South Asia faces significant challenges from terrorism. The region is home to over 1.5 billion people and has a history of conflict and disputes between countries. It also has two nuclear powers in India and Pakistan and is strategically important given its location between Central Asia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. However, it also struggles with poverty, weak governance, and militant groups operating in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. Addressing the social and economic factors that contribute to radicalization will be important to reducing the threat of terrorism in South Asia.

1. Terrorism
South Asian Scenario

3. South Asia: An Introduction
 The region is located at the
strategically important area in
world.
 SA comprises of the sub-
Himalayan countries and is
surrounded (clockwise, from west
to east) by Western Asia, Central
Asia, Eastern Asia, and
Southeastern Asia.
 It is home to over 1.50 billion
people .
 It is the home of two new nuclear
weapon states
3

4.  It has a history of protracted dispute, conflict and
regional wars. It has close proximity to another
nuclear power (China).
 It has one of the fastest growing power and
economy (India).
 South Asia is one of the poorest and most
misgoverned regions of the world after sub-Saharan
Africa.
 Enormous Diversity within South Asia .
1. Demography, Economy, Governance, Human
Development,
2. Social Development and Poverty Incidence

5. Geostrategic Importance of South Asia
 South Asia is a most complex, volatile and
politically explosive region, the most
enigmatic and baffling in the world
 Lies between the sea routes of the Indian
Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific) and
the land routes of Central Asia connecting
Europe to the East
 Large reservoir of natural and human
resources

6.  Prime destination for finance capital, a lucrative market
for trade and a source of cheap raw material.
 Sits at the confluence of the richest sources of oil, gas.
 The transit point for most of the resources and
manufactures that crisscross the world.
 Was the base for infamous “Great Game” in the 19th
century.
 United States Base at Diego Garcia, just south of
Maldives.

7. Geostrategic Importance of South Asia
 Indo-US strategic
partnership
 Concept of “Chindia”
 Emergence of India as
Regional Power with
global pretensions
 Nuclearization of South
Asia
 Potentiality of
Nuclear/Conventional
Conflicts

8.  South Asia in the frontline of the energy
resource regions (Central Asia, Persian Gulf).
 Demographic pattern-currently comprising one
fourth of the world’s population.
 Two Nuclear club members are in South Asia.
 Geographical contiguity with would be super
power, China
 “Indian Ocean Rim”

9. Terrorism and South Asia
 Global terrorism center of
gravity shifts to South Asia.
 South Asia now epicenter of
terrorism.
 “The arc of instability”.
 Islamist militancy in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India
and Bangladesh.
 Maoist insurgency in India
and Nepal.
 The “Red Corridor”.
 FATA.
 Hindu radicalism.
 LTTE in Sri Lanka.
Mumbai attack November 2008

10. Common Factors
 Terrorism is caused by poverty and exploitation
 Terrorist enemies are at once civil and military, state
and non-state, territorial and non-territorial’ (Beck, The
Cosmopolitan Vision (Polity) 2006: 152)
 Regional tensions and non-resolution of core disputes
 Hegemonic policies
 Threatening sovereignty of smaller countries
 Growth of nuclear arsenal and induction of new
weapons.

11.  Terrorists identified themselves with
‘the cellular world of global terror
rather than the isolating world of
national minorities’
 Terrorists morphed ‘from one kind
of minority – weak, disempowered,
disenfranchised and angry – to
another kind of minority – cellular,
globalized, transnational, armed,
and dangerous’ Appadurai, A (2006:
113) Fear of Small Numbers: An
Essay on the Geography of Anger
(Duke University Press)

12. Geography of Terror Incidents

13. Areas of Concern
 The Diaspora Connection
 Self-Radicalization
 Tactical Devolution
 Pakistan
 Afghanistan
 South Asia Emerging
as the Global Epicenter of
Terrorism

14.  Female
radicalization
 Migrant worker
connection
 Confused/Dual
identity

15. Trends in terrorism
 Terrorism and insurgency
 Internationalism
 Suicide terrorism
 Speed of learning
 Media developments
 Economic targeting
 Mass casualty attacks and
weapons of mass
destruction

16. Strategic Trends
 Al – Qaeda in a strategic Cul de Sac yet posing a
credible threat to global security.
 An incomplete ideological battle compounding
the problem.
 Lack of effective trans-national cooperation
creating an advantageous situation for the terrorist
organizations.
 The deepening problem in the global south: need
to address core issues.
 Preferred asymmetric tool.

