Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 1 -
Homeland Security U.S. vs U.K
Strategy Comparison
Joy A. Bowman
HMSN 610, Section 9081
Dr. Sibel McGee
November 25, 2013
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 2 -
Abstract
The future paths of an intellectual state are often defined by the knowledge of past
occurrences. This holds true in the development of tactical security measures or models of
counterterrorism. The experience of terrorist activity on United States soil is vastly different
from that of the United Kingdom. September 11, 2001 was a defining moment in US history.
This pivotal moment could very well be added to the list of proverbial events referred to as ‘the
shot heard around the world’ and its resulting legacy identified for thrusting the U.S. and nations
around the globe into massive security restructuring activities. Prior to the 9/11 attacks the
citizens of the United States had not seen destruction of such a great magnitude since the events
of Peal Harbor in 1941. Neither had the U.S. engaged in any military conflicts on its home soil
since the Civil War ending in 1865. Unlike the U.S., the citizens of the United Kingdom have
endured centuries of conflict with Northern Ireland on its home soil. Each country’s post 9/11
national security model is a derivative of their pre-9/11 historic domestic terrorism perspectives.
The importance of the Homeland Security framework does not lie in the fundamental differences
between each nation but rather in their individual ability to identify threats human or natural,
protect their citizens, defend their critical infrastructures, and respond to disruptions. This paper
will present evidence that the post 9/11 strategies and the effectiveness of their current structures
are similar in many respects and face the same vulnerabilities under different governances. It
will focus on FBI, MI5, and their post 9/11 strategic changes in both countries’ homeland
security structures. Their differences will be examined as it relates to intelligence agency
structures, counterterrorism strategies, and national preparedness planning.
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 3 -
Introduction
Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap
(Galatians 6:7 kjv). On August 6, 1945, the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT was dropped the
city of Hiroshima; collectively delivering a blow of enormous proportions. Could this have been
the seed that reaped 9/11? The answer one may never know. However, we do know that once
again the arrogant bureaucracy of U.S. leadership framed in negligence, underestimation, and
communication breakdowns allowed a state of unpreparedness to memorialize 2 of the most
catastrophic events in American history.
The significance of 9/11 and its intelligence failures became the catalyst for change. The
U.S. intelligence community’s “failure to connect the dots” indicates that although the evidence
was there, failing to identify it was either beyond their abilities or the events were to
unfathomable to be credible Simonsen, and Spindlove (2010). This resulted in the need for
introspective analysis of current security structures, intelligence procedures, and preparation
planning for both the U.S. and the U.K.
Intelligence Structures
The American experience with domestic terrorist activities was minimal before 9/11. In
contrast, the U.K.’s longstanding history of conflict with Ireland allowed their homeland security
and national intelligence structures to be more proven than the U.S. The U.K., had a foundation
in terrorist group infiltration and an implemented functional relationship with the police which
allowed them to pursue more pre-emptive measures over the U.S capabilities.
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was responsible conducting
investigations as it related to our domestic terrorism events which predominantly occurred
overseas on the soil of our U.S. interests or territories. As a result of these limitations, their
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 4 -
national security protocol and subsequent investigative activities were reactionary in nature and
conducted as a means of prosecution rather than prevention. Furthermore, internal governmental
laws were not clearly understood and applied by intelligence professionals. This resulted in a
lack of information and collaboration that was vital for preventative measures to exist.
In his article 9/11: Before and After, Michael Chertoff reveals:
Under that legal architecture, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as well as a host of other statutes
and regulations, governed domestic intelligence collection. Exchange of information
collected by foreign and domestic agencies was determined by a strict set of rules that
were (perhaps somewhat incorrectly) interpreted as forbidding pure “intelligence”
information from being collected for law enforcement purposes, and – conversely – made
it difficult to share criminal justice-derived information with other agencies. When
terrorists were apprehended either in the United States or “abroad, they were [accorded]
the treatment of any other criminal defendant, including receiving warnings about the
right to silence, and a full-blown criminal jury trial” (Chertoff, 2011 “9/11: Before and
After,” pp. 1, para. 2).
