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Traffic Analysis for Peering, and
Security
Utilizing xFlow Technologies
August 2014
Julie Liu
Agenda
 What is xFlow Technology?
 What values can xFlow propose to xSPs?
 Traffic Visibility for Peering Analysis
 Infrastructure Security
What is xFlow Technology?
(A quick foreword, in case you are not familiar with it…)
 Definition of a Flow
 A unidirectional set of packets that arrive at a router on the same
interface, have the same source/destination IP addresses, Layer
4 protocol, TCP/UDP source/destination ports, and the same
ToS byte in the IP headers
 A technology to gather
information on
forwarded packets
 In router/switch caches
 And exported to collectors
Client
Server
Request
Response
TWO flows for ONE TCP connection
Client ServerContent
ONE flow for ONE UDP Stream
Flow Cache Table
• Active Timeout
• Inactive timeout
How xFlow Can Benefit xSPs?
Traffic
Matrix
Visibility
Security
Protection
Capacity
Planning
xFlow
Collection
& Analysis
Traffic
Engineer-
ing
Peering
Analysis
Anomaly
Detection
In-cloud
Mitigation
TRAFFIC MATRIX VISIBILITY
Traffic
Matrix
Visibility
Security
Protection
Capacity
Planning
xFlow
Collection
& Analysis
Traffic
Engineer-
ing
Peering
Analysis
Anomaly
Detection
In-cloud
Mitigation
Why Traffic Matrix Visibility?
 Traffic Matrix Visibility
 The amount of data transmitted between every pair of network
"instances" (router-level, Pop-level, network-level)
 Provide end-to-end, network-wide traffic visibility, in contrast to
the individual link load stats
 Traffic Matrix Visibility for what purposes?
 Capacity planning (build capacity where needed)
 Traffic engineering (steer traffic where capacity is available)
 Peering Analysis (support peering decisions, TE at the border)
 Better understand traffic patterns (what is normal or abnormal)
Challenges of xFlow Only
Flow duplicates
 Collect from where?
 Usually multiple Flow measurement sources in a data path
 However, if collecting from multiple
xFlow sources in a data path, will
duplicate the Flow data results for
counting traffic toward a network
instance
 Network topology data is
needed!
Count once on the
network boundary
of the instance to
be monitored
Challenges of xFlow Only
From point into path measurements
 xFlow only
 Can tell you where traffic is going now
 Some simple information about origin-AS or peer-AS
 Not only peer or origin, the transit ASes also matter!
 Embed a BGP (passive) peer on the Flow Collector to correlate
Flow data with all the BGP attributes (path, communities, etc.)
 Use of full AS Path information to determine where traffic is
going and coming from and how existing transit/peer is used
 BGP carries the topology (i.e. path) information helps extend
local measure view to completely across the Internet
Peering Analysis
What is Peering? (Just a quick reminder…)
 What is Peering?
 The Internet is a collection of many individual networks (ASes),
who interconnect with each other under the common framework
of ensuring global reachability between any two points
 There are 3 primary positions for this interconnection:
 Transit Provider – Typically someone you pay money to, who has
the responsibility of routing your packets to/from the entire Internet
 Transit Customer – Typically someone who pays you money, with
the expectation that you will route their packets to/from the entire
Internet
 Peer – Two networks who get together and agree to exchange
traffic between each others’ networks, typically for free
Peering Analysis
Peering and its benefits…
 One major benefit of Peering
 Reduced operating costs
 Peering traffic is “free”. If you no longer pay a transit provider to
deliver some portion of your traffic, it reduces your transit bills
Provider
A
Provider
B
Provider
C
Customer
Customer Customer Customer
Customer
Customer
Multi-homed
Customer
Peering
Transit
Peering Analysis
Why traffic visibility for Peering?