17. Changes in Tactics
 Bomb Blasts Increasingly
Being Replaced by
Operations involving Small
Arms e.g. Mumbai CST
Attack 26/11/2009
 New Innovations in
Training and Organization
 Rotating leadership
 Organizational identity
change

18. Terrorist Tactics, based on 25,303
terrorist events, 1968-2004
% of all events % of all casualties
Bombs 53.4 70.1
Guns 19.9 23.0
Arson 9.8 2.7
Remote control bombs 1.9 4.7
Knives & other blades 1.3 2.1
Chemical 0.2 0.59
Biological 0.08 0.02
Other 13.3 8.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Risks of Mortality and Morbidity from Worldwide Terrorism:
1968-2004. Risk Analysis Vol. 26, No.1, 2006.

19. Changes in Tactics
 Small groups and sleeper cells increasingly
gaining prominence.
 The lone wolf making a comeback?
 Decentralised organisational structure –
The case of JMB
 New innovations in training: The use of
Char areas for training
 An evolving crime – Terror nexus

20. The Emerging Threat Scenarios
 The looming threat to critical infrastructure:
Rawalpindi water supply
 The threat from internet radicalisation
 Fighting the flow of money: The challenge from
terrorist financing
 JMB financing – bona fide investments
 The question of nuclear security
 Terrorist or insurgent – where to draw the line??
 Possibility of WMD terrorism

21. The Emerging Threat Scenarios
 The deepening threat of radicalisation across
societies.
 The increasing threat from extremist groups in the
context of South Asia e.g. Hizbut Tahrir.
 The problem of integration in an increasingly
globalising world.
 The rise of the radical elements across different
societies: The mainstream becoming smaller??

22. Who are the Terrorists?
 Al-Qaeda
Militant, international Islamic organization focused on
removing all western influence from Muslim countries
and fighting a global “Jihad”

23. Who are the Terrorists?
 Taliban
Violent fundamentalist group from
Afghanistan; focused on implementing
Sharia law in Afghanistan and Pakistan

24. Who are the Terrorists?
 Separatist Movements
Punjab (Sikh), Kashmir, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura,
Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland; all
have tried to gain autonomy at one point.

25. Why does this matter to us?
 Terrorism threatens the stability of
the region; big consequences if
these countries fall.
 India and Pakistan are both
nuclear nations; weapons could
fall into terrorist hands.
 Many of these organizations are
international (e.g. Al-Qaeda)
 Operation Enduring Freedom –
US led military action in
Afghanistan
25

26. International Front for Jihad against
the Jews and Crusaders
The ruling to kill the Americans and
their allies civilians and military is an
individual duty for every Muslim who
can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it. ”
Fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden
& Ayman al-Zawahiri

27. Key Drivers of Radicalisation, according to
Global Futures Forum
• Mass communication and propaganda
• Western responses to radicalisation
• Governance in target countries
• Western dominance (both real and
perceived)
• State-to-state tensions
Global Futures Forum. Radical Worlds of 2020.
Imagining the Futures of Radicalisation.
The Hague, 12-14 December 2007

28. • Religion (and its relationship to politics)
• Government responsiveness (civil society)
• Immigration and demographics
• “Us- vs. -Them” identity politics
• New ideologies
• Resources (scarcities, conflicts over ~)
• Violence (associated with extremism)
28

29. Radicalization: A strategic challenge
 Terrorism is a tactic, it does not operate in a
vacuum.
 The continuum starts with radicalization
 Myriad reasons not one single factor
 A growing problem across the South Asian region.
 The Afghan jihad
 The role of the media in countering radicalization

30. Countering Radicalisation
 The importance of the theologian.
 Fighting ideology with ideology.
 Countering the religious arguments.
 Understanding the importance and the
centrality of the religious debate.
 The incorporation of the religious clerics
into the sphere of counter terrorism in
various countries.

