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Functional Safety Overview
Michael Mats
Table of Contents
 What is Functional Safety?
 FS in Standards
 FS per IEC 61508
 FS Lifecycle
 FS Certification Process
 Marketing Activities
 Additional Resources
Table of Contents
Standards
 UL 991 (2004), "Tests for Safety-Related Controls Employing Solid-State Devices"
 ANSI/UL 1998 (1998), "Software in Programmable Components" (used in
conjunction with UL 991 for products that include software)
 ANSI/UL 61496-1 (2010), "Electro-Sensitive Protective Equipment, Part 1: General
Requirements and Tests"
 ANSI/ASME A17.1/CSA B44 (2007), "Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators"
 EN 50271 (2010), "Electrical Apparatus for the Detection and Measurement of
Combustible Gases, Toxic Gases or Oxygen - Requirements and Tests for
Apparatus Using Software and/or Digital Technologies"
 IEC 60335-1 (2010), "Household and Similar Electrical Appliances - Safety - Part 1:
General Requirements"
 IEC 60730-1 (2010), "Automatic Electrical Controls for Household and Similar Use -
Part 1: General Requirements"
 EN/IEC 61508-1 through -7 (2010), "Functional Safety of
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems
Slide 3
Standards
 EN/IEC 61511 (2003), "Functional Safety - Safety Instrumented Systems for the
Process Industry Sector
 EN/IEC 61800-5-2 (2007), "Adjustable Speed Electrical Power Drive Systems - Part
5-2: Safety Requirements - Functional"
 EN/IEC 62061 (2005), "Safety of Machinery - Functional Safety of Safety-Related
Electrical, Electronic, and Programmable Electronic Control Systems"
 EN ISO/ISO 13849-1 (2006), "Safety of Machinery - Safety-Related Parts of Control
Systems - Part 1: General Principles for Design"
 ANSI/RIA/ISO 10218-1 (2007), "Robots for Industrial Environments - Safety
Requirements - Part 1: Robot"
 ISO/Draft International Standard 26262 (2009), "Road Vehicles - Functional Safety
Slide 4
Demand Drivers for Functional Safety
Why evaluate your product/system for functional safety?
• A functional safety assessment determines whether your
products meet standards and performance requirements
created to protect against potential risks, including
injuries and even death
• Compliance is driven by customer requirements,
legislation, regulations, and insurance demands
What is Functional Safety?
 What is Functional Safety?
• The exact definition according to IEC 61508:
“part of the overall safety relating to the EUC
and the EUC control system that depends on
the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-
related systems and other risk reduction
measures”
Slide 6
IEC 61508: A standard in seven parts
(Parts 1 – 4 are normative)
 1: general requirements that are applicable
to all parts.
– System safety requirements
– Documentation and safety assessment
 2 and 3: additional and specific
requirements for E/E/PE safety-related
systems
– System design requirements
– Software design requirements
 4: definitions and abbreviations
 5: guidelines and examples for part 1 in
determining safety integrity levels,
 6: guidelines on the application of parts 2
and 3;
– Calculations, modeling, analysis
 7: techniques and measures to be used
– To control and avoid faults
Slide 7
FS according to IEC 61508:
EUC + EUC Control System
EUC + Control System EUC + Control System
EUC + Control System EUC + Control System
Slide 8
Why is there something called Functional
Safety?
