Anthropology in Pakistan Recent Sociocultural and Archaeological Perspectives.pdf

Anthropology in Pakistan : recent socio-cultural and archaeological
perspectives / editors, Stephen Pastner, Louis Flam.
[Ithaca, N.Y.] : South Asia Program, Cornell University, 1982.
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015013326767
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RECENT SOCIO-
ANTHROPOLOGY IN PAKISTAN:
CULTURAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
Editors: Stephen Pastner
Associate Professor of Anthropology and
Director of Asian Studies
University of Vermont
Louis Flam
Department of Earth Resources
Colorado State University
South Asia Occasional Papers and Theses
South Asia Program
Cornell University
No. 8
l982

The editors dedicate this volume to
Debbie, Becky, and Michelle.
ii

EDITORS* PREFACE
Most of the papers in this volume were presented in
the course of two symposia which were held at the l978
annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association,
Los Angeles, California. Several others —notably those by
the Lindholms, Ann Christine Frankowski , and M. A. Rauf —
were written expressly for this volume.
Special thanks is given to the Pakistan American
Foundation and its trustees and President, Dr. Hafeez Malik.
The Pakistan American Foundation's generous contribution
toward a major part of the cost of publication has made the
volume available to students of Pakistan studies at this
time .
Additional funds were provided by the South Asia
Program of Cornell University under the directorship of Dr.
Gerald Kelley. The editors would like to thank the American
Institute of Pakistan Studies which generously provided the
funds permitting Dr. Aquila Kiani of the University of
Karachi to participate in the symposia. We would also like
to thank Kenneth A. R. Kennedy and Gerald Kelley of the
Cornell University South Asia Program for their editorial
patience in what has been a more drawn-out project than was
originally anticipated. To our typist and editorial
assistant, Jill Mason, we owe a special debt.
Stephen Pastner
Louis Flam

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EDITORS' PREFACE iii
PART I: SOCIO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES l
Introduction to Part I: Pakistan and the
Anthropological Endeavor. Stephen Pastner
(Department of Anthropology, University of
Vermont ) 2
The Need and Prospects for Social Science
Research in Pakistan. Aquila Kiani (Sociology
Department, University of Karachi) and M. Arif
Ghayur (Sociology Department, University of Utah) .... ll
Models of Segmentary Political Action: The
Examples of Swat and Dir, NWFP, Pakistan.
Charles Litidholm (South Asian Institute,
Columbia University) 2l
Lineage Politics and Economic Development:
A Case-Study from the Northwest Frontier Province,
Pakistan. Akbar S. Ahmed (Anthropology Department,
Harvard University; Political Agent, Government of
Pakistan) 40
The Swat Pukhtun Family as a Political Training
Ground. Cherry Lindholm (Science Digest editorial
staff) 5l
Clients, Camps & Crews: Adaptational Variation
in Baluch Social Organization. Stephen Pastner
and Carrol McC. Pastner (Department of Anthropology,
University of Vermont) 6l
Sufis and -Adepts: The Islamic and Hindu Sources
of Spiritual Power Among Pun.jabi Muslims and
Christian Sweepers. Katherine Ewing (Collegiate
Division of the Social Sciences, University of
Chicago) 7k
Hot and Cold: Towards an Indigenous Model of
Group Identity and Strategy in Pakistani Society .
Richard Kur in (Department of Anthropology,
Southern Illinois University) 89
Goans in Lahore: A Study in Ethnic Identity.
Ann Christine Frankowski (Houston, Texas) l03
iv

Labor Emigration and the Changing Trend
of Family Life in a Pakistani Village. Mohammed A.
Rauf (Department of Anthropology, Quaid-I-Azam
University) ll4
PART II: ARCHAEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES l2l
Introduction to Part II: Ecological Perspectives
on the Past. Louis Flam (Department of Earth
Resources, Colorado State University) l22
Human Occupation in Northwest Pakistan During
the Late Pleistocene. Anthony J. Ranere
(Department of Anthropology, Temple University) l24
From Hunting to Herding in Prehistoric
Baluchistan . Richard H. Meadow (Peabody
Museum, Harvard University) l45
Adaptation and Exploitation at Harappan
Coastal Settlements. George F. Dales
(Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies,
University of California, Berkeley) l54
Harappan Commerce: An Alternative Perspective.
Jim G. Shaffer (Department of Anthropology, Case
Western Reserve University) l66
Paleodemographic Perspectives of Social
Structural Change in Harappan Society. Kenneth
A. R. Kennedy (Division of Biological Sciences,
Anthropology and Asian Studies, Cornell
University) 2ll
Suggested Archaeological Evidence for Complex
Social Organizations in Prehistoric Sind. Louis
Flam (Department of Earth Resources, Colorado
State University) 2l9
v

PART I
SOCIO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
l

INTRODUCTION TO PART I:
PAKISTAN AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL ENDEAVOR
Stephen Pastner
Most of the articles in this section are based on
research carried out during the mid to late l970' s when
social/cultural anthropology enjoyed a relative high point
in what has been a rather oscillating relationship with
Pakistan. A similar "boom" period for research was the
decade of the 50' s which produced a number of classic
studies of Pakistani regional cultures such as Barth (l959) ,
Eglar (l960), and Pehrson (l966).
Some of the reasons for the shifts in the relationship
of anthropology to Pakistan are among the issues discussed
in the first paper, by Pakistani sociologists A. Kiani and
M.A. Ghayur. The authors note that anthropology in the
subcontinent at large is rooted in the colonial heritage,
when ethnographic data were gathered to support the political
and economic ends of the Raj. Kiani and Ghayur suggest that
modern-day anthropologists—particularly if they are foreigners
may be suspected of pursuing neo-colonial interests (cf . also
Pastner l979 and Kurin l980) and even if they are Pakistanis
may face some formidable barriers to fieldwork, including
informant hostility, withdrawal, and lack of privacy.
Now such problems are commonly encountered by researchers
in many ex-colonial societies. However, the Pakistani case
has its own particularities which can be further illuminated
if we go a bit beyond the Kiani-Ghayur discussion to compare
the role of anthropology in Pakistan with its place in India,
where the discipline has been used to far better advantage.
In India nearly all of the more than l00 major univer
sities have integrated anthropology curricula, a subject
introduced into the University of Calcutta as early as
l920. Twenty departments offer graduate degrees. In
Pakistan, the only autonomous anthropology department is
found at the Quaid-I-Azam University, this since the early
70' s, and although rural sociology has been introduced at
a number of colleges and universities these developments
began only in the 60's.
India has long produced a number of internationally
respected journals of anthropology such as Man in India,
Eastern Anthropologist, Rural India, and others. Although
it has widely respected vehicles for publishing articles
2

3
in economics and management, Pakistan has had no anthro
pological journal until recent plans to publish one out
of the department at Quaid-I-Azam University (Rauf , personal
communication) .
Despite the same stigmas attached to colonial anthro
pology in both India and Pakistan, in the post-colonial era
the former has a better record for utilizing the discipline's
special skills. There anthropologists are associated with
management institutes in such places as Calcutta and Bangalore
(berth of the renowned M.N. Srinivas), while metropolitan
planning agencies, such as the one in Calcutta, have long
included anthropologists. Indian anthropologists have been
involved in the implementation and evaluation of education
programs like the Ahmedabad-based Satellite Instructional
Television Experiment, and other agencies, such as state
information departments, the Office of the Commissioner of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and the Registrar
General have also drawn on anthropological expertise (for
a fuller account of such matters cf. Sarana and Sinha l976).
In Pakistan, on the other hand, to my knowledge there are
no anthropologists in non-academic administrative positions
with the notable exception of Dr. Akbar Ahmed, an authority
on the tribes of the Northwest Frontier. While foreign aid-
granting agencies, such as The Agency for International
Development, have utilized anthropological input, and the
department at Quaid-I-Azam University has recently contri
buted applied social impact research to such efforts as
rural electrification programs (Rauf, personal communication),
the Pakistani use of anthropological expertise continues at
a far lower level than in India.
Foreign anthropologists have often had their share of
difficulties in obtaining research clearances in both
countries, but India established a facilitating agency,
in the American Institute of Indian Studies (founded l96l)
more than a full decade ahead of the analogous American
Institute of Pakistan Studies.
Enough foreign, as well as home-grown, theoretical
anthropological scholarship has gone on in India in the
past few years to result in significant new directions in
the study of such hoary issues as the nature of the "little
community" in India, caste, and agrarian reform (cf. for
example the special issue of Reviews in Anthropology, summer
l980) . Anthropology in India has also made recent strides
in the explication of classical Indology, melding "text and
context" (Sarana & Sinha op.cit. 2l6).
Even though Sarana and Sinha (ibid p. 2l9) in their
account of anthropology's achievements in India lament,
inter alia, the "diffused" and "ad hoc" response of Indian

4
practitioners of the craft to the problems of nation
building, it is clear that the Indian anthropological
experience has been a happy one in comparison to its
neighbor. Why should these differences be as marked as
they are in countries sharing so much history and culture?
Certainly the answer is not in the old colonial saw that
contrasted the bookish Hindu babu to the brave but dumb
Muslim who cared "more for guns than books" (a phrase
actually uttered by an American journalist covering the
Bangladesh war). Pakistan has produced its share of prodi
gies in both the natural sciences and such social sciences
as economics and political science. Indeed, Pakistan's
best known anthropologist —Akbar Ahmed — in the last five
years has produced enough high quality anthropological
writing on the Frontier to qualify him as a one-man
scholarly conglomerate (cf. Ahmed l976, l977a & b, l980,
and forthcoming) .
Instead, a number of related historical and cultural
reasons can be advanced to account for the differences in
the Indian and Pakistani response to anthropology:
l. Hindu cosmology is far more pluralistic than that
of Islam, able to accommodate both the devotees of Vishnu
and Kali. Islam, as a "revealed" faith, is rigidly mono
polistic in its insistance that it rests on the ultimate
prophecy. In fact, Islam is divided into many heterodox
sects each of which claims for itself the mantle of greatest
purity. Pakistan, although predominantly peopled by Sunnis
of the Hanafite school, has more than its fair share of this
sectarianism — Shi' as, Ismailis, Qadianis, Zikris (cf. the
Pastner and Pastner article in this volume) and the followers
of idiosyncratic Sufi pirs beyond counting. Add to these
the cleavages of ethnicity, class, and genre de vie, each
often nourished by attitudes of personal rectitude analogous
to the religious one and a milieu is created which is not
altogether receptive to the relativistic perspective tradi
tional in Western anthropology. When a researcher seeks to
pursue inquiries among ethnic groups other than those to
which clearance granting officials belong, he may be met
with a certain amount of incredulity or disdain for the
value of the project.
Attempts by Pakistani anthropologists like Akbar Ahmed
to construct a "narcissistic anthropology," blending the
anthropologist's own Muslim faith with Western concepts
and methods (cf . Ahmed l976 and forthcoming) have produced
results of much interest to Western colleagues (e.g., Current
Anthropology l8 O, for an extended discussion of Ahmed's
work) , but the verdict from the Pakistani side, measurable
in terms of increased support for the discipline, is still
out . l