31. The situation of Afghanistan
( Background)
 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, as a result of
military operations by the US-led multinational
forces. Al Qaeda and leaders of Taliban fled to the
border regions and into Pakistan.
 In Afghanistan, security operations by ISAF
established by a UN Security Council resolution have
been successful to a certain extent and the
international community has been supporting nation-
building.

32.  peace dividends have not reached every
corner of the country and some people
support the insurgents for economic and
other causes.
 With increased power of the Taliban
forces, the security situation has
deteriorated in recent years without
considerable improvement of people’s
living standards.

33. 33

34. Challenges in Afghanistan
 Crushing OBL and al-Qaeda, and hard-core
Taliban seems imperative for US security;
stabilizing Afghanistan, growing its own security
forces and building out its government capacity
are critical to those goals.
 Revised COIN strategy is good in theory, Piraeus
is real leader, US combat forces are superb, but
how much will it take, can Afghanistan unite, and
will US public stay the course?
 Pakistan’s commitment and capacity to rebuilding
Afghanistan and defeating the Taliban are huge
question marks, as are Iran’s in a lesser way

35. Afghanistan: anti-government forces:
Taliban
 Pakistan origin during anti-Soviet war
 US and Pakistani intelligence role in creation
 Pakistani military interest in maintaining Afghan unrest
 Ethnically- and class-inflected Sunni Islamism
 Pashtun ethnic dominance
 Regional variations
 Not a single united body, or equivalent to pre-invasion
government
 Mullah Omar, leader (at least in south)
 Overlaps with Taliban in Pakistan but not identical

36. Afghanistan: anti-government forces: Militia
leaders/“warlords”
 Regional/clan/tribal-based patron-client relationships
 Fusion of “feudal”/pre-modern relations and “modern” social
and political relationships
 Haqqani Network
 Jalauddin Haqqani
 Claimed responsibility for Kabul bombing this week
 Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddun
 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
 Former PM
 Deeply opposed to foreign intervention
 “Warlords” on both sides
 Shifting loyalties and finances
central to current presidential elections
 36

37. Afghanistan: anti-government forces: Al
Qaeda
 Saudi- Egyptian-originated Sunni Salafi international
militia group
 November 2001 invasion immediately destroyed training
camps, displaced AQ activists to Pakistan, reduced AQ
capacity, increased tensions with hosts
 key leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri still
at large, presumably in Pakistan
 Core AQ international combat reach doubtful; limited
Afghanistan combat role
 Effective “franchising” of AQ through loose international
networks continues
 Differentiation and development of loosely related networks
 Mega-terrorism threat continues
 Taliban distancing themselves

38. Terrorist Incidents in Afghanistan in 2005
and 2006 according to US National Counter
Terrorism Centre
2005 2006
Incidents of terrorism in 491 749
Afghanistan
Source: US National Counter Terrorism Centre as quoted in US Department of
State. Country Reports on Terrorism and Patterns of Global Terrorism.

39. Current challenges
 To reverse the
momentum on the
ground in Afghanistan.
 The safe haven that the
Taliban and al-Qaeda
and other jihadists have
built in Pakistan has to
be closed down

40.  Afghanistan: The new regional political play
ground (e.g. entry of India)
 Drug-terror nexus: drug trafficking source of
terrorist funding(e.g. opium trafficking in
Afghanistan)
 Warlords
 Taliban by back
 Private militias

41. Pakistan- The Core Issue
 Pakistan is under
international pressure linked
to the influx of Afghan
refugee
 Pakistan under complex
challenge because of
geographic location
 FATA (Federally
Administered Tribal Area)
 Decentralization of Taliban
 Growing radicalization