 Functional safety as a property has always existed
 The definitions of Functional safety show that it is not related to a
specific technology
– Functional Safety, as a term and as an
engineering discipline, has emerged with the
advancement of complex programmable
electronics
Slide 9
IEC 61508 mandates an ”overall” safety approach could
also be referred to as a:
– System safety approach or
– Holistic approach (accounts also for the whole life cycle of
a system)
Functional safety as per IEC 61508
Slide 10
Overall Safety Lifecycle and E/E/PES life cycle
Slide 11
Concept
Overall Scope Definition
Hazard & Risk Analysis
Overall Safety Requirements
Safety Requirements Allocation
Operation &
Maintenance
Safety
Validation
Installation &
Commissioning
Overall Planning
Safety-related
systems: E/E/PE
Realization:
E/E/PE
Other risk
Reduction
measures
Overall Modification & Retrofit
Overall Installation & Commissioning
Overall Safety Validation
Overall Operation, Maintenance
& Repair
Decommissioning or Disposal
E/E/PES System Safety
Requirements Specification
Functional Safety Certification Process
Kick-Off Meeting
• Most effective during the product design phase
• Collaborate to ensure that the features required by the
specified standard are included in the initial design
• Understand the consequence of choices being made
• Guidance from certification body on how to design
product
• Discuss prototyping
Slide 12
Functional Safety Certification Process
Pre-Audit and IA
• Increase the probability of success of the certification
audit
• Management system audit
• Engineers perform on-site GAP analysis
• Customer received concept evaluation report with
detailed action items
Slide 13
Functional Safety Certification Process
Certification Audit
• Certification body audits the system’s compliance
with the designated standard and functional safety
rating
• Evaluation of documentation
• Product is certified
Slide 14
Functional Safety Certification Process
Follow-up Surveillance
• A surveillance to verify that the protective
functions of the product match the report are
performed
• Certification body conducts an audit of the
functional safety management system once every
three years
Slide 15
Examples of Function Safety Products
Slide 16
EUC – E/E/PE System – Subsystems
 Hazard & Risk Analysis shall be conducted for the EUC and the
EUC control system
 Hazardous events are identified, and the associated risk (the “EUC
risk”) determined
 If the risk is not acceptable, it must be reduced to a tolerable risk
level by at least one of, or a combination of, the following:
– External risk reduction facilities
– Safety-related control systems, which can be:
• Based on electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE)
technology
• Other technology
Slide 17
Necessary risk reduction and Safety Integrity
Level (SIL)
 IEC 61508 is a standard for E/E/PE safety related systems
(E/E/PES), or subsystems. Therefore, the following is addressed by
this standard:
– The part of necessary risk reduction allocated to an E/E/PES is
expressed as a failure probability limit (target failure measure),
which in turn is used to select the so called Safety Integrity
Level (SIL)
– This means SIL is an attribute of an E/E/PES ( or subsystem),
i.e. of a system/device/product that provides risk reduction
Slide 18
FS Marks
 The FS Marks are related to a SIL (or similar other FS ratings)
– They can thus only be granted for products or components
which provide risk reduction functions (i.e. E/E/PE safety-
related systems or subsystems)
• From a SIL point of view, it doesn’t make a difference
whether the E/E/PE safety-related (sub-)system is to be
considered a stand alone product or a component
 An E/E/PE safety-related system can be:
– Either integral part of the EUC control system
– Or implemented by separate and independent systems
dedicated to safety
Slide 19
E/E/PE safety-related system and risk reduction
 EUC risk
– risk arising from the EUC or its interaction with the EUC control system
 Tolerable risk
– risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of
society
 Necessary risk reduction
– risk reduction to be achieved by the E/E/PE safety-related systems,
other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction
facilities in order to ensure that the tolerable risk is not exceeded
 Residual risk
– risk remaining after protective measures have been taken
– Must be equal or lower than tolerable risk
Slide 20
E/E/PE safety-related system and risk reduction
 EUC (+ EUC control system) poses risk, E/E/PES contributes to
reduce risk below a tolerable level
IEC 61508-5, Figure A.1
Slide 21
Target failure measure =>
SIL
EUC Risk
Slide 22
E/E/PE System and Subsystems
IEC 61508-4, Figure 3
 In most cases the FS products certified by UL will be sub-systems
of an E/E/PE safety-related system
Subsystem
(sensors)
Subsystem
(logic unit)
Subsystem
(actuators)
Subsystem
(data communication)
Slide 23
Software Drives FS Requirements - IEC 61508-3
 Electromechanical systems are rapidly being
replaced by (software) programmable electronic
systems due to:
– Lower cost parts
– Greater redesign flexibility
– Ease of module reuse
– Less PCB space required
– Improved Efficiency
– Greater functionality
Slide 24
