Counterfeit Prevention & Detection Strategies: When To Do It, How to Do It

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9000 Virginia Manor Rd Ste 290, Beltsville MD 20705 | 301-474-0607 | www.dfrsolutions.com
Counterfeit Prevention & Detection Strategies: When To Do It, How to Do It
SMTA Empire Chapter
June 16, 2013
Cheryl Tulkoff
ctulkoff@dfrsolutions.com

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Nathan Myhrvold
o“I want you to remember that everything I am saying may be wrong and I want you to question everything that I’m saying.”

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Abstract
oThis workshop addresses the sources of counterfeit components and provides insights into how they occur.
oCounterfeit components are a rapidly growing area of concern. The Department of Commerce has identified a 141% increase in the last three years alone!
oCounterfeit Parts are no longer an emerging threat: they’re real, and they’re here to stay.
oA counterfeit is any item that is not as it is represented with the intention to deceive its’ buyer or user. The misrepresentation is often driven by the known presence of defects or other inadequacies in regards to performance. Whether it is used for a commercial, medical or military application, a counterfeit component can cause catastrophic failure at a critical time.
oDetection methodologies, such as visual inspection, mechanical robustness, X- Ray, XRF, C-SAM, electrical characterization, decapsulation, and marking evaluations will be compared and contrasted.
oMultiple examples of counterfeit parts identified using these techniques will be highlighted.

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oState of Counterfeiting – Background, Facts & Statistics
oCounterfeits Defined
oLegislation, Standards & Databases
oEstablishing an Anti-Counterfeiting Program
oDetection and Failure Analysis Techniques
oCase Studies and Examples
oDevice Countermeasures
oAnatomy of a Counterfeit
oSummary
Topics

5 9000 Virginia Manor Rd Ste 290, Beltsville MD 20705 | 301-474-0607 | www.dfrsolutions.com
The State of Counterfeits
o Increasing concern across all
electronics industries
o Department of Commerce
measured 141% increase over
past three years
o http://www.bis.doc.gov/defensein
dustrialbaseprograms/osies/defm
arketresearchrpts/final_counterfeit
_electronics_report.pdf
o Recent DfR counterfeit activities
o Military Communications
o Internet Routers
o Air Traffic Control
o Consumer (Repair)

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oFlood of counterfeits in the US Defense supply chain
oFrom 2009-2010, over 1800 suspect cases of counterfeit electronic parts involving over 1 million parts!
oData consistently points to China as the epicenter

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oElectronic Component Counterfeit Incidents Continue Record Pace as the US Department of Defense Set to Update Acquisition Rules

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Number of High Risk Suppliers, Including Counterfeiters, Surges by More than 60% from 2002 to 2011

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Recent Military Case Studies
oUS Navy SH-60B Helicopter
oCounterfeit EIFs installed in FLIR (thermal imaging) units from Raytheon
oUS Air Force C-130J and C27-J
oCounterfeit memory in L3 Displays
oUS Navy P8A Poseidon
oReworked parts in Boeing ice detection module

Rank Commodity Type
% of Reported
Incidents
#1 Analog IC 25.2%
#2 Microprocessor IC 13.4%
#3 Memory IC 13.1%
#4 Programmable Logic IC 8.3%
#5 Transistor 7.6%
Source: IHS Parts Management 2012
Top 5 Most Counterfeited
Semiconductors in 2011

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oICM7170 is a microprocessor-compatible real-time clock, manufactured by Harris/Intersil
oICM7170IPG:
o-40C to 85C Temperature Range
o24-Lead Plastic Dual-In-Line Package (PDIP)
o20uA Maximum Standby Current at 32kHz
oICM7170AIBG:
o-40C to 85C Temperature Range
o24-Pin Small Outline Plastic Package (SOIC)
o5uA Maximum Standby Current at 32kHz
oICM7170IPG
oCounterfeiter bought for $.02
oSold for $38.00 each as ICM7170AIBG’s
oBuilt around 45k/month which equals a potential gross profit of $2,000,000 per month!
Lucrative Economics of Counterfeiting
DMSMS & Standardization 2011, http://www.dmsms2011.com

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Counterfeit Parts Defined
oWhat are they?
oWhat is their impact?
oWhere do they come from?
oIdentification
oIndustry Countermeasures
oAvoidance
oMitigation

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What are counterfeit parts?
oAny part or component that is not as represented
oDuplication of another manufacturer’s product
oManufacturer’s product that failed test, inspection, or burn-in or was an engineering sample
oEmpty package or wrong functionality
oSalvaged or reworked parts
oTrojans
oParts being counterfeited include:
oNewest parts & components
oObsolete parts
oInexpensive parts as well as high value parts

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oUsed product marked as higher grade new product
oThese types of counterfeits may work
oWill not operate at the same level as the higher grade part
oMay fail under stress that would be expected under normal conditions.
oElectronics recycling or salvage sources
oFake, non-working product
oDisguised parts
oDefective Scrap
oInside sources
oNew product re-marked as higher grade product
oLike used product, re-marked new product will work, but not at the desired level of functionality.
Top 4 Types of Counterfeits

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Types of Confirmed Counterfeits
oMicrocircuits
oMicroprocessors
oOther Microcircuits
oMemory
oRadio Frequency/Wireless
oLogic, Standard
oSpecial Purpose Logic
oDiscretes
oElectromechanical
oThyristors
oCapacitors
oOther Discretes
oCircuit Protection/Fuses
oDiodes
oResistors
oSensors & Actuators
oOptoelectronics
oPower Transistors
oRectifiers
oSmall Signal Transistors
oMagnetics
oCrystals/Oscillators

