This document discusses vulnerability design patterns for kernel exploitation. It outlines several common vulnerability classes for the kernel including out of boundary errors, buffer overflows, and null pointer writes. It provides examples of how these vulnerabilities could be used to achieve kernel code execution or privilege escalation. It also notes how kernel exploitation techniques have evolved over time to bypass defenses like KASLR and discusses developing exploitation tools instead of just shellcode.
In order to prevent exploiting mistakes, introduced in developing process, are continuously implemented various security mitigations & hardening on application level and in operating system level as well.
Even when those mitigations highly increase difficulty of exploitation of common bugs in software / core, you should not rely solely on them. And it can help to know background and limits of those techniques, which protect your software directly or indirectly.
In this talk we will take a look at some of helpful mitigations & features introduces past years (x64 address space, SMAP & SMEP, CFG, ...) focusing from kernel point of view. Its benefits, and weak points same time.
In order to harden kernel exploitation as much as possible was introduced variety of features including KASLR, SMEP and sometimes also SMAP.
Even those are powerful techniques their effectiveness rely on their cooperation, environment and their implementation.
We will present new and some not so new exploitation techniques, show ideas behind breaking trough before mentioned security features and why it is possible, and we will take a look at pool spraying on x64 as well.
In the past few years, the bar for exploitation was raised highly, and in the current state of software security it is harder and harder to make successful exploitation on newest operating systems.
But as some systems continue to evolve and introduce new mitigations, the others just freeze a few years behind. In our talk we will focus on rooting Android by two racing conditions vulnerabilities. We will show the differences between level of exploitation needed, and how some mobile vendors are killing offered security features.
XCon 2014 => http://xcon.xfocus.org/
In the past was quite common to exploit heap / pool manager vulnerabilities attacking its internal linked structures. However current memory management improve a lot and at current date it is quite ineffective to attack heap in this way. But still those techniques come into hand when we start to looking at linked structures widespread throughout kernel that are unfortunately not hardened enough.
In this presentation we will examine power of these vulnerabilities by famous example “CVE – 2013 - 3660”. Showing bypass on ‘lazy’ assertions of _LIST_ENTRY, present exploitation after party and teleport to kernel.
Kernel vulnerabilities was commonly used to obtain admin privileges, and main rule was to stay in kernel as small time as possible! But nowdays even when you get admin / root then current operating systems are sometimes too restrictive. And that made kernel exploitation nice vector for installing to kernel mode!
In this talk we will examine steps from CPL3 to CPL0, including some nice tricks, and we end up with developing kernel mode drivers.
You didnt see it’s coming? "Dawn of hardened Windows Kernel" Peter Hlavaty
Past few years our team was focusing on different operating systems including Microsoft windows kernel. Honestly our first pwn at Windows kernel was not that challenging. Number of available targets with friendly environment for straightforward pwn, from user up to reliable kernel code execution.
However, step by step, security policies continue to evolve, and it becomes more troublesome to choose ideal attack surface from various sandboxes. In addition, what steps to follow for digging security holes is highly dependent upon the chosen target. In general, a few common strategies are available for researchers to choose: e.g choose “unknown” one which hasn’t been researched before; Select well fuzzed or well audited one, or research on kernel module internals to find “hidden” attack surfaces which are not explicitly interconnected. In the first part of the talk we introduce our methodology of selecting, alongside with cost of tricks around to choose seemingly banned targets, illustrated by notable examples.
After getting hands on potential bug available from targeted sandbox, it is time for Microsoft windows taking hardening efforts to put attacker into corner. Strong mitigations are being introduced more frequently than ever, with promising direction which cuts lots of attack surface off, and a several exploitation techniques being killed. We will show difficulties of developing universal exploitation techniques, and demonstrate needed technical level depending on code quality of target. We will examine how different it becomes with era of Redstone and following versions even with those techniques and good vulnerability in hand. How it changed attacker landscape and how it will (and will not) kill those techniques and applications. However will it really change the game or not?
Recently our team researched various ntos subsystem attack vectors, and one of the outputs we will present in our talk. DeathNote as our internal code name to this component, which resides in Microsoft Windows kernel, hiding behind different interfaces and exposed to user differently.
What can goes bad with it?
Basically two kinds of problems, one is syscall handling via direct user interaction. We will describe how to obtain basic understanding of what's going on, how it interacts with other components and what is its purpose. With those knowledge we will dig deeper how to make more complex fuzzing logic to cause enough chaos that will end up in unexpected behaviors in Windows kernel, and demonstrate some of them.
And as for second, as it hints from title, this module does bit of data parsing, so we will dive deep into internals, pointing out some available materials, and move on to reverse engineered structures and internal mechanism. We will show how some tricks can outcome with various results, and how structured approach can expose more problems than is expected.
