Asks why governments intervene in the public transport business. And therefore, who should plan it, who should own it, and who should pay for it? I also ask, are these technical questions or political ones? These are internationally relevant but this presentation was to a Singapore audience and uses Singapore’s public transport story for most examples.
Presentation for Singapore's OTC leadership institute (10 April 2014).
2. OUTLINE
Why does government intervene in the
public transport business?
So, who should plan it, who should own it,
and who should pay for it?
And are these technical questions or political ones?
Using Singapore’s public transport story for most examples
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
3. 3
SINGAPORE NEEDS SPACE-
EFFICIENT TRANSPORT
from Kenworthy and Laube’s UITP Millennium database
Singapore: 93.5 persons per urban hectare in 1995;
and 98.5 in 2005 according to Kenworthy
This is NET urban density
Gross density comparisons are
totally useless
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
4. CARS ARE EXTREMELY SPACE CONSUMING
ROAD SPACE CONSUMED BY: AFULL BUS; THE SAME PEOPLE ON BICYCLES; THE SAME PEOPLE IN CARS
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
5. PUBLIC TRANSPORT IS VERY
SPACE-EFFICIENT
Mindboggling rail capacity through Shibuya in Tokyo
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
8. SINGAPORE’S BUSES PRE 1935
Singapore Traction Company (STC)
- private but with statutory monopoly in urban core
‘Mosquito buses’ (1910 or so to 1935)
- virtually unregulated by government
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Source: Archives and Oral History Department Singapore
9. Some public transport assets are:
- long lived
- immobile
- purpose specific
- expensive to replace
So large sunk costs …
Hence natural barriers to entry
- imagine trying to build a
parallel competitor
Kuala Lumpur
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
10. Natural Monopoly:
- Due to inherent characteristics of industry
(examples: water, electricity transmission and distribution)
- Monopoly a problem if it also involves market power
(which allows firm to raise prices without losing sales)
Conditions for market power:
- Barriers to entry
- Lack of close substitutes
Does MRT have market power from natural monopoly?
How about the old mosquito buses?
SBS and SMRT bus services?
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
11. SO URBAN BUSES NOT A NATURAL MONOPOLY!
WHEN NOT REGULATED WE GET HUNDREDS OF SMALL BUS BUSINESSES
Manila
Jakarta
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
12. THE MAIN BUS REGULATION OPTIONS
Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)
Public
monopolies
Proactive
planning
with service
contracts
Well-
regulated
Franchises
Passive
franchises
Deregulation
Government takes
much responsibility
Government
takes little
responsibility
Notice that there are many ways to organize urban bus industries!
Bus regulation options include deregulation (buses not a natural monopoly)
The options for urban rail are more limited
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
13. SINGAPORE’S BUSES PRE 1935
Singapore Traction Company (STC)
- private but with statutory monopoly
in urban core
‘Mosquito buses’ (1910 or so to 1935)
- virtually unregulated by government
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Source: Archives and Oral History Department Singapore
Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)
14. SO GOVERNMENTS OFTEN ERECT BARRIERS
TO ENTRY FOR BUS SERVICES
But why?
Bogor
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
15. MAYBE BECAUSE A PUBLIC GOOD?
EXCEPT THAT PUBLIC
TRANSPORT IS NOT A
PUBLIC GOOD!
(Easily) Excludable
Yes No
Subtractable
(or rivalrous)
Yes
Private
Goods
Common-
Pool
Resources
No
Club Goods
(or ‘toll goods’ or
‘low-congestion
goods’)
Public
Goods
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
16. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE?
