Danish Cartoons Lecture The subject matter of the present discussion are the freedom of the press, justifiability of the press's harms by benefits, and the use of stereotypes in the 2005 Danish Cartoon Affair. A Danish newspaper published a series of political satire cartoons, whose subject matter were terrorism, immigration and integration, gender inequality, etc., as they are thought to pertain to some of the current manifestations of Islam. One of the notorious images in the cartoons was the Islamic faith's prophet Muhammad depicted with a bomb in his turban and another one of the notorious images was the same prophet Muhammad welcoming suicide bombers to heaven with apologies for that heaven has run out of virgins as a reward for the martyrs. Immediately, we are prompted to recall the Patterson and Wilkins discussion of the use of stereotypes in the popular media to reinforce the status quo and unprogressed understanding of reality. Murphy offers three types of arguments concerning the cartoon affair. One, the argument why newspaper had the right - and even a moral and political obligation according to that right - to publish the cartoons. This was done out of respect for autonomy. Two, the argument that the newspapers had a moral and political obligation not to publish those cartoons. This was based on the utility of consequences. And, three, the argument that even though the newspaper had a moral and political right and obligation to publish those cartoons - it also had a civic multiculturalist obligation not to publish them. The latter obligation should have modified and transformed the moral and political obligation to the point that that the publication of cartoons was, after all, not the right moral decision. The moral and political obligation to publish the cartoons is founded on the right to freedom of expression of the press. Craft had presented us with a discussion of the freedom of the press in her article earlier. The moral and political obligation not to publish those cartoons is founded on the comparison of the harms and benefits. The discussions of help on this issue were probably by Plaisance and Gauthier – in which the question was raised whether the harms due to the press's publishing are harmful or superficial, and whether the benefits of the publication justify those harms. And the wise or prudent decision not to exercise the right to publish the cartoons is founded , once again, on both of the above and a good will to live in a multicultural society. I. The Rights Argument Let's address the first argument - based on rights. The reason why the newspaper had the right to publish the cartoon is due to the right of freedom of expression. The right of freedom of expression is grounded in respect for autonomy for each person. In order to be autonomous, one must subject oneself to learning as much as possible and to criticism - in order to make sure that one's decisions really are decision.

1. Danish Cartoons Lecture
The subject matter of the present discussion are the freedom of
the press, justifiability of the press's harms by benefits, and the
use of stereotypes in the 2005 Danish Cartoon Affair. A Danish
newspaper published a series of political satire cartoons, whose
subject matter were terrorism, immigration and integration,
gender inequality, etc., as they are thought to pertain to some of
the current manifestations of Islam. One of the notorious
images in the cartoons was the Islamic faith's prophet
Muhammad depicted with a bomb in his turban and another one
of the notorious images was the same prophet Muhammad
welcoming suicide bombers to heaven with apologies for that
heaven has run out of virgins as a reward for the martyrs.
Immediately, we are prompted to recall the Patterson and
Wilkins discussion of the use of stereotypes in the popular
media to reinforce the status quo and unprogressed
understanding of reality.
Murphy offers three types of arguments concerning the cartoon
affair. One, the argument why newspaper had the right - and
even a moral and political obligation according to that right - to
publish the cartoons. This was done out of respect for
autonomy. Two, the argument that the newspapers had a moral
and political obligation not to publish those cartoons. This was
based on the utility of consequences. And, three, the argument
that even though the newspaper had a moral and political right
and obligation to publish those cartoons - it also had a civic
multiculturalist obligation not to publish them. The latter
obligation should have modified and transformed the moral and

2. political obligation to the point that that the publication of
cartoons was, after all, not the right moral decision.
The moral and political obligation to publish the cartoons is
founded on the right to freedom of expression of the press.
Craft had presented us with a discussion of the freedom of the
press in her article earlier.
The moral and political obligation not to publish those cartoons
is founded on the comparison of the harms and benefits. The
discussions of help on this issue were probably by Plaisance and
Gauthier – in which the question was raised whether the harms
due to the press's publishing are harmful or superficial, and
whether the benefits of the publication justify those harms.
And the wise or prudent decision not to exercise the right to
publish the cartoons is founded , once again, on both of the
above and a good will to live in a multicultural society.
I. The Rights Argument
Let's address the first argument - based on rights.
The reason why the newspaper had the right to publish the
cartoon is due to the right of freedom of expression. The right
of freedom of expression is grounded in respect for autonomy
for each person. In order to be autonomous, one must subject
oneself to learning as much as possible and to criticism - in
order to make sure that one's decisions really are decisions
informed by knowledge about the world as well as by
information about the impact of one's choices on others and on
oneself. To choose autonomously, one has to make sure that