The United Kingdom utilized a pre 9/11 Domestic Intelligence model, which separated
the responsibilities of prosecution or law enforcement and the collection of intelligence data.
There are three main security and intelligence branches that operate within this model. They
include The Security Service (MI5), The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),
and the focus of this paper The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6).
MI5 responsibilities included responding to a wide range of security threats that included
terrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass destruction, and organized crimes (as cited in
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 5 -
Burch, 2007, pp. 6, para. 1). Unlike the U.S. sharing, of intelligence information was required to
produce successful results from intelligence investigations. The efforts of MI5 operated in
cooperation with two branches of the London Police. The “Special Branch” responsible for
gathering intelligence information and the “Anti-Terrorist Branch” responsible for law
enforcement. (as cited in Foley, 2009, pp.447, para. 1). This distinction of labor efforts did not
allow MI5 arresting authority (Burch, 2007 and Foley, 2009), but left final arresting decisions
and execution efforts up to the police (Foley, 2009).
Counter-Terrorism Strategy
The US perceives the response required for threats against the nation vastly different
from the UK. The United States employs a two prong approach of military action and
diplomatic relations to sway the actions of potential threats. The UK focuses mainly on
diplomacy. The actions and emphasis of both nations post 9/11 focuses heavily on counter
terrorism. Additionally, the US places equal emphasis on homeland security.
“The early Bush administration’s National Strategy for Homeland Security defined
homeland security as ‘a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States, reduce US vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks
that do occur’” (Kamien, 2006, pp. 228). With this definition came a radical reorganization of
government agencies, a refocus of the intelligence operation, and the legislative induction of the
Homeland Security Act 2002 that produced the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The US National Strategy for Homeland Security defines 6 mission critical areas to
address prevention, vulnerability, response and recovery. They include “Intelligence and
Warning”, “Boarder and Transportation Security”, “Domestic counterterrorism”, “Protection of
critical infrastructures and key resources”, “Defense against catastrophic threats”, “Emergency
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 6 -
preparedness and response” (Kamien, 2006, pp. 228). This new and broad approach also
identified the four foundations of government required at all levels of command and sections of
society for successful implementation of the 6 mission areas. They were law, science &
technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation (Kamien, 2006).
The United Kingdom approach to counter-terrorism is organized around four principal
concepts: prevent, pursue, protect, prepare (Hammond, 2008, Introduction pp.219). This strategy,
referred to as “CONTEST” was unveiled in April 2004 (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko, & Woehrel.
(2006)). Proponents of this strategy as indicated by Archick et al. view this as a “dual-use of
measures” and argue the advantage of this (cost-effective) approach is that departments,
agencies, and first responders maintain their skills on a day-to-day basis. Society benefits from
these resources daily, but many of these same skills and resources can also be used in response to
a terrorist incident.
Both nations have actively developed homeland security structures aimed at reducing the
risk of terrorist activity against their nations, citizens, and offshore interests. Likewise, both
strategies have re-defined their perspective approaches in this vein and require extensive
collaboration and cooperation across multiple bureaucratic entities. However, the U.S. model is
very robust and wide sweeping, employing the efforts of 16 departmental components.
Conversely, the UK inter-governmental model is more centralized and concise. This avoids
bureaucratic confusion present in the U.S. structure and provides a little more flexibility in the
use of assets and event responses.
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 7 -
National Preparedness
Initial structures of this preparedness program followed a two year span; beginning in
1993 terrorist activity in and against the U.S. forced authorities to action. Beginning with a
presidential directive to call for increased federal agency efforts (which did not provide funding)
and was followed Congressional legislation. This was followed with the establishment of several
teams and tasks forces across multiple agencies, and great uncertainty in where leadership
responsibilities should lie. Unfortunately, the event of 9/11 placed the U.S. National un-
Preparedness program to center stage. Unlike the U.S., the U.K. preparedness structure has been
a function of its evolving strategies for security. The events of 9/11 identified the need to
enhance these functions, but not radically reform them.
