Space Shuttle Columbia Group Case StudyAssuming the perspective .docx

Space Shuttle Columbia Group Case Study
Assuming the perspective of your role, consider how you would
address the following case study questions:
1. What are the key issues surrounding this case?
2. What is the nature of the problems that exist?
3. Identify opportunities that may be involved.
4. In what ways were problems resolved or leveraged?
5. Recommend and justify additional courses of action that are
most likely to be effective.
Student 3 - Human Resources RepresentativeJob
responsibilities: Accomplishes human resource objectives by
recruiting, selecting, orienting, training, assigning, scheduling,
coaching, counseling, and disciplining employees;
communicating job expectations; planning, monitoring,
appraising, and reviewing job contributions; planning and
reviewing compensation actions; enforcing policies and
procedures.
After reading the case study in the PDF file attached separately,
answer the 5 questions above from a Human Resources
Representative. DON'T JUST GIVE GENERAL ANSWERS TO
THE QUESTIONS. IT HAS TO BE FROM A HUMAN
RESOURCES REPRESENTATIVE POINT OF VIEW. YOUR
PERSONAL OPINION AS AN HR REPRESANTAITVE.
DON't list references or citations, as this is supposed to be your
own personal opinion from a project HR point of view.
AT LEAST 50 Words for each answer.
address the
following case study questions:

1.
What are the key issues surrounding this case?
2.
What is the nature of the problems that exist?
3.
Identify
opportunities that may be involved.
4.
In what ways were problems resolved or leveraged?
5.
Recommend and justify additional courses of action that are
most likely to
be effective.
Student 3
-
Human Resources Representative
Job responsibilities: Accomplishes hum
an resource objectives by recruiting,
selecting, orienting, training, assigning, scheduling, coaching,
counseling, and
disciplining employees; communicating job expectations;
planning, monitoring,
appraising, and reviewing job contributions; planning and r
eviewing compensation

actions; enforcing policies and procedures.
After reading the case study in the PDF file attached
separately, answ
er the 5 questions above from a
Human
Resources Representative
.
DON'T JUST GIVE GENERAL ANSWERS
TO THE QUESTIONS. IT HAS TO BE FROM A HUMAN
PERSONAL OPINION
AS AN
HR REPRESANTAITVE.
DON't list
references
or citations, as this is supposed to be
you
r own personal opinion from a project HR point of view.
AT LEAST
50 Words for each answer.
address the
following case study questions:
1. What are the key issues surrounding this case?
2. What is the nature of the problems that exist?
3. Identify opportunities that may be involved.

4. In what ways were problems resolved or leveraged?
5. Recommend and justify additional courses of action that are
most likely to
be effective.
Student 3 - Human Resources Representative
Job responsibilities: Accomplishes human resource objectives
by recruiting,
selecting, orienting, training, assigning, scheduling, coaching,
counseling, and
disciplining employees; communicating job expectations;
planning, monitoring,
appraising, and reviewing job contributions; planning and
reviewing compensation
actions; enforcing policies and procedures.
After reading the case study in the PDF file attached
separately, answer the 5 questions above from a Human
Resources Representative. DON'T JUST GIVE GENERAL
ANSWERS
TO THE QUESTIONS. IT HAS TO BE FROM A HUMAN
PERSONAL OPINION AS AN HR REPRESANTAITVE.
DON't list references or citations, as this is supposed to be
your own personal opinion from a project HR point of view.
AT LEAST 50 Words for each answer.
Few projects start with an explosion. Even fewer start with a
deliberate explosion.
Yet every time the space shuttle is launched into space, five
tremendous explo-
sions in the rocket engines are needed to hurl the orbiter into
orbit around the
earth. In just over ten minutes, the orbiter vehicle goes from
zero miles an hour

to more than 17,500 miles per hour as it circles the Earth.
Shuttle launches are a very dangerous business. The loss of the
second shut-
tle on February 1, 2003, shocked everyone. It is apparent now
that some fuel-tank
insulation dislodged during liftoff and struck the orbiter during
its powered ascent
to earth orbit, and that the insulation punched a fatal hole in the
leading edge of
the left wing. This hole allowed superheated gases, about
10,000°F, to melt the
left wing during the re-entry phase of the mission. The loss of
the orbiter was the
result of the loss of the left wing.
Reading through the results of the disaster, one cannot help but
conclude how
simple and straightforward the project risks can be that are
handled by most
project managers. As an example, we can consider the writing
of software.
Writing and delivering computer software has its challenges,
but the risks are not
on the same scale of a space shuttle launch. Even the standard
risk response
453
The Space Shuttle
Columbia Disaster1
1© 2005 by Randall R. Kline, MBA, PMP, Qualtek Software
Development, Inc. Reproduced by per-
mission of Randall R. Kline.