Windows Kernel Exploitation : This Time Font hunt you down in 4 bytesPeter Hlavaty
In our recent work we targeted also win32k, what seems to be fruit giving target. @promised_lu made our own TTF-fuzzer which comes with bunch of results in form of gigabytes of crashes and various bugs. Fortunately windows make great work and in February most of our bugs was dead - patched, but not all of them…
Whats left were looking as seemingly unexploitable kernel bugs with ridiculous conditions. We decided to check it out, and finally combine it with our user mode bug & emet bypass. Through IE & flash we break down system and pointed out at weak points in defensive mechanism.
In this talk we will present our research dedicated for pwn2own event this year. We will describe kernel part of exploit in detail*, including bug description, resulting memory corruption conditions & caveats up to final pwn via one of our TTF bugs.
Throughout the talk we will describe how to break various exploit mitigations in windows kernel and why it is possible. We will introduce novel kernel exploitation techniques breaking all what stands { KASLR, SMEP, even imaginary SMAP or CFG } and bring you SYSTEM exec (from kernel driver to system calc).
* unfortunately bug was not fixed at the time of talk, so we do not exposed details about TTF vulnerability, and we skipped directly to some challenges during exploitation, and demonstrate how OS design can overpower introduced exploit mitigations.
In order to prevent exploiting mistakes, introduced in developing process, are continuously implemented various security mitigations & hardening on application level and in operating system level as well.
Even when those mitigations highly increase difficulty of exploitation of common bugs in software / core, you should not rely solely on them. And it can help to know background and limits of those techniques, which protect your software directly or indirectly.
In this talk we will take a look at some of helpful mitigations & features introduces past years (x64 address space, SMAP & SMEP, CFG, ...) focusing from kernel point of view. Its benefits, and weak points same time.
In order to harden kernel exploitation as much as possible was introduced variety of features including KASLR, SMEP and sometimes also SMAP.
Even those are powerful techniques their effectiveness rely on their cooperation, environment and their implementation.
We will present new and some not so new exploitation techniques, show ideas behind breaking trough before mentioned security features and why it is possible, and we will take a look at pool spraying on x64 as well.
In the past few years, the bar for exploitation was raised highly, and in the current state of software security it is harder and harder to make successful exploitation on newest operating systems.
But as some systems continue to evolve and introduce new mitigations, the others just freeze a few years behind. In our talk we will focus on rooting Android by two racing conditions vulnerabilities. We will show the differences between level of exploitation needed, and how some mobile vendors are killing offered security features.
XCon 2014 => http://xcon.xfocus.org/
In the past was quite common to exploit heap / pool manager vulnerabilities attacking its internal linked structures. However current memory management improve a lot and at current date it is quite ineffective to attack heap in this way. But still those techniques come into hand when we start to looking at linked structures widespread throughout kernel that are unfortunately not hardened enough.
In this presentation we will examine power of these vulnerabilities by famous example “CVE – 2013 - 3660”. Showing bypass on ‘lazy’ assertions of _LIST_ENTRY, present exploitation after party and teleport to kernel.
Kernel vulnerabilities was commonly used to obtain admin privileges, and main rule was to stay in kernel as small time as possible! But nowdays even when you get admin / root then current operating systems are sometimes too restrictive. And that made kernel exploitation nice vector for installing to kernel mode!
In this talk we will examine steps from CPL3 to CPL0, including some nice tricks, and we end up with developing kernel mode drivers.
You didnt see it’s coming? "Dawn of hardened Windows Kernel" Peter Hlavaty
Past few years our team was focusing on different operating systems including Microsoft windows kernel. Honestly our first pwn at Windows kernel was not that challenging. Number of available targets with friendly environment for straightforward pwn, from user up to reliable kernel code execution.
However, step by step, security policies continue to evolve, and it becomes more troublesome to choose ideal attack surface from various sandboxes. In addition, what steps to follow for digging security holes is highly dependent upon the chosen target. In general, a few common strategies are available for researchers to choose: e.g choose “unknown” one which hasn’t been researched before; Select well fuzzed or well audited one, or research on kernel module internals to find “hidden” attack surfaces which are not explicitly interconnected. In the first part of the talk we introduce our methodology of selecting, alongside with cost of tricks around to choose seemingly banned targets, illustrated by notable examples.
After getting hands on potential bug available from targeted sandbox, it is time for Microsoft windows taking hardening efforts to put attacker into corner. Strong mitigations are being introduced more frequently than ever, with promising direction which cuts lots of attack surface off, and a several exploitation techniques being killed. We will show difficulties of developing universal exploitation techniques, and demonstrate needed technical level depending on code quality of target. We will examine how different it becomes with era of Redstone and following versions even with those techniques and good vulnerability in hand. How it changed attacker landscape and how it will (and will not) kill those techniques and applications. However will it really change the game or not?
Recently our team researched various ntos subsystem attack vectors, and one of the outputs we will present in our talk. DeathNote as our internal code name to this component, which resides in Microsoft Windows kernel, hiding behind different interfaces and exposed to user differently.
What can goes bad with it?