In an effort to set initial mission goals, the United States DHS used the above indicated
definition of homeland security. However, the essential definition is “combating terrorists and
their threat to domestic targets including secondary effects on the economy or other social
functions - is often used interchangeably with the broader concept of national preparedness”
(Kamien, 2006). The United States preparedness strategy aims to define the protocol by which
we respond to emergency and disaster events – natural and human inflicted. Officially it is
defined as the “existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the
federal, state, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from
major events” (as cited in Kamien, 2006). This definition promotes a preparedness protocol
which is all inclusive of major disasters terrorist events, and all other identified emergencies –
aka all-hazards. However, as with initiatives within the homeland security structure there
remains a high level of ambiguity and unclear roles of responsibility.
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 8 -
The UK adopted “a multi-agency approach to crisis management, a framework that
embodies the same principles irrespective of the cause or nature of the incident, but remains
adaptable to individual circumstances. Program planning follows a protocol where the
department that has the greatest knowledge of the threat takes the point role in the overall
response. This includes horizontal connections that unite different agencies and ministries, and
vertical command and control (Jones, 2005). As part of their continuous efforts, they regularly
conduct practice exercises for their assets to practice their response to disaster and emergency
events.
Conclusion
The post 9/11 urgency was the impetus for the complete restructuring of existing
intelligence architecture and the development of new homeland security strategies in the United
States. The U.S. homeland security strategy for success in the “War on Terrorism” focuses on
the immediate use of military and economic sanctions to eliminate potential threats. The
sustainable strategy includes an added focus on international relations and peacekeeping. The
main focus of the intelligence agency architecture included the creates of DHS and associated
departments, the refocusing of the FBI and Department of Justice’s structure and priorities, and
the realignment of other government agencies like the Department of Transportation under the
DHS umbrella.
For the U.K., 9/11 revealed a need to modify their model to pursue one of preventive and
administrative activities. They redirected threat matrix’s to make the Islamic terrorism threat as
their central focus. The overall scope and organizational structure was modified to support a
tighter scope which included the creation of two new entities; the umbrella for all UK
counterterrorism efforts and the other for all other areas of focus.
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 9 -
The National Security structures of both the UN and UK are very similar their
implementation and execution efforts are determined by each of their individual democratic
model. In general, the restructuring changes of both of these nations are more aligned with each
other and support information sharing operations domestically and abroad. However, regardless
of their individual improvements they both continue to be plagued with information sharing
challenges across inter-government agencies as well as international government agencies.
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 10 -
References
Archick, K., Ek, C., Gallis, P., Miko, F. T., & Woehrel, S. (2006, July). European approaches to
homeland security and counterterrorism. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON
DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Burch, J. (2007). A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative
Analysis of Domestic Intelligence Agencies and Their Implications for Homeland
Security. Homeland Security Affairs, 3(2).
Chertoff, M. (2011). 9/11: Before and After. Homeland Security Affairs 7, 10 Years After: The
9/11 Essays (September 2011). Retrieved from http://www.hsaj.org/?article=7.2.13
Foley, F. (2009). Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in
Britain and France. Security Studies, 18(3), 435-478. doi:10.1080/09636410903132920
Fry-Pierce, C. C., & Lenze Jr., P. E. (2011). Bioterrorism and U.S. Domestic Preparedness:
Bureaucratic Fragmentation and American Vulnerability. Journal Of Homeland Security
& Emergency Management, 8(1), 1-16. doi:10.2202/1547-7355.1887
Hammond, A. (2008). Two countries divided by a common threat? International
perceptions of US and UK counter-terrorism and homeland security responses to the
post-September 2001 threat environment. Place branding and public diplomacy, 4(3),
218-239.
Kamien, D. G. (2006). The Mcgraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook.
Jones, D. (2005). Structures of Bio-terrorism Preparedness in the UK and the US: Responses to
9/11 and the Anthrax Attacks. British Journal Of Politics & International Relations, 7(3),
340-352. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00189.x
Homeland Security U.S. vs. U.K - 11 -
Simonsen, C. E., & Spindlove, J. R. (2010). Terrorism today: The past, the players, the future.