5
2. The taint of colonial manipulation attached to
South Asian anthropology and alluded to above, was strongest
in those areas of the Raj encompassed in modern Pakistan's
borders. Martial groups like the Baluch and Pathans were
never fully subdued, Sind wasn't conquered until nearly a
century after Plassey, while the Punjab long supplied some
of the toughest fighting men for the sepoy ranks.
This vulnerable territory on the Raj frontier, with
its relatively unruly populace, accordingly witnessed more
of the espionage cum ethnography endeavors associated with
the "Great Game" of Russo-British jockeying for power over
South Asia than the more placid parts of the subcontinent.
In the modern world the "Great Game" clearly continues,
although some of the players have changed. Current events
such as those in Afghanistan and Iran are reminders to
Pakistanis of the unchangingly perilous character of their
political environment, and anthropology thus continues to
be heir to the suspicions generated by the colonial heritage.
3. Muslim culture in South Asia and the Middle East,
especially in rural areas, manifests what the anthropologist
John Gulick (l976) has called the mentality of "peril and
refuge" — a feeling that the extra-kin social environment
is a hostile one. Mankind is seen as a species dominated
more by naf s (the base and uncontrolled aspects of the
soul) than by akil or rationality and spirituality. One's
honor (izzat) and that of dependants and kin is best pro
tected by creating screens (purdah) , both real and meta
phorical, against these dangers. The burka, or shroud,
worn by many women, the sequestration of vulnerable females
in walled compounds, and widespread patterns of close-kin
endogamy are all permutations on this theme. So, too, is
the readiness with which inquisitive strangers like the
anthropologist may be met with guardedness or dissimulation,
derived in part from the Islamically sanctioned notion of
taqiyyeh or not tipping one's hand to a potential enemy.
However, it should be stressed that if these hurdles can
be overcome, and bona fides established, the researcher in
Pakistan can enter a world of great warmth, support, and
cultural richness.
4. Finally, there is the observation made by a canny
American grant administrator in Pakistan who spent years
commiserating with hopeful foreign scholars whose requests
for clearances, especially to tribal areas, were often turned
down outright or relegated to the limbo of South Asian
bureaucracy. He notes that much seeming "wrongheadedness"
on the part of Pakistani officials is sometimes simply good
sense, aimed at preventing the naive and romantic westerner
from getting shot "between his myopic blue eyes" (Bo ewe l976:
25) •

6
As insiders to the Pakistani social science establish
ment Kiani and Ghayur offer a number of suggestions for
improving anthropology's status in Pakistan. The most
pointed of these is the need for scholars to offer more
evident applied benefits from their research than has been
the case so far. This point is a gentle echo of the com
plaint often heard in developing countries which rightly
resent the "academic imperialism" of westerners who study
them and depart, leaving little in return. One can endorse
this idea as long as the discipline is not so circumscribed
by the need to deliver a program or policy of "practical
utility," to use Kiani and Ghayur' s term, that empirical
objectivity is subordinated to political expediency. Few
policies, after all, are ever really formulated by social
scientists, who instead are more commonly expeditors of
programs generated by political leaders. That the main
point of the Kiani-Ghayur message has registered, however,
is explicitly reflected in a number of the other papers
here, and implicitly reflected in others.
The next three papers in this section deal with
different but complementary aspects of Pukhtun (Pathan)
society. Charles Lindholm presents a macro-historical
comparison of the segmentary politico/kinship organization
of the tribes of Swat and Dir. Despite fundamental common
values of egalitarianism and personal honor— the so-called
"code of the Pathans" or Puk htunwal i—Lindholm suggests
that during periods of political expansion, strong secular
leaders will emerge to rally tribesmen for conquest and
booty; but when outsiders loom as a threat, religious leaders
come to the fore, such as the Akhund of Swat, who organized
Yusufzai resistance to the British in the l860's. The paper
concludes on an appropriately "applied" note, suggesting to
the incumbent Pakistani regime that it would do well to
consider the historical patterns of Pukhtun reaction to
outside pressures before attempting to impose on them the
de-tribalizing, pan-Islamic ideologies that are now the
official government line. Certainly events in Afghanistan,
which transpired after the first draft of this paper was
submitted, show how prescient a piece of work this is.
Writing from the favored vantage points of trained
anthropologist, government administrator among the Pukhtun
and social "insider" with kin ties to tribal society, Akbar
Ahmed relates the sort of social organization described by
Lindholm to problems of economic development among the
Mohmand Pukhtun. The extended case method is used to
demonstrate why an agricultural development scheme among
the tribesmen ultimately failed. Lineage rivalries and
inter-generational disputes, endemic in the Pakh tunwal i
system, gave rise to a feeling among the Mohmand of Bela
village that certain individuals were using the agricultural

7
cooperative society as a base for expanding their political
clout with government officials, to the detriment of rival
tribesmen. This pattern grows out of the same segmentary
stresses Lindholm discussed and clearly illustrates how the
anthropological perspective can illuminate , in a very real
and practical way, issues of policy implementation.
Cherry Lindholm, although not a formally trained
anthropologist, holds a graduate degree in psychology and
has the keen observational skills of her present journal
istic profession. While working with her husband among
the Yusufzai Pukhtun of Swat she became one of the few
outsiders to enter fully into the purdah dominated domestic
world of the Pukhtun. Here she focuses on child raising
and other intra-familial activities which ultimately forge
the individuals who act in the ways described in the previous
two papers. Instant gratification of an infant's desires are
juxtaposed to the abrupt withdrawal of these favors once
younger siblings appear on the scene. Severe corporal
punishment further sets the stage for the kin rivalries and
emphasis on personal toughness which pervade Pukhtun society
and which are found among both sexes.
The Pastners' paper looks at another of Pakistan's
major tribal groups, the Baluch. Based on diversified
fieldwork among desert dwelling oasis farmers and nomads
and coastal fishermen, the Pastners examine some of the
common ideological and organizational themes that transcend
Baluch ecological variations. They focus in particular on
institutions based on Baluch notions of power and protection
of family honor. An additional theme of the paper is the
explication of how pan-Baluch cultural traits, found from
the stratified oasis centers of Makran to the more egali
tarian maritime villages of the Arabian Sea littoral, have
historically facilitated population shifts from desert to
coast. By ruling coastal peoples into the analytical
picture the Pastners hope to expand the traditional arid
zone conceptual trilogy of nomad, farmer, and townsman.
Although "applied" aims are not central to this paper,
the attention it devotes to the interplay of interior and
coastal groups in Pakistan has implications for development
policies aimed at providing occupational alternatives to
economically depressed rural populations. The relatively
untapped protein-rich maritime resource should be given a
lot more attention than it has received so far in Pakistan,
where the only university marine biology department is
located 30 miles inland and, as of l977 , lacked even a
rowboat for its research, and where indigenous social
research on coastal lifeways has been all but nil in the
last twenty years.

8
Katherine Ewing's paper describes syncretisms between
Hinduism and Islam in certain sectors of Punjabi society.
Numerous ex-untouchable, and nowadays nominally Christian,
sweepers of Lahore are followers of the pirs of the surround
ing Muslim majority. However, those "saints" who minister
to both sweepers and low status Muslims differ in their per
ceptions and use of spiritual power from the spiritual
mentors of more ashraf i or "elite" groups, who reflect
more "mainstream" and orthodox Islamic ideology. The norma-
tively dualistic nature of orthodox Islamic eschatology
and cosmology are contrasted to Hinduism which emerges as
an ideological substratum in the groups Ewing discusses. .
Richard Kurin also examines symbolic systems, in this
case those that underlie perceptions of the natural and
social order held by Karachi moha.jirs (Partition-era
refugees from India) and rural Punjabis. Notions derived
from Greek-Arabic homeo and allopathic humoral theory are
seen as the basis of ethnic taxonomies among these groups.
Muha.jirs and Punjabi villagers attribute the relative
"hotness" or "coldness" in the temperament of different
quoms , or ethnic groups, in Pakistan to influences from
the environment—f ood, occupation, soil, etc. —each of
which has its temperament-molding effects or tasir. The
integration of a social group to its surroundings is seen
by Kurin as an ongoing attempt to achieve a desirable level
of temperament.
The "practical utility" of studies like Ewing's and
Kurin' s may at first seem a bit obscure, but in fact applied
payoffs can be great. In the case of Kurin* s work speci
fically, an understanding of indigenous concepts of tasir
can be translated into agrarian development programs which
offer to villagers fertilizers, seed strains and cropping
patterns that will produce the foodstuffs most desired in
terms of "temperament maintenance." Failure to take these
ideas into account can in turn create hindrances to the
implementation of such programs (Kurin, personal communica
tion) .
Ann Frankowski's paper describes a little-known group
in Pakistan's ethnic mosaic--the Catholic Goans of Lahore.
She concentrates on the diacritical features of Goan self-
identity. In a Muslim-dominated society they have chosen
to retain their separateness through self-conscious use of
Western dress, English as a mother tongue, Portuguese sur
names, and a high degree of endogamy. Yet because of this
they are often castigated for "aping" foreigners. Frankowski
shows how Goa's history as a European enclave has led quite
naturally to such behaviors and questions the continued
viability of this population in Pakistan.