1321.ch11 11/3/05 9:26 AM Page 453
Kerzner, H. (2008). Project management. Retrieved from
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com
Created from erau on 2018-09-09 07:16:45.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
2
00
8.
J
oh
n
W
ile
y
&
S
on
s,
In

co
rp
or
at
ed
. A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
strategies (avoidance, transference, mitigation and acceptance)
take on new
meanings when accelerating to achieve speeds of more than
15,000 mph. For
example:
� Avoidance is not possible.
� Acceptance has to be active, not passive.
� Transference is not possible.
� Mitigation entails a lot of work, and under massive
constraints.

For the space shuttle, risk analysis is nonlinear, but for most
software
projects, a simple, linear impact analysis may be sufficient. The
equation for lin-
ear impact analysis can be written as follows:2
Risk impact � (Risk probability) � (Risk consequence)
For a given risk event, there is a probability of the risk
occurring and a con-
sequence expressed in some numerical units of the damage done
to the project
cost, timeline, or quality. This is a simple linear equation. If
one of the factors on
the right side of the equation doubles, the risk impact doubles.
For a given set of
factors on the right, there is one answer, regardless of when the
risk occurs. So,
based on the equation, impact can be understood and planned
for.
Most of the computer software projects have relatively simple
functions that
either happened or did not happen. The vendor either delivered
on time or did not
deliver on time. If a particular risk event trigger appeared, then
there usually ex-
isted a time period, usually in days, when the risk response
could be initiated.
There might be dozens of risks, but each one could be defined
and explained with
only two or three variables.
This linear approach to risk management had several advantages
for com-

puter software projects:
� The risks were understandable and could be explained quite
easily.
� Management could understand the process from which a
probability and
a consequence were obtained.
� There was usually one risk impact for a given risk event.
� No one was aware that one risk event may require dozens of
strategies to
anticipate all the possible consequences.
One valid argument is that the risk of external collisions with
the space ve-
hicle as it accelerates to make orbital speed results in a
multivariant, multidimen-
454 THE SPACE SHUTTLE COLUMBIA DISASTER
2Kerzner, H., Project Management: A Systems Approach to
Planning, Scheduling and Controlling, 8th
ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p. 653.
1321.ch11 11/3/05 9:26 AM Page 454
C
op
yr
ig

ht
©
2
00
8.
J
oh
n
W
ile
y
&
S
on
s,
In
co
rp
or
at
ed
. A
ll
rig

ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
sional, nonlinear risk function that is very difficult to
comprehend, much less
manage. This is orders of magnitude more complex than the
project risks en-
countered when managing computer software development
projects.
RISK DEFINITIONS AND SOME TERMS
For this case study, risks and related terms will be defined
according to the Project
Management Institute’s PMBOK® Guide (Project Management
Body of
Knowledge).
� Risk: An uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a
positive or
negative effect on a project’s objectives.
For this discussion, the focus will be on negative risks. This
family of nega-
tive risks can have detrimental consequences to the successful

completion of the
project. These risks may not happen, but if they do, we know
the consequences
will make it difficult to complete the project successfully. The
consequences may
range from a minor change in the timeline to total project
failure. The key here is
that for each risk, two variables are needed: probability of
occurrence and a
measurement.
� Risk triggers: These are indicators that a risk event has
happened or is
about to happen.
� Risk consequence(s): What could happen if the risk is
triggered? Are we
going to lose a few dollars, lose our job, or lose an entire
business?
To analyze these standard terms, additional terms can be
included. These
terms are needed to adequately support managing risks that are
multivariant, mul-
tidimensional, and nonlinear risk functions:
� Risk scope: What parts of the project are affected if the risk
is triggered?
Does this risk jeopardize a task, a phase, or the entire project?
Is the risk
confined to one project or an entire portfolio of projects?
� Risk response rules: Given that the event occurred, and based
on avail-
able information, what is the best response? Can we derive rules
to make

intelligent decisions based on the information acquired when
the risk
event triggers or even the risk events occur?
� Risk response levels: Based on the variables and the response
rules, the
level of concern may range from not a problem to total
destruction.
� Risk timeline: If the risk event or risk trigger occurs, how
much time is
available to make a decision about the best response to the risk?
Are there
two days to make a decision, or two seconds?
Risk Definitions and Some Terms 455
1321.ch11 11/3/05 9:26 AM Page 455
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
2
00
8.