Upper Saddle River, NJ:Prentice Hall.

JBowmanResearchPaper

  • 1.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 1 - Homeland Security U.S. vs U.K Strategy Comparison Joy A. Bowman HMSN 610, Section 9081 Dr. Sibel McGee November 25, 2013
  • 2.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 2 - Abstract The future paths of an intellectual state are often defined by the knowledge of past occurrences. This holds true in the development of tactical security measures or models of counterterrorism. The experience of terrorist activity on United States soil is vastly different from that of the United Kingdom. September 11, 2001 was a defining moment in US history. This pivotal moment could very well be added to the list of proverbial events referred to as ‘the shot heard around the world’ and its resulting legacy identified for thrusting the U.S. and nations around the globe into massive security restructuring activities. Prior to the 9/11 attacks the citizens of the United States had not seen destruction of such a great magnitude since the events of Peal Harbor in 1941. Neither had the U.S. engaged in any military conflicts on its home soil since the Civil War ending in 1865. Unlike the U.S., the citizens of the United Kingdom have endured centuries of conflict with Northern Ireland on its home soil. Each country’s post 9/11 national security model is a derivative of their pre-9/11 historic domestic terrorism perspectives. The importance of the Homeland Security framework does not lie in the fundamental differences between each nation but rather in their individual ability to identify threats human or natural, protect their citizens, defend their critical infrastructures, and respond to disruptions. This paper will present evidence that the post 9/11 strategies and the effectiveness of their current structures are similar in many respects and face the same vulnerabilities under different governances. It will focus on FBI, MI5, and their post 9/11 strategic changes in both countries’ homeland security structures. Their differences will be examined as it relates to intelligence agency structures, counterterrorism strategies, and national preparedness planning.
  • 3.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 3 - Introduction Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap (Galatians 6:7 kjv). On August 6, 1945, the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT was dropped the city of Hiroshima; collectively delivering a blow of enormous proportions. Could this have been the seed that reaped 9/11? The answer one may never know. However, we do know that once again the arrogant bureaucracy of U.S. leadership framed in negligence, underestimation, and communication breakdowns allowed a state of unpreparedness to memorialize 2 of the most catastrophic events in American history. The significance of 9/11 and its intelligence failures became the catalyst for change. The U.S. intelligence community’s “failure to connect the dots” indicates that although the evidence was there, failing to identify it was either beyond their abilities or the events were to unfathomable to be credible Simonsen, and Spindlove (2010). This resulted in the need for introspective analysis of current security structures, intelligence procedures, and preparation planning for both the U.S. and the U.K. Intelligence Structures The American experience with domestic terrorist activities was minimal before 9/11. In contrast, the U.K.’s longstanding history of conflict with Ireland allowed their homeland security and national intelligence structures to be more proven than the U.S. The U.K., had a foundation in terrorist group infiltration and an implemented functional relationship with the police which allowed them to pursue more pre-emptive measures over the U.S capabilities. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was responsible conducting investigations as it related to our domestic terrorism events which predominantly occurred overseas on the soil of our U.S. interests or territories. As a result of these limitations, their
  • 4.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 4 - national security protocol and subsequent investigative activities were reactionary in nature and conducted as a means of prosecution rather than prevention. Furthermore, internal governmental laws were not clearly understood and applied by intelligence professionals. This resulted in a lack of information and collaboration that was vital for preventative measures to exist. In his article 9/11: Before and After, Michael Chertoff reveals: Under that legal architecture, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as well as a host of other statutes and regulations, governed domestic intelligence collection. Exchange of information collected by foreign and domestic agencies was determined by a strict set of rules that were (perhaps somewhat incorrectly) interpreted as forbidding pure “intelligence” information from being collected for law enforcement purposes, and – conversely – made it difficult to share criminal justice-derived information with other agencies. When terrorists were apprehended either in the United States or “abroad, they were [accorded] the treatment of any other criminal defendant, including receiving warnings about the right to silence, and a full-blown criminal jury trial” (Chertoff, 2011 “9/11: Before and After,” pp. 1, para. 2). The United Kingdom utilized a pre 9/11 Domestic Intelligence model, which separated the responsibilities of prosecution or law enforcement and the collection of intelligence data. There are three main security and intelligence branches that operate within this model. They include The Security Service (MI5), The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the focus of this paper The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6). MI5 responsibilities included responding to a wide range of security threats that included terrorism, counterintelligence, weapons of mass destruction, and organized crimes (as cited in