9
The final paper is by Mohammed Rauf , Chairman of
the Anthropology Department at Quaid-I-Azam University.
He addresses an issue due to receive increasing attention
from both scholars and administrators — the massive exodus
of labor from Pakistan to the oil-economies of the Middle
East. Rauf examines the ways in which male absenteeism
has altered women's domestic roles in the Punjab, resulting
in. an increased incidence of matrifocal households and
greater scope for female decision making in the economic
sphere. This brief paper is a beginning step in fleshing
out the actual "social impact" of the migration issue, an
area only speculated about thus far by observers primarily
concerned with its economic parameters (cf. Burki l980,
Guisinger l980). Other anthropologists have also made
some tentative probes of this matter (Pastner l98l; Ahmed
l98l) and we can expect far more work to be done in the
future as the flow into Pakistan of remittance money from
the oil fields rapidly transforms local economic and social
organization.
Although the papers here lack a central focus, I believe
that their very diversity in theoretical, substantive, and,
in some cases, applied focus well illustrates the symbiotic
benefits to be gained from an increased role for anthropology
in Pakistan. It is hoped that this collection will be a step
in achieving this goal.
Note
"^"Since completion of this essay, Dr. Akbar Ahmed has
been granted the Tamgha-i-Imtiaz Award by the government of
Pakistan. That this prestigious honor for cumulative literary
and scholarly achievement has for the first time gone to an
anthropologist may bode well for the discipline's future in
Pakistan.
References
Ahmed, A.S. l976 Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
l977a Pieces of Green. Karachi: Royal Book Co

l0
l977b Social and Economic Change in the Tribal
Areas l972-76. Karachi: Oxford.
l980 Pukhtun Economy and Society. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
l98l The Arab Connection. Paper presented at
meeting of the Northeastern Anthropological Association.
(forthcoming) Religion and Politics in Islam: A
Case Study from Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press.
Barth, F. l959 Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans.
New Jersey: Athalone Press.
Boewe, C. l976 A Modest Research Proposal. Mimeo in limited
circulation to clients of the United States Educational
Foundation in Pakistan.
Burki, S.J. l980 What Migration to the Middle East May
Mean for Pakistan. Journal of South Asian and Middle
East Studies III, 3. ^7-66.
Eglar, Z. i960 Panjabi Village. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Guisinger, S. l98O The Impact of Temporary Worker Migration
on Pakistan. Presented at symposium of Pakistan's
development, Pennsylvania State University.
Gulick, J. l976 The Middle East—An Anthropological
Perspective. Pacific Palisades: Goodyear.
Kurin, R. l980 Doctor Lawyer Indian Chief. Natural
History, November: 6-2^ .
Pastner, S. l979 The Man Who Would be Anthropologist:
Dilemmas in Fieldwork on the Baluchistan Frontier.
Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies III,
2: 4^-52.
l98l Another Man Done Gone: The Impact of Middle
East Oil Wealth on the Pakistani Baluch. Paper presented
at meeting of Northeastern Anthropological Association.
Pehrson, R. l966 The Social Organization of the Marri
Baluch. Chicago: Aldine.
Sarana, G. and D.P. Sinha l976 Status of Social-Cultural
Anthropology in India. Annual Review of Anthropology
5: 209-226.

THE NEED AND PROSPECTS FOR
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN PAKISTAN
Aquila Kiani and M. Arif Ghayur
Introduction
An attempt has been made in this paper to (l) trace
the beginnings of the anthropological and sociological
approaches in the understanding of cultural and social
aspects of life in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent;
(2) discuss the rationale for the introduction of social
sciences, particularly sociology and anthropology as teach
ing disciplines in various universities in Pakistan;
(3) delineate areas of research in social sciences in the
context of Pakistan; discuss difficulties and limita
tions in research confronting social scientists; (5) explore
prospects for future research; and (6) make suggestions and
recommendations how best to serve needs and maximize uses
of research.
The Beginnings
The study of social sciences has formed an integral
part of the curricula mostly in the faculty of Arts in all
the universities in Pakistan. Different social sciences
have, however, been introduced at different times in the
same university depending upon the demand for its study
and resources of the university in terms of money and staff
availability. Economics, political science, history, and
geography preceded the inclusion of psychology, sociology,
and anthropology. These former disciplines were introduced
both in the college curricula at the undergraduate level
as well as in the universities at the graduate level. But
sociology and anthropology have been first introduced at
the graduate level in separate university departments.
Demand for their teaching grew out of the need for research
and evaluation of the existing social conditions for formu
lation of policies at the government level for social devel
opment programs. The uses of anthropology as a tool of
inquiry into the cultural traits, tribal idiosyncracies
and social characteristics of groups inhabiting the Indo-
Pakistan Sub-continent dates back to the early days of
British rule (cf. Malcolm l8l2; Muller l892; Cunningham
l8^9; Hunter l8?l; or the assorted works of Sir Thomas
Row on caste). English scholars and civil servants compiled
detailed accounts of races, castes, and ethnic groups and
sub-groups inhabiting the various regions of the vast
ll

l2
sub-continent. Its use was primarily to facilitate admin
istration by colonies. The provincial gazetteers, for
instance, dealt with ethnographic descriptions, customs,
manners, tastes and traditions, values and world views
of a great many tribes, castes and groups. The fundamental
aim of such studies, was to determine how English revenue,
settlement, and legal systems were to be applied to indig
enous groups, and secondarily to gain insight into the
modal personality and characteristics of certain tribes
with whom the English administrators had to deal. By
knowing different aspects of their milieu, tribal and
caste behaviors could be predicted in normal and crisis
situations and strategies for dealing with them could then
be designed. In the l8th and l9th centuries anthropological
data, therefore, served certain specific ends for the rulers.
The advancement of anthropology as a discipline was then not
in view. The use of anthropological material for the purpose
of teaching thus remained unknown and unrecognized.
With the attainment of independence, need for the
understanding of conditions and problems of social life
became more evident. The purpose in view was to bring
change in communities for socio-economic development. Due
to predominance of an agrarian population, rural community
development programs became the focus of attention. For a
realistic approach to the solution of social problems,
objective analysis of social situations were considered
necessary. The urgency of community surveys and collection
of data from different strata of society and its interpreta
tion was well realized. The time was ripe for the intro
duction of sociology as a subject of study. It was envisioned
as the preparation of a class of intellectuals who would be
equipped with the know-how of social science methodology,
would be capable of effectively describing and analyzing
social phenomena in view of enhancing development. It may
be pointed out that the first department of sociology was
established at the University of Punjab in l955- This
synchronized with the formulation of the First Five- Year
Plan for National Development (l955-l960). Due to non
availability of trained personnel, the Department started
under the expert guidance of an American sociologist,
Dr. J.B. Edlefson. The Social Science Research Centre at
the University of the Punjab employed many students in
ongoing projects of the Centre after they received training
in research methodology at the Department of Sociology.
Thus the Department and the Research Centre worked closely
and assisted each other, leading to the development of a
coherent program of sociological research.
By l960, when the second Department of Sociology was
opened at the University of Karachi, trained personnel were
available to staff the department. Due to the importance

l3
of rural studies, students educated abroad returned with
Ph.D.'s in rural sociology and the subject was introduced
at the agricultural universities at Lyallpur (now called
Faisalabad), Punjab in l96^, at the College of Lyallpur
Agriculture, University of Peshawar (NWFP) in l967 , as well
as at the Agricultural University at Tandojam (Sindh) .
Financial resources were made available at the University
of Baluchistan for the opening of a department there in
l975 • A native of Baluchistan trained at the University
of Karachi became its first head.
Areas of Research
The importance of the study of sociology as a subject
for research has been realized from its very inception at
the universities. As an academic discipline, it grew
further in later years when the development of human
resources became the sine qua non of progress. (The Third
Five- Year Plan and the subsequent Plans have emphasized
development of manpower resources.) In national planning,
since l955 , emphasis has been placed on rural community
development for which the training of administrators, social
workers, extension workers, and field staff has been consi
dered necessary. It was believed that such training would
make a group of professionals capable of handling both the
administration and the problems of development and social
change. It was the expectation of sociologists that they
were to initiate, define and coordinate projects requiring
applied research. On the one hand sociologists were expected
to implement plans for changes which would bring about the
betterment of communities and on the other, to deal with
problems of those instrumental changes. The most significant
factors, giving rise to problems have been rapid growth of
population, mass migration of people from rural to urban
areas and urbanization, etc.l Steps toward their solution
require constant survey and research. A multiplicity of
factors have impact on each other. In dealing with social
change and problems arising therefrom, we can hardly ignore
the interconnectedness of the various social sciences.
The empirical situation in Pakistan with regard to develop
mental planning is tremendously complex. Traditional
barriers and cultural constraints have undoubtedly hindered
the execution of program development and obstructed the
processes of planned social change. Repeated political
crises and instability, effects of inflation and other
economic variables, religious movements, problems of violence
in educational institutions, labour unrest, high rates of
crime, delinquency, blackmailing, graft, etc., have all to
be taken into account in handling the issues of social
change and development. It is at this juncture when dealing
with empirical situations not conveniently divisible into

l4
atomistic social sciences that one realizes the necessity
of an inter-disciplinary approach. The social sciences have
existed and grown as separate academic disciplines for a
long time. The demand of the time, however, is to take
stock of the situation and start the process of integration
(cf. Kiani l963 for an early advocacy of this process).
The need for sociological and anthropological research
has never been so acutely felt as today in the process of
development of both rural and urban communities, whether it
be in the areas of family planning, industrial management,
or public health and nutrition. The need for anthropological
expertise has been particularly felt more recently in the
areas of fertility studies and population due to the in
creasing realization of the role cultural factors play in
defining behavior with regard to these matters.
Planned social change is the focal point of development
in transitional societies today. It requires an under
standing of culture and personality, the types of stress
situations which may arise in the conflict between conser
vative values and those attitudes associated with moderniza
tion. Stresses in the value systems of Pakistanis have
led to a host of problems similar to those historically
found when cultures clash or are in a state of flux. Social
psychology and psychological anthropology have much to
contribute in offering insight into patterns of communica
tion in the formulation of public opinion in the understanding
of national, tribal, and ethnic ideologies and the elimination
of prejudice, and in the study of socialization and education
processes and their effect on political and economic behavior
of people. Other aspects requiring study of group dynamics
are equally important.
During the past few years in Pakistan ethnic differences
and language issues have become more politicized in the con
text of renewed attempts to achieve national integration.
In this respect insights from social anthropology can be
utilized and programs planned with the view of developing
social integration and national cohesion. The opening of
the Department of Anthropology at the University of Quaid-
I-Azam in Islamabad with special focus upon studies in
social anthropology has fulfilled a long standing need in
this regard gearing its program toward basic applied research.
Pakistan has a diversity of languages. Their impact
upon each other offers a rich field for linguistic research,
especially in such areas as socio-linguistics . At present
there are no departments of linguistics in Pakistan, and
hence this area of potentially fruitful and important
research remains overlooked.

