

beings, the next area of work finds that, on the individual level, numerous
factors make the outcome less direct and predictable. Specifically, the
work on animals and violence examines the connection between the
abuse of animals and violent behavior toward other people. Child and
animal welfare professionals have long recognized that animal cruelty can
co-exist with other forms of violence. They have assumed not only a
connection between the two types of violence, but also that the connection
follows a particular path. The ‘graduation hypothesis’ or ‘progression thesis’
holds that violent behavior begins with abuse of animals during childhood.
The abuser then allegedly moves on to other forms of violence, usually
inflicted on people. Child and animal welfare agencies refer to this as ‘the
link’, and they use its existence to advance their own ideological agendas.
However, sociological research points out that ‘the link’ may be more
complex than it seems.
As Piers Bierne explains, ‘the detection of acts of animal abuse by
scholars, by police, and by members of the public very much hinges on how
“animal abuse” is defined’ (2004, 49; see also Agnew 1998). For example,
Arnold Arluke (2002a, 2004, 2006) found that children commonly abuse
animals during play without considering it abuse. Their cruelty can function
as ‘dirty play’ (Fine 1986) that initiates them into adult behaviors. Arluke
interviewed college students who admitted to having harmed or killed
animals as children. He argues that engaging in cruelty, particularly with
peers, instructs kids how to keep secrets, establish boundaries, and acquire
adult-like knowledge. Years later, the students’ disgrace over their actions
indicated that they had left the behavior, and the adolescent selves that
had enacted it, behind. Arluke’s research concludes that animal cruelty can
exist with other forms of crime, but the former does not clearly predict
the latter (see also Arluke, et al. 1999; Arluke and Lockwood 1997).
He argues that ‘the link’ has been accepted without reliable empirical
evidence. Because child and animal welfare advocates use it to promote
their goals and programs, they discount systematic research highlighting
the complexity of violent behavior. Research that reveals a ‘link’ receives
attention, regardless of its reliability or validity.
Using a population of ‘normal’, or non-incarcerated, adults, Suzanne
R. Goodney Lea (2007) examined the frequency of cruelty to animals
during childhood, gender differences in rates of animal cruelty, and the
correlation between animal cruelty in childhood and violence toward
humans later in life. She found no direct correlations between animal
cruelty and human-directed violence. She did find an association between
acts of cruelty and other anti-social behaviors, such as fighting or bullying,
in childhood and adolescence. However, none of these factors predicted
adult violence. Similarly, Lisa Anne Zilney’s research (2007) suggests that
one does not simply ‘progress’ directly from animal abuse to violence
against people. Zilney found that acts of abuse toward animals committed
in childhood, particularly adolescence, predict domestic partner abuse, but

not generalized violence. She also found that numerous factors, including
simply being male, predicted animal abuse.
Other sociological research on animal abuse focuses on the role of
power in domestic violence (Atwood-Harvey 2007; Carlisle-Frank et al.
2004; Fitzgerald 2005, 2007b; Flynn 1999a,b, 2000a,b,c, 2001). For
example, Clifton Flynn pioneered the research on the relationship
between animal abuse and intimate partner battering (2000b). In research
in domestic violence shelters, battered women revealed that their partners
often abused their companion animals to inflict emotional abuse on the
women themselves. Flynn found that women turned to their animals for
emotional support and even delayed leaving violent situations for fear that
their partners would harm their pets (see also Ascione 1998). Similarly,
Amy Fitzgerald found that animals helped abused women resist the
emotional effects of battering. Women considered their animals as fellow
sufferers, factoring them into their plans for survival. In many cases, the
animals were critical in women’s decisions not to take their own lives.
Dana Atwood-Harvey extends this line of inquiry in a rare examination
of the role animals play in the lives of abused children. She introduces the
concept of ‘entangled victimization’ to describe what happens when adult
perpetrators threaten children’s pets and force children to witness, and
even participate in, acts of abuse.
In sum, the sociological research on animal cruelty enriches our under-
standing of violence and can inform society’s response to it. The research
shows how we use animals to display patriarchal power within families or
bureaucratic power within the criminal justice and social service systems.
Further work on this topic can address the concerns of those facing the
impact of violence.
Theorizing the self: interacting with animals
The third area of research examines relationships between humans and non-
human animals. Much of this work lies within the symbolic interactionist
tradition. Clinton Sanders, who blazed a trail in this research, concentrates
on interactions between people and dogs (1990, 1991, 1993, 1994a,b,
1999, 2000, 2003, 2006a,b; Robins et al. 1991). In his work, Sanders
argues that dogs ‘have at least a rudimentary ability to construct meaning
– to purposefully define situations and devise coherent plans of action on
the basis of these definitions’ (1999, 5). Dogs modify their behavior in
response to feedback from others, whether canine or human. Among
humans, the symbolic interactionist tradition usually considers this an
indication of taking the role of others. As beings whose natural social
group is the pack, canine interaction depends on dogs’ ability to read and
respond to the emotional states of others, including their human caretakers.
Because of dogs’ ability to interact with us at complex and intimate levels,
we often come to know them as well as we know other people. We give