42.  Politics of terror
 Regional politics and Indo –Pak rivalry
 Foreign fighters and Taliban
 International linkages of terrorist groups
 Invisible foreign hands?
 Complex identity toned between Islamic and
ethnic identity
 Complex relationship with the US and the west

43. Ground Realities of Pakistan
 Renewed strategic partnership with US and frontline role in the
global war against terrorism elevate dangers to sensitive
materials
 The geo-political environment and maintenance of strategic
stability present other challenges
“No one else’s bomb is called Hindu, Jewish, Christian, capitalist, or
communist, yet somehow our bomb becomes “Islamic”, as if that makes it
illegitimate. The idea is illogical and essentially racist. This is an example of
how Muslims continually feel unjustly singled out and alienated”
President Pervez Musharraf’’s Memoir, “In the Line of Fire”

44. Pakistan’s response
 A bold and courageous operation
in FATA by Pakistan Army.
 Close cooperation with ISAF
(International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan)
 A stated policy of Counter
terrorism
 CBM efforts with India specially
after Mumbai incident.
 Fighting the Afghan local
refugee extremists

45. Terrorism and Pakistan
Islamabad Marriott Bombing: September
20, 2008

46. Marriott Hotel Bombing
PERPETRATORS:
 No group claimed of
responsibility for the
attack, although
most link the attack
to al-Qaeda or
Pakistani Taliban.
 Pakistani Taliban
denied involvement
in the bombing.

47.  No indication that Marriott received any
warning of attack.
 In addition, senior al-Qaeda leader
Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, who claimed the
June Danish Embassy bombing in
Islamabad, threatened additional attacks
against western interests in Pakistan in a
video timed to the recent anniversary of
the September 11 attacks.

48. Lahore Incident

49. Apprehension about the security of Pakistan’s
nuclear assets and threat of terrorism
 Terrorists’ acquisition of nuclear
weapons or sabotage thereof, dirty
bombs, RDDs, and radiation hazards
caused by sabotage/attack on a nuclear
facility or a transport vehicle.

50. Strategy needed in Pakistan
 Revitalizingexisting multilateral
mechanism, regimes and treaties for
their contribution to prevent terrorist
activities.

51. The Afghanistan-Pakistan complex
 Now a two-country war: Afghanistan, spilling over
into Pakistan
 The principal source of the global crisis of Terrorism.
 2009 was a year of escalating violence and widening
disorder across the Af-Pak region.
 The ‘surge’ of US troops in Afghanistan in 2010 and
the uncertain tactical gains in Marjah notwithstanding,
there is little reason to believe that the troubling
fundamentals of the region are going to experience any
significant change.

52.  Afghanistan and Pakistan both ethnically mixed
 Structure/border legacies of colonial formation as nation-states
 key Pashtun ethnic group cross-border relations: hence
“Pashtunistan”
 Largest single group in Afghanistan; southern and eastern
concentrations
 Dominant in western border provinces of Pakistan
 Emerging US perception of a cross-border war against
Pashtunistan: hence “Af-Pak War”
 What next in the post withdrawal period of US forces.
 Resurgent Taliban.
 It’s the time in Taliban framework.

53. Overview: Terrorism in India
 Nation building process marked by
religious fundamentalism, ethnic tensions
and economic disparities.
 Continuing militancy /insurgency in
Kashmir and North –Eastern States.
 Rising Maoist/ Naxal influence across
central India and linkages with Nepal.