Software is Being Used Increasingly
 Software controls motor-driven equipment
safety parameters such as:
- PRESSURE generated by a compressor
- Motor SPEED of an inline gasoline pump
- POSITIONING of Fuel/Air valves in a
combustion control
- FORCE applied by a robotic arm
- Air FLOW RATE within a combustion
chamber
- …the possibilities are limitless…
Slide 25
Achieving HW safety integrity
 IEC 61508-2 requires application of the following
principles to achieve the intended HW safety integrity:
– Redundancy
• Diversity of redundant channels to eliminate common cause failures
– Failure detection
• per IEC 61508, detection implies a reaction to a safe (operating) state
▪ For fail-safe applications, this can mean activation of the fail-safe state
– Reliability of components
• Probability of dangerous failure (on demand - PFD, per hour - PFH) in
accordance with target failure measure of the required SIL
Slide 26
Two routes to demonstrate HW safety integrity:
Route 1H and Route 2H
 Route 1H :
– based on hardware fault tolerance and safe failure fraction
concepts
• This means a complete FMEDA on HW component level must be
carried out
• PFH and SFF calculated on this basis
 Route 2H :
– based on field reliability data and hardware fault tolerance for
specified safety integrity levels,
• Data must have been recorded in accordance with applicable
standards, >90% statistical confidence
• stricter HW fault tolerance requirements for the different SIL’s
Slide 27
Slide 28
Achieving HW safety integrity
 The primary measurement is PFDavg or PFHavg
– These depend on the following system-level parameters:
• Proof-test interval
• Mission time (if proof-test not feasible)
 In addition to this, the HW integrity of an E/E/PES is measured by
– Degree of redundancy: Hardware Fault Tolerance HFT
– Detection capability: Safe Failure Fraction SFF
– Susceptibility to common cause failure: b-factor
FMEDA Table (Design level)
Slide 29
Component
reference
Component
function
Failure
modes
Effects failure
distribution
Criticality DC l
[FIT]
lD lS lDD lDU Detection
reqmts
Exclusion
reqmts
R100 energetic
separation
between
channels, cross
communication
for diagnostics
0,9 1 0,9 0,1 0,813 0.087
short circuit no
separation
between
channels
0,2 1 0,6 0,2 0 0,12 0,08 sample test,
off line
MELF resistor
open circuit no cross
communica
tion
0,7 1 0,99 0,7 0 0,693 0,007 cross
comparison
between
channels
0,5< value <2 no effect 0,1 0 0 0 0,1 0 0 select value
high enough to
ensure
separation
IC101
IC102
Output diag Safety-related output
Safety device
Emergency
Stop switch
Switch off 1
Switch off 2
T101
T102
R100
Input 1
Input 2
SFF and diagnostic test interval
 Looking at SFF formula, it doesn’t depend on
the test frequency (low demand vs high
demand)
SFF = (SlS + SlDD)/(SlS + SlD)
Slide 30
Simplified approaches proposed by other standards
 Also ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 suggest simplified methods for
determining the probability of random HW failure
 ISO 13849-1 approach is based on ”designated architectures” for
the different Categories
 IEC 62061 approach is based on ”basic subsystem architectures”
 These simplified approaches claim to err towards the safe
direction, and make a number of assumptions
 If the assumptions cannot be made, or if just more precise (and less
conservative) values are desired, then more detailed reliability
modeling may be applied
Slide 31
Additional Information
Websites:
www.ul.com/functionalsafety
www.exida.com
www.siemens.com
http://www.automationworld.com/newsletters_fsn.html
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Functional-Safety-Overview-UL.ppt

  • 2. Table of Contents  What is Functional Safety?  FS in Standards  FS per IEC 61508  FS Lifecycle  FS Certification Process  Marketing Activities  Additional Resources Table of Contents
  • 3. Standards  UL 991 (2004), "Tests for Safety-Related Controls Employing Solid-State Devices"  ANSI/UL 1998 (1998), "Software in Programmable Components" (used in conjunction with UL 991 for products that include software)  ANSI/UL 61496-1 (2010), "Electro-Sensitive Protective Equipment, Part 1: General Requirements and Tests"  ANSI/ASME A17.1/CSA B44 (2007), "Safety Code for Elevators and Escalators"  EN 50271 (2010), "Electrical Apparatus for the Detection and Measurement of Combustible Gases, Toxic Gases or Oxygen - Requirements and Tests for Apparatus Using Software and/or Digital Technologies"  IEC 60335-1 (2010), "Household and Similar Electrical Appliances - Safety - Part 1: General Requirements"  IEC 60730-1 (2010), "Automatic Electrical Controls for Household and Similar Use - Part 1: General Requirements"  EN/IEC 61508-1 through -7 (2010), "Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems Slide 3
  • 4. Standards  EN/IEC 61511 (2003), "Functional Safety - Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector  EN/IEC 61800-5-2 (2007), "Adjustable Speed Electrical Power Drive Systems - Part 5-2: Safety Requirements - Functional"  EN/IEC 62061 (2005), "Safety of Machinery - Functional Safety of Safety-Related Electrical, Electronic, and Programmable Electronic Control Systems"  EN ISO/ISO 13849-1 (2006), "Safety of Machinery - Safety-Related Parts of Control Systems - Part 1: General Principles for Design"  ANSI/RIA/ISO 10218-1 (2007), "Robots for Industrial Environments - Safety Requirements - Part 1: Robot"  ISO/Draft International Standard 26262 (2009), "Road Vehicles - Functional Safety Slide 4
