The document discusses the pull factors that attract young people to join terrorist organizations like the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, using it as a case study. It argues that there are both ideational and material pull factors. Ideationally, terrorist groups use radical religious ideologies to attract youth and give their lives meaning. Materially, they offer monetary rewards, supplies, and support to families to entice impoverished youth. The Abu Sayyaf Group initially grew due to the charismatic preaching of its founder but later resorted more to kidnapping-for-ransom activities to fund recruitment through financial incentives as ideological fervor waned. Understanding these pull factors is important for counterterrorism policy.
This presentation elaborates on how terrorism has gain currency in Cameroon. A brief idea on the regional and institutional approach on the issue and the answers to the question, if Cameroon can defeat Boko-Haram?
In the wake of ISIS’ decline in Syria and Iraq, the African Union warned in December 2017 that some 6,000 (former) ISIS fighters could return to the continent. This warning comes at a time when counterterrorism (CT) in Africa is starting to yield some positive dividends, especially in Western Africa. In the Lake Chad Basin Area, the Multinational Joint Task Force comprising of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin have succeeded in dispersing Boko Haram factions, and in putting the Islamist militants on the defensive. In the Sahel-Sahara, the G5-Sahel Joint Force, a regional response initiative made up of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad, and buoyed by some 4,000 French troops and a plethora of security actors have unsettled the region’s various Islamist groups. In each of these cases, extremist groups have lost significant territorial and ideological control, and have resorted to sporadic attacks organised with little coordination. Returning ISIS fighters might however complicate and or reverse these CT efforts. This presentation looks at the ways in which ISIS’ decline and returning fighters may impact CT and de-radicalisation in Western Africa. It also provides some countermeasures for consideration by policy makers.
This presentation elaborates on how terrorism has gain currency in Cameroon. A brief idea on the regional and institutional approach on the issue and the answers to the question, if Cameroon can defeat Boko-Haram?
In the wake of ISIS’ decline in Syria and Iraq, the African Union warned in December 2017 that some 6,000 (former) ISIS fighters could return to the continent. This warning comes at a time when counterterrorism (CT) in Africa is starting to yield some positive dividends, especially in Western Africa. In the Lake Chad Basin Area, the Multinational Joint Task Force comprising of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin have succeeded in dispersing Boko Haram factions, and in putting the Islamist militants on the defensive. In the Sahel-Sahara, the G5-Sahel Joint Force, a regional response initiative made up of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad, and buoyed by some 4,000 French troops and a plethora of security actors have unsettled the region’s various Islamist groups. In each of these cases, extremist groups have lost significant territorial and ideological control, and have resorted to sporadic attacks organised with little coordination. Returning ISIS fighters might however complicate and or reverse these CT efforts. This presentation looks at the ways in which ISIS’ decline and returning fighters may impact CT and de-radicalisation in Western Africa. It also provides some countermeasures for consideration by policy makers.
Ethical Leadership for Nigeria’s Development: An Ibibio Virtue Ethics ApproachAJHSSR Journal
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to show the application of Ibibio (African) ethics in solving major
moral problems in Nigeria's leadership crisis. In Ibibio traditional society, the shared norms are what define the
culture of the Ibibio people. Prohibitions concerning issues like stealing, embezzlement of public funds, and
corruption, among others attract societal disapproval and punishment, serving as a deterrent to others and thus
engendering positive values through abstention. What held the nation back and has continued to do so is rooted
in the lack of ethical leadership. The greatest issue in leadership in Africa, particularly Nigeria, is that of moral
bankruptcy - a complete lack of ethics and ethical principles among leaders. African ethics was employed to
achieve the purpose of the paper. This work argues that the non-existence of ethics in leadership promotes
unethical behaviour among leaders and followers such as the present condition of uncommon looting and
corruption in the country. This paper concludes that sustainable development would be illusive unless there is a
paradigm shift from the present self-centred leadership paradigm to African ethics and principles as exemplified
in Ibibio ethical leadership.
Terrorist incidents and attacks against Jews and Israelis in the United State...Juval Aviv
Analyzing Five Decades of Incidents, Study Finds Synagogues Most Frequent Location of Attacks Against Jewish Community
New York (December 12, 2016) -- A pioneering analysis of attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in the United States has found the severity of incidents has risen in recent years. The Community Security Service (CSS), a leading Jewish security organization in the United States, partnered with Yehudit Barsky, a counterterrorism expert, to conduct the study, entitled Terrorist Incidents and Attacks Against Jews and Israelis in the United States, 1969-2016. The report is an examination of the 104 most serious attacks and terrorist acts against Jews and Israelis in the US from 1969 through the present, out of the thousands of more general anti-semitic incidents and hate crimes that occur annually.