 To decide if you should peer with a new network
 To convince other networks to peer with you
 To manage traffic engineering to other networks
 To defend your network against depeering actions
 To make intelligent transit purchasing decisions
Peering Analysis
Peering traffic requirements
 Traffic Volume
 A peer may be required to exchange a certain minimum amount
of traffic to be considered
 Traffic Ratios
 Inbound vs. outbound traffic ratio
 Traffic is “hot potato” routed (i.e. get it off your network ASAP)
 Push traffic coming from Network A gets hauled primarily by
Network B, and vice versa
 If the ratio is 1:1, both peers share backhaul costs equally
 Others: PoP requirements, interconnect locations, routing stability,
operations requirements, business concerns…
Peering Analysis
Peering evaluation questions
" A Business Case for Peering," William B. Norton
Does the AS send me about as much traffic as I send to it?
How much of the traffic originates from the potential peer?
Does the volume of traffic justify a direct peering effort?
How much traffic is transited through the potential peer?
AS101
AS100
AS21
ASC
AS23
AS4
AS1
AS2
AS3
Home
Internet
Peer AS
Origin AS
Transit AS
Peering Analysis
Route-flow fusion analysis answers this…
" A Business Case for Peering," William B. Norton
Source-sink/transit traffic distribution
TopN ASNs sourcing-sinking/transiting traffic with me1
In/Out traffic ratio2
3
Peering Analysis
Peering cost analysis
 In theory, peering is “free” right?
 The fact is that the overhead associated with peering can be
higher than transit costs (if the peered traffic is not huge enough)
 How much does it save/ cost?
Which transit
provider(s)?
How much transit traffic
can be offloaded?
US$
Internet
Transit Price
Transit A $1.6 per Mbps
Transit B $1.8 per Mbps
Transit C $1.2 per Mbps
AS101
AS100
AS21Peer
Candidate
AS23
AS4
Transit A
Transit B
Transit C
Home
Internet
SECURITY PROTECTION
Traffic
Matrix
Visibility
Security
Protection
Capacity
Planning
xFlow
Collection
& Analysis
Traffic
Engineer-
ing
Peering
Analysis
Anomaly
Detection
In-cloud
Mitigation
Infrastructure Security Threats
DDoS attacks
DDoS attack traffic
consumes SP network
capacity
DDoS attack traffic
saturates in-line security
devices
DDoS attacks launched
from compromised
systems (bots)
DDoS attack traffic
targets applications and
services
Internet
Service Provider
Network
Enterprise or
IDC
Bots
Victim
Why traditional in-line security solution fails preventing infrastructure security threats?
Volumetric attacks must be removed from the cloud
Tradition security products are easy targets of it (stateful in-line solution)
Deployment costs
Single point of failure and latency
Anomaly traffic
Normal traffic
Infrastructure Security
A Flow-based solution
 Flow-based solution building blocks
Flow-based
Learning
Flow-based
Detection
Cloud-based
Mitigation
•Network-wide: Collects xFlow
data from various router locations
and correlates the data into a
comprehensive network model
•Dynamic Behaviour Analysis:
During peace time, the system
creates a network-wide view of the
traffic patterns and learns
thresholds for representing 'what
is 'normal'
•Detection Engines:
compare the collected
real-time Flow data
and thresholds
•Once significant
threshold violations
identified, the system
sends alarms and
enable cloud-based
mitigation actions
•Cloud-based
mitigation
action options:
- Remote
Triggered Black
Hole (RTBH)
- BGP FlowSpec
-OOP Traffic
Cleaning
Flow-based Learning & Detection
The idea
 Flow-based Network Behavior Anomaly Detection
(NBAD)
 DOES:
 Analyze Flows data (IP header info, byte/pkt count) from routers
 Detect anomalies by observing network traffic behaviors – knowing
what is normal, and hence identify abnormal when it happens
 DOESN'T:
 Analyze L7, packet contents from raw packets
 Detect anomalies by matching content signatures – knowing what is
bad, and then catch the bad from the good
 First-line protection for the network infrastructure
 Trading DPI precision off for carrier-grade scalability and performance
Flow-based Learning & Detection
Network behavior analysis examples
What's Normal? What can be Abnormal? Example
A server accepts requests
from clients
Over 5,000 SYN requests per
second and lasts over 3 minutes
TCP SYN Flooding
A client connects to few
destination hosts / ports
Over 100 connection requests per
second to destination hosts / ports
Port Scan / IP Scan
Various packet sizes Fixed packet size (e.g. UDP/1434,
packet size = 404)
SQL Slammer
The source address ≠ the
destination address
The source address is the same as
the destination address
LAND Attack
The traffic rate for this
network scope is usually
around 150M bps
Over 180M bps traffic rate appears
in this network scope
Zero-day attack
(generic traffic
floods)
Flow-based Learning & Detection
The mechanisms
 Flow-based NBADMechanism Type Detection Engine Examples
Fingerprint-based
Protocol anomaly TCP Flag Null, IP Fragment, IP Protocol Null,
Land Attack, Ping of death, TCP XMAS attack…
Flood attack ICMP Flooding, UDP Flooding, TCP SYN
Flooding, TCP RST Flooding, TCP ACK Flooding…
Specific behaviour
attack
IP Scan, Port Scan, DNS Flooding, e-Mail Spam,
Trojan Heloag, MS Blaster, Sasser, Code Red,
SQL Slammer…
Baseline Heuristic Baseline deviation Zero-day attacks (generic traffic floods)
1-Jul 11-Jul 21-Jul 31-Jul
TrafficLevel
Learning peacetime Flow data samples
"Baseline": what is the "normal"
traffic rates?