Basically two kinds of problems, one is syscall handling via direct user interaction. We will describe how to obtain basic understanding of what's going on, how it interacts with other components and what is its purpose. With those knowledge we will dig deeper how to make more complex fuzzing logic to cause enough chaos that will end up in unexpected behaviors in Windows kernel, and demonstrate some of them.
And as for second, as it hints from title, this module does bit of data parsing, so we will dive deep into internals, pointing out some available materials, and move on to reverse engineered structures and internal mechanism. We will show how some tricks can outcome with various results, and how structured approach can expose more problems than is expected.
Windows Kernel Exploitation : This Time Font hunt you down in 4 bytesPeter Hlavaty
In our recent work we targeted also win32k, what seems to be fruit giving target. @promised_lu made our own TTF-fuzzer which comes with bunch of results in form of gigabytes of crashes and various bugs. Fortunately windows make great work and in February most of our bugs was dead - patched, but not all of them…
Whats left were looking as seemingly unexploitable kernel bugs with ridiculous conditions. We decided to check it out, and finally combine it with our user mode bug & emet bypass. Through IE & flash we break down system and pointed out at weak points in defensive mechanism.
In this talk we will present our research dedicated for pwn2own event this year. We will describe kernel part of exploit in detail*, including bug description, resulting memory corruption conditions & caveats up to final pwn via one of our TTF bugs.
Throughout the talk we will describe how to break various exploit mitigations in windows kernel and why it is possible. We will introduce novel kernel exploitation techniques breaking all what stands { KASLR, SMEP, even imaginary SMAP or CFG } and bring you SYSTEM exec (from kernel driver to system calc).
* unfortunately bug was not fixed at the time of talk, so we do not exposed details about TTF vulnerability, and we skipped directly to some challenges during exploitation, and demonstrate how OS design can overpower introduced exploit mitigations.
This talk will cover how powerfull are buffer overflows, how weak are mitigations against them, why are buffer overflows still possible in those days, how generic are they, and example how useful is turn race conditions to buffer overflow. Race conditions are nice example for that, because they are one of the hardest to find and on of the easiest to make. example is on Linux kernel (droids included), but talk will be keeped for buffer overflows in general (mainly for windows & Linux kernel)
Ice Age melting down: Intel features considered usefull!Peter Hlavaty
Decades history of kernel exploitation, however still most used techniques are such as ROP. Software based approaches comes finally challenge this technique, one more successful than the others. Those approaches usually trying to solve far more than ROP only problem, and need to handle not only security but almost more importantly performance issues. Another common attacker vector for redirecting control flow is stack what comes from design of today’s architectures, and once again some software approaches lately tackling this as well. Although this software based methods are piece of nice work and effective to big extent, new game changing approach seems coming to the light. Methodology closing this attack vector coming right from hardware - intel. We will compare this way to its software alternatives, how one interleaving another and how they can benefit from each other to challenge attacker by breaking his most fundamental technologies. However same time we go further, to challenge those approaches and show that even with those technologies in place attackers is not yet in the corner.
Rainbow Over the Windows: More Colors Than You Could ExpectPeter Hlavaty
As time goes on operating systems keep evolving, like Microsoft Windows do, it ships new designs, features and codes from time to time. However sometimes it also ships more than bit of codes for complex subsystems residing in its kernel ... and at some future point it starts implementing new designs to prevent unnecessary access to it. However is it safe enough?
As we can see from security bulletins, win32k subsystem attracts lots of attention. It looks that with efforts of many security researchers who has dug into this area, finding bugs here shall becomes pretty tough and almost fruitless. But unfortunately this is not true, as win32k is backed up by very complex logic and large amount of code by nature..
We will present our point of view to Windows graphic subsystem, as well as schema of our fuzzing strategies. We will introduce some unusual areas of win32k, its extensions and how it can breaks even locked environments.
Part of our talk will be dedicated to CVE-2016-0176, the bug we used for this year's Pwn2Own Edge sandbox bypass, from its discovery to its exploitation techniques, which could serves as an example for universal DirectX escape which is independent of graphics vendors.
Security research over Windows #defcon chinaPeter Hlavaty
Past several years Microsoft Windows undergo lot of fundamental security changes. Where one can argue still imperfect and bound to tons of legacy issues, on the other hand those changes made important shifts in attacker perspective. From tightened sandboxing, restricting attack surface, introducing mitigations, applying virtualization up to stronger focus even on win32k. In our talk we will go trough those changes, how it affects us and how we tackle them from choosing targets, finding bugs up to exploitation primitives we are using. While also empathize that windows research is not only about sandbox, and there are many more interesting target to look for.
As @nicowaisman mentioned in his talk Aleatory Persistent Threat, old school heap specific exploiting is dying. And with each windows SP or new version, is harder to attack heap itself. Heap management adapt quickly and include new mittigation techniques. But sometimes is better to rethink the idea of mittigation and do this technique properly even half version of it will cover all known heap exploit techniques…
Steelcon 2014 - Process Injection with Pythoninfodox
This is the slides to accompany the talk given by Darren Martyn at the Steelcon security conference in July 2014 about process injection using python.