  • 5.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 5 - Burch, 2007, pp. 6, para. 1). Unlike the U.S. sharing, of intelligence information was required to produce successful results from intelligence investigations. The efforts of MI5 operated in cooperation with two branches of the London Police. The “Special Branch” responsible for gathering intelligence information and the “Anti-Terrorist Branch” responsible for law enforcement. (as cited in Foley, 2009, pp.447, para. 1). This distinction of labor efforts did not allow MI5 arresting authority (Burch, 2007 and Foley, 2009), but left final arresting decisions and execution efforts up to the police (Foley, 2009). Counter-Terrorism Strategy The US perceives the response required for threats against the nation vastly different from the UK. The United States employs a two prong approach of military action and diplomatic relations to sway the actions of potential threats. The UK focuses mainly on diplomacy. The actions and emphasis of both nations post 9/11 focuses heavily on counter terrorism. Additionally, the US places equal emphasis on homeland security. “The early Bush administration’s National Strategy for Homeland Security defined homeland security as ‘a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce US vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur’” (Kamien, 2006, pp. 228). With this definition came a radical reorganization of government agencies, a refocus of the intelligence operation, and the legislative induction of the Homeland Security Act 2002 that produced the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The US National Strategy for Homeland Security defines 6 mission critical areas to address prevention, vulnerability, response and recovery. They include “Intelligence and Warning”, “Boarder and Transportation Security”, “Domestic counterterrorism”, “Protection of critical infrastructures and key resources”, “Defense against catastrophic threats”, “Emergency
  • 6.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 6 - preparedness and response” (Kamien, 2006, pp. 228). This new and broad approach also identified the four foundations of government required at all levels of command and sections of society for successful implementation of the 6 mission areas. They were law, science & technology, information sharing and systems, and international cooperation (Kamien, 2006). The United Kingdom approach to counter-terrorism is organized around four principal concepts: prevent, pursue, protect, prepare (Hammond, 2008, Introduction pp.219). This strategy, referred to as “CONTEST” was unveiled in April 2004 (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko, & Woehrel. (2006)). Proponents of this strategy as indicated by Archick et al. view this as a “dual-use of measures” and argue the advantage of this (cost-effective) approach is that departments, agencies, and first responders maintain their skills on a day-to-day basis. Society benefits from these resources daily, but many of these same skills and resources can also be used in response to a terrorist incident. Both nations have actively developed homeland security structures aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist activity against their nations, citizens, and offshore interests. Likewise, both strategies have re-defined their perspective approaches in this vein and require extensive collaboration and cooperation across multiple bureaucratic entities. However, the U.S. model is very robust and wide sweeping, employing the efforts of 16 departmental components. Conversely, the UK inter-governmental model is more centralized and concise. This avoids bureaucratic confusion present in the U.S. structure and provides a little more flexibility in the use of assets and event responses.
  • 7.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 7 - National Preparedness Initial structures of this preparedness program followed a two year span; beginning in 1993 terrorist activity in and against the U.S. forced authorities to action. Beginning with a presidential directive to call for increased federal agency efforts (which did not provide funding) and was followed Congressional legislation. This was followed with the establishment of several teams and tasks forces across multiple agencies, and great uncertainty in where leadership responsibilities should lie. Unfortunately, the event of 9/11 placed the U.S. National un- Preparedness program to center stage. Unlike the U.S., the U.K. preparedness structure has been a function of its evolving strategies for security. The events of 9/11 identified the need to enhance these functions, but not radically reform them. In an effort to set initial mission goals, the United States DHS used the above indicated definition of homeland security. However, the essential definition is “combating terrorists and their threat to domestic targets including secondary effects on the economy or other social functions - is often used interchangeably with the broader concept of national preparedness” (Kamien, 2006). The United States preparedness strategy aims to define the protocol by which we respond to emergency and disaster events – natural and human inflicted. Officially it is defined as the “existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the federal, state, and local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events” (as cited in Kamien, 2006). This definition promotes a preparedness protocol which is all inclusive of major disasters terrorist events, and all other identified emergencies – aka all-hazards. However, as with initiatives within the homeland security structure there remains a high level of ambiguity and unclear roles of responsibility.