l5
It may be emphasized that Pakistan is that part of
the world where the traces of the first civilized man have
been found. The rich cultural heritage of Pakistan has
therefore stimulated both the foreign and the local scholars
to take up archaeological research. Sites of archaeological
excavations have brought scholars from different parts of
the world for study and research. Related to excavation
of the archaeological sites is the organization of museums
for the presentation of the arts and artifacts obtained
from historical sites. Such activities have brought in
its wake the development of both internal and external
tourism. The field requirements for the organization and
development of the museums and tourism call for the training
of specialists in museology and personnel for achieving
the more pedagogical goals of tourism. The dearth of
specialists and suitable staff are accountable for slow
growth of archaeology and related enterprises.
Difficulties and Limitations in Research
Social science research in Pakistan has been recog
nized as an important tool for gathering data for the social
and economic conditions requiring improvement. The most
commonly used empirical method of data collection is the
sample survey. It is not an unusual sight in Karachi or
Lahore to see sociology students visiting "Juggis" and
"Katcha" houses to collect data, for example, on the
dwellers' housing needs or recording incidence of tubercu
losis and the type of house or the extent of male and female
literacy as related to the family income. Facts are gathered,
data are put into percentages, rates and ratios are shown
to support sociological conclusions. The techniques of a
mailed questionnaire cannot be very effective in a society
where 80 percent population is functionally illiterate
(cf. Korson and Ghayur l978a). Moreover, even those who
can read and write are preoccupied with survival and have
no time to indulge in the luxury of analyzing their situa
tions and filling out questionnaires for sociologists.
Therefore, interviewing schedules, question guides, parti
cipant observation and in-depth interviews are the most
frequently used methods for the study of social phenomena.
But there are several limitations to the collection of data
through such means. First, the absence of basic recorded
statistics tends to cause needless repetition for every
research survey conducted. Second, no precise quantitative
measurement of variables is in existence. Even such key
sociological variables as income or educational level are
not properly standardized. Third is the difficulty of
rapport-building, particularly in tribal and segmentary
societies where outsiders are looked upon with suspicion.
Fourth, the rural population, tending to be formally

l6
uneducated is unfamiliar with the idea of research itself
and in perceiving of the research process may be unable
to respond to certain types of questioning. Additionally,
such people may be apprehensive about the researcher's
intentions. This sometimes causes among the respondents
an attitude of antagonism or withdrawal from the interview
situation. Fifth, given the value orientations of Pakistani
society, it is difficult to achieve privacy in discussions
with selected respondents. It is not uncommon for an
interviewer to confront a brother-in-law or mother-in-law
during an interview intended for a young woman chosen as
respondent to answer questions on knowledge, attitude, and
practice of family planning, for example. Lastly, the
problems of communication between the villager and the
researcher affect the reliability of data as information
that may be of value to the sociologist or social anthro
pologist.
Participant observation has its limited use in societies
with a closely-knit kinship system and the seclusion of women,
allowing little or no scope for the intrusion of anthropolo
gists or outsiders despite their overcoming the barriers
of language and attire. On the whole, the frequent appear
ance of investigators and researchers is now met with
indifference by villagers, as responding to a volley
of questions in no way leads to an improvement of their
material conditions of life. The long stay of an anthro
pologist in a village is also viewed with suspicion of
spying to meet certain political ends — particularly of an
anthropologist from a foreign country. It has been diffi
cult in some cases to convince the people and the government
that the data collected by foreign experts would contribute
to scientific knowledge about a certain region and its people.
While admiring the courage of foreign anthropologists to face
foreign people in new lands and to bear the inconvenience
due to primitive living in most areas which the social
anthropologists or the archaeologists choose for work, it
may be said that the sincerity of a foreign scholar and
his devotion to work cannot remain hidden and he ultimately
earns rewards in return through friendship and cooperation
of the people. While collecting information, if an investi
gator, local or foreigner, does little favors to fulfill the
personal and private needs of the persons he interviews,
he establishes strong bonds of good relationships in future
and is welcomed any time he chooses to go back. In the end,
it may be pointed out that so far research in sociology and
social anthropology has failed to make any impact on society
in general and the sensitive areas in Pakistan (cf . Badrudduza
l968 and Habibullah 1963).

l7
Prospects for Future Research
Before discussing the future needs in sociological
and anthropological research, a basic question must be
faced. This is regarding the future of the two social
sciences. The question is often posed — should these two
disciplines continue to expand their scope to more and
more theoretical research or should they emerge as practical
disciplines to solve certain problems facing the society.
In developing societies, social science cannot afford to
ignore the overall set-up of society and various problems
faced by it. Research in the two disciplines will always
be connected with these methodological orientations: the
theoretical and the applied. But up until now, the organiza
tion of these disciplines in the West within an academic
context has not achieved a breakthrough into the areas of
applied research and social planning or development. While
in the past universities could sponsor such pursuits, present
political and economic pressures may make it harder to do
so in the future. In Pakistan, these political and economic
pressures to justify research and perform socially relevant
research related to national goals have been brought to
bear sooner and with more force than in the West. Social
research must enter the areas where it is most needed.
Pakistan, like most developing nations, is a state in
crisis, i.e., along with the emergence of nationalistic
spirit and preservation of moral values, the disintegrating
effects of industrialization and urbanization are evident.
There is an effort to achieve economic progress and social
development. In an attempt to achieve sometimes contra
dictory goals simultaneously, we are facing a crisis situa
tion. There is need to study pressing problems that concern
the survival of both the nation and its people.
Social scientists are expected to foresee a situation
and recommend action before an event occurs. Jillani has
aptly observed that "only those researchers will survive
the test of time who respond to the call of society in
which they are working" (l963»36). Research in sociology
and anthropology has, therefore, to meet new challenges,
face new problems and tackle new situations. Today there
is need to understand the drifting course of Pakistan
society as much as there is need to define the origin of
Pakistani culture. There is need to see the effect of the
bureaucratic system on the process of democratization of
administration. Also, the patterns of communication and
their impact on decision-making and on adoption and diffu
sion of new practices have been subjected to little explora
tion and need concentrated research. ^

l8
Suggestions and Recommendations
Much has been said by way of suggestions in the last
two sections, namely the difficulties, limitations, and
the future needs of social science research. Here a few
suggestions are pointedly highlighted.
l. Developing societies are like "living laboratories"
for social scientists in as much as they are in different
stages of development. Each society should, therefore, be
studied in its particular setting. Instead of applying
Western models based on Western experience drawn from the
l8th century, empirical observations in these developing
societies should lead to development of models which are
applicable to the societies explored. Because fundamental
changes are occurring and can be observed, thus, model
building has great scope.
2. Transition from a colonial to an independent
status has led to the development of national ideologies
and a revival of traditional and moral values as well as
a desire for economic development and material progress.
The thrust is, therefore, toward multi-dimensional change.
Dealing with the effects of such change and the solution
of problems will go a long way in maximizing the utility
of social research.
3. The social anthropologists and sociologists from
abroad with rigorous training in methodology who arrive with
research designs which meet their fancy and can be of little
practical utility in the country's development or in the
improvement of teaching of these disciplines do little to
help the discipline in Pakistan. Foreign researchers would
do well if they work in unison with a social scientist in
the country who is familiar with its people and places.
This "collaborative approach" is most needed in Pakistan.
k. Most research studies remain lying on the book
shelves of libraries and are seldom read. The use of research
can best be made in the teaching of disciplines and their
circulation to departments concerned with policy-making and
program execution.
5. Evaluation of research and suggestions for future
research can well be conducted through a coordinating
council for research which may have complete bibliographies
of research conducted at the universities, research centres,
agencies and individuals. The council may also obtain in
formation from relevant sources concerning the need for
research and circulate it through research bulletin or news
letter.

l9
6. An organization on the pattern of the Social
Science Research Council of America, or the Wenner-Gren
Foundation should be established in Pakistan to promote
financing of researches and for exchanging scholars with
advanced countries. It was unfortunate that the National
Science Foundation of Pakistan had not included social
science in its scope until as late as l978. This shows
the lack of importance given to social sciences research
in Pakistan which is, no doubt, very unhealthy. In the
United States, the National Science Foundation has been
one of the major supporters of social sciences research
for a long time.
Notes
"^The total population of Pakistan was only l6.58
millions in l90l which reached 6^.89 million mark in l972,
meaning an approximately four-fold increase in the last
seven decades. However, the comparable figures for urban
population growth rates are even higher. In l90l, urban
population was only l.6 millions (9-8 percent of the total
population), but by l972, it was l6.6 millions (26.5 percent
of the Pakistan's total population). This means the increase
in urban population is as high as ten times between l90l-72
period. Most of this increase is the result of mass migra
tion of rural population to urban centres (cf . Korson and
Ghayur l978b).
2
It is appropriate to make a comparison between some
of the research topics and courses offered at American and
Pakistani campuses in sociology and anthropology departments.
Being a poor country Pakistani sociologists generally re
search only those topics results of which may have some
practical value for nation-building. That is why research
studies on family planning, population problems, problems
of urbanization, community development, etc. are very
popular topics with Pakistani sociologists and anthropolo
gists. On the other hand, in an affluent society like the
United States, besides the core courses one reads in univer
sity catalogues such titles of courses as "Sociology of
Leisure Time," Sociology of Sports," Elites," etc. Virtually
any American university offers a spectrum of courses which
simply cannot be afforded in Pakistan's universities.