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Generators of Counterfeit Parts
oInside Job
oFailed parts off the production line
oMay operate in benign environment
oCompetitors
oUnknown competitor may package and label the same as a known company
oMay function as a direct replacement (may not)
oMoney Makers
oFraudulent: empty package or wrong chip
oWill fail immediately
oHackers
oTrojans: malicious code
oSecurity threat

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Primary Sources of Counterfeit Parts
oMost counterfeit parts come from parts brokers that deal in small and odd lots
oLow volume of obsolete parts bought off the internet
oAuthorized parts distributors rarely have counterfeits because they receive them directly from the original component manufacturer (OCM)
oRegions with highest counterfeit activity:
oChina
oMiddle East
oEastern Europe
oBut truly a global problem!

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China & US dominate but true origin is hard to identify
Counterfeit Origins

Environmental Legislation Impact
o Provides additional opportunities
o Recycling
o Need for obsolete SnPb parts

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What is the Impact of Counterfeit Parts?
oCost
oReputation
oSecurity
oFailure
oRisk and impact varies based on type of counterfeit and operational environment

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oVisible Costs
oRevenue Loss
oDevice level anti-counterfeiting measures
oPersonnel measures
oHidden Costs
oAvoiding potentially lower cost manufacturing companies or regions of the world
oReputation / Brand
oLoss of Credibility to buyers
Cost Impacts of Counterfeiting to Semiconductor Manufacturers

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oTraining
oTracking
oInspection
oTesting
oPaperwork
oControl
oAnalysis
oProcedures
Anti-counterfeiting Personnel Costs

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oProcurement training
oLimiting potential sources and purchasing controls
oStaff/operator training
oIncoming product inspection
oTime, tracking, test equipment
oControl and testing of product sourced from non-approved or infrequently used sources.
oLoss of manufacturing time and output while re-sourcing device if counterfeits are found or delivered
oCosts if counterfeit gets into manufacturing process
oRework or scrap
Equipment Producer Costs

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End Component User Costs
oAdditional servicing and spares
oPremature equipment failure
oEquipment downtime
oDefects or bugs causing malfunction
oLegal expenses: downtime, damage, failure to perform, injury, loss
oMilitary & national security

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Counterfeit Databases, Standards, and Legislation

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oFounded in 1995, ERAI is an information services organization that monitors, investigates and reports issues affecting the global hi-tech electronics supply chain.
oERAI provides tools to mitigate risks on substandard parts, counterfeit parts, vendors and even customers.
oSubscribers include OEMs, CMs, Distributors, OCMs, government agencies and industry associations.
oFounding participant in SAE International G-19 Counterfeit
owww.erai.com
ERAI (Electronic Retailers Association International)

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oGovernment - Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) is a cooperative activity between government and industry
oSeeks to reduce/eliminate expenditures of resources by sharing technical information.
oMaintains suspect counterfeit database
owww.gidep.org
GIDEP

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IDEA, IACC
oIndependent Distributors of Electronics Association (IDEA), www.idofea.org
oNon-profit trade association representing distributors of electronic components
oIDEA-STD-1010-B: Acceptability of Electronic Components Distributed in the Open Market
oInternational Anti Counterfeiting Coalition
oIACC is the world's largest non-profit organization devoted solely to protecting intellectual property and deterring counterfeiting
owww.iacc.org

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US Government Legislation
o2012 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
oAdded regulations for counterfeit part detection and avoidance.
oOctober 3, 2012 updates to the DFAR supplement implemented portions of section 818 of NDAA that must add definitions specific to counterfeit parts, define contractors' responsibilities, and clarify the government's role.

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DoD Memorandum
o“Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance.’”
oIn the memo, the department laid out an actionable definition of counterfeit material and also emphasized the importance of taking immediate action to apply existing policy and procedures, prior to establishing new DoD policy and procedures or waiting for forthcoming changes to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
ohttp://www.dmsms2012.com/images/Counterfeit- Prevention-Guidance.pdf

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oDirector’s policy memo dated 21 July 2011
oReport suspect and confirmed counterfeits to the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) as Agency Action Notices
oNotification of criminal investigative organization, identified users, & DLA’s Counterfeit Material Team
o“It is an unacceptable practice to report a suspect counterfeit item after a protracted period of time trying to conclusively determine an item is suspect or actually counterfeit”
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

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oAS5553 “Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition”
oProvides 7 basic requirements for controlling counterfeit part threat
oControl Plan, addressing
oObsolescence management
oPurchasing Practices
oPurchasing Documentation
oReceiving Inspection
oIn process investigation
oMaterial Control
oReporting
SAE AS5553 – The Aerospace Standard

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oARP 6178-2011, ‘‘Fraudulent/Counterfeit Parts; Tool for Risk Assessment of Distributors’’
oNumber of Standards now under development
oSAE AS 6081 ‘‘Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance Protocol, Distributors’’
oSAE AS 6174‘‘Counterfeit Materiel; Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition’’,
oSAE AS 6171 ‘‘Test Methods Standards; Counterfeit Electronic Parts’’
oSAE ARD 6884 ‘Terms and Definition – Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts’’.
SAE: The Aerospace Standard Series

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oSEMI® is the global industry association serving the manufacturing supply chain for the micro- and nano-electronics industries
owww.semi.org
SEMI Anti- Counterfeiting Standards