Assessing ISIS: Success or Failure of Islamist Insurgenciesinventionjournals
Assessing the current and long-term success of the Islamist insurgent group, the “Islamic State” (hereafter “ISIS”), requires not only identifying prerequisites for conducting insurgency but also assessing the group’s ability to attain the goals proclaimed by its ideology or program. Such success or failure can be determined by a systematic comparison with other Islamist insurgent groups which have either failed or succeeded in achieving their stated objectives. Examining the historical and theological backgrounds of movements, such as al Qaeda and Hezbollah, reveals that success requires having visible leadership openly controlling a territory and providing security and social services to its population. The importance of territorial control, a social-political infrastructure, and external legitimation is demonstrated by the relative success of groups enjoying Iranian support, such as Hezbollah, over Islamist groups following the non-state strategy of al Qaeda. ISIS has a visible leadership openly controlling a territory and providing at least minimal security and social services to its population but lacking belligerent status and having rejected alliances with like-minded Salafist groups sharing most of its goals. Another essential but often overlooked condition for success for militant Islamist movements is the endorsement of the traditional Muslim Ulema as guardians of the Islamic faith.
Fanaticism and Barbarism: Synonyms of Dysfunctionality in Nigeria Todaypaperpublications3
Abstract: Civility is the language of decency, moderation, honesty, truthfulness, justice, equity, tolerance, mutual understanding, dialogue and mutual responsibility for the development of any society. There are other associated values and virtues, which are imbedded in the cultivation of civility in a polity such as patience and forgiveness. On the other hand, it renounces violence, coercion, destruction of life and property, as well as fanaticism and barbarism in every aspect of societal life. It denounces corruption and disorder. In fact, civility is antithetical to anarchy and lawlessness. But the reality of the Nigerian society manifests a total opposition to all the aforementioned virtues towards development and progress, especially with the current threats of Boko Haram and other political manipulations of the economy. It is in the light of this fact that the paper considers various acts of fanaticism and barbarism inflicted on the country, thus, challenging the sustainability of Nigeria as a nation.
Moving Forward with Mobile Capture: The Whats, Whys, and HowsSteve Weissman
Much breath, blood, and ink has been expended recently to identify and describe the opportunities surrounding the use of mobile technology to capture information. Much less, however, has been directed toward explaining just how you are to go about getting this done!
This presentation, first delivered at the 2013 Document Strategy Forum, explores many of the key practical realities associated with actually achieving success. Viewers will learn/validate/confirm the organizational dynamics that are driving realizations toward mobile capture in the first place, understand the leading options for actually inputting the content, and recognize how the technology may change your current processes.
Ethical Leadership for Nigeria’s Development: An Ibibio Virtue Ethics ApproachAJHSSR Journal
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to show the application of Ibibio (African) ethics in solving major
moral problems in Nigeria's leadership crisis. In Ibibio traditional society, the shared norms are what define the
culture of the Ibibio people. Prohibitions concerning issues like stealing, embezzlement of public funds, and
corruption, among others attract societal disapproval and punishment, serving as a deterrent to others and thus
engendering positive values through abstention. What held the nation back and has continued to do so is rooted
in the lack of ethical leadership. The greatest issue in leadership in Africa, particularly Nigeria, is that of moral
bankruptcy - a complete lack of ethics and ethical principles among leaders. African ethics was employed to
achieve the purpose of the paper. This work argues that the non-existence of ethics in leadership promotes
unethical behaviour among leaders and followers such as the present condition of uncommon looting and
corruption in the country. This paper concludes that sustainable development would be illusive unless there is a
paradigm shift from the present self-centred leadership paradigm to African ethics and principles as exemplified
in Ibibio ethical leadership.
Terrorist incidents and attacks against Jews and Israelis in the United State...Juval Aviv
Analyzing Five Decades of Incidents, Study Finds Synagogues Most Frequent Location of Attacks Against Jewish Community
New York (December 12, 2016) -- A pioneering analysis of attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in the United States has found the severity of incidents has risen in recent years. The Community Security Service (CSS), a leading Jewish security organization in the United States, partnered with Yehudit Barsky, a counterterrorism expert, to conduct the study, entitled Terrorist Incidents and Attacks Against Jews and Israelis in the United States, 1969-2016. The report is an examination of the 104 most serious attacks and terrorist acts against Jews and Israelis in the US from 1969 through the present, out of the thousands of more general anti-semitic incidents and hate crimes that occur annually.
Assessing ISIS: Success or Failure of Islamist Insurgenciesinventionjournals
Assessing the current and long-term success of the Islamist insurgent group, the “Islamic State” (hereafter “ISIS”), requires not only identifying prerequisites for conducting insurgency but also assessing the group’s ability to attain the goals proclaimed by its ideology or program. Such success or failure can be determined by a systematic comparison with other Islamist insurgent groups which have either failed or succeeded in achieving their stated objectives. Examining the historical and theological backgrounds of movements, such as al Qaeda and Hezbollah, reveals that success requires having visible leadership openly controlling a territory and providing security and social services to its population. The importance of territorial control, a social-political infrastructure, and external legitimation is demonstrated by the relative success of groups enjoying Iranian support, such as Hezbollah, over Islamist groups following the non-state strategy of al Qaeda. ISIS has a visible leadership openly controlling a territory and providing at least minimal security and social services to its population but lacking belligerent status and having rejected alliances with like-minded Salafist groups sharing most of its goals. Another essential but often overlooked condition for success for militant Islamist movements is the endorsement of the traditional Muslim Ulema as guardians of the Islamic faith.