54. 54

55. Trends in terrorism in India
 Homegrown terrorists
mixed with foreign connections
 Lots of the groups rally around
Kashmir issue
 The looming threat from Maoist
terrorism
 The rise of Hindu
fundamentalism.
 The regional nexus of terrorism

56. Major conflicts and terrorist groups
operating in India
 State: Jammu & Kashmir
Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Prophet)
Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen (Party of Holy Warriors)
Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (Movement of Holy Warriors)
Al Badr (The Full Moon)
Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami (Movement of the Islamic
Jehad)

57.  North East India
 State: Assam
 ULFA: United Liberation Front of Asam
NDFB: National Democratic Front of
Boroland
UPDF: United Peoples Democratic Front
BLT: Bodo Liberation Tigers

58.  State: Nagaland
 NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagalim- Isak-
Muivah
NSCM-K: National Socialist Council of Nagalim- Khaplang
 State: Manipur
 UNLF: United National Liberation Front
 PLA: People’s Liberation Army
 PREPAK: People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagalim- Isak-
Muivah

59.  State: Tripura
 NLFT: National Liberation Front of
ATTF: All Tripura Tiger Force
 State: Meghalaya
 HNLC: Hynniewtrep National liberation
Council
ANVC: Achik National Volunteer Council

60.  Left Wing Extremism
 State: Bihar
 People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-
Lennist (People’s War)]
Maoist Communist Centre
Ranvir Sena (Anti-Left Wing caste army of landlords)
 State: Jharkhand
 People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-
Lennist (People’s War)]
Maoist Communist Centre

61.  State: Orissa
 People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-
Lennist (People’s War)]
 State: Chattisgarh
 People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-
Lennist (People’s War)]
Maoist Communist Centre
 Andhra Pradesh
 People’s War Group (PWG)
Communist Party of India – Marxist Lennist (Janasakhti)
[Janasakhti: People’s Power]

62. 62

63. States Civilian SF Naxal Total
Andhra Pradesh
6 0 7 13
Bihar
30 6 7 43
Chhattisgarh
58 135 69 262
Jharkhand
41 12 20 73
Karnataka
0 0 1 1
Maharashtra
6 2 2 10
Orissa
29 18 13 60
Uttar Pradesh
0 0 0 0
West Bengal
243 33 40 316
Total*
413 206 159 778
Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism - 2010
Statewise Fatalities 2010

64. Current situation
 Naxalites do not belong to any religion or community. They
are mainly Dalits, Adivasis or other marginalized sections of
society totally indoctrinated by the teachings of Mao and
Marx.
 Links with Nepalese Maoists, ULFA, and LTTE for training
and modern weapons.
 Maoist incidents account for over 60% of the violence:
killings, kidnappings, extortion, abduction, IED blasts and
destruction of property.
 Growth of Naxalite movement due the exploitation and
oppression of Dalits, Adivasis and other landless people by
feudal agrarian system with strong interface of caste and
class.

65. New forms of Terrorism in India
 Cyber-terrorism.
 RDDs (Radiological dispersal devices).
 Threats to India’s nuclear installations.
 Threats to India’s maritime assets (offshore oil
platforms, attractive commercial targets).
 Bio-terrorism.
 Nuclear terrorism??

66. Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal
66

67. The Mumbai Attack
 On November 26th-29th
2008, Mumbai, India’s
greatest commercial capital,
came under siege by ten
terrorists.
 Ten coordinated attacks,
each conducted in populous
areas of Mumbai, killed at
least 173 people and left
308 injured.
The symbol of Lashkar-e-
Taiba

68.  Presently, the terrorists are suspected to have
originated from Pakistan
Terrorist organization: Lashkar-e-Taiba
Currently being denied by Pakistani officials
 Terrorists’ motives seem to be partly related to
Kashmir
Lashkar-e-Taiba operates several training
camps in Kashmir, and regularly carries out
offensives against Indian forces in Jammu
and Kashmir.

69. Possible Future Scenarios
 Maoist will expand
 Possibility of Maoist
groups to link up with the
other terrorist groups
 The unrest of Kashmir
might aggregate
 The homegrown terrorism
will expand (e.g. Deccan
Mujahideen)

70.  The possibilities are that the Situation would
be roughly the same as today.
 Maoist threat may assume gigantic proportions
and pose a grave threat to the security of
Indian Union.
 Maoists might be marginalized and
discredited.