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EIA/G-12 JEDEC
oEIA/G-12 Recommendation
o“only procure from the Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) that makes and warranties the part or material or their designated franchisees.”
oProcuring from OCM’s
oUnrealistic for Military / Government programs
oVolumes too low
oProcuring from designated franchisees
oComponent availability from designated franchisees is often similar to that of OCM

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EIA/G-12 Committee Strategy
oTB-0003-2009: Counterfeit Parts & Materials Risk Mitigation
Prevention Detection Mitigation

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EIA/G-12 Statistical Analysis
oA Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA) should be conducted in accordance with MIL-STD-1580 on a random sample with a minimum of a 90% confidence level (i.e. 22 piece sample, C =0) at a program approved laboratory. A sample (22 pieces) should be selected from each lot / date code
o EIA now rolled into JEDEC

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oSuspect Counterfeit Material Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDRs):
oTotal Reported
oTotal Closed and Verified
oTotal Closed Other (i.e., final investigation showed they were not counterfeit)
oFederal Stock Code Identifier
oSource of supply of counterfeit material
oLocation where suspect counterfeit material was detected
oCriticality of Item (Safety of flight, SUBSAFE, etc.)
oAction taken (e.g., stock screen, purge stock, suspend)
Counterfeit Metrics: NAVSEA Example

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Counterfeit Reporting
oFor counterfeit or suspect counterfeits:
oDo not return parts!
oSegregate, quarantine, recall
oReport to stakeholders and GIDEP, ERAI databases
oReport to authorities

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Establishing an Anti-Counterfeiting Protection and Detection Program

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Obstacles to a Successful Anti-Counterfeit Program
oComplacency
oWon’t or can’t happen here
oHasn’t happened yet
oUnclear ownership of issue
oNot understanding or underestimating the threat
oOnly expensive parts are counterfeited
oBuy from an “American” company
oParts use latest design
oDistributor provides a Certificate of Conformance (C of C)
oReceiving inspection or test process will catch fakes

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oFederal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)/ Defense (DFAR) issues
oFAR/DFAR says use the lowest bidder
oNeed to meet Small Disadvantaged Business quota
oIf I restrict where I buy from, I will pay more money
oSupply chain excuses or push back
oExpensive: here’s the bill for it, $$$
o“You want to know every time I buy a high risk part?”
oOther customers don’t have the requirement
oLiability

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oAffordability is key
oNo one size fits all strategy
oMitigations must pass the cost versus outcome test
oCounterfeit Parts are no longer an emerging threat. They’re real, and they’re here to stay.

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oResearch
oCarefully Select Sources
oImplement Purchasing Best Practices
oPerform Lot Validation Testing
Cost-Effective Counterfeit Protection Approach

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oDo Your Homework
oContact Original Component Manufacturer (OCM) and franchise distributers first
oConfirm product status
oIs the product end of life (EOL)?
oCheck for authorized aftermarket sources
oDetermine if/when the product went EOL
oDetermine EOL production lot date codes
oTry to locate a known good device
oCheck with industry sources like ERAI or GIDEP for counterfeit activities of the product needed.
Counterfeit Protection Strategies

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oChoose Sources Wisely
oDon’t use cost as sole/primary criteria for purchase
oQuality Product is goal
oUse industry sources to evaluate potential suppliers
oAsk for accreditations, certifications & memberships like ISO9011, AS9120, IDEA-1010, ERAI or IDEA Members
oAudit sources
oPurchase only from suppliers who have implemented and are committed to counterfeit avoidance practices
oUnderstand warranty and payment terms
oCreate a list of approved, trusted suppliers and use them
Counterfeit Protection Strategies - Continued

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oClearly communicate objectives and needs
oCreate company policy on counterfeits
oLook for product in stock, not just availability
oAsk if the product is traceable back to the OCM
oDon’t buy COD
oNegotiate terms or use escrow services.
oAllows time for authenticity checks & testing to be performed before paying
Purchasing Best Anti-Counterfeiting Protection Practices

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oBefore buying, ask for photos and evidence
oImages of component front and back
oCompare date codes and EOL date for product
oCompare marking with known-good product
oDo research now as it will save money later
oUnderstand the product warranty
oAnything less than 30 days is a RED flag
oIf supplier does not have confidence in the product, why would you?
Purchasing Best Anti-Counterfeiting Protection Practices

Complex Supply Chains
μcircuit
design
Fab
Avionics
OEM
Ass’y
Dist.
Test
• Multiple points of entry
• Porous return policies
Lloyd Condra, Boeing

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oBroker or Independent Distributor Basics
oNot all Brokers & Independent Distributors are the same
oMany have minimal Quality Systems and no ESD, storage, or handling controls.
oSome have no experience with semiconductors
oThe Internet has created virtual companies
oTraceability back to the original OCM is unavailable
oLimited or no product warranty or support
oBuying obsolete products requires more diligence, not less
Broker 101

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oDefine Test Plan based on your level of risk
oWhat is your application? Commercial? Military?
oDefine your test plan to meet risk mitigation needs
oPut requirements in writing and be as detailed as possible
oRequire documented reports of all validation tests
oCopy of lot information detailing all tests performed and results
oDie ID Photos, X-Ray Photos, etc.
Evaluate & Validate ALL broker material

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oChose a reputable Test Lab/Partner based on accreditations and capabilities, not on price alone.
oAsk for details of test plan prior to starting test
oIf your supplier provides Lot Validation Testing in the purchase price:
oProvide your test requirements to your supplier
oCompare their test plan against your risk mitigation needs
oUnderstand what you are paying for
oAsk who will be performing the testing on your material
Evaluate & Validate ALL broker material

