1. Understanding Northern
China’s Water Crisis
Christine E. Boyle
Doctoral Student | Fulbright Fellow
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy
&
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Presentation at B.E.E.R.
3. Water Scarcity in China is
concentrated in the North
Northern China accounts for:
• 19% of China’s water resources
• 46.5% of its population
• 64.8% of arable land
• 42.5% of China’s GDP
• Level of annual per capita available water ranges
from 358 m3 per person to 750 m3 per person.
• < 1000 m3 per person is considered water scarce,
worse than water stressed.
Sources: Liu 2002, Shalizi 2006
5. Today’s Presentation
• GETTTING THE FACTS
RIGHT
• RECENT REFORMS
• A FRAGMENTED
INSTITIUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK
Main canal in Jingyuan City, Gansu Province
• POLICY
RECCOMENDATIONS
6. Water Resources
Country: People's Republic of China United States
Bulletin 2000; Colorado River Commission 2000
Source: Yellow River Conservation Conservancy
Study Unit: Yellow River Basin Colorado River Basin
Basin Indicators
Length (km): 5,463 2,333
Catchment Area (km2): 795,125 631,960
Population (millions of people): 136 25
Major Urban Areas (> 100,000 people): 9 3*
Mean Annual Discharge (bcm): 185 (at River Delta) 580 (at Fort Lee)
Water Utilization Indicators
Water Available per Capita (m3/year): 553 740
3
Water Use per Capita (m /year): 379 660
6 2
Cropland Total (10 km ): 0.28 .011**
6
Irrigation Area (10 ha): 4.83 1.2
% of water to Agriculture: 80% 80%
Current Storage Capacity (bcm): 57 74
Rate of Population Growth since 1990: 60% 50%
Average Water Price (USD/m3)
Urban: $0.15 $0.35
Industrial: $0.16 $0.28
Agriculture (volumetric): < $0.01 $0.23
3 2
** Includes 4.1 x 10 km irrigated agriculture in Imperial Valley and Coachella Valley, California
7. Water Resources
Per capita water availability for Huang Hai Huai River
Basins is well below global standards for water scarcity
8000
7000
cubic meters per
6000
5000
capita
4000 Water
scarce
3000
2000
1000
0
World China HHH Region
8. Water Usage
• Increasing demand: Water Utilization from 1949 - 2003
– Agricultural
– Non-Agricultural
sectors
• Sign of depleted
water resources:
Source: Lohmar (2008)
-dry river beds
-falling groundwater
tables
9. Water Shortage
Discharge Trend at Aixinzhuang Station:
Lower Haihe River Basin
25
20
Discharge 108 m3
15
10
5
0
1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Year
Source: Wang, JX (2005) “Evolution of Tubewell Ownership in the North China Plain”
10. Water Shortage
No-Flow Days in the Lijin Station, downstream in the
Yellow River Basin
250
200
Days
150
100
50
0
72
75
78
80
82
87
89
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
Year
Source: Ministry of Water Resources (2003)
12. Response
• Is there a
crisis?
• What is the
government Bazi Village, Ningxia Province. 2008
doing about it?
• What are
farmers doing
about it?
Fengyuan Village, Ningxia Province, 2008
13. Policy Response
“Deepen the systemic reform of
water pricing, promote a water
saving society”“
• Many responses (1988 Water Law, 2002 Water
Law, participatory management reform, 11th
Fifth Year Plan (2006-10), 7 River Basin
Commissions…)
• Almost zero effect on agricultural water use
14. Farmer Response – Rapid increase in
groundwater use
•Groundwater playing an
increasingly important role in
proliferation of privately run tubewells (based
irrigation in northern China
on sample of 400 villages in northern China)
•Over 3.5 million tubewells
established since the 1960s
•Farmer’s response to
surface water shortage has
been to sink tubewells
•tubewells provide about
68% of the total irrigation
water in northern China
Source: Zhang et al 2008
15. Surface Water Management
• River Basin Management Policies
–Implementation of Integrated Water Resource Management
principles in Yellow River Basin
– Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) Substantial
gains from allocating water to downstream users (roughly US$1
billion/year)
– Confounded by provincial interests
• Irrigation District Management Policies
– Seek to resolve cost recovery and promote water conservation
16. Irrigation District (ID) Reform
• Water User Associations
(WUAs)
– Ostensibly farmer organized groups
to elect managers and make joint
irrigation policy decisions
• Canal Contracting
– Contracting the management of
lateral canals out to individuals who
make investments, provide delivery
services and collect fees
• Investment & Subsidies
–funds channeled from central &
“Farmers water user association’s five guiding
provincial government to ID’s for
principles”
installation of water saving
technologies, canal lining, and system
rehabilitation
17. Increased Adoption of Reform
in Yellow River Basin
Source: Wang et al (2005) “Incentives to Managers or participation of farmers in China’s
irrigation systems: what matters most for water savings, farmer income & poverty”
18. Participatory reforms have not
achieved water savings
With
reform
From surveys in Ningxia, 2001. source: Wang et al (2005) “Incentives to
Managers or participation of farmers in China’s irrigation systems: what matters
most for water savings, farmer income & poverty”
19. Summary of ID – Level Reforms
When effective ID
reform can:
• reduce per hectare
water applications
• not impact incomes or
crop production
Unclear how reforms:
• impact long term
sustainability Focus group discussion with farmers in Hunan,
2006
• Cost recovery of system
infrastructure
20. Adoption of Water Saving
Technology is low
< 20% of
sown land
Low
adoption
rate!
Source: Blanke, A , et al (2006) “Water saving technology and saving
water in China”
21. Water Technology in Ningxia
Plastic sheeting &
burrow irrigation
Branch canal water control point
22. Institutional Framework
• Economics perspective: misplaced incentives
do not promote water conservation (i.e.
wrong price signals, lack of water rights to
guide rational water allocation)
• Institutional perspective: bureaucratic
conflicts impede integrated water
management and water conservation (i.e.
incomplete legal framework, unwieldy water
management coordination)
23. Fragmented Authoritarian
Model
Central Government
consensus
Bargaining Bargaining
Province A Province B
Adapted from Dr. Yok-shiu Lee (2008, “DONG JIANG: WATER RESOURCES CONSERVATION
AND BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICTS”
24. Bargaining for water
Reform complicates bargaining by decentralizing
resource authority to localities
Central government :
Use of coercive means
national policy agenda
Local government units:
Resource autonomy (buy, sell, trade)
Bargaining positions
25. Recommendations
• Implement complementary policies to water price policy to protect
the poor (offset effect of water fee increase on crop production &
incomes);
• Establish secure water rights framework to set conditions for water
users related to rights for utilization of water (withdrawal, consumption,
and return flows;
• Continue to facilitate grassroots institutional reform aimed at
promoting sustainable water use at the irrigation district and village level;
• Establish agricultural extension network of professionals. Embed
trained agriculturists into rural communities to aid in development of soil
management, irrigation, technology adaption, seed & fertilizer use.
26. Further Work
• Explore village-level irrigation fiscal policy to see how
localities are in fact responding to water scarcity;
• Develop better understanding of decision-making
framework for infrastructure investment and water
allocation in response to changing environmental
conditions;
• Further research into training, agricultural
entrepreneurship, agricultural credit and other
grassroots initiatives.