71. Steps required for India
 Strengthening of intelligence machinery at the Centre
and in States
 Need for greater focus on activities of terrorist outfits,
naxals, criminal & communal elements
 Enhanced physical security and better access control
systems through latest technology at vital
installations, and public places such as airports,
trains, railway stations, crowded markets and
important religious places.

72. Sri Lanka after the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil (LTTE)
 The Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has
been comprehensively
defeated.
 An end of a relentless 33-
year long conflict, and 26
years of full scale civil war.
 On May 20, 2009, the Sri
Lanka Army officially
declared the end of Eelam
War .

73.  The top leadership of the LTTE, including its chief
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, intelligence chief Pottu
Amman and Sea Tigers chief, Soosai, were dead
 Defeated remnants of the armed cadres surrendered
or sought obscurity among the thousands of the Tamil
displaced in refugee camps
 The Diaspora leadership squabbled over succession,
eventually to publicly renounce the option of violence

74. Significant focus of LTTE
 LTTE had biggest money machine
 Controlled a territory which became
a state within a state
 LTTE taught suicidal bombing
 Had three dimensional capacity
 LTTE and WMD?

75.  Gender dimension of
terrorism
 Child soldier in terrorism
 Media and terrorism
75

76. 76

77. Post war challenges
 Economic destruction which is to be
reconstructed
 Emotional trauma
 Ruined hopes and shattered dreams.
 Rehabilitate the Tamils.
 More than 2,50,000 internally displace
persons, who are to be fed and attended to

78. Apprehension about future
 Little possibility of a immediate resurgence of
terrorist violence in the foreseeable future but
beyond short term cannot be ruled out.
 The enduring tragedy of Sri Lanka is that the
opportunities of a hard won peace are quickly
being frittered away in a blind, polarizing and
fractious politics.
 They won the war but missing the peace
 Solution has to be political not military.

79.  LTTE’s financial empire exists which
have not been dismantled
 Tamil Diaspora
 Incomplete political reconciliation
 Issues of human rights violation

80. Glimpses of Bangladesh
Muslim Majority South
Asian State

81. Originally People with Moderate
Mindset & Homogenous Population

82. Nature of Terrorist threats in
Bangladesh
 Religious militancy (Islamic
extremism).
 Violent radicalization
 Leftist movement.
 Terrorism in the form of
political violence.
 Ethnic insurgency (in the
CHT).
 Maoist threats.

83. Existing militant/ terrorist groups in
Bangladesh
 29 listed Islamic organizations for
suspected involvement in militancy.
 Government so far banned four
militant organizations:
 JMB,
 Huji-B,
 Jagrata Muslim Janata
Bangladesh (JMJB)
 Shahadat-e al Hikma.
 Focus only on outlawed JMB and
Huji-B.
 List includes Bangladesh chapter of
international organization Hizbut-
Tahrir Bangladesh.

84. The other listed militant/terrorist
outfits are
Hizb-ut Towhid Biswa Islami Front
Allahr Dal, Islami Samaj Juma'atul al Sadat
Al Harat al Islamia Shahadat-e-Nobuat
Jama'atul Faliya Jama'at-e Yahia al Turat
Towhidi Janata Joyshe Mostafa Bangladesh
Al Jihad Bangladesh Woarat Islamic Front
Dawat-e Islam Tanjim

85. The other listed militant/ terrorist outfits are
Jamaat-as-Sadat Joysh-e Mohammad
al Khidmat Hijbul Mahadi
Harkat-e-Islam al Kalemar Dawat
Jihad
Hijbullah Islami Islami Dawati Kafela
Samaj
Muslim Millat Shahria
Council
World Islamic Front al Islam Martyrs
for Jihad Brigade
Hizb e Abu Omar Jadid al-Qaeda
Bangladesh

86. Transnational Linkages
 HUJI’s suspected
international
connections.
 Case of Fazlur Rahman.
 Hizbut Tahrir.
The Growing International Linkages
 Revival of JMB
 International Terrorists
search for a sanctuary.