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Designated Franchisees
oMilitary / Government contractors standardizing sourcing plans
oLists of approved sources (Authorized Source Directory)
oOther sources by exception and with specific approvals
oApproval process
oAudit based on quality system
oRisk assessment to the program
oDevelopment of an inspection / test plan
http://www.authorizedcomponents.com/manufacturers.html
Use of Authorized Franchisees does not eliminate risk

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oMany unsafe part & supplier sources
oOnline Broker Search Engines
oMaverick procurement methods or spending limits
oGoogle
oThese are counterfeit ports of entry
oRapid access to millions of parts
oMinimal membership requirements
oQuick & easy access to a large audience of buyers
Counterfeit Sources

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oDirect from the Factory (Original Component Manufacturer, OCM)
oApproved Vendor / Manufacturer (AVL / AML)
oFranchised and Authorized Sources
oApproved Independent Distributors
oERAI Members
oQualified Sources of Supply
oSuppliers
oManufacturers
oParts (or alternates meeting the above criteria)
Trusted Supply Chain

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Qualified Supplier Resources
oUse industry resources!
oDSCC QSLD
oPre-qualified distributors
oSemiconductors and Microcircuits
oDistributors with demonstrated quality assurance practices
ohttp://www.dscc.dla.mil/downloads/VQGeneral/QSLD_Booklet. pdf

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Decision Process
oIf prevention is not realistic, when to detect?
oHow to mitigate?
oEntry for counterfeit components is cost
oCost to procure < cost of redesign (+ requal, etc.)
oIf cost to mitigate is too high, then redesign
oHow to determine the appropriate cost to detect and mitigate?
oDriven by probability / mission risk / volume matrix

Decision Matrix
Probability of
Counterfeit

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Threat Evaluation
oTHREAT ASPECTS
oProbability
oKnowledge of Part
oTiming of Effect
oWhere Part Can be Found
oDestructiveness
oOBSERVABILITY
oMeasureable
oAccessible
oNo damage
oIntermittent
oUnknown Latency
oProvokable

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Counterfeit Probability
oProbability of counterfeit (per shipment) tends to display order of magnitude dependence on component source
oMay vary based on supply chain and component technology
Known: Existing business relationship
Unknown: No existing business relationship (e.g., eBay)

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Case Study
oTelecom OEM procures one reel of capacitors from known broker
oEnd-of-life (EOL) product
oDecision Matrix
oDfR recommended that $10K to $100K should be spent on counterfeit detection and mitigation
oIndustry ROI can be 1:1 to 10:1
Probability is 2% Volume is 4000 parts
Mission Risk is $5M
Eight capacitors per CCA (500 CCAs)
$10K cost of quality ($5K COGS + $1K service + $4K loss of market)

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Counterfeit Component Inspection & Detection Techniques Explained

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Detection of Counterfeits
oCounterfeiters are increasingly sophisticated
oUse of actual parts at the start and end of a reel
oChallenges sampling techniques
oInspection and comparison of known-good to possible counterfeits
oMarkings
oInternal structure
oPerformance measurement

Detection Techniques
T. Apple 610-531-5484 5
Risk Mitigation Methods
Visual /
Marking
Inspec-tion
Verificati
on of
Manuf.
LDC,
SNs, etc.
Mater-ial
Analy-sis
Seal Test
Radio-graphic
DPA
Minimal
Electrical
Test
Full
Electri-cal
Test
(Am-bient)
Full
Electrical
Test (Hot
/ Cold Am-bient)
Test &
Burn-in
Test,
Burn-in
and QCI
No Die / Non-functional
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Material Content P No Yes No No Yes No No No No No
Wrong Die P P No No P Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Re-used /
Repaired /
Salvaged
P No P P P P No No No No No
Scrapped /
Reject
P No No P P P P P P Yes Yes
Mechanical
Damage
Yes No No P P Yes P P P P P
Mis-Handling /
Storage
No No No P No P P Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manufacturer
Change
P P P No P Yes P P P P P
Less Reliable
Parts
P P P No No P No P P P P
Reliability /
Quality Issue
No No No No P P No P P Yes Yes
ESD / EOS
Damage
No No No No No P P P P Yes Yes
Counterfeit with
functional die
P P P No P P P P Yes Yes Yes
Temperature
Range
Upmarking
No P No No No P No No Yes Yes Yes
Code:
This chart was developed from one created by Mark Marshall of Integra Technologies.
No = Unlikely to Find
Shading:
Green = Low Cost / Easily Accomplished
Yellow = Moderate Cost / Some time involved
Red = High Cost / Significant time to accomplish
Dotted Pattern = Will be found at first electrical test
Counterfeit Concern
P = Possibly Find
Yes = Probably Find
Detection/Risk Mitigation Methods

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Detection Techniques (cont.)
Add material check / seal test / radio-graphic or do basic electrical testingAdd full ambient electrical testsModerate cost / repairable- replaceable / non-mission criticalAdd QCI and other lot acceptance testingAdd testingRisk Mitigation TechniquesSelection Guide Cost & ScheduleCost Schedule The more spent, the more time taken, the more confidence in reliabilityAdd DPAAdd DPAAdd full electrical tests over temperatureAdd burn-inAdd inT. Apple 610-531-5484theodore.s.apple@lmco.com3/27/2007Item End-Use RequirementsLow cost / repairable / redundant systemsHigh cost / non-repairable / mission critical Reliability (Probability of Detection) Add post burn-in full electricaltests over temperatureAdd temperatureC of C Only Check AlertsVisual InspectionVisual Inspection