  • 8.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 8 - The UK adopted “a multi-agency approach to crisis management, a framework that embodies the same principles irrespective of the cause or nature of the incident, but remains adaptable to individual circumstances. Program planning follows a protocol where the department that has the greatest knowledge of the threat takes the point role in the overall response. This includes horizontal connections that unite different agencies and ministries, and vertical command and control (Jones, 2005). As part of their continuous efforts, they regularly conduct practice exercises for their assets to practice their response to disaster and emergency events. Conclusion The post 9/11 urgency was the impetus for the complete restructuring of existing intelligence architecture and the development of new homeland security strategies in the United States. The U.S. homeland security strategy for success in the “War on Terrorism” focuses on the immediate use of military and economic sanctions to eliminate potential threats. The sustainable strategy includes an added focus on international relations and peacekeeping. The main focus of the intelligence agency architecture included the creates of DHS and associated departments, the refocusing of the FBI and Department of Justice’s structure and priorities, and the realignment of other government agencies like the Department of Transportation under the DHS umbrella. For the U.K., 9/11 revealed a need to modify their model to pursue one of preventive and administrative activities. They redirected threat matrix’s to make the Islamic terrorism threat as their central focus. The overall scope and organizational structure was modified to support a tighter scope which included the creation of two new entities; the umbrella for all UK counterterrorism efforts and the other for all other areas of focus.
  • 9.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 9 - The National Security structures of both the UN and UK are very similar their implementation and execution efforts are determined by each of their individual democratic model. In general, the restructuring changes of both of these nations are more aligned with each other and support information sharing operations domestically and abroad. However, regardless of their individual improvements they both continue to be plagued with information sharing challenges across inter-government agencies as well as international government agencies.
  • 10.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 10 - References Archick, K., Ek, C., Gallis, P., Miko, F. T., & Woehrel, S. (2006, July). European approaches to homeland security and counterterrorism. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE Burch, J. (2007). A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative Analysis of Domestic Intelligence Agencies and Their Implications for Homeland Security. Homeland Security Affairs, 3(2). Chertoff, M. (2011). 9/11: Before and After. Homeland Security Affairs 7, 10 Years After: The 9/11 Essays (September 2011). Retrieved from http://www.hsaj.org/?article=7.2.13 Foley, F. (2009). Reforming Counterterrorism: Institutions and Organizational Routines in Britain and France. Security Studies, 18(3), 435-478. doi:10.1080/09636410903132920 Fry-Pierce, C. C., & Lenze Jr., P. E. (2011). Bioterrorism and U.S. Domestic Preparedness: Bureaucratic Fragmentation and American Vulnerability. Journal Of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 8(1), 1-16. doi:10.2202/1547-7355.1887 Hammond, A. (2008). Two countries divided by a common threat? International perceptions of US and UK counter-terrorism and homeland security responses to the post-September 2001 threat environment. Place branding and public diplomacy, 4(3), 218-239. Kamien, D. G. (2006). The Mcgraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook. Jones, D. (2005). Structures of Bio-terrorism Preparedness in the UK and the US: Responses to 9/11 and the Anthrax Attacks. British Journal Of Politics & International Relations, 7(3), 340-352. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856X.2005.00189.x
  • 11.
    Homeland Security U.S.vs. U.K - 11 - Simonsen, C. E., & Spindlove, J. R. (2010). Terrorism today: The past, the players, the future. Upper Saddle River, NJ:Prentice Hall.