Ee w05.1 m_ 2. electricity generation _ part 4 (generation technologies)
1. 1
2. Why coal
rather than
(new) gas
generatiors?
1.Why a diversity
of generation
types?
3. Negative
prices?
Different fixed &
variable cost
profiles x
variability in
demand
21. 21
Nuclear Coal Gas Oil Shortage
Exceptionally highVery high
ModerateLow
Load curve
00 05 07 10 13 15 18 24
Very Low
Low
Moderate
Very high
Exceptionally high
Very LowP
0
20
30
50
P=0
P=20
P=30
P=50 P=CAP
Hours
21
Price is set by the variable costs
of the most expensive generator
needed to meet demand
Supply & demand curve
36. 36
0 .2 0 .4 0 .6 0 .8 1 .0
p r o b a b i l l i t y
2
4
6
d e m a n d
0 .2 0 .4 0 .6 0 .8 1 .0
p r o b a b i l l i t y
2
4
6
d e m a n d
x~N(1,0.05)
x~N(1,0.1)
x=1
Each level * x
0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0
p r o b a b i l l it y
2
4
6
d e m a n d
Daily Load-Duration Curve:
Duration[y] = Pr[Demand > y]
Daily Load-Duration Curve:
Duration[y] = Pr[Demand > y]
Daily Load-Duration Curve:
Duration[y] = Pr[Demand > y]
37. 37
0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0
p r o b a b illit y
2
4
6
d e m a n d
N: 1 unit
C: 1.8 unit
G: 0.2 unit
O: 2.2 unit
Total installed: 5.2 unit
Pr[D>5.2] =
= Pr[5x>5.2]
= Pr[x>(5.2/5)]
= Pr[x>(1.04]
≈ 21%
Daily Load-Duration Curve:
Duration[y] = Pr[Demand > y]
40. Installed power capacity 2011 (MW)
Steam 10787,5 53,27%
Nuclear 3970 19,60%
PV 1971 9,73%
Pumped-storage 1146,5 5,66%
Hydro 1054,6 5,21%
Gas 1101,7 5,44%
Wind 218,9 1,08%
Total 20250,2 100,00%
Source: ERU Jiří Krejsa
About 2x more capacity than peak demand!!!
41. • Remains of the good old times of electricity being run as
state-owned Vertically Integrated Utilities (VIUs) (up to
2000)
– Civil engineers “gold-plate” the system: excess generation
reserves for “just-in-case” disregarding the costs
– Prices calculated as average costs + an uplift for capital expenses
• 1990-2000: Onset of liberalization, privatization and
competition
– Prices are marginal prices
– Due to the excess capacity they are relatively low
– Thus: no investment in new capacity
• Now: “sweating” the assets
Source: Helm, D. 2005. The assessment: the new energy
paradigm. Oxford review of economic policy, vol. 21, no. 1
Editor's Notes
For example, for a 1-hour outage, MISO has estimated VOLL at $730-$2510/MWh for residential, $15,000-$50,000/MWh for small commercial and industrial (“C&I”), and $16,000-$78,000/MWh for large C&I customers. The range in estimates shows
the range across industries, where, for example the mining sector has a much larger VOLL than the services sector. (See MISO (2006).)
Nordpool’s scarcity pricing mechanism is quite simple: if the level of available capacity is so low that TSOs must provide additional supply out of their capacity reserves, then the day-ahead price is increased to the price cap, and prices inthe intra-day and balancing markets must be as high or higher. 94 Joskow (2006a) recommends this method of setting prices equal to the price cap as a “rough and ready” mechanism for scarcity pricing. 95 Nordpool sees its reliance on TSOs’ non-market-based reserves as a transitional market failure, which justifies setting market
prices equal to the price cap in an attempt to attract market-based investment.
Capacity market
Pay power plants for being prepared to generate, even if they are not called upon