Covers using Python to manipulate processes by injecting code on x86, x86_64, and ARMv7l platforms, and writing a stager that automatically detects what platform it is running on and intelligently decides which shellcode to inject, and via which method.
The Proof of Concept code is available at https://github.com/infodox/steelcon-python-injection
For the Greater Good: Leveraging VMware's RPC Interface for fun and profit by...CODE BLUE
Virtual machines play a crucial role in modern computing. They often are used to isolate multiple customers with instances on the same physical server. Virtual machines are also used by researchers and security practitioners to isolate potentially harmful code for analysis and review. The assumption being made is that by running in a virtual machine, the potentially harmful code cannot execute anywhere else. However, this is not foolproof, as a vulnerability in the virtual machine hypervisor can give access to the entire system. While this was once thought of as just hypothetical, two separate demonstrations at Pwn2Own 2017 proved this exact scenario.
This talk details the host-to-guest communications within VMware. Additionally, the presentation covers the functionalities of the RPC interface. In this section of the presentation, we discuss the techniques that can be used to record or sniff the RPC requests sent from the Guest OS to the Host OS automatically. We also demonstrate how to write tools to query the RPC Interface in C++ and Python for fuzzing purposes.
Finally, we demonstrate how to exploit Use-After-Free vulnerabilities in VMware by walking through a patched vulnerability.
One Shellcode to Rule Them All: Cross-Platform ExploitationQuinn Wilton
As the internet of things becomes less a buzzword, and more a reality, we're noticing that it's growing increasingly common to see embedded software which runs across different architectures -whether that's the same router firmware running across different models, or the operating system for a smart TV being used by different manufacturers. In a world where even your toaster might have internet access, we suspect that the ability to write cross-platform shellcode is going transition from being a merely neat trick, to a viable tool for attackers.
Writing cross-platform shellcode is tough, but there's a few techniques you can use to simplify the problem. We discuss one such method, which we used to great success during the DEFCON CTF qualifiers this year.
Presented by Tinfoil Security founder Michael Borohovski and engineer Shane Wilton at Secuinside 2014, in Seoul.
https://www.tinfoilsecurity.com/blog/cross-platform-exploitation
An introduction to exploit development.
I gave this talk at Hack the North 2014, and most of this information is pulled out of classics like Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, so there shouldn't be anything novel in here.
As computer systems become more sophisticated, process injection techniques also evolve. These techniques are notorious for their use by "malicious software" to hide code execution and avoid detection. In this presentation we dive deep into the Windows runtime and we demonstrate these techniques. Besides, we also learn how to code construction and design patterns that relate to perform hidden code can recognize.
This is the slides accompanying the talk I gave at BSides Hannover 2015, discussing the reverse engineering and exploitation of numerous vulnerabilities in Icomera Moovmanage products along with the post exploitation of such, including the potential creation of a firmware rootkit
At a time when Herbt Sutter announced to everyone that the free lunch is over (The Free Lunch Is Over: A Fundamental Turn Toward Concurrency in Software), concurrency has become our everyday life.A big change is coming to Java, the Loom project and with it such new terms as "virtual thread", "continuations" and "structured concurrency". If you've been wondering what they will change in our daily work or
whether it's worth rewriting your Tomcat-based application to super-efficient reactive Netty,or whether to wait for Project Loom? This presentation is for you.
I will talk about the Loom project and the new possibilities related to virtual wattles and "structured concurrency". I will tell you how it works and what can be achieved and the impact on performance
This talk will cover how powerfull are buffer overflows, how weak are mitigations against them, why are buffer overflows still possible in those days, how generic are they, and example how useful is turn race conditions to buffer overflow. Race conditions are nice example for that, because they are one of the hardest to find and on of the easiest to make. example is on Linux kernel (droids included), but talk will be keeped for buffer overflows in general (mainly for windows & Linux kernel)
Ice Age melting down: Intel features considered usefull!Peter Hlavaty
Decades history of kernel exploitation, however still most used techniques are such as ROP. Software based approaches comes finally challenge this technique, one more successful than the others. Those approaches usually trying to solve far more than ROP only problem, and need to handle not only security but almost more importantly performance issues. Another common attacker vector for redirecting control flow is stack what comes from design of today’s architectures, and once again some software approaches lately tackling this as well. Although this software based methods are piece of nice work and effective to big extent, new game changing approach seems coming to the light. Methodology closing this attack vector coming right from hardware - intel. We will compare this way to its software alternatives, how one interleaving another and how they can benefit from each other to challenge attacker by breaking his most fundamental technologies. However same time we go further, to challenge those approaches and show that even with those technologies in place attackers is not yet in the corner.
Rainbow Over the Windows: More Colors Than You Could ExpectPeter Hlavaty
As time goes on operating systems keep evolving, like Microsoft Windows do, it ships new designs, features and codes from time to time. However sometimes it also ships more than bit of codes for complex subsystems residing in its kernel ... and at some future point it starts implementing new designs to prevent unnecessary access to it. However is it safe enough?