3. one does what respects everyone's choosing as well as that what
one does really is aligned with one's values, and, ultimately,
that one chooses to subscribe to one's values after one has found
out as much as one can about what is involved in choosing
according to those values. The last element would also have to
contain that one has subjected one's choices of values and
accordant actions to criticisms from the views that one would
not encounter on one's own – as was laid out for us by Patterson
and Wilkins with their first principle of democratic ethics.
Case in point, publishing the cartoons, as permitted by the
freedom of self-expression, was specifically meant to function
by the newspaper as an act that questions and tests whether
newspapers in the West engage in excessive self-censorship. It
was an an act of self-expression to test the limits and confines
of the free expression of the press.
The excessive censorship in question would be out of desire not
to offend as well as out of fear of retaliation from the offended
parties.
In publishing the cartoons, among other of newspaper's intended
purposes, was the test of whether Western newspapers engage in
the kind and degree of self-censorship that undermines
autonomy of the public by withholding information about facts
as well as viewpoints from it. A refusal to engage in deep
exploration of topics and criticism undermines autonomy.
Likewise, the publication of cartoons was also meant to
question the limits of religious toleration – is there in fact the
kind of tolerance of religion in the West that undermines
autonomy, by the governments, in the public discourse, and by

4. other institutions?
But, one type of critic of this kind of publication might say, is
there not a right to not be offended in a liberal state – based on
respect for each person's autonomy? No. The wish not to be
offended comes not from the will for (greater) autonomy but
from the desire for safety (from the desire to live a sheltered
life). In order to pursue knowledge required for autonomy - one
has to risk and sacrifice the right to be not offended. The desire
not to be offended is trivial in comparison to gains in and
respect for autonomy that require freedom of expression.
However, this does not mean that one has the right to offend
people for the sake of offending people. But it does mean that
in an attempt to speak the truth in a liberal society - supported
by argument and evidence - one may offend others as side-
product or a by-product. We can recall Plaisance discussing
this point.
So, from the standpoint of rights on the basis of respect for
autonomy – a newspaper is entitled to freedom of expression in
an attempt to criticize any practice (of a government, or, in this
case, religion and the media itself, and of other institutions and
practices). The newspaper was attempting to offer a criticism
of corrupt practices within a religion (violence) and within the
media itself (refusal to criticize) - from the standpoint of
respect for autonomy. The goal of this criticism would be to
shine a spotlight on corrupt practices and to contribute to the
force of the debate for reconsideration and reform.
II. The Consequences Argument
Let's address the second argument - based on consequences.

5. There are two basic schools of thought in moral philosophy.
One school of thought says that we must do what's right in
principle - as a duty. The best known representative of this
school of thought is Immanuel Kant, who wrote in the 18th
Century Germany, and he is the philosopher who has put respect
for autonomy as the moral principle on the map of moral
thought.
The second school of thought says that we must do what
produces the best consequences - roughly, whatever maximizes
happiness and minimizes suffering for everyone. The best
known representatives of this school are the founders of the so-
called Utilitarian philosophy in 19th Century England - Jeremy
Bentham and John Stewart Mill. The first argument, for the
publication of the cartoons, was on the basis of rights and was
Kantian. The present argument, against the publication of
cartoons, is on the basis of utility and is Utilitarian.
The second argument is that the harmful consequences of the
publication of the cartoons outweighed the beneficial
consequences – and that the newspaper editors should have and
did know better and should not have published the cartoons.
Serious harms resulted from the publication. A significant
portion of the Muslim population was offended and moved away
from reflection and dialogue with the West concerning religious
violence and other issues in the Muslim community that were
intended to be raised by the cartoons. Also, given the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks in
Europe, islamophobia was strong and the cartoons fed into it
and intensified it and actions based on it.