87. The Nexus between Terrorism and
Transnational Crime
 Terrorists engage in organized crime activity to
support themselves financially
 Organized crime groups and terrorists often operate on
network structures and these structures sometimes
intersect, terrorists can hide themselves among
transnational criminal organizations
 Both organized crime group and terrorists operate in
areas with little governmental controls, weak
enforcement of laws and open borders

88.  Both organized criminals and terrorists
corrupt local officials to achieve their
objectives
 Organized crime groups and terrorists often
use similar means to communicate–exploiting
modern technology
 Organized crime and terrorists launder their
money, often using the same methods and
often the same operators to move their funds

89. Terrorist group (al-Qaeda )to Reconfigure Itself
Late-1990s: Now:
Monolithic Structure “Movement of Movements”
• Centrally controlled organization • Nebulous, segmented, and polycentric
organization
• Strategic assaults executed by
inner core of jihadist activists • Tactically oriented strikes done by
affiliated cells (individuals) and when
opportunity arises

90. Based on Changes, We Postulate Four
al-Qaeda Trends for the Future
Now:
Future Trends
“Movement of Movements”
1. Continuing interest in hard
targets but increased focus on
soft, civilian-centric venues
2. Ongoing emphasis on
economic attacks
3. Continued reliance on suicide
strikes
• Nebulous, segmented, and polycentric 4. Desire to use CBRN weapons
organization but little ability
to execute large-scale
• Tactically oriented strikes done by conventional attacks
affiliated cells (individuals) and when
opportunity arises

91. Timeline of Post 9/11 Major Attacks
 Oct 2001: Kashmir, India assembly attacked by militants.
 Dec 2001: militants attacked Indian Parliament in New Delhi
 May 2002 – Karachi, Pakistan; 14 dead, 20+ injured
 Jun 2002: attack against the US Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan.
 Aug 2003: simultaneous bomb blasts in Mumbai, India.
 Dec 2003: two assassination attempts on President Musharraf in
Pakistan
 Aug. 2005 – Bangladesh, 400 bombs in 30 min.; 2 dead, 138
injured.

92.  Jul 2006 – Mumbai trains; 209 dead, 700+
injured
 Feb. 2007 – Delhi Express; 68 dead, 50 injured
 Oct. 2007 – Karachi, Pakistan; 136 dead, 387
injured
 Dec. 2007 – Rawalpindi, Pakistan; 24 dead, 46
injured
 Sep. 2008 – Islamabad, Pakistan; 54 dead, 266
injured
 Dec. 2008 – Mumbai, India; 173 dead, 327
injured

94. Challenges in the next five years
 Decentralization of Threat
 New Threat Configuration
 Dominance of Al Qaeda
 Globalization of Threat
 Changing Profile
 Rise of Asian Terrorism

95.  Riseof Homegrown Terrorism
 Threat Migration
 Threat Escalation
 Threat Diversification

96.  The geography and demography of terrorism will change.
 The Middle Eastern and Asian groups will dominate the international
landscape of terrorism.
 With the developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Indonesia, the specter of Asian terrorism will rise.
 Al Qaeda working together with TTP will provide training for both
Muslims and Muslim groups on the Afghan Pakistan border.
 Global Jihad groups will co-opt local and tribal groups creating safe
havens and sanctuaries from Tribal Pakistan.
 While Middle Eastern threat groups will continue to pose a threat, there
will be a comparable threat stemming from Asian groups.
 The area of FATA will be critically watched.

97. The Way Ahead
 Need to address radicalization and extremism
at a national and international level.
 The need to fashion an adequate strategy to
fight the ideological battle.
 Understanding what makes a terrorist group
tick – the importance of research.

98.  Counter terrorism is not a the task of the governments
alone.
 Need to engage the youth.
 The role of the theologians.
 Media playing a more proactive role.
 Importance of building social resilience against
terrorism.
 A carefully calibrated multi pronged counter terrorism
strategy.
 High time for regional engagement.