Infrastructure Security
Cloud-based mitigation with RTBH
All traffic to the victim is
discarded
Remotely triggered black
hole filtering at SP edge
BGP prefix with next-
hop set to a pre-defined
black hole route
Internet Service Provider
Network
Enterprise or
IDC
Bots
Victim
RTBH RTBH
Anomaly traffic
Normal traffic
BGP announcement
Infrastructure Security
Cloud-based mitigation w/ BGP FlowSpec
Suspicious traffic recognized is
filtered at the SP network edge
Only filtered traffic is delivered
to the enterprise/IDC network
BGP FlowSpec
distributes traffic filter
lists to routers
Internet Service Provider
Network
Enterprise or
IDC
Bots
Victim
 RFC 5575;Selectively drop traffic flows based on L3/L4 information
FlowSpec
Anomaly traffic
Normal traffic
BGP FlowSpec
FlowSpec
Infrastructure Security
Cloud-based mitigation w/ OOP cleaning
Suspicious traffic is diverted at the
SP network edge
Divert victim prefix
traffic via BGP
Internet Service Provider
Network
Enterprise or
IDC
Bots
Victim
 The "Cleaning Centre" is typically a shared resource in the network infrastructure to
reduce the deployment costs
Malicious traffic
Benign traffic
BGP announcement
Cleaned traffic
tunnelled back
DPI-capable mitigation appliance
(application-layer attack,
asymmetric detection)
Cleaning
Centre
No impacts to
other traffic to
other networks
Infrastructure Security
xFlow-based OOP solution value proposition
Flow Technology
Network Resource Impact Issues
 NetFlow data volume? 1K FPS ≒ 338K bps NetFlow traffic
 However, to estimate Flows/ second based on the given network traffic
bps is a much more complex task!