them the social status of ‘persons’. Thus, Sanders advocates expanding our
understanding of how we construct and assign that designation.
Building on work by Sanders, Keri Brandt (2004, 2005, 2006) and Leslie
Irvine (2001, 2004b,c, 2007c) move beyond a language-based theory to
emphasize the components of interaction in selfhood. Challenging Mead’s
([1934] 1962) claim that the self developed alongside the capacities for
spoken language, Irvine claims that animals can see themselves as objects,
despite their inability to speak. Drawing on interviews with dog and
cat guardians, she argues that interaction between people and animals
contributes to human selfhood. She then claims that, for this to occur,
animals must themselves be subjective others, and not just the objects
of anthropomorphic projection. She argues that several dimensions of
subjectivity appear among dogs and cats, constituting a ‘core’ self consisting
of agency, coherence, affectivity, and history. By conceptualizing selfhood
in this way, her work offers critical access to animals’ subjective presence.
Brandt takes this line of analysis into the context of human–horse interaction.
She proposes an understanding of language that incorporates the body (see
also Shapiro 1990; Konecki 2005). Through ethnographic research and
interviews with women riders, Brandt found that the women communicated
with their horses through body language, especially through the legs, the
hands, and the posture in the saddle known as the ‘seat’. Horses, too, use
their bodies to express their intentions and their emotional states. Horses and
riders ‘read’ each other through the body. Brandt learned that inexperienced
riders – and horses – lack the ability to read the subtle communication
that takes place without words, while accomplished riders will virtually
become one with their horses, creating what Brandt calls ‘a language of
their own’ (2004).
The work of Janet and Steven Alger (1997, 1999, 2003a) examines
interaction among cats and between cats and humans. Within the community
of cats at a shelter, the Algers documented the ability to learn from others,
the sanctioning of norms, cooperation, adaptation, and complexity of
behavior. The Algers emphasize the importance of social interaction in
bringing out the selves of the resident cats. Their work challenges dominant
sociological views that only human behavior is shaped by social forces,
while biology and instinct are at work among animals.
As a whole, while the research on human-animal interaction relies heavily
on the symbolic interactionist perspective, it challenges interactionism’s
emphasis on spoken language. Phenomena such as memory, knowing, and
feeling do not necessarily depend on speech. To be sure, humans developed
the capacity to put experiences into words, but this does not mean that
animals cannot also have those experiences and process them in socially
meaningful ways. As Alger and Alger explain:
The ability to take the role of the other, define situations, produce shared
meanings, and transform objects into meaningful symbols ... is not founded on

