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1. The Encyclopedia of Greek Tragedy, First Edition. Edited by Hanna M. Roisman.
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Aristotle’s Theory of Tragedy
Tragedy in the Poetics Tragedy is the
principal subject of Aristotle’s Poetics and its
most discussed topic. Apart from the general
introduction (chs. 1–5) and the concluding
discussion of epic poetry (chs. 23–6), the main
body of the treatise is dedicated to tragedy.
But tragedy looms large also in those parts of
the Poetics which formally treat other subjects.
The very identification of poetry as repre-
sentation, or mimesis, argued for in the
Introduction (see esp. 1.1447b14–15 “as if
[the poets] are not called poets by virtue of
mimesis”), points to the author’s privileging
of dramatic genres, the only ones that are fully
mimetic in that they present all the characters
as being impersonated (3.1448a19–24). An
outline of the origins of tragedy and its devel-
opment up to the point when it ceased to
change “after it had acquired its proper
nature” (4.1449a14–15; presumably, with
SOPHOCLES) is also placed here. Epic poetry
(Heath 2011a), even when it is in the focus of
the discussion, is approached through the lens
of tragedy (e.g., 23.1459b2–4, on the unity of
the Homeric epics: “Therefore out of the
Iliad or the Odyssey only one tragedy can be
made, or at most two” or 24.1459b8–9: “epic
poetry should have the same kinds as trag-
edy”). In the concluding section of our text,
which is dedicated to comparison between
the two genres, tragedy is found superior
(kreittōn) to epos (26.1462b12–15).
Here and elsewhere in the Poetics, Aristotle
uses Plato’s theory of poetry as a mimetic art
to build a hierarchy of preferences directly
opposed to Plato’s (Else 1957: 97–100; Lucas
1972: 228, 235–6, 299; Janko 1987: x–xiv;
Finkelberg 1998a: 10–11, 189–90). While
Plato regarded mimesis as the art of producing
phantoms of reality, for Aristotle it is an art that
enables the representation of the universal,
purified of the accidental aspects of empirical
reality; while Plato faulted Homer for the con-
siderable part played by impersonation in his
poems, Aristotle saw this as one of Homer’s
greatest virtues; while Plato thought tragedy
has a harmful effect on the soul in that it feeds
the emotions that destroy its rational part, in
Aristotle’s eyes the emotions aroused by trag-
edy have a purifying effect on the soul; and
while Plato considered tragedy the least accept-
able of all literary genres, for Aristotle it was the
most acceptable (see also PLATO AND TRAGEDY).
The discussion of tragedy proper (chs.
6–22) begins with a general definition:
Now, tragedy is a representation (mimēsis)
(a) of a serious and complete action pos-
sessed of a certain scale; (b) by means of
language embellished with different kinds
[of embellishment] in each of its sections;
(c) of persons who perform actions rather
than through telling a story; (d) which
achieves, by means of pity and fear, the
purification (katharsis) of such emotions.
(6, 1449b24–8)
Aristotle identifies six aspects, or “parts,” of
tragedy: PLOT (mythos), CHARACTER (ēthos), LAN-
GUAGE (lexis), thought (dianoia), SPECTACLE
(opsis), and MUSICAL composition (melopoiia).
The most important aspect of tragedy, to
which all the others are subordinated, is the
plot.
The theory of the tragic plot For all practi-
cal purposes, Aristotle’s theory of tragedy is a
theory of the tragic plot. For Aristotle, the
plot is the first principle (archē) of tragedy
and, as it were, its soul (6.1450a37–8).
Consistently identified as the arrangement of
events (systasis, or synthesis, tōn pragmatōn:
6, 1450a4–5, 15 et passim), it should be a
whole (holon), having a beginning, a middle,
and an end (7.1450b 27–8) and “one,” that
is, present a unity (8.1451a15–16); it is man-
datory for it to be arranged in accordance
with probability or necessity (kata to eikos ē to
anankaion: 9.1451a37–9 et passim). These

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principles are violated in the so-called epi-
sodic plots, “in which the acts (ta epeisodia),
following one another, display neither prob-
ability nor necessity” (9.1451b34–5; cf.
Metaph. 1090b19–20). This is the worst
kind of plot.
Plots may be simple or complex. The latter
are characterized by RECOGNITION (ana-
gnōrismos, anagnōrisis) and REVERSAL (peri-
peteia), both of which should arise from the
arrangement of the plot itself and agree with
probability or necessity (10.1452a18–20,
11.1452a38–1452b1; see also ARISTOTLE:
ELEMENTS OF GREEK TRAGEDY). The third ele-
ment of the plot is SUFFERING (pathos), under-
stood as enactment of destruction or pain
(11.1452b9–13). In virtue of recognition
and reversal, the complex plots produce PITY
or FEAR, both of them distinctive (idion) of
tragic representation (13.1452b30–3). The
plot which has a single focus and whose rever-
sal is from good to bad fortune is the best
one; the reversal should occur as a result of a
major error (HAMARTIA) committed by a man
who is like ourselves in that he is neither
entirely blameless nor entirely mean: such
plots produce pity and fear and result in the
kind of pleasure (hēdonē) that is specific to
tragedy (13.1453a7–17, 35–6). The genuine
tragic pleasure is therefore the one that comes
from pity and fear by way of representation
(14.1453b10–13).