As we can see from security bulletins, win32k subsystem attracts lots of attention. It looks that with efforts of many security researchers who has dug into this area, finding bugs here shall becomes pretty tough and almost fruitless. But unfortunately this is not true, as win32k is backed up by very complex logic and large amount of code by nature..
We will present our point of view to Windows graphic subsystem, as well as schema of our fuzzing strategies. We will introduce some unusual areas of win32k, its extensions and how it can breaks even locked environments.
Part of our talk will be dedicated to CVE-2016-0176, the bug we used for this year's Pwn2Own Edge sandbox bypass, from its discovery to its exploitation techniques, which could serves as an example for universal DirectX escape which is independent of graphics vendors.
Security research over Windows #defcon chinaPeter Hlavaty
Past several years Microsoft Windows undergo lot of fundamental security changes. Where one can argue still imperfect and bound to tons of legacy issues, on the other hand those changes made important shifts in attacker perspective. From tightened sandboxing, restricting attack surface, introducing mitigations, applying virtualization up to stronger focus even on win32k. In our talk we will go trough those changes, how it affects us and how we tackle them from choosing targets, finding bugs up to exploitation primitives we are using. While also empathize that windows research is not only about sandbox, and there are many more interesting target to look for.
As @nicowaisman mentioned in his talk Aleatory Persistent Threat, old school heap specific exploiting is dying. And with each windows SP or new version, is harder to attack heap itself. Heap management adapt quickly and include new mittigation techniques. But sometimes is better to rethink the idea of mittigation and do this technique properly even half version of it will cover all known heap exploit techniques…
Steelcon 2014 - Process Injection with Pythoninfodox
This is the slides to accompany the talk given by Darren Martyn at the Steelcon security conference in July 2014 about process injection using python.
Covers using Python to manipulate processes by injecting code on x86, x86_64, and ARMv7l platforms, and writing a stager that automatically detects what platform it is running on and intelligently decides which shellcode to inject, and via which method.
The Proof of Concept code is available at https://github.com/infodox/steelcon-python-injection
For the Greater Good: Leveraging VMware's RPC Interface for fun and profit by...CODE BLUE
Virtual machines play a crucial role in modern computing. They often are used to isolate multiple customers with instances on the same physical server. Virtual machines are also used by researchers and security practitioners to isolate potentially harmful code for analysis and review. The assumption being made is that by running in a virtual machine, the potentially harmful code cannot execute anywhere else. However, this is not foolproof, as a vulnerability in the virtual machine hypervisor can give access to the entire system. While this was once thought of as just hypothetical, two separate demonstrations at Pwn2Own 2017 proved this exact scenario.
This talk details the host-to-guest communications within VMware. Additionally, the presentation covers the functionalities of the RPC interface. In this section of the presentation, we discuss the techniques that can be used to record or sniff the RPC requests sent from the Guest OS to the Host OS automatically. We also demonstrate how to write tools to query the RPC Interface in C++ and Python for fuzzing purposes.
Finally, we demonstrate how to exploit Use-After-Free vulnerabilities in VMware by walking through a patched vulnerability.
One Shellcode to Rule Them All: Cross-Platform ExploitationQuinn Wilton
As the internet of things becomes less a buzzword, and more a reality, we're noticing that it's growing increasingly common to see embedded software which runs across different architectures -whether that's the same router firmware running across different models, or the operating system for a smart TV being used by different manufacturers. In a world where even your toaster might have internet access, we suspect that the ability to write cross-platform shellcode is going transition from being a merely neat trick, to a viable tool for attackers.
Writing cross-platform shellcode is tough, but there's a few techniques you can use to simplify the problem. We discuss one such method, which we used to great success during the DEFCON CTF qualifiers this year.
Presented by Tinfoil Security founder Michael Borohovski and engineer Shane Wilton at Secuinside 2014, in Seoul.
https://www.tinfoilsecurity.com/blog/cross-platform-exploitation
An introduction to exploit development.
I gave this talk at Hack the North 2014, and most of this information is pulled out of classics like Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, so there shouldn't be anything novel in here.
As computer systems become more sophisticated, process injection techniques also evolve. These techniques are notorious for their use by "malicious software" to hide code execution and avoid detection. In this presentation we dive deep into the Windows runtime and we demonstrate these techniques. Besides, we also learn how to code construction and design patterns that relate to perform hidden code can recognize.
This is the slides accompanying the talk I gave at BSides Hannover 2015, discussing the reverse engineering and exploitation of numerous vulnerabilities in Icomera Moovmanage products along with the post exploitation of such, including the potential creation of a firmware rootkit
At a time when Herbt Sutter announced to everyone that the free lunch is over (The Free Lunch Is Over: A Fundamental Turn Toward Concurrency in Software), concurrency has become our everyday life.A big change is coming to Java, the Loom project and with it such new terms as "virtual thread", "continuations" and "structured concurrency". If you've been wondering what they will change in our daily work or
whether it's worth rewriting your Tomcat-based application to super-efficient reactive Netty,or whether to wait for Project Loom? This presentation is for you.