Fanaticism and Barbarism: Synonyms of Dysfunctionality in Nigeria Todaypaperpublications3
Abstract: Civility is the language of decency, moderation, honesty, truthfulness, justice, equity, tolerance, mutual understanding, dialogue and mutual responsibility for the development of any society. There are other associated values and virtues, which are imbedded in the cultivation of civility in a polity such as patience and forgiveness. On the other hand, it renounces violence, coercion, destruction of life and property, as well as fanaticism and barbarism in every aspect of societal life. It denounces corruption and disorder. In fact, civility is antithetical to anarchy and lawlessness. But the reality of the Nigerian society manifests a total opposition to all the aforementioned virtues towards development and progress, especially with the current threats of Boko Haram and other political manipulations of the economy. It is in the light of this fact that the paper considers various acts of fanaticism and barbarism inflicted on the country, thus, challenging the sustainability of Nigeria as a nation.
Moving Forward with Mobile Capture: The Whats, Whys, and HowsSteve Weissman
Much breath, blood, and ink has been expended recently to identify and describe the opportunities surrounding the use of mobile technology to capture information. Much less, however, has been directed toward explaining just how you are to go about getting this done!
This presentation, first delivered at the 2013 Document Strategy Forum, explores many of the key practical realities associated with actually achieving success. Viewers will learn/validate/confirm the organizational dynamics that are driving realizations toward mobile capture in the first place, understand the leading options for actually inputting the content, and recognize how the technology may change your current processes.
REpresentational State Transfer (REST) is a style of software architecture for distributed systems such as the World Wide Web. REST has emerged as a predominant web API design model.
International terrorism scope, causes and the role of education in combating ...SARON MESSEMBE OBIA
The global dimension of international security and violence has stimulated the rise of youth in the world and Africa in particular. The focus is no longer on policing terrorism, but rather understanding the mutations and how education can help combat terrorism.
The Radicalisation and Recruitment game_ How Terrorist and Violent Extremist ...Cecilia Polizzi
In this Q&A discussion, our Chief Executive Officer, Cecilia Polizzi, addressed crucial issues of concern. The topics explored included the growing online radicalization among children, an evaluation of the UK's Prevent program, and the challenges facing children within the Sahel region.
The Islamic State in Central African and the Centrality of Children in its Ex...Cecilia Polizzi
Violent extremist threats in Central Africa have been on the rise in recent years. The Allied Democratic Forces, an Islamist rebel group, established increasing ideological, financial, and operational ties with the Islamic State. This association also reflects in ADF/ ISCAP's increasing rate of child recruitment and use. In this report, our fellow Guillaume Soto-Mayor offers in-depth insights into the ADF/ISCAP's trajectory, strategies, and potential impacts in Central Africa and raises awareness of the need to address child protection risks across the region.
The Islamic State in Central Africa and the Centrality of Children in its Exp...Cecilia Polizzi
Last month, ADF militants stormed a school in Uganda in a tragic attack that resulted in the deaths of over 40 people, and more students were abducted.
In this analysis, our fellow Guillaume Soto-Mayor traces the trajectory of the ADF, and exposes firmly established ideological, financial, and operational links with the Islamic State.
An increase in the rate of child recruitment and use at the hands of ADF/ISCAP has significant implications. It coincides with the group's adoption of a Salafi-jihadi ideological stance, methods, and purposes of territorial expansionism and poses serious threats to the safety and rights of children and security in the region.
The Islamic State in Central Africa and the Centrality of Children in its Exp...Cecilia Polizzi
Last month, ADF militants stormed a school in Uganda in a tragic attack that resulted in the deaths of over 40 people, and more students were abducted.
In this analysis, our fellow Guillaume Soto-Mayor traces the trajectory of the ADF, and exposes firmly established ideological, financial, and operational links with the Islamic State.
An increase in the rate of child recruitment and use at the hands of ADF/ISCAP has significant implications. It coincides with the group's adoption of a Salafi-jihadi ideological stance, methods, and purposes of territorial expansionism and poses serious threats to the safety and rights of children and security in the region.
Children Affected by the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: Guidelines on the Preven...Cecilia Polizzi
The 2023 Children Affected by the Foreign Fighter Phenomenon (CAFF) Series aims to provide insight and advice for states, professionals, practitioners, and other relevant stakeholders. The CAFF expounds the trajectory of child involvement with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in relation to the foreign fighter phenomenon and the life-cycle of the present scenario, offering solutions across sectors and disciplines and tackling the full range of issues it exerts. It encompasses key themes such as online safety, the Al-Hol crisis, repatriation, reintegration and rehabilitation, and offers four sets of Guidelines.
This line of effort by the CRTG Working Group proposes comprehensive, integrated and multi-faceted approaches to progress towards sustainable and meaningful solutions to the prolonged child protection and security crisis stemming from the issue of foreign fighters. Central to CAFF is ensuring that human rights, the rule of law, and children’s rights remain at the forefront throughout the development and implementation of interventions and programs.