Yes, too important to risk
failure
MRT - and a strong bus system to go
with it - are both essential because
1971 Concept Plan calls for strong city
centre and dense transit-based
corridors
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
17. MAYBE BECAUSE IT IS A BASIC NECESSITY?
Yes, this is another reason
(although what would happen if we had almost no
public transport? – consider Hanoi for example)
Politics of prices is hot when
a good is a basic need
But there is another
very important set of
reasons that
governments intervene
Penang
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
18. PROBLEMS WITH DEREGULATED BUS INDUSTRIES
Even with real competition, service is
often poor and not comprehensive:
- Excess service on busy corridors/busy times
- Neglect of other corridors/quiet times
- racing and dangerous behaviour
- waiting to fill at terminals and busy stops
But real competition often doesn’t
last:
- mafia-based barriers to entry
- or dominant player in each market (UK)
- still neglect unprofitable routes and times
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
19. SINGAPORE’S BUSES 1935 - 1973
Ten ‘Chinese’ companies (1935-1970)
– route monopolies with fare regulation but weak
and little-enforced service obligations (“passive
franchises”)
Pirate taxis (especially in 1960s and 70s)
- illegal, unregulated
Three consortia (1970-1973)
- merged but still under “passive franchise”
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
A Changi Bus Company Limited bus. Image credit: Yeo Hong Eng
(via http://wwwyeohongeng.blogspot.sg/2012/11/buses-of-singapore-in-50s-60s-and-70s.html)
20. IMPORTANCE OF REGULAR, FREQUENT SERVICE
Hanoi bus reforms
(relative) success story
Regular service (10 min
headway) transformed
demand for buses in city of
motorcycles
Hanoi
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
21. IMPORTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE SERVICE
Regular service from early
morning until late evening)
Decent service to all parts of
the metropolitan area
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
22. SINGAPORE’S BUSES 1973 - 2008
1973 - : SBS regulated bus monopoly
1982 - : SBS and TIBS (now SMRT)
• monopolies serving distinct regions
• regulated by Government
• Fare regulation (balanced)
• Quality of Service Standards
• PTC approved route change requests
Successful for almost 4 decades
But not adequate now?
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
23. IMPORTANCE OF A UNIFIED NETWORK
(‘INTEGRATION’)
MRT very important but still needs
help from buses
Can’t provide a direct service for every trip
Need easy and free connections/transfers
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
24. SINGAPORE UNIFIED NETWORK EFFORTS
Service obligations (QoS standards)
Bus interchanges at MRT
Common ticketing and info
Free transfers (via distance-based fares)
Covered walkways etc
But more ambitious connective
network is difficult with existing
regulation approach
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Woodlands: bus interchange directly below MRT station
(Image credit: Flickr user xcode)
25. PUBLIC TRANSPORT SPEED
VIA HIGH FREQUENCIES
Good to
improve public
transport
vehicle
speeds on
roads
But speed for
users ALSO
depends on
high frequency
of service to
reduce waiting
times
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
26. ‘CONNECTIVE’ VERSUS
‘DIRECT’ PUBLIC
TRANSPORT NETWORKS
• More frequent
with SAME
resources
• Connections a
feature not a bug
• Lower travel time,
despite connections
• Simpler network:
easily understood
and remembered
Connective
Network
achieves
Based on a diagram in “Human Transit” by Jarrett WalkerPaul Barter, Reinventing Transport
27. SINGAPORE’S BUS NETWORK IS COMPLEX WITH
NUMEROUS OVERLAPPING ROUTE SEGMENTS
Difficult to convey on a map
Bus congestion problem if we boost frequencies much more
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
28. SEOUL’S 2004 ‘SEMI-PUBLIC’ BUS REFORMS
PUBLIC CONTROL, PRIVATE PROVISION SUITS AMBITIOUS INTEGRATION
Source: Kim, GC 2007 with permission
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
30. VIENNA EXAMPLE OF REGULAR, ALL-DAY, FREQUENT SERVICE
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
31. EXAMPLE: COPENHAGEN’S “A BUSES”
Bus funding cut
Rather than reduce frequencies,
decided to simplify network
New high-frequency “A-Buses”
• simple routes, high brand profile,
part of ‘mass transit’
• 3-5 minute headways all day
(10 min very early am, very late pm)
• Other routes complement/feed both
A-bus and metro
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
32. Simpler,
connective
network
Bus
headways
need to be
shorter
Waiting time
is huge
influence on
passenger
trip speed
Connective
network
forces more
transfers
Short
headways
make
transfers
less painful
Simpler
network
enables
shorter
headways!
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
This is the
unpopular bit!
33. SO, WHO SHOULD
PLAN IT, WHO
SHOULD OWN IT,
WHO SHOULD PAY
FOR IT?
NOW WE CAN THINK ABOUT THESE QUESTIONS
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
34. Singapore does seek a more
‘connective’ or integrated
network (gradually)
2007 review critical of half-hearted
integration
So LTMP 2008 embraced integrated
hub-spoke network
Does this goal require changes in
how the industry is organised and
regulated?