I will talk about the Loom project and the new possibilities related to virtual wattles and "structured concurrency". I will tell you how it works and what can be achieved and the impact on performance
JavaOne 2010: Top 10 Causes for Java Issues in Production and What to Do When...srisatish ambati
Top 10 Causes for Java Issues in Production and What to Do When Things Go Wrong
JavaOne 2010.
Abstract: It's Friday evening and you hear the first rumble . . . one java node has become slightly unresponsive. You lookup the process, get a thread dump, and for good measure restart it at 8 p.m. Saturday afternoon is when you realize that other nodes have caught the flu and you get the ugly call from the customer. In a matter of hours, you're on that conference bridge with support groups of different packages and Java vendors and one of your uberarchitects. Yes, production instances are up and down, and restarting like there's no tomorrow. Here's an accumulated compendium of the op 10 things that can cause Java production heartburn and what to do when your Java production is on fire. And yes, please have your tools belt on.
Speaker(s):
Cliff Click, Azul Systems, Distinguished Engineer
SriSatish Ambati, Azul Systems, Performance Engineer
Ansible 101 - Presentation at Ansible STL MeetupJeff Geerling
Jeff Geerling, author of Ansible for DevOps, demonstrates basic Ansible usage on the Dramble, a cluster of six Raspberry Pi 2 computers.
This presentation was delivered on July 8, 2015, at the Ansible St. Louis meetup, at Riot Games in Clayton, MO.
Presentation on how GRNET uses Ceph as a storage backend on its Cloud Computing services. Technical specs, lessons learned, future plans.
Presentation held at the 1st GEANT SIG-CISS Meeting in Amsterdam, 2017-09-25.
GRNET - Greek Research and Technology network is the state-owned Greek NREN.
With multicore systems becoming the norm, every programmer is being forced to deal with multi-CPU memory atomicity bugs: data races. Data-race bugs are some of the hardest bugs to find and fix, sometimes taking weeks on end, even for experts. There are very few tools to help here (mostly just academic implementations). The authors of this presentation are at the forefront of multicore Java technology-based systems and daily have to debug data races. They have a lot of hard-won experiences with finding and fixing such bugs, and they share them with you in this presentation.
You Call that Micro, Mr. Docker? How OSv and Unikernels Help Micro-services S...rhatr
OSv is the new open source unikernel technology that combines the power of virtualization and micro-services architecture. This combination allows unmodified applications to be packaged just like Docker containers while at the same time outperform bare-metal deployments. Yes. You've heard it right: for the first time ever we can stop asking the question of how much performance would I lose if I virtualize. OSv lets you ask a different question: how much would my application gain in performance if I virtualize it. This talk will start by looking into the architecture of OSv and the kind of optimizations it makes possible for native, unmodified applications. We will then focus on JVM-specific optimizations and specifically on speedups available to micro-service oriented applications when they are being deployed on OSv.
Running Applications on the NetBSD Rump Kernel by Justin Cormack eurobsdcon
Abstract
The NetBSD rump kernel has been developed for some years now, allowing NetBSD kernel drivers to be used unmodified in many environments, for example as userspace code. However it is only since last year that it has become possible to easily run unmodified applications on the rump kernel, initially with the rump kernel on Xen port, and then with the rumprun tools to run them in userspace on Linux, FreeBSD and NetBSD. This talk will look at how this is achieved, and look at use cases, including kernel driver development, and lightweight process virtualization.
Speaker bio
Justin Cormack has been a Unix user, developer and sysadmin since the early 1990s. He is based in London and works on open source cloud applications, Lua, and the NetBSD rump kernel project. He has been a NetBSD developer since early 2014.
(Click 2nd slide for video) Deploy PHP apps faster in 2017. This talk focuses on how PHP developers can use simple Ansible scripts to rapidly configure new dev and production servers from scratch, and deploy their apps. No more "snowflake servers"!
This is a general introduction to DevOps essentials and Ansible, with a few extras for PHP developers, including some best practice tips and overview of two major Ansible-based PHP projects, Drupal-VM and Trellis (modern WordPress setup).
Lions, Tigers and Deers: What building zoos can teach us about securing micro...Sysdig
How to secure microservices running in containers? Strategies for Docker, Kubernetes, Openshift, RancherOS, DC/OS Mesos.
Privileges, resources and visibility constrains with capabilities, cgroups and namespaces. Image vulnerability scanning and behaviour security monitoring with Sysdig Falco.
Listen to the keynote address and hear about the latest developments from Rachana Ananthakrishnan and Ian Foster who review the updates to the Globus Platform and Service, and the relevance of Globus to the scientific community as an automation platform to accelerate scientific discovery.