These syntheses of accumulated experience and expertise on selected themes provide comprehensive, detailed, and nuanced overviews of their subject matter. The present Guidelines initiate this line of thematic work by the CRTG Working Group in a very important area - the online ecosystem of terrorism and violent extremism. It is the result of CRTG Working Group specialized knowledge and draws from a CRTG Working Group-led technical session with Ms. Hallie Stern, Founder and Director of Mad Mirror Media, and Mr. Ardian Shajkovci, Co-Founder and Director of the American Counterterrorism Targeting and Resilience Institute, concerned with preventing and mitigating harms against children in the digital sphere. Thus, acknowledging how ISIL and other terrorist and violent extremist actors exploit technological innovation, social media, and the Internet to entice, mobilize, recruit and radicalize children and seeking to enable appropriate responses, guaranteeing online safety and a secure online experience for all children and young people.
Prevention of Radicalization on Social Media and the Internet in this Digital...Cecilia Polizzi
I am glad to share the first volume of the 2023 Children Affected by the Foreign Fighter phenomenon (CAFF) series. The CAFF is an undertaking by the CRTG Working Group expounding the trajectory of child involvement with the Islamic State in relation to the foreign fighter phenomenon and offering solutions across sectors and disciplines.
The present Guidelines initiate this line of thematic work in a very important area - the online ecosystem of terrorism and violent extremism. The Recommendations are categorized into three distinct sections, specifically designed to cater to the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders, including digital communications technology providers, policymakers, and non-professionals.
PREVENT Project: The Targeting of Children by Boko HaramCecilia Polizzi
Boko Haram insurgents abducted 276 girls from a school in Nigeria 10 years ago, sparking global outrage and the #BringBackOurGirls campaign.
Today, 89 girls remain missing, and 30 children were recently kidnapped in Katsina State. These events highlight ongoing challenges in securing the release of abducted children and the persistent threat of violent groups in the region.
The CRTG Working Group, monitors terrorist targeting of children in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, understanding the strategic purposes behind such abductions.
Download the report here https://t.ly/iJdyf
Running head INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS .docxcowinhelen
Running head: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 1
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 5
Internal and External Stakeholders
Tiara Miller
Strayer University
CRJ 499
4/29/16
Internal and External Stakeholders
Identify the Internal and External Stakeholders.
Internal stakeholders are the people who the individuals and the parties of a certain organization in a country while the external stakeholders are the individuals or the groups of people that are not part of an organization, but they are directly affected by the activities of that organization (Henisz, 2014). In this context regarding to terrorism, the internal stakeholders are the people who are involved in the criminal groups that organize and conduct the terrorist activities such as mass killing, raping, bombing buildings and other nasty activities in order to change some laws that are in operation in a certain country or as a result of the religious differences. External stakeholders, on the other hand, can be attributed to the loyal citizens of a country who are innocent but end up being affected by the activities conducted by these terroristic activities. The external stakeholders also include the children and women who are not part of the terrorist activities, but they get to suffer as a result of the humiliating and the negative activities that are performed by the terrorists in these organizations leaving them as orphans and widows when their fathers and their husbands respectively die.
Discuss how internal or external stakeholders have influenced the situation in a positive or negative way?
One of the ways in which the internal stakeholders in the terrorist groups have influenced the situation of the continuously increasing terrorists’ activities in the different countries is that once the parents of the children have been killed, the terrorist groups takes up the helpless kids. When the victims of terrorism die, the terrorists take their helpless children and induct them in their vices. For example in the country of Somali, the Al Shabaab abducts the children left by the parents behind after their death and takes them in their hideouts. It is in these places that they train them and introduce them to the terrorist group. This increases the instances of terrorism due to the increased manpower to conduct the inhuman activities leading to so much suffering on the loyal citizens in the country.
The other way in which the stakeholders have influenced the situation negatively is that some of the external stakeholders find it a pleasure to support the al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups by giving them the finances to support their activities. The support given to these groups fuel their inhuman activities since it becomes easy for them t attain the amount of funds that they require purchasing the ammunitions that they require using for the bombing activities ...
A Study Of Terrorism And The Terrorist
Internal Terrorism in India
Hindutva Essay
Worldview On Terrorism : Terrorism
Essay on The War on Terror
Cross Border Terrorism And Kashmir
Essay on Terrorism
Terrorism in India
Counter Terrorism Laws And Human Rights
Essay on Terrorism in the Media
Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism
Right-Wing Extremism: Children´s Perspectives, Policy and Practice.pdfCecilia Polizzi
On April 7, 2022 the CRTG Working Group hosted an Expert Briefing on Violent Right-Wing Extremism: Children ́ s Perspectives, Policy and Practice by Mr. Robert Örell, EU Radicalisation Awareness Network. The purpose of this paper is to offer a series of recommendations to policy-makers and practitioners responsible for preventing and countering child radicalization to Right-Wing Extremism (RWE). This guidance is the result of shared insights, lessons learned, practical examples and policy recommendations from the joint meeting between the CRTG Working Group and Mr. Robert Örell.
This study examined Kwara central undergraduates’ perceived peer pressure
on youths’ involvement in kidnapping. This study was a descriptive survey.