20
References
Badrudduza, M. l968 Problems of Survey Research in Pakistan.
In Pakistan Sociological Perspectives. H.A. Chaudhari
et al, eds. Lahore: University of the Punjab, l62-l79.
Cunningham, J.D. l849 A History of the Kikhs. London:
John Murray.
Habibullah, M. l9&3 Some Problems of Socio-Economic Research
in a Rural Setting. In Sociology and Social Research in
Pakistan. M. Afsaruddin, ed. Dacca: Pakistan Socio
logical Association, East Pakistan Unit, 4l-49.
Hunter, Sir Wm l87l The Indian Musalmans. London: Comrade
Publishers.
Jillani, M.S. l963 Presidential Address. In Sociology and
Social Research in Pakistan. M. Afsaruddin, ed.
Dacca: Pakistan Sociological Association, East Pakistan
Unit, 36.
Kiani, A. l963 Sociological Perspectives and Teaching
Problems. In Sociology and Social Research in Pakistan.
M. Afsaruddin, ed. Dacca: Pakistan Sociological Asso
ciation, East Pakistan Unit.
Korson, J.H. and M.A. Ghayur l978a Education and Social
Change in Pakistan. Presented at the Association for
Asian Studies Annual Meeting, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
l978b The Effects of Population and Urbanization
Growth Rates on Political Groupings in Pakistan. Paper
presented at International Conference on Pakistan,
Columbia University, New York, March 9-ll- Also in
Contemporary Pakistan: Society, Politics and Economy.
M. Ahmed, ed. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press
(l979).
Malcolm, Sir J. l8l2 Sketch of the Kikhs. London.
Muller, M. l892 India: What Can It Teach Us? London:
Longmans Green.

MODELS OF SEGMENTARY POLITICAL ACTION:
THE EXAMPLES OF SWAT AND DIR. NWFP , PAKISTANl
Charles Lindholm
In this paper, I would like to postulate models for
political action within acephelous segmentary lineage
societies. These models are nothing if not provisional,
but they have helped me to make sense of some rather para
doxical contortions of polity in the history2 of Pakistan's
North West Frontier Province; that Is, a resurgence of
religious leadership in the secular state of Dir coupled
with a simultaneous secularization of politics in the
District of Swat, a region ruled until recently by the
descendant of a holy man. A consideration of how and why
these shifts should have occurred led me to an analysis
of the evolution of these two neighboring, closely related,
but very different valley kingdoms.
In undertaking this analysis, I have made use of the
acephelous segmentary lineage model, a model which has
been outlined in numerous works (Sahlins l96l; Gellner l969;
Evans-Pritchard l9^9; Salzman l978; to name a few) and which
has as its premises a genealogical ordering of political
alliances based on the principle of complementary opposition.
Lineages are relative social entities, arising only when
aroused by competition. The model has been strongly attacked
by more historically minded scholars, including Peters (l967),
Black-Michaud (1975) * Asad (l972), Hammoudi (l980), and
others for being too rigid, for ignoring hierarchization
and historical process, and for reifying local ideology to
the level of social theory. In studies of Swat, Barth (l959a)
has explicitly denied that the region is characterized by a
segmentary lineage structure, focusing instead on the endemic
opposition between patrilateral cousins and the formation
of opposing parties. Ahmed (l980) denies that Swat is
dominated by party oppositions. Rather, following Asad
(l972) and his own earlier work (l976), he sees Swat as a
class society. My own study of Swat has led me to argue
with both these positions, and to assert that Swat is
indeed a typical, and perhaps prototypical, acephelous
segmentary system (Lindholm l98la) . But I would like to
make clear from the very outset that I am not pretending
that all human activity can be predicted from the model.
Of course, historical constraints and the necessities of
the ecological setting will enter in, as will the personal
characteristics of the actors themselves. All this having
been said, and with the admission that previous theories
of segmentary society were, perhaps, overly static and
21

22
ahistorical, the theory nonetheless continues to have an
explanatory power , as I have tried to demonstrate in a
number of previous papers (Lindholm l977, l979 , l980, l98la,
l98lb, l98lc; Lindholm and Lindholm l979). Behaviors vary
in every human society as individuals manipulate within the
range of choices available to them, but to focus only on
manipulation and ignore the structural framework is, in
my opinion, going at analysis from quite the wrong way
around. Rather than discarding the theory of segmentary
polity because it has been misused, I would prefer to press
it to its limits to see just what can be understood through
it. That is the purpose of this experiment in model-building.
The areas which have been selected for this experiment
are the parallel valleys of Swat and Dir. Dir , the more
westerly valley, borders on Afghanistan and lies just
below the former Kingly state of Chitral. Swat extends in
the east to the rugged hills of the Indus. Both are
relatively isolated from the rest of Pakistan by rugged
mountain ranges.
The two valleys are alike in many ways. Both are
dominated by the Yusufzai Pukhtun who migrated into the
area some four hundred years ago, subjugating the local
inhabitants. Because the inhabitants of Dir and Swat are
so closely related, the general outlines of their social
structure are quite similar. Both have nucleated villages
of patrilineal kinsmen. The village centers are the men's
houses (hujera) , where hospitality is offered to guests,
and the mosques , where men gather to worship. Hierarchies
are shallow in the villages, with about a third of the
families acting as landless laborers. The remainder are
split equally between very small holders, who are known
simply as Pukhtun, and somewhat larger holders, who are
called by the honorific Khan. Even the largest landholdings
are quite small (l5 acres is considered an enormous holding) ,
and there are no absentee landlords.
Unlike other Pukhtun areas, landholding is the sine
qua non for recognition as member of a clan (khel) , and a
man who loses his land also loses his right to the honor
due a Yusufzai. In other respects, the people of Dir and
Swat are like other Pukhtun. They govern themselves accord
ing to the rule of custom and the Pukhtun code of ethics
(Pukhtunwali ) which enjoins standards of hospitality, refuge,
and blood revenge. The people are strict Sunni Muslims in
both valleys, practicing rigid purdah . Despite Koranic
injunctions, women have no rights in land. Rather, land is
divided equally among sons. In other aspects as well, such
as family life, ritual, and so on, Dir and Swat are hardly
distinguishable .

23
Yet, although the two areas are alike in most respects,
there are two important differences. The first is ecological.
Swat is a lush valley with well irrigated fields. Despite
a dense population of over a million, Swat is a region which
has historically been able to export food. Dir, on the
other hand, is dry and harsh, and the population density
is much lower.
The second difference is the divergence in the political
evolution of the two regions; a difference which is inti
mately tied to ecological variation, as we shall see. A
fundamental premise of the segmentary system is the equality
of all patrilineal relatives. In Dir, however, this equality
had been displaced by a petty Princedom, a development quite
unique in the area. The Dir state was begun in the late
seventeenth century as the Painda khel lineage carved itself
an empire against warring mountain tribes, against the en
croachments of the neighboring kingdom of Chitral, and
against their own fellow Yusufzai. Not only did the Painda
khel face human opposition, but they also had to conquer
the rugged terrain of Northern Dir, which is the hardest
country in a hard valley. Nonetheless, in l8l5 Elphinstone
was able to write that Qasin Khan, the head of the Painda
khel, had managed to decisively defeat a Sultan of Chitral
and gain recognition as "by far the most powerful Khaun
among the Eusof zyes. . . . He can imprison, inflict corporal
punishment, and even put to death" (Vol. 11:25). At the
time of the early part of this century, Dir had reached
its fullest expansion, and the ruler, Aurangzeb Khan, was
able to proclaim himself not Only as the master of the
entire valley of Dir, but also as the King of Swat, Shamozai,
Bajaur, Moh2andzai , Buner , part of Chitral, Jandul, and a
number of other territories.
Swat, on the other hand, had a more typical Pukhtun
polity. Prior to British intervention, the only hierarchies
which existed in Swat were the shallow hierarchies of the
village. The valley was in a state of "ordered anarchy,"
or, as Ahmed (l980) calls it, "institutionalized dissidence,"
lacking a central leadership. Instead, the small khans of
the villages vied with one another with none ever becoming
dominant. Each village was divided into two parties (dullah)
on the basis of internal rivalries between parallel patri-
lateral cousins over land rights. The principle for party
membership was opposition to one's cousin. But membership
was not binding, and cousins joined together to combat
other, more distantly related families. Even if a family
did achieve local domination, it soon split into rival
factions and fell back into the welter of contending elements.
(See Barth l959b and Lindholm l980 for more detail.)