J
oh
n
W
ile
y
&
S
on
s,
In
co
rp
or
at
ed
. A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv

ed
.
All we know is that if the risk event is “triggered” or occurs,
bad things can
and will happen. Our goal is to minimize the consequences. Our
plan is that by
early identification and rigorous analysis of the risks, we will
have time to de-
velop a portfolio of responses to minimize the consequences
from a risk event.
BACKGROUND TO THE SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH
The three liquid fuel motors consume an amazing quantity of
super cooled fuel.
The main fuel tank is insulated to ensure that the fuel stays
hundreds of degrees
below the freezing point of water. It is this insulation that had a
history of com-
ing off the fuel tank and hitting the orbiter. It most cases, it
caused very minor
damage to the orbiter because the foam was usually the size of
popcorn. In one
or two previous launches, the foam was able to knock a tile off
the orbiter.
Fortunately, the orbiter was able to return safely. So for most of
the launch team,
the news that Columbia had been struck by foam was of minor
concern.
After all, if the risk was not a major problem in one hundred
previous

launches, then it could not be a problem in this launch.
Reviewing, our linear im-
pact equation:
The risk probability was very high, but the consequences were
always ac-
ceptable. Therefore, the conclusion was that it would always be
an acceptable
risk. This is what happens when there is only one risk
consequence for the life of
the risk event. People want to believe that the future is just the
same history wait-
ing to happen.
DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAPPENS AS THE SHUTTLE
RE-ENTERS THE ATMOSPHERE
If getting the orbiter into space is one problem, then getting the
orbiter back is an-
other problem. Re-entry is a complex set of computer-guided
maneuvers to
change the speed of the vehicle into heat. And as the heat
grows, the speed de-
creases. Since the metal components of the shuttle melt around
2,000°F, the lead-
ing edges of the orbiter are covered in ceramic tiles that melt at
about 3,000°F.
The tiles keep the 10,000°F re-entry heat from penetrating the
vehicle. If all goes
well, the computers bring the orbiter to a slow enough speed
that a human being
can land the vehicle.

1321.ch11 11/3/05 9:26 AM Page 456
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
2
00
8.
J
oh
n
W
ile
y
&
S
on
s,
In

co
rp
or
at
ed
. A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
In Columbia’s launch, the foam knocked several of the tiles off
the leading
edge of the left wing and created a hole where the tiles had been
attached. Upon
re-entry, the hot gases entered Columbia’s left wing and melted
the internal struc-
ture. When enough of the wing melted, the wing collapsed and
the orbiter blew
apart.

THE RISK FUNCTION
What are some of the variables needed to understand the risk of
foreign objects
colliding with the vehicle from the time the rocket engines start
until the rocket
engines are jettisoned from the orbiter some ten minutes later?
Since the linear risk-impact equation may not be applicable,
what kind of
questions should we ask if we are to find a risk impact equation
that could work?
Exhibit I examines what you need to measure and/or track if an
object strikes
the shuttle:
The Risk Function 457
Exhibit I. Concerns if an object strikes a space shuttle
1. What are the attributes of the foreign object?
� What was it that you collided with?
� What is the length, width, thickness?
� What is the mass of the object?
� What is the density of the object?
� How hard is the object?
� How is the mass of the object distributed?
� Is it like a cannon ball, or dumbbells, or sheet of paper?
2. What are the attributes of the collision?
� Where did it hit?
� Were there multiple impact points?
� How much damage was done?
� Can the damage be verified and examined?
� Is this an isolated event, or the first of many?