The population comprised of all undergraduates in Kwara Central Senatorial
District. The target population was undergraduates from University of Ilorin
and Alhikmah University, 500 students were randomly selected. A researcher
design questionnaire was used for data collection while data collected were
analyzed using frequency and percentage, mean, standard deviation (SD),
ranking T-test and one-way analysis of variance. Research hypotheses were
tested using independent T-test and also one-way analysis of variance at 0.05
level of significance. Findings revealed that peer pressure influences youth
involvement in kidnapping in Nigeria; there was no significant difference in
the influence of peer pressure on youth’s involvement in kidnapping as
perceived by undergraduates based on academic level and school type. It was
concluded that peer pressure influences youths’ involvement in kidnapping in
Nigeria. We recommend both school and home adequate monitoring of
students peers and friends at home and schools to prevent them from bad
groups, adequate legislation to curb youth participation in kidnapping, good
leadership examples for young ones to emulate and value reorientation of
youths should be given top priority in educational curriculum.
Upsurge of Money Ritual among Youths in Nigeria and National SecurityYogeshIJTSRD
This study examines the threat of money ritual among youths in Nigeria, a subject that has received little or no sufficient academic attention and it socio political and national under pinning have largely been ignored in state responses. The apparent downward trend in socio economic greediness and quest for material possession, have led to increase in the number of youth using fetish practices to come to term with prevailing socio economic demands. The focus of this paper therefore is to critically analyze the upsurge of money ritual among youths in Nigeria. Pivoting the theoretical framework of the study on Robert .K. Merton’s anomie strain theory, to the effect that “Innovation†in which goals are pursued but legitimate means is eliminated, and illegitimate means is created and used. The paper concludes that money ritual is a threat to national security and therefore, recommends among others, provision of employment opportunities to jobless youth, effective policies to combat the scourge of poverty, address the widening gap of inequality, and reward core value of honesty and hard work review of security architects. Saka-Olokungboye, N | Fapetu, O. V | Agbi Nelson | Ologun, C. A "Upsurge of Money Ritual among Youths in Nigeria and National Security" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-5 | Issue-3 , April 2021, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd38664.pdf Paper URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/sociology/38664/upsurge-of-money-ritual-among-youths-in-nigeria-and-national-security/sakaolokungboye-n
Updates on Threats of Violent Extremism in the PhilippinesRommel Banlaoi
Lecture delivered at a Public Forum on Violent Extremism organized by the Department of International Studies and International Studies Society of Miriam College on 11 March 2019.
Marawi City Siege and Threats of Narcoterrorism in the PhilippinesRommel Banlaoi
Threats of narcoterrorism have received very serious attention in the Philippine when the Philippine government under the administration of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte vigorously raised the menace in the aftermath of the 2 September 2016 Davao City bombing and the 23 May 2017 Marawi City siege. Though narcoterrorism has been a global problem since the 1980s, it takes almost four decades for the Philippine government to realize the gravity of this threat only in the aftermath of the siege of Marawi City by armed groups claiming to be part of the Islamic State (IS), more known initially as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As a result, the Duterte Administration securitized narcoterrorism in his National Security Policy 2017-2022 and National Security Strategy 2018 declaring drugs and terrorism as national security threats.
As a concept, narcoterrorism remains to be very nebulous. As a threat, it arguably presents panoply of complex security challenges for law enforcement not only for the Philippines but also for the international community.
Other countries have been combating narcoterrorism for years with mixed results and unintended consequences. Based on great lessons learned from exemplary practices of other countries and cognizant of the Philippines’ own unique situations and experiences, the Duterte government needs to develop a more humane and socially responsible innovative anti-narcoterrorism approach that applies not only a strong law enforcement but also a decisive treatment through rehabilitation and care.
01062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
03062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
04062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
Here is Gabe Whitley's response to my defamation lawsuit for him calling me a rapist and perjurer in court documents.
You have to read it to believe it, but after you read it, you won't believe it. And I included eight examples of defamatory statements/
El Puerto de Algeciras continúa un año más como el más eficiente del continente europeo y vuelve a situarse en el “top ten” mundial, según el informe The Container Port Performance Index 2023 (CPPI), elaborado por el Banco Mundial y la consultora S&P Global.
El informe CPPI utiliza dos enfoques metodológicos diferentes para calcular la clasificación del índice: uno administrativo o técnico y otro estadístico, basado en análisis factorial (FA). Según los autores, esta dualidad pretende asegurar una clasificación que refleje con precisión el rendimiento real del puerto, a la vez que sea estadísticamente sólida. En esta edición del informe CPPI 2023, se han empleado los mismos enfoques metodológicos y se ha aplicado un método de agregación de clasificaciones para combinar los resultados de ambos enfoques y obtener una clasificación agregada.
An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
1. THE PULL OF TERRORISM:
A PHILIPPINE CASE STUDY
Rommel C. Banlaoi
ABSTRACT
ere are many explanations on why young persons join terrorist organisations.
One focuses on pull factors that strongly draw the youth to enter organisations that
promote political violence and terrorism. ese pull factors maybe ideational or
material and are utilised by a terrorist organisation through an effective recruitment
strategy. Examining the Abu Sayyaf Group, a terrorist organisation operating in
the Philippines, this study argues that a nuanced understanding of these pull
factors are essential for a comprehensive grasp of terrorist threats emanating from
this group and for the formulation of an effective counterterrorism policy.