Aristotle’s theory of the plot is holistic, in
that it embraces both the form and the con-
tent of the tragic play, both its inner structure
and the response of the AUDIENCE (cf.
6.1450a32–4: “Those [elements] that espe-
cially affect the soul, namely, the reversals and
recognitions, are parts of the plot”). Its
fundamental principles form an indissoluble
chain in which the arrangement of events
leads to the protagonist’s error; the error
results in recognition and reversal; recogni-
tion and reversal arouse pity and fear; and pity
and fear culminate in KATHARSIS (so in the
general definition) or in the specific tragic
pleasure (so in the rest of the text). All this is
presented as a quasi-real event with no media-
tion of the authorial or narrative voice.
It follows from this that for Aristotle the
objective of tragedy is in bringing the
audience (or the reader) to a certain state,
alternately designated as either katharsis or
pleasure. Although the exact meaning of
Aristotle’s katharsis has been debated for
centuries, on any interpretation it would
amount to a profound purifying effect on the
soul. Pleasure as the objective of tragedy
should not be taken lightly either. The
thorough treatment of pleasure in book 10 of
the Nicomachean Ethics is especially helpful in
this respect (Finkelberg 1998a: 13–17).
Every activity has its end (telos) in the kind of
pleasure specific to it: the pleasure specific
to a worthy activity is good and that specific
to an unworthy one is bad (1174b31–4,
1175a19–21, 24–9). If, then, a work of
poetry is ethically worthy (and in ch. 13 of
the Poetics Aristotle supplies well-defined cri-
teria for distinguishing between ethically
worthy and unworthy plots), then the pleas-
ure in which it culminates would lead, as with
other virtuous activities, to the attainment of
happiness (eudaimonia; cf. 1177a2–11). This
would place the pleasure caused by tragedy
among those pleasures that belong with the
activities of “the perfect and blessed man”:
such is first and foremost the activity of rea-
son (1176a26–8, 1177b19–21). On this
interpretation, the pleasure caused by the
right kind of tragedy would be akin to the
pleasure of spiritual contemplation experi-
enced by the philosopher.
What Aristotle leaves out The other asp-
ects of tragedy receive a much less thorough
treatment. CHARACTERIZATION is considered
secondary to the plot, and it too should agree
with probability or necessity (6.1450a38;
15.1454a33–6). This is why sudden changes
of character – as, for example, in EURIPIDES’
IPHIGENIA AT AULIS – should be avoided, and
the same holds good of the dramatic device of
DEUS EX MACHINA as introduced, for example, in
EURIPIDES’ MEDEA (15.1454a31–3, 1454b1–2).
To avoid inconsistencies at the time of perfor-
mance, the poet should keep the scenic action
before his eyes (17.1455a22–9); the CHORUS

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should be treated as one of the ACTORS and
part of the whole (18.1456a25–30), and so
on. The concluding chapters of Aristotle’s dis-
cussion of tragedy (chs. 19–21) deal with lan-
guage and thought, although not everything
here seems to have originally belonged to the
Poetics.
The performative aspects of tragedy, namely,
the spectacle and the musical composition, are
deliberately skipped over: “The spectacle does
indeed affect the soul, but it is the most unso-
phisticated (atechnotaton) and the least ger-
mane to the art of poetry, for the power of
tragedy holds even without performance and
actors” (6.1450b17–20). The experience of
the reader or the listener of a tragic play is
therefore acknowledged as just as effective a
form of reception as that of the spectator.
Aristotle’s other omissions are no less reveal-
ing. He ignores the entire genre of lyric poetry
and hardly even mentions the choral odes of
tragedy, obviously on account of their non-
mimetic character (see LYRIC POETRY AND
TRAGEDY). He never refers to religious aspects
of tragedy nor to the role played in it by GODS,
apparently because their workings add noth-
ing to the overarching principles of probabil-
ity and necessity. He ignores such generally
acclaimed masterpieces as EURIPIDES’ TROJAN
WOMEN and SOPHOCLES’ OEDIPUS AT COLONUS,
both of them episodic, or AESCHYLUS’
AGAMEMNON and EURIPIDES’ BACCHAE, both
dominated by the chorus. His exemplary trag-
edies are SOPHOCLES’ OEDIPUS TYRANNUS and
EURIPIDES’ IPHIGENIA AMONG THE TAURIANS,
both fitting to perfection his requirements for
the best plot (Else 1957: 446).