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Commonly Requested Tests for Counterfeits
oGeneral product review
oPaperwork Check
oExternal visual inspection
oInspection for remarking/resurfacing
oX-ray
oLead finish exam
oInternal verification
oBasic electrical testing

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Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Desired:
oDocumentation check
oVisual Inspection
oMarking Permanency
oSurface Finish Permanency
oAggressive Solvents Test (destructive)
oX-Ray Fluorescence
oX-Ray
oDie Verification (destructive)
MDA Example Desired Inspection & Test Requirements

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Counterfeit Analysis Techniques
•Analysis always starts with Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE)
•Designed to obtain maximum information with minimal risk of damaging or destroying physical evidence
•Emphasize the use of simplest tools first
•Generally non-destructive techniques:
•Visual Inspection
•Electrical Characterization
•Acoustic Microscopy
•X-ray Microscopy
•X-Ray Fluorescence
•Destructive evaluation techniques
•Decapsulation
•Cross-sectioning
•SEM/EDX

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Electrical Characterization
•Parametric characterization
•Comparison of performance to datasheet specifications
•Curve tracer
•Applies alternating voltage; provides plot of voltage vs. current response
•Valuable in characterizing diode, transistor, and resistance behavior
•Time domain reflectometry (TDR)
•Release and return of electrical signal along a given path
•Measurement of phase shift of return signal indicates potential location of electrical open
•Other characterization equipment
•Inductance/capacitance/resistance (LCR) meter
•High resistance meter (leakage current < nA)
•Low resistance meter (four wire; < milliohms)
•Use of additional environmental stresses
•Semiconductor-based devices
•Temperature rise or temperature/humidity could trigger elevated leakage current
•Passive components

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Visual Inspection Cost & Benefit
oCost: $1K to $3K
oWhat to look for:
oPart marking, date codes
oColor differences in parts
oMarking imperfections, changes, blacktopping, “ghost” images
oLead finish, plating variability, exposed copper, excess solder, co-planarity of leads, bent leads
oResidues & contamination
oPackage variation, thickness, radii

Visual Inspection
o Which is counterfeit?
o The one with markings? Or the two that seem to have none?
o Two samples are non-functional and one functions
1 2 3

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Visual Inspection
oFive different capacitor types in one reel!
Capacitor Group 1, Fluorescent Light - Dark Brown
Capacitor Group 2, Fluorescent Light - Pink
Capacitor Group 3, Fluorescent Light - Greenish Gray
Capacitor Group 5, Fluorescent Light - Light Brown
Capacitor Group 4,
Fluorescent Light - Bluish Gray

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Date Code Marking - Differences
2.22
12.00
3.18
12.00
Smooth
Even
Textured
Uneven
Registration (mm)
Surface
Lettering
Uniform
depth
Uneven
depth

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Samsung Marking Information
(1) SAMSUNG logo : SAMSUNG or SEC
top marking type
mark criteria
package
SAMSUNG marking
>11.2mm
U-BGA, W-BGA, TBGA, FBGA etc
(2) Year & Week
(3) Part Number : Refer to Part No. decoder page
(4) Lot Number
Country of origin not a standard Samsung marking feature

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Visual Inspection
Identical part numbers different marking styles

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Visual Inspection
Real or Fake? The Counterfeit Chip Conundrum, Hal Rotchadl, Premier Semiconductor Services, Tempe, AZ, USA, IPC Printed Circuit Expo, APEX & Designer Summit Proceedings.
Observed differences on lid corners. Part A has chamfer, and part B has dimple

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Visual Inspection
Observed side view differences. Left part has a thin lid and right part has a thick lid

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oBlacktopping is a counterfeiting technique where the counterfeiter:
oTakes components, usually real, but discarded
oSands them to remove the original component marking
oBlacktops them in order to hide the original marking
oPrints them with fake markings.
oDissolve the blacktop with a solvent / acetone that reveals the true identity of the components.
oBut, methods used to blacktop sanded parts improve daily so the acetone test is no longer reliable
Blacktopping

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Examples of Blacktopping
Just under top surface, date code mismatch and hynix part
L01, remarked date code, VC36 changed to GC33
L011, hynix part

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Blacktopping & Acetone Wipe Test
Appearance After Acetone Wipe: change in texture and finish
Evidence of Sanding: Visible after blacktopping is removed
Photos courtesy of Oxygen Electronics

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X-Ray Cost & Benefit
oCost: $1K to $3K
oVerification of die and wire bonding pattern
oInternal construction of component
oDie bonding delamination issues
oDie attach voiding

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X-Ray Microscopy
Allows for internal inspection
Latest innovations
Digital detectors
Laminography (‘virtual’ cross- sectioning)
Produces CT models for 3D sample analysis, virtual micro-sectioning and internal dimensional
Nanofocus resolution
Oblique viewing
Agilent 5DX
Nordson Dage X-Ray with 3D m-CT

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X-Ray Inspection
oInspect for:
oExtra wire bonds
oWrong configuration of bond pads
oDifferent die sizes
oExtra heat capacity (large paddle)
oDifferent lead frames

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X-Ray Inspection
Different die sizes
L01
L011

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X-Ray Inspection
Same part but a better remarking, same die sizes, Hynix mark visible