Introduction
All terrorist organisations have many ways in which they manage to
draw people to their side. ey have “magnets” to attract members, especially
young recruits, to join their groups.
But the processes by which young persons are pulled to join terrorist
organisations are not yet widely understood in the academe, policy-making
world, the media and the broader public. ough existing scholarly literature
on terrorism have already identified several pull factors of terrorism (Sobek
and Braithwaite, 2005), none of these, however, may be applied generally
to all terrorist organisations because the behaviors of terrorist groups vary
from country to country (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002).
Some terrorist groups may have shared common experiences that cut across
national boundaries. But vigorous social science investigations indicate that
behaviors of terrorist organisations differ in historical context, socio-cultural
milieu, politico-economic setting, specific intentions, exact targets, and
even particular tactics (Davis and Cragin 2009; Cordes, et. al., 1985). us,
grappling with the pull of terrorist is better understood on a case-to-case
basis.
SEARCCT 39
2. ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
is paper is an attempt to describe the processes by which young
persons are pulled to join terrorist groups, using the Philippines as a
case study; this paper examines the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a terrorist
organisation operating largely in the Southern Philippines, concentrating on
ASG’s recruitment methods and strategies in pulling the youth to become
involved in terrorist activities.
is paper contends that there are ideational and material factors
that pull the youth to join the ASG. A nuanced understanding of these
ideational and material pull factors are essential for a comprehensive grasp
of the ASG threat and for the formulation of a policy to counter the threat
posed by this terrorist group.
e Pull Factors of Terrorism
ere are many factors that pull young people to terrorist groups.
ese pull factors can be ideational and material, that are mutually
reinforcing. Ideational factors may be in the form of ideology endorsed
by a certain religious belief, philosophical perspective or cultural outlook.
Material factors, on the hand, may be in the form of monetary inducements,
logistical assistance, perks and other financial benefits. ese pull factors are
best utilised with an effective recruitment strategy by a terrorist group to
increase its membership and to keep the organisation alive.
Ideational Pull
A particular study on terrorism has shown that the major pull factor
that draws young persons towards terrorist acts is ideology (Ginges, 1997).
Ideology is deemed to be the main ideational pull mechanism “that makes
possible the translation of discontent into specific political goals” of young
individuals being lured to join terrorist groups (Ibid). It is posited that
ideologies are “important organizers of experience and act as moral codes
and motivations for actions” of young recruits (Ibid). It is further argued that
in the assessment of the perceived benefits of, and motivations for, terrorist
acts of the youth, deeply understanding the virulent ideology of terrorist
groups is essential (Ibid). Ideology provides meaning to the emptiness felt
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3. THE PULL OF TERRORIST:
A PHILIPPINE CASE STUDY
by young people and defines their “reasons for existence”. One study even
asserts ideology is a great pull of terrorist in attracting young people, to
with:
e young people don’t know why they exist…they suffer from an
emptiness of meaning…[hu]man is more than (an) ensemble of
material needs, that he is in truth a spiritual being, which means
he has essential spiritual needs, which are even not approximately
recognized nor understood, let alone satisfied…the atmosphere
in which today’s terrorists have grown up…they feel powerless
(Quoted in Ibid. See Billig, 1985).
e profile of youths joining terrorist organisations through ideological
motivations is that of mostly students, young professionals and learned
individuals recruited from schools, universities and working places. Ideology
is a pull factor in the radicalisation of a small but significant minority of
young persons dissatisfied with the society in which they find themselves
(European Commission’s Experts Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2008).
Radical ideology introduces the youth to violent ideas that eventually lead
them to enter terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.
Material Pull
While ideology is indeed a pull factor in terrorism, there are young
recruits who are induced to join terrorist groups not because of ideology but
largely due to material considerations. Young persons succumbing to this
pull are mostly out-of-school youth in depressed areas or communities where
poverty is pervasive and the rate of illiteracy is high. ese types of young
persons are induced to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism
through the lure of money, arms, and material needs of their families and
loved ones. Terrorist groups buy the loyalties of their young recruits through
tangible inducements in the form of money, perks, arms and other concrete
benefits. ese young members are made to work as combatants, bombers,
lookouts, mules, or to be simply errant persons (Homeland Security Institute,
2009).
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4. ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
e Pull of Recruitment
ough a terrorist organisation has an ideology and material resources
with which to entice young people to join, a well-planned recruitment
strategy is also a crucial pull factor. Without a systematic recruitment
strategy, a terrorist group cannot efficiently or automatically pull the youth
to its side.
Recruitment strategies of terrorist groups can be classified into two:
benign strategy and coercive strategy.
A benign strategy utilises persuasive tools to entice recruits to
join a terrorist group. is kind of recruitment strategy allows terrorist
organizations to actively reach out to the youth by visiting them in schools,
youth camps, refugee areas, boarding houses and even amusement places
(Homeland Security Institute 2009). Terrorist organisations deliberately
spot young persons and radicalise them through the convincing power of
ideology or, in most cases, through material inducements, if the ideological
indoctrination fails.