6. So, from the standpoint of consequences, on the basis of that
action should produce more benefits than harms – the
newspaper should not have published the cartoons. The
intended reflection, dialogue and reform were not achieved in
the Muslim community as a result of the publication. Neither
was integration of Muslim residents into the larger European
communities achieved by means of the cartoons. Both were
probably significantly hindered by the cartoons. There were
significant harms that outweighed the benefits.
III. The Wisdom/Prudence Argument
Let's address the third argument - based on wisdom or prudence.
The argument acknowledges that the newspaper had a right to
publish the cartoons – as discussed under the first argument.
However, one should not necessarily do all that has one has the
right to do – if there are good reasons not to. The good reasons
not to were addressed by the second argument. Murphy points
out that in the case like this, where there is such a conflict of
interest, a better alternative should be attempted to be found.
So, it seems to be a much better idea to publish an article,
presenting an argument, and giving an opportunity to the
criticized party to respond – rather than to publish a
sensationalist cartoon that turned out (and should have been
seen to be) so counterproductive.
The interesting issue about the last point is this. Given that
there is a right to publish the cartoons – but that it is arguably
not wise and not prudent to do so – the decision to not run the
cartoons must be voluntary. That is to say that the government
in a liberal state cannot legitimately under normal
circumstances intervene in the newspaper's decision to exercise
its right to freedom of expression. In order for the newspaper,

7. and for any institution or individual who must act under similar
circumstances, to exercise wisdom or prudence - a virtue called
civic multiculturalism is needed. This virtue is an interest and a
willingness to do what it takes (perhaps over, above and beyond
the call of duty) to live peacefully, in the best possible way,
with tolerance and civility, and with respect for other cultures
in a multicultural liberal society.
Murphy points out two interesting things with regard to civic
multiculturalism. Liberal society has no right to force an
attitude of civility or friendship onto anyone toward members of
any culture. These types of attitudes must be assumed
voluntarily. And two, when there is civic multiculturalism, a
genuine will to respect autonomy of members of other cultures
(and even this will cannot be forced onto any individual by
society), Murphy underscores that it does not always end up in
courteous behavior, but, rather in just behavior. He is thinking
of that criticism that matters (as a duty of respect for autonomy)
comes close to those issues that are dear to our hearts – and may
make us feel offended.
Murphy calls a political philosophy that is based on these kinds
of considerations a contextualism - to point out that it takes into
consideration not only the principles of what is just but also
looks at the specific circumstances of differently situated
cultures. Contextualism is a part and parcel of deliberative
democracy - in which we participate in hearing each other out in
each of our own terms. During the latter, we risk being
offended as much as we stand to gain in autonomy by learning.
IV. Reflection More Closely Along The Lines Of The Rest Of
The Materials Of Our Class
Craft would point out that that the right of the Danish
newspaper to run the cartoons is protected by the freedom of the

8. press guaranteed by the First Amendment – and that the
government cannot step in to censor the cartoons. Once we
allow any rights of censorship to the government, these rights
can be abused, and much more stands to be lost by the
possibility of this abuse (information needed for our autonomy
about government abuses of power, etc.) than whatever harm
can be done by published words and images.
Plaisance would echo the last point by pointing out that the
offensive content of the cartoons is not – by itself – a reason to
conclude that the newspaper is doing something immoral.
However, Plaisance would remind us that the offense (the
minor harm) from it must be justified by benefits to come. The
benefits are that we would know the level of self-censorship in
the media (if there is an outrage from the rest of the media and
society at the cartoons, then we can conclude that fear of social
pressure is high and really influences how much exposure we
have to controversial views in our society), as well as that the
shocking nature of the images would provoke self-reflection in
the Muslim community on the problem of violence in it, and
lead to a more productive dialogue between Muslim
communities and the West (with regard to Muslim communities
in the Middle East as well as those that reside in the West).
Even though we can say that there is a moral justification for
the offensive cartoons, for the reasons stated above, due to the
historical circumstances, the Muslim community took a great
offense, xenophobia in the West was fueled, and dialogue and
reflection did not take place. With Plaisance, we may say that
these turned out to be substantive harms to the autonomy of so
many people.
Let us remember that a part of Plaisance's Utilitarianism was to

9. claim that if the same benefits can be brought about by an
alternative action that causes less harm – then morality demands
that an alternative action is performed. This was the prudence
argument for running an article rather than a cartoon.
So, why did the editors not run an article instead of a cartoon?
Their reason is that such an article would have been very
difficult to write or ineffective, given the social pressure not to
offend and the West's tip-toeing around saying anything critical
with regard to the Muslim world and religion.
Finally, we may ask with Patterson and Wilkins about the
reliance on stereotypes in the Danish cartoons. Did they
challenge the status quo or did they reinforce it? I think we can
vouch for that the stereotypes were used to reinforce the status
quo thinking about violence and misogyny in the Muslim world.