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X-Ray Inspection
Same part

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Case Study: Counterfeit FETS-X-Ray
oCustomer had an issue with DC to DC converter failures
oSimulation models did not predict the failures
oX-ray inspection of the failed units
Parallel FETS

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X-Rays of Loose Parts
EZ609
Z436, Z536
Z536
Z536
Z536
Differences noted in:
-Lead frame
-Wire bonding
-Molding

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X-Ray Technique: Automation?
oChipCheck Project, www.smartgroup.org
oMove focus from sampling and problem to resolution

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X-Ray Technique: Automation?
oChipCheck Project
oCreation of an inspection system for automatic detection of counterfeit components at incoming
oCreation of counterfeit component detection software for fast and automatic sentencing of components. A component database storing details of known, good, components for comparison included

92
Electrical Characterization Cost & Benefit
oCost: $3K to $6K – passives, simple actives
oOne temperature for evaluation
oCost: $15K to $80K – characterization of complex IC, fixturing, test equipment
oPotential for circuit board design, layout and fabrication costs to enable testing
oCOMMENT: You can’t afford the risk associated with buying expensive ICs from unknown suppliers

93
oLimitations of physical characteristic testing
oParts may be re-manufactured or factory rejects in what appears to be authentic packaging
oNo conclusive identification information on the die once decapsulated
oTherefore, some electrical analysis is helpful in determining authenticity.
oAlthough full datasheet testing is highly recommended for high reliability applications, a curve trace on each lead is a very effective way to begin an electrical examination of the parts.
oA known good or reference component is required.

Case Study – Capacitor Electrical
Characterization
Suspect capacitor - group 3
9.720E-10
9.730E-10
9.740E-10
9.750E-10
9.760E-10
9.770E-10
9.780E-10
9.790E-10
9.800E-10
9.810E-10
9.820E-10
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Temperature (°C)
Capacitance (F)
C7 SN2854 - 0632
limit 1
limit 2
0.0E+00
2.0E-04
4.0E-04
6.0E-04
8.0E-04
1.0E-03
1.2E-03
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Temperature (°C)
Dissipation factor
C7 SN2854 - 0632
1.049E-09
1.050E-09
1.051E-09
1.052E-09
1.053E-09
1.054E-09
1.055E-09
1.056E-09
1.057E-09
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Temperature (°C)
Capacitance (F)
Cap 4 - Bag 10
limit 1
limit 2
0.0E+00
1.0E-04
2.0E-04
3.0E-04
4.0E-04
5.0E-04
6.0E-04
7.0E-04
8.0E-04
9.0E-04
1.0E-03
-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Temperature (°C)
Dissipation factor
Cap 4 - Bag 10
o Top
o Within spec
o Bottom
o Out of spec

95
Electrical Characterization of Counterfeit Diodes
Breakdown: 280V 250V
Breakdown: 50V 420V

96
Electrical Characterization of Counterfeit Diodes
Acceptable Waveform
Counterfeit Waveform
Recovery measurements

97
This is not an authentic STS25NH3LL Part, does not meet resistance specifications. Its higher drain to source resistance will cause its parallel FET partner to carry all the current.
FETs with large die have similar resistances and electrical performance, regardless of lead frame style

98
Mechanical Robustness - Cost & Benefit
oCost: $2K to $5K
oThermal cycling or other testing to verify component is not counterfeit

99
Counterfeit Mechanical Risk
oThermal Shock Test
oVisual Inspection (EIA-595 allows for 5 mil depth)
o8 of 32 counterfeit capacitors had acceptable chip-outs
o12 of 32 counterfeit capacitors had unacceptable chip-outs
o8 of 32 Taiyo Yuden capacitors had acceptable chip-outs (very small)
Pictures of chip-outs of counterfeit capacitors (left) and Taiyo Yuden capacitors (right)

100
Destructive Physical Analysis (DPA)
oCost: $7 to $10K passives
oCost: $8 to $12K actives
oStep by Step analytical approach to identifying whether a device is counterfeit using all tools available.

101
Decapsulation and Cross Sectioning
oAllows direct inspection of circuits and identification of
oExtra circuitry
oExtra layers
oExtra interconnects

102
oDecapsulation is a very valuable tool for determining authenticity of difficult parts.
oAfter performing non destructive tests, the part may be opened for die verification
oDoes not guarantee all of the parts in the lot are the same
oTypically cheaper than electrical testing
Decapsulation
Plasma Etcher
Wet Etch Tanks

103
Decapsulation
oNote: point of no return! Voids any warrantees
oMechanical preparation and removal
oNon-critical material adjacent to die removed with diamond wheel
oGross package removal with razor blades, carbide/diamond drill bits, and polishing wheels
oStop once the tips of the wirebonds are contacted: electrical testing possible
oChemical removal
oWarning: significant safety precautions and training required
oMethods: heated sample + dropper application or immersion
oFuming nitric acid: apply, rinse in IPA, ultrasonic rinse with methanol
oFuming sulfuric acid: apply, ultrasonic rinse in DI water and then methanol
Material
Nitric
Sulfuric
Dynasolve 160
Uresolve +
Anhydride epoxy
X
Novolac epoxy
X
2 part epoxy, Nylon
X
Silicone package, gel
X
Silicone die coating
X
Source: Wills et al., Microelectronics Failure Analysis

104
Decapsulated Parts Inspection
Observed internal differences on lids. Part on left has flat lid, and part on right has a cavity lid