A coercive strategy, on the other hand, uses “threat” and “fear”
factors to get young persons to join terrorist groups. In such cases a terrorist
organisation forces young persons into membership by threatening to kill
them and their families if they do not join. ere are cases where young
persons are kidnapped and forced to commit terrorist acts against their will
(Ibid). ere are also cases where young sisters of persons associated with
terrorist groups who are forced to marry young male members and thus
becoming new members. Terrorist groups resort to this coercive recruitment
strategy as a desperate measure to keep the organisation alive, particularly in
the context of dwindling membership.
e Abu Sayyaf Case
e ASG is an excellent case, in the Philippines, to examine the
processes by which young persons are pulled to enter terrorist organisations.
e ASG is listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United
States (US) and an active International Terrorist Organization (ITO) by the
United Nations (UN). Because of its involvements in kidnap-for-ransom
activities, Philippine law enforcement authorities regard the ASG as a mere
bandit group (Banlaoi, 2006).
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5. THE PULL OF TERRORIST:
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ere are conflicting narratives on the origin of ASG (Santos and
Dinampo, 2010, Banlaoi, 2009, Manalo, 2004, Gunaratna, 2001, Tan,
2000, Turner, 1995). It is even argued that the ASG had a very nebulous
beginning (Gloria, 2000).
But a more nuanced analysis of the evolution of the ASG indicates
that the group started as an Islamic propagation group organised by Ustad
Abdurajak Janjalani who earned popularity in Basilan, Sulo and Zamboanga
City in the 1980s for his very charismatic preaching. is Islamic propagation
group was known as Jamaa Tableegh, a local version of Tabligh Jammaat
that originated in Pakistan where Abdurajak Janjalani received most of his
religious training. In 1989, the military and the media described this group
as Abu Sayyaf ’s group because Janjalani used the nom de guerre Abu Sayyaf
in honor of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of Afghanistan.
ASG’s Ideological Pull
Abdurajak Janjalani recruited many followers in Zamboanga City,
Basilan, Sulo and Tawi-Tawi (ZAMBASULTA) because of his powerful
sermons or Khutbahs that expressed his mastery of Salafi faith or Wahhabi
ideology. Janjalani used Salafism and Wahhabism to analyse the state of
Islam in Mindanao and the situation of Muslim people in the Southern
Philippines. Janjalani was able to pull young Muslims in Mindanao to join
him through the power of Wahhabi ideology that he preached in various
mosques.
From initial followers of almost 100 in Basilan in 1989, the group
grew to almost 300 in 1990 when disgruntled members of Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) in Sulo and Tawi-Tawi joined him. Janjalani, who
was once a member of the MNLF, also convinced young MNLF followers to
join him, until his group reached a membership of almost 1,000 in 1991. It
was during this year that Janjalani’s group mounted its first terrorist attack:
the 1991 bombing of M/V Doulous, a Christian-owned ship propagating
Christian faith (Banlaoi, 2007). Janjalani using the name of his “Abu Sayyaf
Group claimed responsibility for this bombing”. is earned the ire of the
Philippines military and police that erroneously described the group as
Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) in several intelligence
reports.
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6. ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
Janjalani was able to win the hearts and minds of former MNLF
fighters and other young Moros because he offered an alternative ideology
that effectively touched the sentiments and aspirations of Muslims in
Mindanao. In his inner-circle, he recruited younger and more passionate
Muslim leaders who studied Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, Libya,
Pakistan and Egypt. ese young Muslim leaders had a common reproof of
the MNLF, which had entered into a peace agreement with the Philippine
government in 1996. ese leaders also shared common anger against the
so-called Christian-dominated Philippine government based in what they
called “Imperial Manila”.
Because he had garnered a significant number of followers, in 1993
Janjalani named his group Al-Harakatul Al Islamiyyah (AHAI) or the Islamic
Movement. Within this movement, Janjalani formed a consultative group
called Majilis Shura, which officially proclaimed the foundation of AHAI in
1994 during its First Assembly.
On 18 November 1994, amidst heavy speculation that the ASG
was created by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Abu Abdu Said, then spokesman of the group,
issued a document called Surat Kasabunnal or “A Voice of Truth” (Tan,
2003). is document vehemently denounced the view that the AFP or the
CIA created the ASG. It argued that the ASG started as a movement called
Juma’a Abu Sayyaf.
By 1998, the ASG reached a membership of around 1,300. But the
momentum of increasing membership was cut short when Abdurajak Janjalani
was killed in a firefight with the police in Lamitan, Basilan in December 1998.
But before he died, Janjalani delivered eight radical ideological discourses
called Khutbahs, which may be considered as primary sources of Janjalani’s
radical Islamic ideology (Banlaoi, 2009). ese discourses explained
Janjalani’s Quranic perspective of Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah, which he lamented
was misinterpreted by many Muslims. He even denounced the ulama
(Muslim scholars) for their limited knowledge of the Quran and lamented
that most Muslims in the Philippines, calling themselves Moros, were not
really practicing Islam in its true form compared to Muslims in West Asia.
ese eight discourses also revealed Janjalani’s deep grasp of Wahabi Islam,
which considered non-Wahabi Muslims heretical. e Islamic theology of
Wahabism greatly informed Janjalani’s radical ideology, and that attracted
young Moros to join him (Ibid).