 Typically 1~4% link rate
 Leverage data reduction techniques:
 Partial coverage (i.e. a few POPs, selective boundaries)
 Tune the active & inactive timeouts
 Flow Sampling
 In addition to the data volume, 'full NetFlow’ may inflict a burden on
memory and router CPU intensive. Therefore sampled xFlow is
preferred…
Flow/sec Pkt/sec Byte/sec bps
1,000 33 49,500 338.37K
Flow Technology
Flow Sampling
 To alleviate the performance penalty incurred by
turning on xFlow on routers
 Allow users to sample one out of every “N” IP packets being forwarded
(a user can configure the “N” interval)
 Substantially decreases the CPU utilization needed to account for
Flow packets
 CPU utilization varies, depending on the sampling rate and the routers
 Example:
 Cisco 12000 Series Router to handle 65K flows
 In “full-flow” mode required 24% more CPU; the same router using 1:100
sampling required only 3% additional CPU
 Cisco 7500 Router
References
 Yann Berthier, "NetFlow to guard the infrastructure," NANOG 39,
2007
 Thomas Telkamp, “Best Practices for Determining the Traffic Matrix
in IP Networks V 3.0,” NANOG 39, 2007
 Richard A Steenbergen, "A Guide to Peering on the Internet,"
NANOG 51, 2011
 William B. Norton, " A Business Case for Peering in 2010,"
http://drpeering.net/white-papers/A-Business-Case-For-Peering.php
 RFC 5575, Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules
 Leonardo Serodio, "Traffic Diversion Techniques for DDoS
Mitigation using BGP Flowspec," NANOG 58, 2013
 Cisco Systems Inc., "NetFlow Performance Analysis," 2007

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Traffic analysis for Planning, Peering and Security by Julie Liu

  • 1. Traffic Analysis for Peering, and Security Utilizing xFlow Technologies August 2014 Julie Liu
  • 2. Agenda  What is xFlow Technology?  What values can xFlow propose to xSPs?  Traffic Visibility for Peering Analysis  Infrastructure Security
  • 3. What is xFlow Technology? (A quick foreword, in case you are not familiar with it…)  Definition of a Flow  A unidirectional set of packets that arrive at a router on the same interface, have the same source/destination IP addresses, Layer 4 protocol, TCP/UDP source/destination ports, and the same ToS byte in the IP headers  A technology to gather information on forwarded packets  In router/switch caches  And exported to collectors Client Server Request Response TWO flows for ONE TCP connection Client ServerContent ONE flow for ONE UDP Stream Flow Cache Table • Active Timeout • Inactive timeout
  • 4. How xFlow Can Benefit xSPs? Traffic Matrix Visibility Security Protection Capacity Planning xFlow Collection & Analysis Traffic Engineer- ing Peering Analysis Anomaly Detection In-cloud Mitigation
  • 5. TRAFFIC MATRIX VISIBILITY Traffic Matrix Visibility Security Protection Capacity Planning xFlow Collection & Analysis Traffic Engineer- ing Peering Analysis Anomaly Detection In-cloud Mitigation
  • 6. Why Traffic Matrix Visibility?  Traffic Matrix Visibility  The amount of data transmitted between every pair of network "instances" (router-level, Pop-level, network-level)  Provide end-to-end, network-wide traffic visibility, in contrast to the individual link load stats  Traffic Matrix Visibility for what purposes?  Capacity planning (build capacity where needed)  Traffic engineering (steer traffic where capacity is available)  Peering Analysis (support peering decisions, TE at the border)  Better understand traffic patterns (what is normal or abnormal)
  • 7. Challenges of xFlow Only Flow duplicates  Collect from where?  Usually multiple Flow measurement sources in a data path  However, if collecting from multiple xFlow sources in a data path, will duplicate the Flow data results for counting traffic toward a network instance  Network topology data is needed! Count once on the network boundary of the instance to be monitored
  • 8. Challenges of xFlow Only From point into path measurements  xFlow only  Can tell you where traffic is going now  Some simple information about origin-AS or peer-AS  Not only peer or origin, the transit ASes also matter!  Embed a BGP (passive) peer on the Flow Collector to correlate Flow data with all the BGP attributes (path, communities, etc.)  Use of full AS Path information to determine where traffic is going and coming from and how existing transit/peer is used  BGP carries the topology (i.e. path) information helps extend local measure view to completely across the Internet
  • 9. Peering Analysis What is Peering? (Just a quick reminder…)  What is Peering?  The Internet is a collection of many individual networks (ASes), who interconnect with each other under the common framework of ensuring global reachability between any two points  There are 3 primary positions for this interconnection:  Transit Provider – Typically someone you pay money to, who has the responsibility of routing your packets to/from the entire Internet  Transit Customer – Typically someone who pays you money, with the expectation that you will route their packets to/from the entire Internet  Peer – Two networks who get together and agree to exchange traffic between each others’ networks, typically for free
  • 10. Peering Analysis Peering and its benefits…  One major benefit of Peering  Reduced operating costs  Peering traffic is “free”. If you no longer pay a transit provider to deliver some portion of your traffic, it reduces your transit bills Provider A Provider B Provider C Customer Customer Customer Customer Customer Customer Multi-homed Customer Peering Transit