105
Decapsulated Parts Inspection
Chip capacitors are missing (bare pad site) on left part and mounted on right part

106
Cross-Sectioning
oStandard method for destructive subsurface evaluation
oMethod:
oSawing to approximate area of interest
oPotting in epoxy resins to aid polishing
oPolishing medium dependent upon materials: typically diamond, SiC, or alumina suspensions & embedded polishing cloths
oCoarse to fine (600 grit to 0.05 um) grinding sequence to eliminate damage from previous step
oFinal etch often used for microstructural relief
oOptical/electron microscopy for inspection
Images courtesy of Buehler

o Customer experienced two failures
o Left: known good part; center and right: bad parts
o Center part: no die; right part: cracked die
1 2 3

108
Higher Risk Non-Destructive Inspection
•Important to understand that NDE equipment is not completely non-destructive
•Acoustic microscopy
•Can remove residues/contaminants when product is submerged in water
•Selection of bath fluid is key (distilled/deionized water; IPA; oil; etc.)
•Issue for moisture sensitive components
•X-ray microscopy
•Elevated exposure, especially with laminography, can induce damage in sensitive components (EEPROM)
•SQUID (Superconducting QUantum Interference Device) microscopy
•Sensitivity allows for use of very low voltages; mostly non-destructive
•Thermal imaging
•Temperature rise can damage or mask fragile conductive filaments (joule heating, thermal runaway, evaporation of retained moisture)

109
H2O or other fluids
Transducer
Receiver
Method for inspecting internal structures through the application of high frequency (>20 kHz) sound waves
Requires immersion in water (acoustic signals reflected by air)
Allows for very accurate detection of voids and delaminations
Options
Frequency
Transmission mode
Imaging
Acoustic Microscopy

110
Acoustic Microscopy: Transducer Frequency
High frequency
Short focus
Low frequency Long focus
1. Higher resolution 2. Shorter focal lengths 3. Less penetration (Thinner packages)
1. Lower resolution
2. Longer focal lengths
3. Greater penetration
(Thicker packages)
General rules:
•Ultra High Frequency (200+ MHz) for flip chips and wafers.
•High Frequency (50-75 MHz) for thin plastic packages. (110MHz-UHF) for flip chips.
•Low Frequency (15-30 MHz) for thicker plastic packages.

111
Acoustic Microscopy: Transmission Mode
Pulse-Echo: One Transducer
•Uses ultrasound reflected from the sample
•Can determine which interface is delaminated
•Requires scanning from both sides to inspect all interfaces
•Provides images with high degree of spatial detail
•Peak amplitude, time of flight (TOF), and phase inversion measurement
Through Transmission: Two Transducers
•Uses ultrasound transmitted through the sample
•One scan reveals delamination at all interfaces
•No way to determine which interface is delaminated
•Less spatial resolution than pulse-echo
•Commonly used to verify pulse-echo results
Through Transmission
Transmit
&
Receive
Transmit
Receive
Pulse-Echo

112
Acoustic Microscopy
Missing die, missing bond wires and different internal structure
Electrical shorting within the package (delamination, electro-chemical migration)
Electrical opens (delamination, wire bond failure)
Insufficient thermal performance detected (i.e. die attach, voids and delamination)

X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Analysis
o XRF widely used determine:
o Elemental composition of components
o Lead content for compliance to the RoHS directive.
o A newer use for XRF:
o Compare a known good component to a suspect component by
comparing the elements of the leads as well as the packaging.
o Software developed to compare the two in order to assist in
authenticity verification.

114
X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Spectroscopy
X-ray emission signature from x-ray source
Portable models available
Crystallographic analysis of solid samples

115
Example of SAC part labeled SnPb
oUse XRF gun to scan incoming BGAs to verify Pb or Pb-free balls
oVerify lead finish on other parts
Pb-free Part failed to solder in Sn-Pb Process

116
Scanning Electron Microscopy
Sample rastered with an electron beam
Emitted electrons sorted by delay and quantity

117
Energy Dispersive X-Ray Spectroscopy (EDS)
•Used with SEM
•X-ray emission signature from electron source
•Elemental analysis of solid samples
•Identification based on multiple emission lines (K, L, M)
•Can’t detect light elements: H, He, Li, Be
EDS scan of elemental copper
Monte Carlo simulation of Si K-a X-rays in an SiO2 matrix at 5 keV
(Vanderlinde, 2004)

118
EDS of Ceramic Capacitor
oMaterials Characterization
oBismuth 7% to 23%
oPalladium 4% to 9%
oSilver 7% to 14%
oTitanium 26% to 34%
oNeodymium 29% to 46%

119
Suspect Counterfeits
oNot all suspect counterfeits are counterfeits
oCompany changed the size of the chip without a product change notice (PCN)
oOriginal components that appear to be fake
New
Old
Both components have the same part number

120
Avoiding Counterfeits
Activity
Relative Cost
Custom fabrication
$$$$
Lifetime Buy
$$-$$$
Modernize/Rev
$$$$$$$$$
Screen Incoming
$$
Screen Outgoing
$-$$$
Buy from origin & verify
$

121
Testing & Reporting Recommendations
oChoose an analysis lab carefully
oNo industry standards or accreditation for counterfeit analysis
oRapidly changing counterfeit landscape
oWide variations noted among labs
oIdentify the information desired from analysis

122
Key Analysis Report Elements
oImage List – as needed
oPackaging images
oX-ray images
oXRF images
oEDS images
oAcoustic microscopy images
oOverall images of part
oObservation images
oLead condition images
oSolvent testing images
oInternal images
oCorner radius images
oIncoming information
oInvestigator & lab name
oDatasheet information
oAssessment Checklist
oAnalysis & test descriptions & tools
oElectrical test results
oOverall Comments
oResults
oSummary