2k
In Dir, the dullah system also operated. The Princely
family, however, remained aloof from the struggles of lesser
families. "They sat upon the dullahs ,
"
as a local informant
said. When the royal family itself split over problems of
succession, the existing dullahs were enlisted on behalf of
the contending parties, but the paramouncy of the Princely
line was not questioned. In contrast, no paramount lineage
existed in Swat.
In order to understand these differences, a closer
look at the political history of the two areas is in order
within the framework of the segmentary system. I have
noted the fundamental premise that all patrilineal relatives
are equal. Given such a premise, the development of hier
archies seems theoretically impossible. Yet the system has
within itself the potential for the appearance of leaders
under certain circumstances in which leadership is necessary
for the survival and/or growth of the system. The first of
these circumstances is external threat. It has long been
noted that invasion by an outsider unites all the units of
segmentary society, despite their internal disputes. For
example, the first British administrator of the Yusufzai
states: "When danger threatens from without, all family
feuds and clan jealousies are at once forgotten and all
unite to repel the common enemy" (Bellew l864:205). But
simple unification is not enough. Some form of organiza
tion is also imperative to give cohesion to the factious
Pukhtun. Traditionally, this need has been met through
the elevation of a Sufi mendicant, who holds the clans
together through his assertion of charismatic power. The
appeal to a higher order permits a united front. Otherwise,
there is a strong tendency for rival cousins to betray one
another (Ahmed l980; Lindholm l980). These mystics must be
outsiders, or else Pukhtun who have given up their political
ambitions for a life of austerity and religious contempla
tion. Examples of such men include the Akhund of Swat, who
led the Yusufzai against the British at Ambela in l863; the
Mastan Mullah, who organized the uprising of l897; the
Powinda Mullah, who headed the Mahsud in rebellion; and
many others. Historically, these religious leaders arose
during times of threat to the total system, and faded away
when the threat had passed to eventually join the multitude
of saints whose tombs dot the countryside. Under the proper
circumstances, however, such a man could seize permanent
power, as the descendant of the Akhund did in Swat. But
that event will be dealt with in its sequence. Ideally,
the mystical leader was transitory, vanishing when the
need for him had passed.
Religious leaders have been well documented in the
anthropological literature on segmentary lineages. This
is because anthropologists have worked with societies

25
suffering under external threat. But another type of
leader also occurs in segmentary society. This is the
war leader who heads his band of warriors on raids. As
Sahlins notes, the segmentary system is one of "predatory
expansion" (l96l). The segmentary structure, which focuses
on the patrilineal household as its basic political unit,
appears to favor a high birth rate. Many sons are needed
to uphold the strength of the household against all other
households. As a consequence, the Pukhtun have tended to
produce a large surplus population. Presently, this popu
lation excess is funneled into migratory labor in South
Asia and the Middle East. But historically the Pukhtun
polity, fueled by population increase, was one of aggressive
expansion.
In the incessant wars of expansion, leadership is just
as necessary as in wars of defense. But wars of expansion
seem to be led by a different type of man. Rather than an
ecstatic saint, the war leader is a pragmatic fighter,
selected by his equals for his qualities of bravery and
intelligence. His men unite behind him for their mutual
benefit, for they hope to share in the plunder of conquest.
The charismatic leader is necessary in times of external
threat to counteract the ever-present temptation for betrayal,
the desire to destroy one's personal enemy by conniving with
the invader. This temptation does not occur in wars of
conquest. Rather, the warrior band cooperates for the sake
of future spoils.
The premise that wars of expansion are led by secular
men is validated in the history of the Yusufzai. (The
situation in Morocco seems somewhat different—see Hammoudi
l980.) It is explicitly stated in the chronicles of the
Yusufzai invasion of Swat, Dir, and Mar dan that the khels
were not a leaderless melange, nor were they led by a holy
man. Instead the leaders, Malik Ahmad and his successor,
Khan Kajju, were Pukhtun warriors. Soon after the wars
of conquest, the Yusufzai were threatened by the invading
army of Akbar the Great. Predictably, this invasion
stimulated a great surge of religious revivalism among
the Yusufzai, who managed to defeat Akbar in l586.
With the external threat vanquished, and with expansion
rendered increasingly difficult by the physical rigors of
the yet unconquered northern region and the ferocity of its
Kohistani inhabitants, the system came to a halt. Cleavages
and internal fragmentation occurred, and the Yusufzai soon
settled into the state of dissidence which characterizes
their society during periods when they are unable to conquer
others and have no need to defend themselves.

26
Only in the fringes of the stagnant society, where
new conquests were still possible, did secular leaders
develop. In Northern Swat, the great Pisha Khan gained
a following as a war leader against the Kohistani. With
the aid of his men, Pisha Khan was able to conquer a sub
stantial domain for himself which included the present
towns of Madyan and Bahrain. The Kohistani were forced
to pay tribute, and the lineage of Pisha Khan were entitled
the Malik khel, or clan of leaders. But, in order to
satisfy his men, who demanded booty, Pisha Khan was obliged
to make severe demands on the Kohistani, who live in a
poor and sparse region of rocky hillsides and narrow valleys.
Oppressed beyond endurance, the Kohistanis rose in revolt
and managed to fight the Pukhtun to a standstill. The loot
to be gained was simply not worth an extensive campaign,
and the Pukhtun were glad to settle for a truce, which was
sealed by the marriage of Pisha Khan's son to a Kohistani
woman. With this setback, Pukhtun expansion in Swat ceased.
The Malik khel, who had, for a time, approximated small-
scale kings, faded from power to become simply one more
contender for the minor victories the segmentary system
offers when expansion is halted.
In Dir, however, expansion did not come to an end, and
this is what distinguishes Dir from Swat. The Painda khel
of Dir, like the Malik khel of Swat, were at the far edge
of Pukhtun territory. But, unlike the Malik khel, the Painda
khel not only defeated their neighbors, but turned their
victorious armies away from the frontier to engage and
conquer their own kinsmen! The reasons for the success of
the Princely lineage of Dir are several. The first is the
character of the people they faced on their border. Instead
of the rough and impoverished Kohistani (though they were
also fought and conquered by Dir) , the primary enemy of the
Painda khel was the Kingdom of Chitral. This ancient Kingdom
of uncertain origins had developed as a center of the slave
trade and as a parasite on caravans to China. While the
Swati Yusufzai were struggling to defeat a society which
was, organizationally, even more fragmented than their own
(the Kohistani), the warriors of Dir were attempting to
conquer a relatively complex and stratified society with a
hereditary King. In emulation of their more centrally
organized and hierarchical opponents, the leaders of the
Painda khel were also granted extraordinary powers by their
followers. The Pukhtun khels of Dir supported the eleva
tion of their leader because of the benefits they gained
from his conquests. This is a classical case of the genera
tion of a secondary state, that is, a social formation which
"is pushed by one means or another toward a higher form of
organization by an external power which has already been
raised to statehood" (Fried l960:73l). While Pisha Khan
of Swat married his son to a Kohistani, Qasin Khan of Dir

27
married the sister of the Ruler of Chitral. Nothing could
more clearly illustrate the differences in the positions
of the two lineages.
The ascendance of Dir was aided by another factor.
This is the ecological situation in Dir valley, which is,
as we have mentioned, poor and underpopulated compared to
Swat. Even though Pisha Khan allied himself with the
Kohistanis and therefore had a large army of loyal warriors,
the wealth and dense population of Swat precluded any
possibility of his leading a conquering army down from the
North unless he had been able to develop a more complex and
efficient organization. In contrast, the Dir Rulers were
able to continually expand southward, conquering their
fellow Yusufzai through their superior organizational ability
and through sheer weight of numbers.
Although the Dir state was secular, religious practi
tioners had a major part in it. The different political
models of the Pukhtun do not preclude one another. Indeed,
all forms are always implicit, though one may be dominant
at a particular time, due to particular circumstances. The
blessings of a Sufi were necessary to validate the King's
right to rule. Holy men also filled administrative roles,
and even commanded the armies of Dir. During the original
conquest of Swat by the Yusufzai, the second-in-command
was Shaikh Mali, a man of a religious lineage. Religious
leadership never disappears j it is merely subordinated.
To this point, I have developed several political
patterns which may appear in the segmentary system under
the proper stimulus. The first is charismatic religious
leadership, which seems likely to occur in times of external
pressure; the second is internal fragmentation and the
ordered anarchy of the shifting dullah system, which occurs
in times of relative quiet; the third is pragmatic secular
leadership, which occurs during periods of expansion. The
task now is to see how these patterns of action can help
us understand the various political transformations of Dir
and Swat in the last century.
Thus far, I have avoided discussing the relationship
between Dir and Swat. The fact is that historically the
two valleys had an intimate connection which took a very
interesting form. I have noted that the sole political
structure of Swat, prior to the British, was the dual party
system. These parties bisected every village and ramified
throughout the valley. Generally, the parties were in
balance, but occasionally one local party would be defeated.
What might happen in such a case has been well described by
Schomberg: "There have always been two parties in these
lawless lands. When one party weakens, it begins to intrigue

28
with some neighboring Ruler, hoping to induce him to come
in, occupy the country and enable his supporters to work
off their vendettas on their stronger opponents, and so
redress the balance of power" (l935 :242). The external
party thus sometimes took the place of the internal media
ting body of men of holy lineage (described by Barth l959a
and Ahmed l976). In the regions of Swat nearest to Dir,
the Dir King was regularly invited in to "redress the balance."
This was not a peaceful process. The army of Dir, joined by
its Swati allies, would invade Swat, often with heavy
casualties. But, once the balance had been re-established,
the Swati parties would unite to expel the invader. The
segmentary principle of unity against an external aggressor
would be asserted under the leadership of a holy man, and
Dir would be forcibly ejected, only to have the cycle repeat
itself after some span of years. When the British arrived,
this wasteful but functioning system was totally disrupted.
The reaction of Swat to Colonial pressure is well
documented. When Muslim rule toppled in India, a wave
of Islamic fervor swept the Pukhtun. At first, a zealot
from Oudh, Ahmad Shah Brelwi, gained a following and
managed to take Peshawar from the Sikhs in l829. However,
he overstepped himself by declaring that he was "King of
the Yusufzai." This turned the Pukhtun against him, and
he was banished.
Shortly thereafter, a more pliable holy man appeared.
This was Abdul Gaffur, a Sufi wanderer who had been born
in Swat and knew the customs of the place. When the British
attached Ambela Pass in l863 , the Swatis elected Abdul Gaffur
their leader, and managed to avoid a defeat. Due to this
action and to his piety, Abdul Gaffur was entitled the Akhund
of Swat and given large land grants by the Khans . True to
form, the segmentary system had produced a religious leader
in a period of crisis. As British aggressions eased, the
Akhund receded from the spotlight and Swat returned to the
incessant internal warfare of the dullahs .
Meanwhile, the ruling house of Dir faced a threat that
eventually led it into a close alliance with the British,
an alliance that had great ramifications for Swat.
The threat was an uprising in the valley of Jandul,
southeast of Dir. The situation in this valley was very
similar to that of Dir during the expansionist era of Qasin
Khan. In Jandul, as in Dir, one lineage had gained ascen
dance as war leaders. In Dir, the ascendant lineage solidi
fied its power by attacking and conquering a Chitrali Prince.
In Jandul, the dominant lineage looked towards Dir. Just as
Qasin Khan of the Painda khel of Dir saw Chitral as a plum
to be picked, so did Umrah Khan of the Mast khel of Jandul