  • 11. Peering Analysis Why traffic visibility for Peering?  To decide if you should peer with a new network  To convince other networks to peer with you  To manage traffic engineering to other networks  To defend your network against depeering actions  To make intelligent transit purchasing decisions
  • 12. Peering Analysis Peering traffic requirements  Traffic Volume  A peer may be required to exchange a certain minimum amount of traffic to be considered  Traffic Ratios  Inbound vs. outbound traffic ratio  Traffic is “hot potato” routed (i.e. get it off your network ASAP)  Push traffic coming from Network A gets hauled primarily by Network B, and vice versa  If the ratio is 1:1, both peers share backhaul costs equally  Others: PoP requirements, interconnect locations, routing stability, operations requirements, business concerns…
  • 13. Peering Analysis Peering evaluation questions " A Business Case for Peering," William B. Norton Does the AS send me about as much traffic as I send to it? How much of the traffic originates from the potential peer? Does the volume of traffic justify a direct peering effort? How much traffic is transited through the potential peer? AS101 AS100 AS21 ASC AS23 AS4 AS1 AS2 AS3 Home Internet Peer AS Origin AS Transit AS
  • 14. Peering Analysis Route-flow fusion analysis answers this… " A Business Case for Peering," William B. Norton Source-sink/transit traffic distribution TopN ASNs sourcing-sinking/transiting traffic with me1 In/Out traffic ratio2 3
  • 15. Peering Analysis Peering cost analysis  In theory, peering is “free” right?  The fact is that the overhead associated with peering can be higher than transit costs (if the peered traffic is not huge enough)  How much does it save/ cost? Which transit provider(s)? How much transit traffic can be offloaded? US$ Internet Transit Price Transit A $1.6 per Mbps Transit B $1.8 per Mbps Transit C $1.2 per Mbps AS101 AS100 AS21Peer Candidate AS23 AS4 Transit A Transit B Transit C Home Internet
  • 17. Infrastructure Security Threats DDoS attacks DDoS attack traffic consumes SP network capacity DDoS attack traffic saturates in-line security devices DDoS attacks launched from compromised systems (bots) DDoS attack traffic targets applications and services Internet Service Provider Network Enterprise or IDC Bots Victim Why traditional in-line security solution fails preventing infrastructure security threats? Volumetric attacks must be removed from the cloud Tradition security products are easy targets of it (stateful in-line solution) Deployment costs Single point of failure and latency Anomaly traffic Normal traffic
  • 18. Infrastructure Security A Flow-based solution  Flow-based solution building blocks Flow-based Learning Flow-based Detection Cloud-based Mitigation •Network-wide: Collects xFlow data from various router locations and correlates the data into a comprehensive network model •Dynamic Behaviour Analysis: During peace time, the system creates a network-wide view of the traffic patterns and learns thresholds for representing 'what is 'normal' •Detection Engines: compare the collected real-time Flow data and thresholds •Once significant threshold violations identified, the system sends alarms and enable cloud-based mitigation actions •Cloud-based mitigation action options: - Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH) - BGP FlowSpec -OOP Traffic Cleaning
  • 19. Flow-based Learning & Detection The idea  Flow-based Network Behavior Anomaly Detection (NBAD)  DOES:  Analyze Flows data (IP header info, byte/pkt count) from routers  Detect anomalies by observing network traffic behaviors – knowing what is normal, and hence identify abnormal when it happens  DOESN'T:  Analyze L7, packet contents from raw packets  Detect anomalies by matching content signatures – knowing what is bad, and then catch the bad from the good  First-line protection for the network infrastructure  Trading DPI precision off for carrier-grade scalability and performance
  • 20. Flow-based Learning & Detection Network behavior analysis examples What's Normal? What can be Abnormal? Example A server accepts requests from clients Over 5,000 SYN requests per second and lasts over 3 minutes TCP SYN Flooding A client connects to few destination hosts / ports Over 100 connection requests per second to destination hosts / ports Port Scan / IP Scan Various packet sizes Fixed packet size (e.g. UDP/1434, packet size = 404) SQL Slammer The source address ≠ the destination address The source address is the same as the destination address LAND Attack The traffic rate for this network scope is usually around 150M bps Over 180M bps traffic rate appears in this network scope Zero-day attack (generic traffic floods)
  • 21. Flow-based Learning & Detection The mechanisms  Flow-based NBADMechanism Type Detection Engine Examples Fingerprint-based Protocol anomaly TCP Flag Null, IP Fragment, IP Protocol Null, Land Attack, Ping of death, TCP XMAS attack… Flood attack ICMP Flooding, UDP Flooding, TCP SYN Flooding, TCP RST Flooding, TCP ACK Flooding… Specific behaviour attack IP Scan, Port Scan, DNS Flooding, e-Mail Spam, Trojan Heloag, MS Blaster, Sasser, Code Red, SQL Slammer… Baseline Heuristic Baseline deviation Zero-day attacks (generic traffic floods) 1-Jul 11-Jul 21-Jul 31-Jul TrafficLevel Learning peacetime Flow data samples "Baseline": what is the "normal" traffic rates?