  • 5. Demand Drivers for Functional Safety Why evaluate your product/system for functional safety? • A functional safety assessment determines whether your products meet standards and performance requirements created to protect against potential risks, including injuries and even death • Compliance is driven by customer requirements, legislation, regulations, and insurance demands
  • 6. What is Functional Safety?  What is Functional Safety? • The exact definition according to IEC 61508: “part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC control system that depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety- related systems and other risk reduction measures” Slide 6
  • 7. IEC 61508: A standard in seven parts (Parts 1 – 4 are normative)  1: general requirements that are applicable to all parts. – System safety requirements – Documentation and safety assessment  2 and 3: additional and specific requirements for E/E/PE safety-related systems – System design requirements – Software design requirements  4: definitions and abbreviations  5: guidelines and examples for part 1 in determining safety integrity levels,  6: guidelines on the application of parts 2 and 3; – Calculations, modeling, analysis  7: techniques and measures to be used – To control and avoid faults Slide 7
  • 8. FS according to IEC 61508: EUC + EUC Control System EUC + Control System EUC + Control System EUC + Control System EUC + Control System Slide 8
  • 9. Why is there something called Functional Safety?  Functional safety as a property has always existed  The definitions of Functional safety show that it is not related to a specific technology – Functional Safety, as a term and as an engineering discipline, has emerged with the advancement of complex programmable electronics Slide 9
  • 10. IEC 61508 mandates an ”overall” safety approach could also be referred to as a: – System safety approach or – Holistic approach (accounts also for the whole life cycle of a system) Functional safety as per IEC 61508 Slide 10
  • 11. Overall Safety Lifecycle and E/E/PES life cycle Slide 11 Concept Overall Scope Definition Hazard & Risk Analysis Overall Safety Requirements Safety Requirements Allocation Operation & Maintenance Safety Validation Installation & Commissioning Overall Planning Safety-related systems: E/E/PE Realization: E/E/PE Other risk Reduction measures Overall Modification & Retrofit Overall Installation & Commissioning Overall Safety Validation Overall Operation, Maintenance & Repair Decommissioning or Disposal E/E/PES System Safety Requirements Specification
  • 12. Functional Safety Certification Process Kick-Off Meeting • Most effective during the product design phase • Collaborate to ensure that the features required by the specified standard are included in the initial design • Understand the consequence of choices being made • Guidance from certification body on how to design product • Discuss prototyping Slide 12
  • 13. Functional Safety Certification Process Pre-Audit and IA • Increase the probability of success of the certification audit • Management system audit • Engineers perform on-site GAP analysis • Customer received concept evaluation report with detailed action items Slide 13
  • 14. Functional Safety Certification Process Certification Audit • Certification body audits the system’s compliance with the designated standard and functional safety rating • Evaluation of documentation • Product is certified Slide 14
  • 15. Functional Safety Certification Process Follow-up Surveillance • A surveillance to verify that the protective functions of the product match the report are performed • Certification body conducts an audit of the functional safety management system once every three years Slide 15
  • 16. Examples of Function Safety Products Slide 16
  • 17. EUC – E/E/PE System – Subsystems  Hazard & Risk Analysis shall be conducted for the EUC and the EUC control system  Hazardous events are identified, and the associated risk (the “EUC risk”) determined  If the risk is not acceptable, it must be reduced to a tolerable risk level by at least one of, or a combination of, the following: – External risk reduction facilities – Safety-related control systems, which can be: • Based on electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) technology • Other technology Slide 17
  • 18. Necessary risk reduction and Safety Integrity Level (SIL)  IEC 61508 is a standard for E/E/PE safety related systems (E/E/PES), or subsystems. Therefore, the following is addressed by this standard: – The part of necessary risk reduction allocated to an E/E/PES is expressed as a failure probability limit (target failure measure), which in turn is used to select the so called Safety Integrity Level (SIL) – This means SIL is an attribute of an E/E/PES ( or subsystem), i.e. of a system/device/product that provides risk reduction Slide 18
