The document summarizes the development of UK counterterrorism strategy and legislation since the Northern Ireland conflict. It describes the evolving threat from Islamist terrorism. The UK adopted the CONTEST strategy in 2003 with four pillars (Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare) and established new agencies like JTAC. Legislation expanded police powers and allowed control orders and detention without trial. Critics argue these measures undermine civil liberties and fair trials. Reviews propose modest changes but retain broad imprecise offenses and executive powers based on suspicion rather than evidence.

1. Terrorism and Counter
Terrorism
Case Study:
Contemporary UK Counter-
terrorism – Strategy,
judicial review,
and review of police powers
Dr Paul Norman
1

2. Session Aims
 To examine the development of
contemporary UK counter-terrorism
strategy
 Drivers
 Legislative development
 Government machinery
 To consider the effect of the judiciary
in reviewing legislation / police
powers
2

3. UK experience - Northern
Ireland – “de-escalation”
(secret) political dialogue; N.I. Peace
Process; agreement on power-sharing
26 March, 2007
3

4. Northern Ireland: security
Exceptional police powers and judicial
process
 Armed police
 Special units (allegations of “shoot to kill”)
 Diplock Courts (no jury)
Military and Security Services
 British Military Intelligence
 Security Service – lead on intelligence
Temporary counter terrorism legislation
 Emergency Powers Act (NI)
 Prevention of Terrorism Act 4

5. Developing Islamist threat –
‘new terrorism’
Development of mass casualty
‘international terrorism’
 World Trade Centre, 1993
 Luxor massacre, 1997
 USA Embassy bombings in Africa, 1998
 GIA [‘Armed Islamic Group’] and Algerian
civil war
5

6. Review of UK Counter-
terrorism strategy, 1998
Terrorism Act 2000
 Made UK counter-terrorism legislation
permanent
 Detention extended up to 7 days
 Proscription extended to international
terrorist groups (i.e. al Qaeda)
 Wider ‘stop and search’ powers
6

7. Further post-9/11 review
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001
 Expanded Terrorism Act 2000
 Funding of terrorism (UN Convention)
 Indefinite detention of non-UK
suspects (Part IV) – derogation from
ECHR (Art. 5)
► ► enhanced powers but lack of
overall strategy
7

8. UK counter-terror strategy?
Home Secretary has overall
responsibility, scope too narrow
 Military CT operations in Afghanistan
 9/11  ‘critical infrastructure’ insecure
8

9. UK counter-terror strategy?
Home Secretary has overall
responsibility, scope too narrow
 Military CT operations in Afghanistan
 9/11  ‘critical infrastructure’ insecure
 Coordination with Foreign Office
 Tasking/support of Ministry of Defence
 Local authorities / utilities / atomic facilities
9

10. UK counter-terrorism - current
Home Secretary
UK Counter-terrorism Strategy
Intelligence and
Security Coordinator,
July 2002 Ministerial  Cabinet Office
Committee on  FCO
Terrorism  MoD
MI5 
International Resilience
MI6 
terrorism
Police 
10

11. Assessing the Threat - Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)
The international terrorist threat to the UK has evolved considerably
since 2001. There has been a significant increase in the number of
people involved in Islamist extremism. Al Qaida continues to pose
the foremost international terrorist threat and the most significant
long-term threat to the UK. It has developed increasingly
sophisticated methods, in particular using the Internet and
videos/DVDs, to promote its propaganda which has helped to
spread extremist ideologies and techniques to a worldwide
audience. However, a more diverse threat picture is emerging. Al
Qaida's affiliates and allies across the world pose an increasing
threat to the UK and to UK interests in their regions. There is also
an underlying, unpredictable threat from people who are inspired,
but not trained or directed, by Al Qaida.
JTAC created in 2003 to coordinate all terrorism-related intelligence
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre.html 11

12. The UK’s Terrorism Plots
12
Guardian (2009) www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2009/apr/29/alqaida2

13. UK Counter-terrorism Strategy
Priorities
 Understanding causes / motivation
 Identify trends / developments
 Prepare for attacks
Identify risk, reduce threat
and vulnerability
 reduced risk
13

14. UK Counter-terrorism Strategy
CONTEST – approved 2003, revised 2009;
‘refreshed’ in 2011. Four strands:
 Prevent
 Pursue
 Protect
 Prepare
Downing Street Presentation (2009)
www.youtube.com/user/DowningSt#p/u/112/mTMS7IqikL4
1.45/13.24
14

15. reference only
CONTEST: “Prevent”
 Stopping attacks
 Averting prospective attacks – ‘next
generation’
 UK Govt. – Muslim Council dialogue /
community leadership
Preventing “radicalisation”
 Tackling “drivers” to recruitment – Middle
East Peace Process, good governance,
counter-terrorism capacity-building abroad
International diplomatic action
15

16. reference only
CONTEST: “Pursue”
Security: Main focus of current efforts
 Current terrorists
 Financing of terrorism
 Immigration and asylum controls
 Legislative development
Costs? 2001 £1 billion
2008 £2.5 billion
2010/11 £3.5 billion projected
HMG (2008). UK National Security Strategy, p.5 16