99. Counter Terrorism in South Asia
SAARC has adopted several
conventions.
 SAARC Regional Convention
on Suppression of Terrorism
(signed by all member states
and came into force in 1988)
 Additional Protocol to the
SAARC Regional Convention
on Suppression of
Terrorism(2002)
 Bilateral CT agreements.
 National CT measures and
regulations.

100. What specific measures can SAARC take
 Sharing intelligence/
information
 Enact a consolidated strategy
to counter the financing of
terrorism to ensure
transparency in the
transaction of money
 Build an effective regional
terrorism cell
 Clear understanding of one
country’s conflict situation
and not to interfere in the
conflict directly or indirectly.

101. What specific measures can SAARC take
 Regional law enforcement
coordination.
 Regional capacity building
training.
 Political Climate.
 Counter new/ emerging
threats.
 Enact regional money
laundering act

102. What specific measures can South Asia take
 Regional Counter Terrorism
framework.
 Coordination among regional
law enforcement agencies.
 Regional capacity building
training.
 Political Climate.
 Counter new/ emerging
threats.
 Enacting regional money
laundering act.
 National and regional Strategic
Communication Plan.
 Joint exercises.

103. Lessons for This Region
 Understanding and acknowledging the need and
acuteness of the problem
 Taking lessons from the various experiences.
 Studying the existing criminal rehab models and
adopting best practices.
 Understanding the terrorist motivations: what makes
a terrorist?
 Adoption of best practice models of rehab and
community engagement

104.  The Ideological Battle and the Centrality of the
Religious Debate
 Arresting a Terrorist is Only Half the Job, Reforming
the Individual is the More Crucial One
 No One Size Fits All Approach
 Operating within Resource Constraints
 The Importance of a Merger Between Law
Enforcement and the Community
 Countering Radicalisation – Looking at the Bigger
Picture

105.  The religious clerics as an important component –
The important role to be played by Islamic
Foundation
 Countering radicalisation needs to be a critical
component of the National Counter Terrorism
Strategy
 Opportunity for cooperation among states in terms
of Counter Radicalisation and terrorist
rehabilitation

106.  Addressing the root and not just the tactic
 Problem of terrorism often linked to
governance deficit
 Identity and integration will be significant
 Think globally act locally
 Primary response is political and primarily
non-kinetic

107. Law Enforcement Response & Policy
There are a number of ways a democracy can respond to
terrorism, ranging from making concessions to military
intervention.
Concessions are only likely when there is moral
substance to the terrorist cause, or when such concessions
are reasonable.
Military intervention may be used when the terrorist
threat is too big for civilian authorities to handle.
The principle of international law obliges countries to
either extradite terrorists to the country where their
crimes were committed or to punish them themselves.

108. Factors Facilitating Future Terrorism,
according to Brynar Lia (2005)
• Resilience and longevity of the international jihadist networks
• Unipolar exclusionist and interventionist world order
• Weak transitional states
• Non-state actors in global politics
• Globalisation of organized crime
• Middle East oil dependence
• Migration and ethnic heterogenisation of Western societies
• Growing information interconnectedness
• Proliferation of deadly technologies
• Out-of-area spill-over from ongoing armed conflicts

109. Future Trends and Contingencies
 Interminable insurgency in Afghanistan and Pashtun
tribal areas in Pakistan (quagmire?)
 Nuclear terrorism threat – shouldn’t discount
 Engage local partners to limit Islamist radicals,
extremism and terrorism (AFPAK)
 Nuclear terrorism rising probability (contingency
plans)

110.  Militant Islam continues to spread and gain
power
 Advanced communication technologies are
changing the way terrorists work and live

111. What to do
 Strengthen institutional capacity for crisis
management and consequence
management.
 For regional stability India and Pakistan
should evolve a strategic restraint regime
covering both nuclear and conventional
forces.

113. Question and
Answer

114. Thank You