  • 19. FS Marks  The FS Marks are related to a SIL (or similar other FS ratings) – They can thus only be granted for products or components which provide risk reduction functions (i.e. E/E/PE safety- related systems or subsystems) • From a SIL point of view, it doesn’t make a difference whether the E/E/PE safety-related (sub-)system is to be considered a stand alone product or a component  An E/E/PE safety-related system can be: – Either integral part of the EUC control system – Or implemented by separate and independent systems dedicated to safety Slide 19
  • 20. E/E/PE safety-related system and risk reduction  EUC risk – risk arising from the EUC or its interaction with the EUC control system  Tolerable risk – risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society  Necessary risk reduction – risk reduction to be achieved by the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities in order to ensure that the tolerable risk is not exceeded  Residual risk – risk remaining after protective measures have been taken – Must be equal or lower than tolerable risk Slide 20
  • 21. E/E/PE safety-related system and risk reduction  EUC (+ EUC control system) poses risk, E/E/PES contributes to reduce risk below a tolerable level IEC 61508-5, Figure A.1 Slide 21 Target failure measure => SIL
  • 23. E/E/PE System and Subsystems IEC 61508-4, Figure 3  In most cases the FS products certified by UL will be sub-systems of an E/E/PE safety-related system Subsystem (sensors) Subsystem (logic unit) Subsystem (actuators) Subsystem (data communication) Slide 23
  • 24. Software Drives FS Requirements - IEC 61508-3  Electromechanical systems are rapidly being replaced by (software) programmable electronic systems due to: – Lower cost parts – Greater redesign flexibility – Ease of module reuse – Less PCB space required – Improved Efficiency – Greater functionality Slide 24
  • 25. Software is Being Used Increasingly  Software controls motor-driven equipment safety parameters such as: - PRESSURE generated by a compressor - Motor SPEED of an inline gasoline pump - POSITIONING of Fuel/Air valves in a combustion control - FORCE applied by a robotic arm - Air FLOW RATE within a combustion chamber - …the possibilities are limitless… Slide 25
  • 26. Achieving HW safety integrity  IEC 61508-2 requires application of the following principles to achieve the intended HW safety integrity: – Redundancy • Diversity of redundant channels to eliminate common cause failures – Failure detection • per IEC 61508, detection implies a reaction to a safe (operating) state ▪ For fail-safe applications, this can mean activation of the fail-safe state – Reliability of components • Probability of dangerous failure (on demand - PFD, per hour - PFH) in accordance with target failure measure of the required SIL Slide 26
  • 27. Two routes to demonstrate HW safety integrity: Route 1H and Route 2H  Route 1H : – based on hardware fault tolerance and safe failure fraction concepts • This means a complete FMEDA on HW component level must be carried out • PFH and SFF calculated on this basis  Route 2H : – based on field reliability data and hardware fault tolerance for specified safety integrity levels, • Data must have been recorded in accordance with applicable standards, >90% statistical confidence • stricter HW fault tolerance requirements for the different SIL’s Slide 27
  • 28. Slide 28 Achieving HW safety integrity  The primary measurement is PFDavg or PFHavg – These depend on the following system-level parameters: • Proof-test interval • Mission time (if proof-test not feasible)  In addition to this, the HW integrity of an E/E/PES is measured by – Degree of redundancy: Hardware Fault Tolerance HFT – Detection capability: Safe Failure Fraction SFF – Susceptibility to common cause failure: b-factor
  • 29. FMEDA Table (Design level) Slide 29 Component reference Component function Failure modes Effects failure distribution Criticality DC l [FIT] lD lS lDD lDU Detection reqmts Exclusion reqmts R100 energetic separation between channels, cross communication for diagnostics 0,9 1 0,9 0,1 0,813 0.087 short circuit no separation between channels 0,2 1 0,6 0,2 0 0,12 0,08 sample test, off line MELF resistor open circuit no cross communica tion 0,7 1 0,99 0,7 0 0,693 0,007 cross comparison between channels 0,5< value <2 no effect 0,1 0 0 0 0,1 0 0 select value high enough to ensure separation IC101 IC102 Output diag Safety-related output Safety device Emergency Stop switch Switch off 1 Switch off 2 T101 T102 R100 Input 1 Input 2
  • 30. SFF and diagnostic test interval  Looking at SFF formula, it doesn’t depend on the test frequency (low demand vs high demand) SFF = (SlS + SlDD)/(SlS + SlD) Slide 30
  • 31. Simplified approaches proposed by other standards  Also ISO 13849-1 and IEC 62061 suggest simplified methods for determining the probability of random HW failure  ISO 13849-1 approach is based on ”designated architectures” for the different Categories  IEC 62061 approach is based on ”basic subsystem architectures”  These simplified approaches claim to err towards the safe direction, and make a number of assumptions  If the assumptions cannot be made, or if just more precise (and less conservative) values are desired, then more detailed reliability modeling may be applied Slide 31