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
35. THE REGULATION OPTIONS EACH HAVE DIFFERENT
INTEGRATION POSSIBILITIES
Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)
Public
monopolies
Proactive
planning
with service
contracts
Well-
regulated
Franchises
Passive
franchises
Deregulation
Government takes
much responsibility for
outcomes
Compatible with
ambitious integration
& connective network
Government
takes little
responsibility for
outcomes
Incompatible
with integration
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
36. SINGAPORE’S BUSES SINCE 2008 AND LOOKING AHEAD
Elimination of transfer penalty (distance fares)
LTA took over bus line planning
Towards competitive tendering?
Moving to the left on the diagram
(more government planning and responsibility)
How far will we go and how fast?
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
37. THE REGULATION OPTIONS ALSO EACH HAVE DIFFERENT
COMPETITION/OWNERSHIP POSSIBILITIES
Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)
Public
monopolies
Proactive
planning
with service
contracts
Well-
regulated
Franchises
Passive
franchises
Deregulation
Government takes
much responsibility for
outcomes
Compatible with
ambitious integration
& connective network
Government
takes little
responsibility for
outcomes
Incompatible
with integration
Competition “for the market”
Competition
“in the market”
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Which of
these two do
you like
better?
In house
with only limited
outsourcing
38. INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES
Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)
Public
monopolies
Proactive
planning
with service
contracts
Well-
regulated
Franchises
Passive
franchises
Deregulation
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Most USA
cities
Many
northern
European
and
Australian
cities
Seoul 2004
Bogotá
Transmilenio
BRT
Singapore
1935
Singapore
1973
UK outside
London
Santiago
1973
Sri Lanka
1990s
Many
developing
cities
HK public
light buses
Many
developing
citiesHK
franchised
buses
39. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR IT?
Payments by users (fares)
Taxpayers
Other beneficiaries
Capital versus operations …
is it an important distinction here?
Is the right balance among these a technical question
or a political one?
Source: wikimedia commons
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/61/Thales_ticket_barriers,_Dhoby_Ghaut_MRT_Station,_Singapore_-_20051231.jpg)
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
40. SINGAPORE FUNDING AND FARE-SETTING
MRT investment from
general government revenue
MRT operations from fares
Fare setting must be both
“affordable” and fund
adequate operations
But in most rich cities around the
world, even operation costs come
from a mix of taxation sources and
fares
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Originally from http://www.lta.gov.sg/projects/proj_maps_rail_l.htm
41. FUNDING SOURCES THAT TARGET ‘OTHER
BENEFICIARIES’ (BEYONDFARES AND GENERALTAXES)
Station Air Rights (Hong Kong)
Land Value Capture (Hong Kong, Los Angeles, Miami, others)
Road charges (such as London congestion charge)
Advertising (many including Singapore)
Parking fees (San Francisco and others)
Parking Levies (Perth)
Employee Levy (France, Portland)
Fuel Taxes (many cities, including Seoul, Bogotá)
Vehicle Levy (Stockholm, many Canadian cities)
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport This list is adapted from one by Todd Litman
42. OBJECTIVES OF FARE SETTING MAY INCLUDE …
Generate revenue to pay for operations
and …?
Attract (the right number of) passengers
in line with vision for the city
And others, including:
• Helping special groups (aged, people with disabilities, very low-
income, etc)
• Improving access to certain areas
• Specific travel behaviour shifts
• etc
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
43. THE REGULATION OPTIONS EACH HAVE DIFFERENT
FUNDING AND FARE-SETTING POSSIBILITIES
Bus regulatory options (diagram by Paul Barter)
Public
monopolies
Proactive
planning
with service
contracts
Well-
regulated
Franchises
Passive
franchises
Deregulation
Government takes
much responsibility for
outcomes
Compatible with
ambitious integration
& connective network
Government
takes little
responsibility for
outcomes
Incompatible
with integration
Competition for the market
possible
Competition in
the market only
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport
Taxpayer and beneficiary
operational funding
possible too
Operational funding by fares
44. TOWARDS A LONDON/SCANDINAVIAN/SEOUL
MODEL FOR SINGAPORE?(I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS)
LTA plans bus lines AND schedules
Procures service from operators
(competitive tendering)
LTA gets fare revenue and pays
operators for service (LTA takes
revenue risk)
Compatible with setting an
ambitious vision for public
transport
London. Photo by David Hawgood and licensed for reuse under this Creative Commons Licence
Paul Barter, Reinventing Transport