29
view Dir.
The eruption came in l888 when Mohammad Sherif Khan,
the Nawab of Dir, ventured out of his home with much of his
army to pay his respects to the Amir of Afghanistan. Umrah
Khan and his men poured into Dir and conquered it easily.
The men of Dir were dissatisfied with Sherif Khan, who had
had a relatively peaceful reign. They eagerly followed
Umrah Khan, who promised battles and booty.
Sherif Khan went into exile in Swat and tried to get
the British to help him regain his lost throne. The British,
however, had decided not to involve themselves directly in
costly border disputes. After Ambela, the British had been
playing a more subtle game. In areas under their nominal
control, middlemen had been established who were held
responsible for administration. These were the celebrated
arbabs of Peshawar. In this way, the British hoped to
develop hierarchical orders among the egalitarian khels
with themselves at the pinnacle. Where hierarchies already
existed, as in Dir and Chitral, the British tried to win
over the leaders by donations and promises of support.
This technique had resulted in friendly relations with
Sherif Khan. Even more importantly, Colonial troops were
given permission to reside in Chitral itself. The British
felt that they were slowly gaining control in the Northern
Frontier without ever having to fight, and were therefore
not responsive to the Dir Nawab' s pleas.
But in l895 "the situation changed radically. Umrah
Khan, pressured to continue his policy of expansion, attacked
Chitral and beseiged the Colonial garrison. This forced the
British to make an overt move. Colonial troops joined those
of Sherif Khan and built forts in the Malakand Pass, which
leads to Swat and Dir, and at Chakdara in Southern Swat
where the road to Dir branches off . This was the first
occupation of Swati territory by British troops. Other
Colonial troops marched from Gilgit in the far north, engaged
Umrah Khan, and drove him into exile in Kabul. Sherif Khan
resumed his throne, with Jandul and the Sind region of
Southern Dir added to his dominion. The British agreed to
massive subsidies of his rule and to acknowledge his
authority in the region in return for loyalty and stability.
Dir thus wedded itself in a pact of mutual advantage with
the Colonial power.
The pact was soon tested. The Swat Yusufzai, threatened
by the British invasion, rose in l897 under the leadership
of a religious ecstatic, the Mastan Mullah. In the greatest
pitched battles fought by the British in any of their colonies,
the Yusufzai were defeated, and almost ^,000 of them were
killed. The army of the Dir Nawab, gratified at the recent

30
extension of their Empire under British aegis, fought against
the forces of the Mastan Mullah.
Although the British were victorious in l897 , they
were not strong enough to maintain control in Swat. Instead,
they hoped that Dir would conquer Swat and render the unruly
Swatis harmless. Consequently, the English underwrote the
costs of supplying the Dir army and strongly supported the
ambitions of Sherif Khan's successor, Aurangzeb Khan, who
desired a final victory in Swat.
With the British impregnable in their forts and with
the well equipped army of Dir pressing from the west, the
independence of Swat was precarious. Nonetheless, acting
in a traditional manner, a dullah of Northern Swat invited
Dir to invade. This time the invasion was more than anyone
had bargained for. True to the ancient pattern, all the
Swat Yusufzai united against Dir under the combined leader
ship of Sandakei Baba, a mystic, and the grandsons of the
Akhund. But the strength of Dir was greater than ever
before and the Dir army was only expelled after terrible
losses to the Swatis. Aurangzeb Khan, the Dir Nawab,
threatened to invade again soon, with or without the
customary invitation. Faced with what seemed to be a
permanent threat, the Khans met to elect a leader who would
not be merely ad hoc .
The situation was a unique one. British interference
had thrown the old system into disarray and Swat was faced
with a threat that could not be defeated once and for all,
but that promised instead to become ever more powerful
until the valley was engulfed. The unique situation led
to a unique solution. Leadership against invasion was
traditionally charismatic, functioning primarily to obliterate
internal differences and rouse the clans to superhuman efforts
in an all-out battle. Leadership in raids was more pragmatic,
involving careful planning and weighing of costs. The Swatis
needed someone who could fill both roles: unite the khels
in bloody struggles of resistance and yet rationally plan
long-term strategy. The man who was selected fitted this
role perfectly. He was Abdul Wadud, the grandson of the
Akhund who had led the Swatis against the British at Ambela
in 1863. Abdul Wadud himself had been foremost in the recent
fighting against Dir. Yet, though he lived a pious life,
Abdul Wadud had renounced his grandfather's Sufi heritage.
Far from remaining aloof from local dullah politics, Abdul
Wadud had proven himself the equal of any Khan in his ruth-
lessness and manipulative ability. He had even assassinated
his two patrilateral cousins in the struggle for leadership
of his lineage. Furthermore, because of pious donations to
his grandfather, he was a large landowner, not a landless
mendicant. His abilities, coupled with his charismatic

31
background, won him the title of Badshah of Swat.
With Swat united behind him, the Badshah was able to
defeat the Dir Nawab in his next invasion. Having filled
his role as defender of Swat, he then stepped into the role
of aggressive conqueror, extending the hegemony of his
Empire into Buner, to the east.
But the possibilities for conquest were limited, and
the Badshah looked for other means to solidify his hold on
Swat. Inevitably, his eye fell on the British.
The Colonial administration had long been anxious
over the ambitions of Dir and had favored Aurangzeb only
as the best of a bad lot. They realistically feared that
he might turn against his British allies at any moment.
Their fear was heightened by the fact that the British
had made no cultural inroads at all into Dir. The Nawab
demanded only money and weapons, not know-how. The Badshah,
on the other hand, proved much more amiable. Realizing
that his future depended on British support, Abdul Wadud
made a concerted effort to win Colonial approval. He en
thused over British institutions and begged for technical
assistance. The British obliged by helping to construct
a network of modern roads and a telephone system. These
novelties were vital in maintaining his rule, since he
could now immediately locate and march to any insurrection.
The willingness of the Badshah to use modern methods
and his diplomatic friendship with the British agent (whom
he called "my father") won the approval of the Raj. The
Dir Ruler, sitting on a long established throne, apparently
felt no need to try anything novel. Indeed, he was threatened
by novelty, for his claim to the throne was by tradition.
But the Badshah, a shaky newcomer to power, was more than
willing to accept advice from the Colonial kingmakers. Not
only did he construct roads and install telephones, but he
also built Western-style schools and hospitals and installed
a system of courts. During this period the only Western
trained person allowed in Dir was a veterinarian who tended
to the Nawab' s kennel.
British aid and technical advice made the Badshah
immune to any internal uprising, and the Pukhtun of Swat
found themselves for the first time under a permanent
dictator. The situation was all the more galling in that
they themselves had elected the Badshah. The threat from
Dir was also nullified, as the British obliged Aurangzeb
to sign a treaty of non-interference. The treaty awarded
Dir the arid region of Adinzai, while Swat was given the
lush valley of Shamozai. This trade-off, which markedly
favored Swat, indicated the end of the special relationship

32
between Dir and the British. Dir continued as a British
ally, but the modernizing ruling house of Swat was now the
British favorite.
In Dir, the shift in British policy had strong reper
cussions. The dominance of the ruling family was based
on its long-standing leadership in expansionist wars.
Splits in the family had often occurred over succession,
since there was no primogeniture, but the right of the
family itself to rule had only once been challenged by
Umrah Khan, the war leader of Jandul. Aurangzeb's conquests
had again established the pre-eminence of the Painda khel
lineage, but when British intervention closed off the possi
bilities of further expansion, the internal stresses of
the Dir political structure became painfully evident.
Dynastic wars soon began and ravaged the country for sixty
years, ending finally with the overthrow of Aurangzeb's
heir, Shah Jehan, by his eldest son, Kushrow Khan.
In the tedious history of these internal conflicts
we can see the segmentary principle reasserting itself.
The ruling house of Dir began to fragment into two dullahs
of Jandul and Dir proper, each ruled by a son of the Nawab,
and unrest against the royal house increased. To offset
this tendency, the Painda khel attempted to stimulate a
religious revival, led by one of Shah Jehan' s ablest sons,
Shahbuddin, the Ruler of Jandul. Shahbuddin sponsored
laws that called for rigid adherence to the rituals of
Islam, and himself often took the role of imam (teacher)
in the mosques of the area. In this way, he sought,
consciously or unconsciously, to divorce himself from
his historical identity as a secular leader and project
a politically more viable image of religious zealot.
The evolving political organizations of Dir and Swat
thus differed radically, but remained within the framework
we have drawn. In Swat, the Badshah extended his influence
under British protection, and his state became increasingly
secular. It is significant that one of his first moves on
gaining real power was to banish all religious mendicants
from Swat, thus eliminating the traditional foci for defense
against external domination from the valley. While Shahbuddin,
in Dir, was preaching in the mosque , the sons of the Badshah
were wearing Western suits, learning English, and going to
Europe for holiday. The ironies of the situation are obvious.
In Dir, the secular ruling family, rightly fearing the
resurgence of fragmentation, was stressing its religiosity.
In Swat, the ruling family, while descended from a Sufi
mystic, was secularizing and Westernizing as rapidly as
possible as it solidified its rule under British protection.