Aristotle’s strategies of inclusion and exclu-
sion show clearly enough that his discussion
of tragedy has never been intended as a piece
of literary criticism or a balanced overview of
the extant corpus of ATTIC drama. The Poetics
is a philosophical treatise purported to present
a theory of mimetic art of which the genre of
tragedy happens to be the most adequate
representative.
Partisans and critics For a number of
reasons, Aristotle’s theory of tragedy exerted
a considerably greater influence on modern
European than on Hellenistic and Roman
tradition (Halliwell 1986: 287–90). From c.
1500, the Poetics became a seminal text which
dominated western thought on art and litera-
ture in the subsequent three centuries; from
c. 1800, its authority started being ques-
tioned, and it was alternately attacked or
endorsed for another 200 years; today, it con-
tinues to be an integral part not only of liter-
ary theory but also of the theory of drama,
cinema, and art in general (see, e.g., Jauss
1973/4; Dolezel 1988; 1998; Eco 1990).
Still, the history of its reception is to a
large degree a history of misinterpretation
(Halliwell 1987: 291–323). The most notori-
ous case is that of the so-called “Aristotelian
UNITIES” – of action, place, and time – which
were regarded as normative in the neo-
classical theory of drama. Yet, although
only the unity of action is actually mentioned
by Aristotle, in the reaction against neo-
classicism that started with the Enlightenment
the three unities were habitually regarded
as representative of Aristotle’s theory. The
still persistent habit of narrowing the focus of
the Poetics by translating the Greek mimēsis as
“imitation” has been equally misleading.
As a rule, both the admirers and the detrac-
tors of the Poetics fail to approach it as a whole,
thus distorting the thread of Aristotle’s argu-
ment and eventually missing its point. Bertolt
Brecht’s theory of “non-Aristotelian theater”
is a unique attempt at challenging the Poetics
in its totality. Just as Aristotle in the Poetics,
Brecht proceeded from the structure of the
play to the reaction of the audience; as a result,
his theory of drama is a mirror image of
Aristotle’s (Finkelberg 2006). Brecht rejected
the Aristotelian model of a lifelike illusion
which lures the spectator into the state of a
complete identification with the hero, result-
ing in feelings of fear and pity and, ultimately,
an emotional katharsis: instead, he strove to
prevent the spectators from experiencing
emotions and to encourage them to think.
This is why, as against the cause-effect conti-
nuity of Aristotelian plot, he adopted the epi-
sodic plot structure detested by Aristotle. This

4. 4
is also why he replaced the audience’s identifi-
cation with the characters, leading to what he
saw as passive acceptance of the existing order
of things, by the emotional estrangement
from what was happening on the scene (com-
pare his famous “I laugh when they weep, I
weep when they laugh”). Brecht’s vision of
“non-Aristotelian theater” has been highly
influential, and in its questioning of such
notions as artistic illusion, identification with
the characters, or unity of the plot the con-
temporary theory owes much to Brecht’s
insights and, through them, to Aristotle.
See also GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY;
MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND GREEK TRAGEDY;
PERFORMATIVE APPROACH TO GREEK TRAGEDY;
POETICS OF GREEK TRAGEDY; POST-
ARISTOTELIAN CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE TRAGIC HERO
References
Dolezel, L. 1988. “Mimesis and Possible Worlds.”
Poetics Today 9: 475–96.
Dolezel, L. 1998. “Possible Worlds of Fiction and
History.” New Literary History 29: 785–809.
Eco, U. 1990. “Thoughts on Aristotle’s Poetics,”
in C.-A. Mihalescu and W. Hamarneh (eds.),
Fiction Updated: Theories of Fictionality,
Narratology, and Poetics. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press: 229–43.
Else, G.F. 1957. Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Finkelberg, M. 1998a. The Birth of Literary Fiction
in Ancient Greece. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Finkelberg, M. 2006. “Aristotle and Episodic
Tragedy.” G&R 53: 60–72.
Halliwell, S. 1986. Aristotle’s Poetics. London:
Duckworth.
Heath, M. 2011a. “Aristotle and Homer,” in
M. Finkelberg (ed.), The Homer Encyclopedia.
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell: 93–6.
Janko, R. 1987. Aristotle, Poetics, with the Tractatus
Coislinianus, reconstruction of Poetics II, and the
fragments of the On Poets. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing.
Jauss, H.R. 1973/4. “Levels of Identification of
Hero and Audience.” New Literary History 5:
283–317.
Lucas, D. 1972. Aristotle: Poetics. 2nd edn. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Further Reading
Andersen, Ø. and J. Haarberg (eds.). 2001.
Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics.
London: Duckworth.
Belfiore, E. 1992. Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on
Plot and Emotion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Oksenberg Rorty, A. (ed.). 1992. Essays on
Aristotle’s Poetics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
MARGALIT FINKELBERG