123
Device Countermeasures: Design for Counterfeit Avoidance

124
oEncryption on a chip
oOften cited as one of the answers to cybersecurity woes
oDifficult for small components to handle
oIntel announced a process that allows the random-number generator, which is the basis for encryption, to be made with the same semiconducting material and at the same feature size now used for modern processors.
oSmart Marking
oINK CONTAINING DNA OR OTHER BIOLOGIC MARKER FOR PREVENTION OF COUNTERFEITING AND PRODUCT DIVERSION PERCEPTIBLE WITH INFRARED LIGHT
oRF tagging
oPackage Authentication - This method makes it extremely difficult to counterfeit the data on RFID tags
oData acts as an electronic security marker to automatically authenticate genuine product packaging.
oShipment tracking
Examples of Device Level Countermeasures

125
Manufacturers Countermeasures
oComplex markings on the package
oUltra-violet ink in package marking
oSymbols or identifiers etched in the die
oDifficult to alter parts
oTraceability

Countermeasures (cont.)
o Latest technique involves
etch depth analysis
o Use of digital light
processing (DLP) to
rapidly scan surfaces
for highly accurate
depth measurements
o Compare to either
manufacturer’s spec or
known good part

127
Mitigating Effects of Counterfeits
oFull performance screen
oTest to or beyond spec
oTest to detect fraudulent parts
oI.e., empty packages or wrong functionality
oFactory-failed parts
oCompetitors parts may prove to work
oWill not detect parts with latent defects or those with additional circuitry

128
Prevention
oComprehensive audit of the distributor based on their quality system
oRisk assessment to the program
oDevelopment of an inspection / test plan

129
oSteps Involved in Repackaging a Die
oStep 1- Decapsulation
oStep 2 - Bond Wire Removal (Plucking)
oStep 3 – Chip Removal (extraction)
oStep 4 – Removing Adhesive Backing
oStep 5 – Bonding in New Package
Anatomy of a Counterfeit Process

130
oDecapsulation is the first step in the overall process to repackage die.
oOften a very dangerous, dirty, manual process.
oRed fuming ntric acid heated to 85-140 deg C or sulfuric acid heated to 140 deg C is then repeatedly dropped into the cavity to remove the plastic material covering the die.
oIn order to maximize profit, operators are under extreme pressure to perform
oIncreases the chance for accidents with the oxidizing acids and their fumes.
oThe chemicals used are aggressive towards the die and bonding pads.
Step 1: Decapsulation

131
oWith fine tweezers and steady hands, the operator gets under the wire and pulls the wires in the direction opposite direction to the ball bond attached to the pad.
oPlastic tweezers are preferred as they tend to cause less damage.
oBreaking the wire at the top of bonds of a decapped part without damaging the original ball bond is the most difficult part of the this process.
Step 2 - Wire Bond

132
oTo extract the die from the package and lead frame, the counterfeiter uses a hot plate at ~ 100 degrees C to loosen the adhesive holding the die to the lead frame.
oThe operator then uses an Exacto blade and tweezers to pry the die off the lead frame or package mounting.
Step 3 - Chip Removal

133
oAfter the die is extracted, adhesive is left on the back of the die. The operator sands the back to remove the adhesive leaving small abrasions that could later impact the die position.
Step 4 - Remove Adhesive Backing

134
oThe new wire bond is placed on top of the old ball providing evidence of what has transpired.
Step 5 – Bonding in New Package

135
oThe finished product can look like the original. Once the components are complete they may undergo a simple electrical test, such as a curve trace, but the stresses from reclaiming and die harvesting can induce severe damage causing;
oLower life expectancy
oCurve trace irregularities
oOut of specification
oContinuity failures
oUnknown reliability
Finished Product and Dangers of Manufactured Counterfeits

136
Conclusions
oCounterfeits are a real threat and growing
oComplex supply chain provides multiple entry points
oRisk needs to be managed through a decision matrix
oProbability / Mission Risk / Volumes
oHelps provide clear boundaries and guidelines for mitigation practices
oCosts are not prohibitive and should be chosen as a function of risk mitigation

137
Instructor Biography
Cheryl Tulkoff has over 22 years of experience in electronics manufacturing with an emphasis on failure analysis and reliability. She has worked throughout the electronics manufacturing life cycle beginning with semiconductor fabrication processes, into printed circuit board fabrication and assembly, through functional and reliability testing, and culminating in the analysis and evaluation of field returns. She has also managed no clean and RoHS-compliant conversion programs and has developed and managed comprehensive reliability programs.
Cheryl earned her Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from Georgia Tech. She is a published author, experienced public speaker and trainer and a Senior member of both ASQ and IEEE. She has held leadership positions in the IEEE Central Texas Chapter, IEEE WIE (Women In Engineering), and IEEE ASTR (Accelerated Stress Testing and Reliability) sections. She chaired the annual IEEE ASTR workshop for four years, is an ASQ Certified Reliability Engineer, and a member of SMTA and iMAPS.
She has a strong passion for pre-college STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) outreach and volunteers with several organizations that specialize in encouraging pre- college students to pursue careers in these fields.

138
Contact Information
•Questions?
•Contact Cheryl Tulkoff, ctulkoff@dfrsolutions.com, 512-913-8624
•www.dfrssolutions.com
•Connect with me in LinkedIn as well!

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