language. As a consequence of such findings, it will be necessary for sociolo-
gists to rethink the whole connection between language and interaction in
relation to humans (2003a, 206).
This rethinking of the self is indeed a significant development, and it
represents a valuable contribution of this body of research. Until this work
broke ground in understanding the selves of animals, research on the self
most often relied on people’s self-reports and narratives. However, these
typically reveal a self moderated in consciousness and shaped by language.
They reveal how people talk and think about the self, not how they
experience it. Moreover, they obscure the point that we simply do not
trust language first or foremost for information about selfhood. In short,
language gives us only part of the information that we need to understand
selfhood. The research on animal selves opens up possibilities for examining
what else is involved.
Expanding interactionism to acknowledge selfhood outside the realm
of spoken language has consequences beyond the realm of human–animal
interaction. In particular, the work in this area helps understand the lived
experiences of ‘alingual’ humans. Scholars have already examined autistic
children (Rocque 2003), the mentally disabled (Bogdan and Taylor 1989;
Pollner and McDonald-Wikler 1985), Alzheimer’s patients (Gubrium
1986), infants (Brazelton 1984; Stern 1985), and deaf and blind children
(Goode 1994). By examining the experience of selfhood among those
who cannot speak, this literature vastly enriches our knowledge of what
it means to ‘be’ a social being – regardless of species.
Conclusion
There is one question sometimes posed to scholars of animals and society:
With so many problems in the world, shouldn’t sociologists devote themselves
to human issues, instead of studying animals? The question itself implies
speciesism by suggesting that the study of animals in society is somehow
less important than other topics. Setting that discussion aside, I offer two
responses that address the question on its own terms.
First, I acknowledge that poverty, environmental degradation, crime,
war, and other issues deserve serious attention. Some would argue that
these issues are more pressing than understanding animals. However, many
of the authors of the work reviewed in this paper would respond that
these social problems are connected, and the segmenting of issues is both
illogical and morally troublesome. Understanding the role of animals can
reveal the dynamics of these broader social problems. For example, significant
environmental degradation occurs through our farming practices, which
are being exported to parts of the world where they make poor people
poorer. Research also reveals connections among immigration (read: poverty)
and crime rates, with the common denominator of slaughter operations.

Thus, the exploitation of animals is often an important link in these other,
major social problems. By examining the privileged position from which
we subjugate other species, research on animals and society can shed light
on the mechanisms of inequality, more generally. Similarly, within the
specific areas examined in this paper, the study of animals and society can
expand our understanding of a range of sociological phenomena. The research
on animal cruelty challenges existing sociological knowledge about violence.
The interactionist research expands our knowledge of how we accomplish
selfhood and interact as social beings. Because many issues that affect
humans also involve animals, research on the role of animals and society
can lead to greater knowledge of society and better social policy.
Second, the idea that time, energy, and research funds would be better
spent on more important human issues suggests that those who focus on
animals do not also regard these other social issues as important. The
implication is that some people care more about animals than they care
about people. However, research suggests that this is not the case. For example,
one study compared support for animal rights with positions on other social
issues, such as race relations, domestic violence, and the rights of women,
gay men, and lesbians (Nibert 1994). The study found that those who
support animal rights tend also to be more supportive of diversity and less
tolerant of violence that those who oppose animal rights. Other work has
found correlations between political conservatism and opposition to animal
protection measures (Kimball 1989). To be sure, scholars of animals and
society need not be animal rights advocates. The point is that concern for
animals does not imply a lack of concern for humans. Rather, a lack of
concern for animals often comes with disrespect for other people.
In sum, research on animals and society is not just the ‘sociology of animals’.
In light of the tremendous influence of animals on culture and their numerous
roles in society, their omission from sociological study has given us an
incomplete picture of the social world. Research that includes animals can
illuminate general social processes that many sociologists seek to understand.
Short Biography
Leslie Irvine’s interests include animals and society, qualitative methods,
and social psychology. She received her PhD from the State University of
New York at Stony Brook. She is Associate Professor of Sociology at the
University of Colorado. She teaches Animals and Society, The Self in
Modern Society, Social Psychology, and Sociological Theory. She is the
author of Codependent Forevermore: The Invention of Self in a Twelve Step Group
(University of Chicago Press, 1999) and If You Tame Me: Understanding our
Connection with Animals (Temple University Press, 2004), as well as numerous
papers. Her recent work examines the vulnerability of animals in disasters.
Her book on the topic, entitled Filling the Ark: The Welfare of Animals in
Disasters, will be published in 2009 by Temple University Press.

Note
* Correspondence address: Department of Sociology, University of Colorado, 219 Ketchum
327UCB, Boulder, CO 80309-0327, USA. E-mail: irvinel@colorado.edu
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