� What was the angle of the collision? Was it a glancing blow
or a direct contact?
� Did the object hit and leave the area, or is it imbedded in the
vehicle?
� Why did the shuttle collide with it? Are you off course? Is
something coming apart?
3. What are the attributes of the vehicle?
� How fast was it going at the time of the collision?
� Was it in the middle of a complex maneuver?
� Did the collision damage a component needed in the current
phase of the mission?
� Did the collision damage a component needed later in the
mission?
This is certainly not an exhaustive list, but it is already orders
of magnitude
more complex compared to most project managers’ experiences
in risk manage-
ment. Unfortunately, the problem is even more complex.
1321.ch11 11/3/05 9:26 AM Page 457
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©

2
00
8.
J
oh
n
W
ile
y
&
S
on
s,
In
co
rp
or
at
ed
. A
ll
rig
ht
s

re
se
rv
ed
.
The acceleration of the vehicles adds another dimension to the
risk function.
A collision with an object at 100 mph is not the same as that
which occurs when
the vehicle is going 200 mph. The damage will not be twice as
much as with a
linear equation (i.e., if you are going twice as fast, then there
will be twice the
damage). These risk functions have now become nonlinear. The
damage caused
when the speed doubles may be sixteen times more, not just
twice as much. This
has a significant impact on how often you track and record the
ongoing events.
Time is also a critical issue. Time is not on your side in a
project that moves
this fast. It is not just the fact that the risks are nonlinear, but
the response enve-
lope is constantly changing. In a vehicle going from 0 to 15,000
mph, a lot can
happen in a very short time.
Now let’s look at what happens to the simple risk–impact
equation:

One probability for a risk event may be sufficient, but the risk
consequences
are now a function of many variables that have to be measured
before an impact
can be computed. Also, the risk consequence may be a non-
linear function. This
is a much more complex problem than trying to identify one
probability and one
consequence per risk event.
CONCLUSIONS
It may be necessary to compress the risk consequence function
into some rela-
tively simple equations and then combine the simple equations
into a much more
complex mathematical statement. For example, consider the
variables of dimen-
sions, weight, and speed. What type of rules can we define to
make the risk im-
pact easily derived and of value in making responses to the
risk? We might apply
the following parameters:
Rule 1: If the sum of the three dimensions (length � width �
height) is less
than 30, then the risk level is “10.”
Rule 1: If the sum of the three dimensions (length � width �
height) is
more than 30, the risk level is “20.”
Rule 2: If the weight is more than 500 grams, then the Risk-
Level is multi-

plied by 1.5.
Rule 3: For every 5 seconds of flight, the risk level doubles.
This process can be continued for all relevant variables.
Risk response level (RRL) is the sum of the individual risk
levels computed.
If the RRL is less than 50, the event is taken as noncritical. If
the RRL is less than
100, procedures A, B, and C should be initiated, and so on.
1321.ch11 11/3/05 9:26 AM Page 458
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
2
00
8.
J
oh

n
W
ile
y
&
S
on
s,
In
co
rp
or
at
ed
. A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.

This exercise provides us with “rules” to initiate action. There
is no discus-
sion or guessing as to the proper response to a hazardous event.
There is no ne-
cessity to contact management for approval to start further
actions. There are no
stare downs with management to minimize the event for
political or other
considerations.
The more complicated things get, the more important rules and
preplanned
responses become to successfully managing project risk.
LESSONS LEARNED
In reviewing articles on the space shuttle events before and
after its destruction,
several things were learned:
� Debris had hit the shuttle during its powered ascent in
previous launches.
Management believed that because there were few problems in
the past,
the risk impact was known and would not change in the future.
� The lesson learned is not to make the same mistake.
� Risks can be very complex.
� The lesson learned is to study more about risk and how to
document
the impact so even managers unfamiliar with risk management
concepts

can grasp complex impact functions.
� The shuttle crew never knew the spacecraft was doomed. By
the time they
were aware of the danger, the shuttle disintegrated.
� The lesson learned is that life is like that, and probably more
often
than you realize.
REFERENCES
1. Peter Sprent, Taking Risks—The Science of Uncertainty
(Penguin Books,
1988).
2. Daniel Kehrer, The Art of Taking Intelligent Risks (Times
Books, 1989).
3. William Langewiesche, “Columbia’s Last Flight,” The
Atlantic Monthly
(November, 2003).
References 459
1321.ch11 11/3/05 9:26 AM Page 459
C
op
yr
ig

Space Shuttle Columbia Group Case StudyAssuming the perspective .docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Space Shuttle Columbia Group Case StudyAssuming the perspective .docx

Similar to Space Shuttle Columbia Group Case StudyAssuming the perspective .docx (20)

More from williame8

More from williame8 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Space Shuttle Columbia Group Case StudyAssuming the perspective .docx