44 SEARCCT
7. THE PULL OF TERRORIST:
A PHILIPPINE CASE STUDY
ASG’s Material Pull
e death of Abdurajak Janjalani, however, marked the waning of
the ideological luster of the ASG. With no ideological beacon to unify the
group, the ASG became factionalised. Some factions degenerated into bandit
groups engaged in predatory activities like kidnap-for-ransom activities
(KRA), smuggling operations of arms and drugs, and extortion activities.
Lacking the ideology to win the hearts and minds of members, ASG leaders
in the post-Janjalani period resorted to material inducements to buy loyalties
and recruit new members.
Khadaffy Janjalani, the younger brother who replaced the founder,
did not have the ideological zeal of the older brother. Being young and
gullible, Khadaffy was even manipulated by more criminally-minded ASG
commanders like Galib Andang (Commander Robot) and Abu Sabaya. e
bandit factions of the ASG led by Commander Robot and Abu Sabaya thus
ruled the ASG. ough Khadaffy attempted to revive the Islamist agenda
of the ASG by concentrating on ideological propagation, his death in 2006
thwarted this goal.
During the leadership of Khadaffy, the ASG went into a KRA
spree. In 2000-2001 alone, the ASG was involved in 140 KRA incidents
that resulted in the death of 16 victims (Abuza, 2005). e biggest KRA
project of the ASG was the Sipadan kidnapping incident of 2000, led by
Commander Robot, which involved a ransom of US$25 million, offered by
Libyan President Muammar Khadaffy as “development aid”. With such huge
money being involved, young impoverished Moros lined-up for membership
in the ASG. Some parents even offered their sons as volunteers for the ASG
with the expectation of financial payment.
In 2000, the ASG reached a membership of more than 1,500
according to military estimates. But insiders claimed that ASG followers
during this period had grown so large that the group could not account
for them anymore. In fact, the ASG acted like “Robin Hood” distributing
part of its loot to local communities. us, the ASG was in turn able to get
support from local communities that gave the group “early warning signals”
and even barricades during military offensives. New younger members were
even paid to work for ASG makeshift camps as second and third layers of
security (Banlaoi, 2008). Parents of young ASG members were issued a
monthly supply of rice and offered monthly financial honorariums ranging
SEARCCT 45
8. ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
from US$100 to US$500. us through material inducements, the ASG
was able pull in members despite the lack of ideological agitation or religious
propaganda.
ASG’s Recruitment Pull
While its benign recruitment method of ideological propaganda
through Islamic propagation was effective during the time of Abdurajak
Janjalani to keep the organisation alive, the ASG had to implement a
combination of benign and coercive recruitment strategy. After Janjalani’s
death, the ASG continued its benign recruitment scheme through the
material inducements discussed above.
However, intensified military operations caused the membership of
the ASG to decline sharply. From more than 1,500 members in 2000, the
ASG membership was reduced to less than 500 in 2005. To recover, the ASG
resorted to coercive methods of recruitment. ASG commanders resorted
to scare tactics like threatening to kill those who refuse to join and their
families. Some ASG commanders even used deception to recruit members,
e.g. making young Muslims carry firearms, taking pictures of them, and
then using the pictures to blackmail the kids into joining the group (Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, undated). ough there are
anecdotal stories of young persons being kidnapped to force them to join
the ASG, these cases have not been properly documented nor vigorously
studied.
Conclusion
Like other terrorist groups around the world, the ASG is a very
adaptive organisation and it is also a very resilient one, whose life depends
on the use of many survival methods in order to replenish its membership
(Banlaoi, 2010). In other words, the ASG is an adaptive adversary. As further
explained by the Homeland Security Institute (2009):
Terrorist groups are adaptive adversaries who use a variety of tools
and tactics to reach potential recruits and supporters, which too
46 SEARCCT
9. THE PULL OF TERRORIST:
A PHILIPPINE CASE STUDY
often include young persons. Groups systematically prey upon
the vulnerabilities of youth in various contexts, offering a range
of incentives that are intended to make membership in the group
attractive. In some cases, young persons have also been forcibly
recruited or deceived into participating in terrorist activities.
To sum up, terrorist organisations operate through utilising ideational
and material pull factors together with an effective recruitment strategy that
is either benign or coercive. In the case of the ASG, the employment of
different pull factors is context bound. During its earlier period under the
leadership of Janjalani, the power of ideology convinced members to join
the group. But in the post-Janjalani period, particularly under Khadaffy, the
ASG resorted to material inducement to attract members.
At present, there is an attempt to revive the ideological appeal of the
ASG under Yassir Igasan who is currently the Head of ASG’s Sharia Court.
But the majority of ASG commanders at present have degenerated into
bandits. Under this current situation, the pull factors of ASG will largely
emanate from the use of money to attract followers. erefore the crafting
of a counter-terrorism policy must be informed by this present reality.
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