  • 22. Infrastructure Security Cloud-based mitigation with RTBH All traffic to the victim is discarded Remotely triggered black hole filtering at SP edge BGP prefix with next- hop set to a pre-defined black hole route Internet Service Provider Network Enterprise or IDC Bots Victim RTBH RTBH Anomaly traffic Normal traffic BGP announcement
  • 23. Infrastructure Security Cloud-based mitigation w/ BGP FlowSpec Suspicious traffic recognized is filtered at the SP network edge Only filtered traffic is delivered to the enterprise/IDC network BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic filter lists to routers Internet Service Provider Network Enterprise or IDC Bots Victim  RFC 5575;Selectively drop traffic flows based on L3/L4 information FlowSpec Anomaly traffic Normal traffic BGP FlowSpec FlowSpec
  • 24. Infrastructure Security Cloud-based mitigation w/ OOP cleaning Suspicious traffic is diverted at the SP network edge Divert victim prefix traffic via BGP Internet Service Provider Network Enterprise or IDC Bots Victim  The "Cleaning Centre" is typically a shared resource in the network infrastructure to reduce the deployment costs Malicious traffic Benign traffic BGP announcement Cleaned traffic tunnelled back DPI-capable mitigation appliance (application-layer attack, asymmetric detection) Cleaning Centre No impacts to other traffic to other networks
  • 25. Infrastructure Security xFlow-based OOP solution value proposition
  • 26. Flow Technology Network Resource Impact Issues  NetFlow data volume? 1K FPS ≒ 338K bps NetFlow traffic  However, to estimate Flows/ second based on the given network traffic bps is a much more complex task!  Typically 1~4% link rate  Leverage data reduction techniques:  Partial coverage (i.e. a few POPs, selective boundaries)  Tune the active & inactive timeouts  Flow Sampling  In addition to the data volume, 'full NetFlow’ may inflict a burden on memory and router CPU intensive. Therefore sampled xFlow is preferred… Flow/sec Pkt/sec Byte/sec bps 1,000 33 49,500 338.37K
  • 27. Flow Technology Flow Sampling  To alleviate the performance penalty incurred by turning on xFlow on routers  Allow users to sample one out of every “N” IP packets being forwarded (a user can configure the “N” interval)  Substantially decreases the CPU utilization needed to account for Flow packets  CPU utilization varies, depending on the sampling rate and the routers  Example:  Cisco 12000 Series Router to handle 65K flows  In “full-flow” mode required 24% more CPU; the same router using 1:100 sampling required only 3% additional CPU  Cisco 7500 Router
  • 28.
  • 29. References  Yann Berthier, "NetFlow to guard the infrastructure," NANOG 39, 2007  Thomas Telkamp, “Best Practices for Determining the Traffic Matrix in IP Networks V 3.0,” NANOG 39, 2007  Richard A Steenbergen, "A Guide to Peering on the Internet," NANOG 51, 2011  William B. Norton, " A Business Case for Peering in 2010," http://drpeering.net/white-papers/A-Business-Case-For-Peering.php  RFC 5575, Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules  Leonardo Serodio, "Traffic Diversion Techniques for DDoS Mitigation using BGP Flowspec," NANOG 58, 2013  Cisco Systems Inc., "NetFlow Performance Analysis," 2007