33
The tactics of both ruling houses were relatively
successful at first. The Badshah of Swat felt secure
enough about his power to abdicate in favor of one of his
sons soon after Swat acceded to the state of Pakistan. A
peaceful transmission of power was thus accomplished, and
it appeared that the new dynasty was a strong one. Shahbuddin,
meanwhile, had built up fanatical loyalty among his followers,
particularly among the Mishwani, landless migrants from
Afghanistan whom he had granted land. The power of Shahbuddin'
army was ruthlessly demonstrated in an atrocity- filled war
against the rebellious province of Miadan. Shahbuddin* s
elder brother, Kushrow Khan who, with his father, ruled Dir
proper, looked with some trepidation at Shahbuddin's ex
ploits in Jandul, but was unable to act.
With the emergence of the Pakistani state, little
changed in the North. The central government had neither
the strength nor the inclination to interfere in the poli
tics of Swat and Dir. Taking their cue from Colonial policy,
the Pakistani state adopted a lenient attitude toward the
Princely states. The Pakistani administration, which had
modernizing ambitions, also followed the British in favoring
the more "advanced" government of Swat over the traditional
government of Dir. Pakistan's President Ayub even married
two of his daughters into the Swati royal family, and Swat
became a tourist resort for Pakistani elite. Dir, meanwhile,
continued to resist modernization and remained relatively
isolated.
Part of Dir's backwardness was due to Pakistani govern
ment policy, but most of it was a result of the policy of
the royal family who, as we have seen, rested their claim
to power on tradition. As that claim shifted from secular
to religious ground, it became necessary for the ruling
family to postulate an external enemy. My model shows that
the ascendancy of a religious leader occurs in periods of
invasion or threat. In fact, Dir was not threatened from
outside, but rather from its own internal schisms brought
about by the cessation of expansion. But, in order to
validate their continued rule, Shahbuddin and his father,
Shah Jehan, began claiming that the secular policies of
the central government of Pakistan threatened the purity
of Islam. The outsiders who had entered Dir to administer
the few hospitals and schools that had been built there
were singled out as heathens, and the institutions them
selves were construed as heretical. These allegations,
which were tactical moves by the royal family, stirred up
the Dir population and roused the anxieties of the Pakistani
state .
While his father and brother built themselves up at
the cost of gaining the animosity of the central state,

34
Kushrow Khan saw an opportunity for conspiracy. He secretly
met with Pakistani officials and plotted the overthrow of
Shahbuddin and Shah Jehan. He would be given authority over
all of Dir and Jandul and in return offer loyalty to Pakistan.
The plot was successfully carried out and, in 1960, Shahbuddin
and Shah Jehan were banished from their homeland.
Kushrow Khan hoped to emulate the Badshah and rely on
the central state for support. But the Badshah had a
stronger power base from which to operate. For one thing,
the Badshah had been elected as leader by his subjects, he
had not usurped his position from a previous legitimate
Ruler. Furthermore, the structural principles I have out
lined favored the development of the Badshah as a secular
leader, since he was heading a state which was expanding
in influence, if not in actual territory. Kushrow Khan,
on the other hand, attempted to be a secular leader in a
state experiencing religious revivalism. The threat of
engulf ment by an un- Islamic Pakistan, which Shahbuddin had
called up to validate his power, had turned into reality
and devoured Shahbuddin himself. Religious revivalism
became even more pronounced in Dir than before, and Kushrow
found himself in a very awkward position. Having removed
his family from positions of power, he had thought he would
be secure. Instead, even more dangerous rivals arose imme
diately. Foremost among them was the Pukhtun holy man,
Saifullah, whose austerities and learning made him a much
more authentic charismatic religious figure than Shabuddin
had ever been. In l969, the pot boiled over, as the Mishwani
rose in open rebellion against the new inroads of Pakistani
officialdom which Kushrow' s alliance had promoted. Rioting
throughout Dir ended in the destruction of almost all
government offices, schools, and hospitals. Kushrow was
powerless to control the people, and the violence only ended
when bad weather and lack of ammunition cut it short.
Soon after this incident, and partly as a result of
it, the governments of both Dir and Swat were completely
merged into Pakistan and the Princely Rulers were deposed.
The state of Pakistan felt that Dir needed close super
vision. From being the staunchest ally of the Colonial
powers, Dir had become the center for rebellion in the
North. Swat, on the other hand, had evolved from the most
troublesome area during British times to the state most
closely tied to the Pakistani central government. The tie
into Pakistan, however, had been too personalized. After
the downfall of President Ayub in l969 , his Swati friends
and in-laws suffered from the resentment of Ayub's powerful
national enemies. The inclusion of Dir into Pakistan was
thus a defensive measure by the central government, while
the inclusion of Swat was, to an extent, an act of revenge.
The Dir royal family was punished for failing to integrate

35
itself into the nation, while the Swat royal family was
punished for succeeding too well.
The political fortunes of the two valleys after the
Pakistani takeover offer more illustrations of the model.
Swat, which had been dominated by a holy lineage, has
turned in recent years to secular Pukhtun leaders. Dir,
in contrast, which had historically been led by the Painda
khel warriors, has recently followed holy men. This pat
tern is clear in the truncated elections of l977- Swat,
especially in the North, was dominated by Pukhtun candidates,
despite the nomination of one Maulana, who lost in his race
(Lindholm l979). Even in the South, where the Badshah's
family continues to hold tremendous wealth and prestige,
the family vote split between two sons, both of whom were
forced to beg the local Khans for help. Meanwhile, in Dir,
the Nawab, Kushrow Khan, was trounced by Pir Saifullah,
while the other victorious candidate was a Maulana from
Mardan .
This process is understandable in the framework of
the model I have presented in its historical transforma
tions. Swat, in favoring secular leaders, was simply con
tinuing a process that had been seen more and more clearly
during the successful years of the Badshah's rule. The
Badshah's family had only maintained their position through
the external strength of the Raj and the Pakistani state.
The more successful the Badshah's family was in extending
its influence beyond Swat, the more secularized it became.
With the fall of the royal family, power has now returned,
in large measure, to the warrior Pukhtun families. But
the success of the Badshah in extending Swati influence
has made a difference in the present power structure of
Swat. Instead of degenerating back to the anarchic localized
dullah system that occurs in a stagnant segmentary polity,
Swati politics has instead been dominated by a few powerful
khels whose influence extends far beyond their home villages.
The leaders of these khels, whether Pukhtun or secularized
scions of holy lineages, are avatars of the warrior leaders
of past expansions; for Swat has assumed a paramount position
in the politics of Northern Pakistan. One Khan from Upper
Swat even became the president of the Provincial Assembly
in Peshawar. Nationalist propaganda about the creation of
Pukhtunistan has further stimulated the expansionist ambi
tions of the Swatis, and the local Pukhtun have aligned
themselves behind warrior-politicians in the hopes of
sharing any spoils. There is a contrary trend as well.
The erosion of the state in Swat has allowed petty land
lords to chip away at the estates of the big Khans who had
gained power through alliance with the Badshah (Lindholm l979) •
The military government presently controlling Pakistan has
also emasculated the Provincial Assembly and thereby restricted

36
Swati political expansionism, thus further contributing to
a return to internal fragmentation and dissidence in the
valley. At the moment, it is difficult to predict which
direction Swat will go.
The situation in Dir is quite different. Far from
hoping to expand, the people of Dir feel profoundly threatened
by the Pakistani state. This fear has been played upon by
Shahbuddin and by the more authentic religious-political
leaders such as Saifullah. We have seen how the Dir people
rose in l969- The same thing occurred again in l976, when
a dispute over the central government's attempt to control
and tax wood cutting in the Dir hills erupted into widespread
violence. Inflamed by government intervention with their
traditions, the people of Northern Dir massed and marched
south, burning government buildings and looting as they
went. Four divisions of the Pakistani army were needed to
halt this march, and jets strafed and bombed some villages.
Although the Pakistani government later made a satisfactory
agreement with Dir over wood rights, the fighting made a
deep impression and increased the influence of the religious
elements .
The research for this paper was done in l969-70 and 1977-
Since then the martial law administration of General Zia has
attempted an "Islamicization" of Pakistan. How much this
effort parallels that of Dir is a subject beyond the range
of this paper, though I believe that the Middle Eastern
state is often not far removed from the political model
of segmentation (Lindholm l977). Whatever the principles
of form which underlie "Islamicization," we can predict
that if it involves overt interference in the states of
Dir and Swat, it will be greeted with resistance. But if
these troublesome areas are simply isolated and left alone,
the model indicates that they will relapse over time into
internally warring fragments. Yet the principle of "benign
neglect," to borrow an appropriate phrase, has an inherent
danger. I have noted that the segmentary lineage structure
is essentially expansionist. Although surplus population
is now being siphoned off by labor migration, this may not
always be the case. Furthermore, the appetites of the Khans
of Swat, in particular, have been whetted by the heady brew
of national politics. If they are cut away from the spoils,
they will certainly consider less peaceful means of expanding
their influence. And, if they are oppressed, they are
always likely to coalesce around a militant holy man. The
administration of the Frontier is therefore, as always, a
conundrum .
To conclude with a recapitulation of the argument, I
have constructed a model of political action in segmentary
lineage societies without the rule of primogeniture. The

37
model, which must be seen as an ideal, involves three basic
patterns, all of which are always existent within the system,
though one form dominates the other two at a given time and
place. In times in which the system is relatively dormant,
neither expanding nor resisting invasion, the pattern is one
of internal fragmentation into local two-party rivalries
which cannot give rise to hierarchies. These internal
rivalries are mediated by holy lineages or by the inter
vention of an external third party. When a third party
intervenes, either by invitation or on its own, the elements
of the system coalesce for defense against the outsider.
The leader of such resistance tends to be a religious
charismatic, since only such a figure can offset the internal
tendency to fragmentation and treachery implicit in the seg
mentary polity. Finally, when the system is expanding (which
it will do whenever the circumstances permit), the different
segments unite behind a secular war leader. In the course
of this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate the useful
ness of this model by applying it to the political history
of Dir and Swat. The experiment has been relatively suc
cessful, though the ambiguous position of the Badshah,
Abdul Gaffur, who was both charismatic and secular, shows
that the ideal types are far from mutually exclusive.
Nonetheless, even he remains within the framework of the
pattern I have outlined.
Notes
^1 would like to express my gratitude to the Henry
Evans Travelling Fellowship of Columbia University which
funded my stay in Northern Pakistan in l969-70 and to the
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the
National Science Foundation for grants which supported my
return in l977. This paper was presented, in an earlier
version, to the annual meeting of the Northeastern Anthro
pological Association in l979 • I am grateful to Stephen
Rittenberg, Abraham Rosman, Marilyn Strathern, Brian
Ferguson, and Stephen Pastner for their helpful comments.
I only wish I could have incorporated them all. The errors,
of course, remain my own.
2
The historical data utilized in this paper derive
in part from Caroe (l965). but most of it is a result of
my own interviews with local historians in both Dir and
Swat .

38
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