17. reference only
CONTEST: “Protect”
Target hardening
 National ‘Critical National Infrastructure’
(10 key sectors – telecoms, energy, transport etc.).
embracing wide range of Govt.
Departments + 50 private companies
 International Aviation and maritime
security
17

18. reference only
CONTEST: “Prepare”
Dealing with consequences (inevitable)
 Effective ‘first responders’ – blue light
services (others?)
 Maintenance of essential services
whilst under attack
 National disaster management, CBRN –
detect, deal with mass infections, mass
casualties, evacuation, restore services
National Resilience
18

19. Countering and
Criminal
Criminal
Financing Offences
Offences
Use of Police
Powers
UK
Mainland
19

20. Up to 10 years imprisonment for:
• Membership
• Inviting support
• Arranging / addressing a meeting in
support
Up to 6 months imprisonment for:
• Wearing an item of clothing or display an
article in a public place to suggest
membership
20

21. Criminal Offences
• Possessing articles for the purpose of terrorism
• Inciting terrorist acts
• Seeking or providing training for terrorist
purposes at home or overseas
• Providing instruction or training in the use of
firearms, explosives or chemical, biological or
nuclear weapons
• Acts preparatory to terrorism
• Encouragement to terrorism
• Dissemination of terrorist publications
• Terrorist training offences
21

22. Detention of Suspects (before charge)
Extended to 7 days by Terrorism Act 2000
• to 14 days by CJ Act 2003
• to 28 days by Terrorism Act 2006
 Government proposal for 90 days rejected
in 2005. Extension to 42 days as a
“reserve power”
 to 14 days? – Coalition Review
22

23. Detention without Trial – Control Orders
Detention without Trial
From:
Detention without Trial
 ACTSA 2001
 A v Home Secretary
(2005)
To:
Control Orders
 POTA 2005
23

24. Detention without Trial – Control Orders
Use of Control Orders imposed on those
that the Home Secretary has:
‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
individual is or has been involved in
terrorism-related activity’ TA 2005, s.2(1)a
individual discretion, based upon
evidence/data that generate the suspicion, in
climate of uncertainty, with potential
catastrophic consequences 24

25. Use of Control Orders
Total: 48 people (most less than 2 years)
 28 foreign nationals
 2 for more than 4 years, subsequently
revoked
 10 others, subsequently deported
7 have absconded
Currently: 8 people (all UK nationals).
 HMG (2011). Review of counterterrorism and security powers . Cm 8004
25

26. Alternative ‘justice’ system
Control, restriction of liberty:
 No evidence, or
 Evidence that cannot be publicly presented
(or therefore tested) in court
Leads to the need for pre-emptive action via the:
 (closed) Special Immigration Appeals
Commission (SIAC), with vetted advocates
 reasons unknown, evidence unknown 26

27. The contemporary relevance
‘We will urgently review
Control Orders, as part of a
wider review of counter-
terrorist legislation, measures
and programmes. We will
seek to find a practical way to
allow the use of intercept
evidence in court’
27
 www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOm17KH1SKc 4.41

28. Liberty: “Our objections to
Control Orders”
1. Unsafe. Dangerous terrorists should not be in their living rooms
but convicted and imprisoned. A genuine terrorist can easily remove
plastic tags and disappear, as some controlees have.
2. Unfair. Innocent people should not be subjected to years and
years of punishment without trial. Control orders place
dehumanizing sanctions on people based on suspicion rather than
evidence.
3. Against the British traditions of justice and liberty .
They undermine the presumption of innocence,… right to a fair trial.
4. There are alternatives to control orders... Liberty urges
the government to use criminal law and the courts to lock up …
terrorists, and to allow the use of intercept evidence in court.
 www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/terrorism/control-orders/28

29. Conclusion:
organisational breadth and resources
 Comprehensive national police,
intelligence agency and overseas
military strategy
 Government, other Public agencies,
Private companies
offences gradually defined in the broadest, and most
imprecise, terms - ‘any conduct in preparation’
Dramatic increase in resource
human, technical, military, border security
29

30. Conclusion:
precautious, precautionary, & pre-
emptive social control
 Uncertainty, leading to extreme pre-emptive
measures
preventative detention, control
 Legal precision is a hindrance
offences gradually defined in the broadest, and
most imprecise, terms - ‘any conduct in
preparation’
From knowledge equals power, to lack of
knowledge equals increased executive power
30

31. Conclusion:
Coalition ‘review findings and
recommendations’ for Control Orders
 From ‘suspect’, to ‘reasonable grounds
to believe’
Time limited preventative control; more ‘flexibility’;
‘restrictions should facilitate surveillance’
 Continuing legal duty on police to
gather evidence
No substantive changes to breadth, and imprecision
of ‘any conduct in preparation’.
- SIAC to be subject to later review of ‘sensitive
material in judicial proceeding’
 HMG (2011). Review of counterterrorism and security powers . Cm 8004
31