TROUBLESHOOTING 9 TYPES OF OUTOFMEMORYERRORTier1 app
Even though at surface level ‘java.lang.OutOfMemoryError’ appears as one single error; underlyingly there are 9 types of OutOfMemoryError. Each type of OutOfMemoryError has different causes, diagnosis approaches and solutions. This session equips you with the knowledge, tools, and techniques needed to troubleshoot and conquer OutOfMemoryError in all its forms, ensuring smoother, more efficient Java applications.
Understanding Globus Data Transfers with NetSageGlobus
NetSage is an open privacy-aware network measurement, analysis, and visualization service designed to help end-users visualize and reason about large data transfers. NetSage traditionally has used a combination of passive measurements, including SNMP and flow data, as well as active measurements, mainly perfSONAR, to provide longitudinal network performance data visualization. It has been deployed by dozens of networks world wide, and is supported domestically by the Engagement and Performance Operations Center (EPOC), NSF #2328479. We have recently expanded the NetSage data sources to include logs for Globus data transfers, following the same privacy-preserving approach as for Flow data. Using the logs for the Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) as an example, this talk will walk through several different example use cases that NetSage can answer, including: Who is using Globus to share data with my institution, and what kind of performance are they able to achieve? How many transfers has Globus supported for us? Which sites are we sharing the most data with, and how is that changing over time? How is my site using Globus to move data internally, and what kind of performance do we see for those transfers? What percentage of data transfers at my institution used Globus, and how did the overall data transfer performance compare to the Globus users?
We describe the deployment and use of Globus Compute for remote computation. This content is aimed at researchers who wish to compute on remote resources using a unified programming interface, as well as system administrators who will deploy and operate Globus Compute services on their research computing infrastructure.
Into the Box Keynote Day 2: Unveiling amazing updates and announcements for modern CFML developers! Get ready for exciting releases and updates on Ortus tools and products. Stay tuned for cutting-edge innovations designed to boost your productivity.
top nidhi software solution freedownloadvrstrong314
This presentation emphasizes the importance of data security and legal compliance for Nidhi companies in India. It highlights how online Nidhi software solutions, like Vector Nidhi Software, offer advanced features tailored to these needs. Key aspects include encryption, access controls, and audit trails to ensure data security. The software complies with regulatory guidelines from the MCA and RBI and adheres to Nidhi Rules, 2014. With customizable, user-friendly interfaces and real-time features, these Nidhi software solutions enhance efficiency, support growth, and provide exceptional member services. The presentation concludes with contact information for further inquiries.
Cyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdfCyanic lab
CyanicLab, an offshore custom software development company based in Sweden,India, Finland, is your go-to partner for startup development and innovative web design solutions. Our expert team specializes in crafting cutting-edge software tailored to meet the unique needs of startups and established enterprises alike. From conceptualization to execution, we offer comprehensive services including web and mobile app development, UI/UX design, and ongoing software maintenance. Ready to elevate your business? Contact CyanicLab today and let us propel your vision to success with our top-notch IT solutions.
Climate Science Flows: Enabling Petabyte-Scale Climate Analysis with the Eart...Globus
The Earth System Grid Federation (ESGF) is a global network of data servers that archives and distributes the planet’s largest collection of Earth system model output for thousands of climate and environmental scientists worldwide. Many of these petabyte-scale data archives are located in proximity to large high-performance computing (HPC) or cloud computing resources, but the primary workflow for data users consists of transferring data, and applying computations on a different system. As a part of the ESGF 2.0 US project (funded by the United States Department of Energy Office of Science), we developed pre-defined data workflows, which can be run on-demand, capable of applying many data reduction and data analysis to the large ESGF data archives, transferring only the resultant analysis (ex. visualizations, smaller data files). In this talk, we will showcase a few of these workflows, highlighting how Globus Flows can be used for petabyte-scale climate analysis.
Quarkus Hidden and Forbidden ExtensionsMax Andersen
Quarkus has a vast extension ecosystem and is known for its subsonic and subatomic feature set. Some of these features are not as well known, and some extensions are less talked about, but that does not make them less interesting - quite the opposite.
Come join this talk to see some tips and tricks for using Quarkus and some of the lesser known features, extensions and development techniques.
Enhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdfGlobus
Cross-facility research orchestration comes with ever-changing constraints regarding the availability and suitability of various compute and data resources. In short, a flexible data and processing fabric is needed to enable the dynamic redirection of data and compute tasks throughout the lifecycle of an experiment. In this talk, we illustrate how we easily leveraged Globus services to instrument the ACE research testbed at the Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility with flexible data and task orchestration capabilities.
Accelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with PlatformlessWSO2
Key takeaways:
Challenges of building platforms and the benefits of platformless.
Key principles of platformless, including API-first, cloud-native middleware, platform engineering, and developer experience.
How Choreo enables the platformless experience.
How key concepts like application architecture, domain-driven design, zero trust, and cell-based architecture are inherently a part of Choreo.
Demo of an end-to-end app built and deployed on Choreo.
Code reviews are vital for ensuring good code quality. They serve as one of our last lines of defense against bugs and subpar code reaching production.
Yet, they often turn into annoying tasks riddled with frustration, hostility, unclear feedback and lack of standards. How can we improve this crucial process?
In this session we will cover:
- The Art of Effective Code Reviews
- Streamlining the Review Process
- Elevating Reviews with Automated Tools
By the end of this presentation, you'll have the knowledge on how to organize and improve your code review proces
Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...Shahin Sheidaei
Games are powerful teaching tools, fostering hands-on engagement and fun. But they require careful consideration to succeed. Join me to explore factors in running and selecting games, ensuring they serve as effective teaching tools. Learn to maintain focus on learning objectives while playing, and how to measure the ROI of gaming in education. Discover strategies for pitching gaming to leadership. This session offers insights, tips, and examples for coaches, team leads, and enterprise leaders seeking to teach from simple to complex concepts.
SOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBrokerSOCRadar
The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) has suffered an alleged data breach after a notorious threat actor claimed to have exfiltrated data from its systems. Infamous data leaker IntelBroker posted on the even more infamous BreachForums hacking forum, saying that Europol suffered a data breach this month.
The alleged breach affected Europol agencies CCSE, EC3, Europol Platform for Experts, Law Enforcement Forum, and SIRIUS. Infiltration of these entities can disrupt ongoing investigations and compromise sensitive intelligence shared among international law enforcement agencies.
However, this is neither the first nor the last activity of IntekBroker. We have compiled for you what happened in the last few days. To track such hacker activities on dark web sources like hacker forums, private Telegram channels, and other hidden platforms where cyber threats often originate, you can check SOCRadar’s Dark Web News.
Stay Informed on Threat Actors’ Activity on the Dark Web with SOCRadar!
Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...Globus
COVID-19 had an unprecedented impact on scientific collaboration. The pandemic and its broad response from the scientific community has forged new relationships among public health practitioners, mathematical modelers, and scientific computing specialists, while revealing critical gaps in exploiting advanced computing systems to support urgent decision making. Informed by our team’s work in applying high-performance computing in support of public health decision makers during the COVID-19 pandemic, we present how Globus technologies are enabling the development of an open science platform for robust epidemic analysis, with the goal of collaborative, secure, distributed, on-demand, and fast time-to-solution analyses to support public health.
AI Pilot Review: The World’s First Virtual Assistant Marketing SuiteGoogle
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5. KERNEL ESCAPE
few lines of code, simple, effective – for that time
Modified sample from : https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/exploits/linux/local/sock_sendpage.rb
9. Present (+-) & Future : Step by step
User
Elevated user
(admin / root)
Supervisor
• DEP, ASLR, SEHOP, ProtectedFree, Isolated Heap, CFG,
Virtual Table Guards, EMET...
• sandbox, SELinux and alikes
• KASLR, SMEP, SMAP, ..
10. Why kernel escape
• Going to be more and more difficult, but ...
• still .. sometimes easier .. shortcut
• Natural bypass of SELinux
• Full control (cpl0 > cpl3)
• for now do not considering cpl-1, ...
11. exploitation ==> developing
• In past was very easy elevate privileges
• Now everything is fast moving
• You need to adapt to all changes & diversity
• Things are getting more complex
• Your exploitation code is expanding dramatically
• Every change can broke your black-box
• + Process of exploitation need more than ioctl
• Race conditions, complex mechanism break (ttf), sandbox
escapes ...
18. Stack overview
• Local vars
• canaries
• Protect ret & args
• ... sometimes ... missing
• UNprotected inner calls ?
• Arg in main func preserved in register
• Inner call invoked, register may be putted onto stack
• Rewrite arg (or directly ret) on stack in inner call
• Return to main func with altered arg (in register)
• Can help more than it seems ;)
• Controlled copy, overwrite save your day
20. Buffer overview
• Windows kernel pool, SLUB
• not so predictable anymore
• but still far from not-predictable at some level
• kmalloc
• targeted kmalloc from user mode ?
• not so hard as can seems
• help with predictability
• Pool spray
• thread, process, pipe, socket ...
• caches (linux)
• can be problem for precise pool layout, but can be solved
27. Elevation of Privilages
USER
• Find nt!_eprocess /
thread_info
• Patch credentials
• Bypass ACL policy
• Reverse engineer per policy
• Implement
• Keep up to date
• Good if not change
frequently .. Not that case
KERNEL
• Elevate process
• Grant access important
operations (callbacks)
• File access
• Process access
• Registry access
• Network
• How effective without
framework ?
28. Kernel part of cake
• Boosting privs
• Why patching ?
• Recognize and grant access instead
• No LKM ? Are you sure ?
• Kernel exploitation may be equals to enable LKM
29. CC-shellcoding framework
• developing instead of shellcoding ?
• C++, boost, std ?
• Loading your own kernel modules ?
https://github.com/k33nteam/cc-shellcoding
more info : http://www.k33nteam.org/blog.htm -
CC-SHELLCODING
@KEENTEAM